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Summary 
This thesis deals with climate change, technology and reciprocity. Climate change is defined as the 
climatic consequences of human-induced higher atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases1. 
Climate change has a number of adverse impacts, such as more frequent and stronger droughts and 
sea level rise, both of which would threaten people’s livelihoods. These effects can be prevented by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere or sequestering greenhouse gases; this is 
called climate change mitigation. Greenhouse gas emissions have been rising consistently over the 
past decades, and it is projected that they will continue to rise rapidly, leading to potentially catas-
trophic climate change if unabated.  
 
Low-carbon technology is one of the means to mitigate climate change and defined as know-how, 
methods, procedures, experience of successes and failures, physical devices and equipment to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions. Technology thus encompasses hardware, software and orgware. 
For instance, for wind energy technology, the hardware is the wind turbines themselves, software 
could be the human capacity to operate and maintain wind turbines, and orgware could be the 
enabling legislation. 
 
The increasing urgency of climate change evidenced in scientific assessments like the IPCC has 
placed the problem firmly on the international policy agenda. Many countries have adopted miti-
gation commitments and are implementing policies and actions. Despite all this action, it is un-
clear however whether a new international treaty on climate change, envisaged to be agreed in De-
cember 2009 in Copenhagen, will have wide coverage and will be environmentally effective.  
 
A characteristic of successful international agreements is reciprocity – a perceived equivalence of 
benefits between parties to an agreement. This is particularly required for international environ-
mental agreements, where there is no international enforcing entity that can hold parties to their 
promises. Hence, for a successful climate agreement, it is necessary to explore ways of balancing 
benefits between parties. One way, explored in this thesis, would be to agree on low-carbon tech-
nologies directly, rather than indirectly through emission reduction targets and economic incen-
tives. This leads to the central research question: Can technology-oriented agreements provide 
greater reciprocity and thus improve the effectiveness of the international regime for climate 
change mitigation?  
 
From a political economy point of view, a stable climate is a public good, which because of coop-
eration problems is underprovided. Climate change can only be fully addressed through collective 
action of many nations in the world: no country can solve the problem by itself. International co-
operation on climate change, however, is extra difficult because of a deep distributional imbalance: 
the vulnerability for climate change impacts is highest in countries which hold little responsibility 
for the problem, while the cost of mitigating climate change is highest in less affected countries. In 
international relations, such an imbalance is called “asymmetric externalities”, as opposed to sym-
metric externalities, where all parties have a roughly equal stake in the causes and the solutions of 
the problem. The consequence of the climate change problem structure is that countries with high 
greenhouse gas emissions and low climate change damage costs have a strong incentive to free-ride 
on an agreement to reduce emissions. This is the central barrier to international cooperation on 
climate change: a specific agreement to reduce emissions is not in the interest of those countries 
that should most urgently act. 
 
                                                 
1  This is a simplified version of the definition in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: “change of 
climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” 
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The only way of providing countries facing high mitigation costs with incentives to reduce emis-
sions is to give them something in return; in other words, to provide reciprocity. In a feasible in-
ternational agreement, all parties involved should perceive sufficient reciprocity to incur the cost 
of the treaty. This means that reciprocity might have to be higher for those parties with high miti-
gation costs and low climate change impacts. Only if all sides perceive sufficient reciprocity, an 
agreement can be self-reinforcing, i.e., attractive for countries to sign and want to carry out the 
terms of agreement. Self-reinforcing agreements are helpful in any policy, but particularly in inter-
national environmental agreements where no entity exists that can coerce nations to participate or 
comply, for instance through a fine or another intervention.  
 
Agreements on emission reductions do not offer reciprocity to all parties, so there are weak incen-
tives among parties to comply. This became clear as Kyoto Protocol was implemented. The Kyoto 
Protocol is an agreement to reduce emissions, and was agreed despite the distributional character-
istics of climate change. However, the effectiveness and the contribution it has made towards pro-
viding the public good was weakened because of the distributional problem structure. The defect-
ing countries face high costs of mitigation and have economic interests that prevailed over the 
need to reduce emissions.  
 
The Kyoto experience provides lessons for the involvement of emerging developing economies in a 
future climate agreements. Even if only one major industrialised country would defect from the 
future agreement to reduce emissions, emerging economies would have no incentive to incur costs 
for reducing emissions, even though they have a strong interest to prevent further climate change. 
After all, the problem is not going to be solved unless all major industrialised countries commit to 
emission reductions. 
 
Parties can perceive reciprocity in three ways: through the benefits of preventing climate change, 
through associated benefits of emission reductions in other policy fields, and through other means 
of compensation or reward. The post-2012 literature and climate negotiations have so far focussed 
mainly on economic instruments, such as an international cap-and-trade system or a global carbon 
tax. Although these instruments in theory are more cost-effective, they are unlikely to make 
agreements self-reinforcing. Their exclusive focus on the short-term costs of commitments and 
mitigation actions hides the long-term, intergenerational benefits of preventing climate change.  
 
The reciprocity that needs to be provided to countries for reducing emissions could be decreased if 
there are associated benefits of emission reductions and mitigation actions in other policy fields. 
Such co-benefits of climate mitigation might provide an incentive for parties to agree on emission 
reductions, and comply with them. Energy efficiency and renewable energy, for example, can lead 
to improved security of energy supply and better air quality. In order to decrease the reciprocity 
needs, these co-benefits need to be visible and as specific as possible. They also need to be recog-
nised as co-benefits by countries. This thesis provides an exploration of co-benefits and possible 
linkages of climate policy with other fields. The conclusion, however, is that their specific recip-
rocity of co-benefits is insufficiently recognised to enable an emission reductions-based agreement. 
 
If not through emission reduction targets, what might one agree on that mitigates climate change 
and provides reciprocity? One could look at what mitigation actions inherently are. Many mitiga-
tion actions imply innovation and diffusion of technology. There is general agreement that the 
emission reductions required to address climate change will need to be achieved through major 
investments in a portfolio of technologies.  
 
If accelerated innovation and diffusion of technology is to provide reciprocity, it should not only be 
seen as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; it should be seen as a reward for a country 
signing up. Economic innovation literature suggests that accelerated innovation and diffusion of 
technology provides economic benefits as it shifts the production function – it allows for the pos-
Summary  
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sibility to generate more income and create employment opportunities with less input of re-
sources. Other motivations for considering technology in international climate agreements range 
from improving the efficiency of markets for technological innovation to expanding opportunities 
for international agreement and spurring necessary socioeconomic and technological change. 
Theoretically, therefore, technology provides more reciprocity than emission reduction agree-
ments. But how can technology be practically incorporated in an international agreement on cli-
mate change? This thesis introduces technology-oriented agreements; those international agree-
ments that are aimed at advancing research, development, demonstration, and/or deployment of 
low-carbon technology. 
 
Technology-oriented agreements have been implemented successfully to address problems other 
than climate change. They tend to fall into four categories: knowledge sharing and coordination; 
research, development and demonstration (RD&D); technology transfer; and technology man-
dates, standards, and incentives for deployment. Existing technology-oriented agreements appear 
in all categories and provide important lessons. They vary substantially in their designs, circum-
stances and perceived success. A conceptual conclusion, based on experiences and more general 
features of the different kinds of technology-oriented agreements, is that knowledge sharing, 
RD&D and technology transfer agreements are not likely to achieve significant greenhouse gas 
emission reductions on their own, and are better seen as complements, contributing to effective-
ness of other policies.  
 
Other technology-oriented agreements, focussed on implementation of the technology through 
mandates, incentives and standards, do appear to have the potential to be effective in environ-
mental terms as a substitute for emissions target-based agreements. Such technology-oriented 
agreements would need to be applied on a sector-by-sector, if not technology-by-technology basis, 
which can be limiting practically. Such an approach may make the most sense in certain specific 
settings, in particular for highly trade-sensitive sectors, for sectors not otherwise covered by emis-
sions trading programs, for sectors that can benefit from international coordination such as build-
ing codes, appliance standards, regulation of vessels for international transportation. Also situa-
tions where significant co-benefits can be recognised are better served by technology-oriented 
agreements.  
 
Technology-oriented agreements are further explored in a number of hypothetical yet concrete 
treaties between a selection of countries. The agreements explored are in the field of sugarcane-
based bioethanol, CO2 capture and storage, nuclear energy, ammonia production, personal vehicles 
and cement. Although some of these agreements could be self-reinforcing and look promising, 
technology-oriented agreements are not a panacea. Costs can be high, compliance is by no means a 
certainty, and fragmentation and poor design could threaten environmental effectiveness.  
 
A specific case of technology in the climate change framework is technology transfer to developing 
countries. Effective international instruments to facilitate technology transfer have been investi-
gated by comparing the technology transfer effects of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Global Environment Facility, a technology fund. The 
outcome demonstrates that about half of project activities in the CDM use new or improved tech-
nologies that originate from outside of the host country, usually with knowledge transfer and ca-
pacity building. However, the CDM was not effective in all sectors nor in all countries; projects in 
end-use sectors such as transportation and energy efficiency are a small part of its project portfolio 
and the CDM selects those developing countries with the most conducive investment climate, 
leaving out least developed countries that arguably have the greatest need for investments in sus-
tainable development. For technologies in sectors not prone to market mechanisms, a specialised 
technology mechanism or fund that would address institutional aspects of technology – including 
the development of technological innovation systems and enabling environments – is likely to be 
more effective. If a market mechanism is can overcome the collective action problems of emission 
 
 
12 
reductions, it can provide a strong pull for mature technologies that face a level-playing field. In 
other cases, technology-oriented agreements appear better suited to address technology-specific 
barriers and market failures and can provide more reciprocity to parties involved. This conclusion 
appears to apply globally, but is magnified in the context of technology transfer to developing 
countries. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis explored whether reciprocity in international climate agreements could 
be improved through international agreements focused on innovation and technology. In particu-
lar, the thesis analyses the role of technology-oriented agreements from different perspectives and 
explores their potential impacts. The main result is that technology-oriented agreements can pro-
vide more reciprocity than emission reduction targets, a finding that needs to be recognised in the 
climate negotiations. A number of recommendations can be made to enable technology-oriented 
agreements. First, technology-oriented agreements should reflect the characteristics of the tech-
nology they address and be aligned with the (vested) technological interests that prevail in the 
sector, to ensure a positive payback function of the agreements to important parties. Second, a 
smart combination of market-based and technology-oriented agreements would work best both 
for climate change in general and for technology transfer to developing countries, if collective ac-
tion problems can be overcome. Third, if indeed market-based and technology-oriented instru-
ments are combined, their co-existence under one regime is recommended over a fully fragmented 
regime. This is necessary to prevent problems related to lack of transparency and sketchy account-
ability that would compromise environmental effectiveness of the climate regime. And last, if tech-
nology-oriented agreements are applied as a replacement or as a geographically or functionally 
complement, they should be designed for technology implementation, to ensure both environ-
mental and technological effectiveness. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift gaat over klimaatverandering, technologie en wederkerigheid. Klimaatverandering 
is de structurele verandering van het gemiddelde weertype of klimaat als gevolg van menselijke 
activiteiten die een verhoging van broeikasgasconcentraties in de atmosfeer veroorzaken. Klimaat-
verandering heeft allerlei nadelige gevolgen, zoals frequentere en ernstigere droogtes en zeespiegel-
stijging. Het kan worden voorkomen door de uitstoot van broeikasgassen te verminderen of de op-
name van die gassen uit de atmosfeer te vergroten; dit heet klimaatmitigatie. De uitstoot van 
broeikasgassen is de afgelopen decennia sterk gestegen en zal, als hier niets aan gebeurt, blijven 
stijgen, wat rampzalige gevolgen kan hebben.  
 
Klimaatvriendelijke technologie kan worden ingezet voor klimaatmitigatie. De definitie van kli-
maatvriendelijke technologie is alle knowhow, methoden, procedures, successen en mislukkingen, 
apparatuur en installaties die tot doel hebben broeikasgasuitstoot te reduceren. Technologie om-
vat dus hardware, software en zogenaamde “orgware”. Voor windenergie bijvoorbeeld, zijn de 
windturbines de hardware, is de kennis van een onderhoudsmonteur onderdeel van de software, en 
is de wetgeving rondom windenergie de orgware.  
 
Naarmate steeds meer wetenschappelijke rapporten het belang van klimaatverandering benadruk-
ken, is het onderwerp hoger op de beleidsagenda gekomen. Veel landen hebben al emissiedoelstel-
lingen vastgesteld en andere beleidsmaatregelen geïmplementeerd. Desondanks is het onduidelijk 
of een nieuw international verdrag over klimaatverandering, dat in december 2009 in Kopenhagen 
moet worden uitonderhandeld, steun krijgt van de belangrijkste landen en voldoende milieuwinst 
kan behalen.  
 
Succesvolle internationale overeenkomsten hebben één ding gemeenschappelijk: ze bieden weder-
kerigheid. Alle betrokken partijen moeten het gevoel hebben dat ze ongeveer evenveel beter wor-
den van het verdrag. Vooral internationale milieuverdragen moeten aan deze voorwaarde voldoen, 
aangezien er geen internationale instantie bestaat die landen aan hun beloftes kan houden, zoals de 
WTO dat wel kan bij schending van handelsverdragen. Een succesvol klimaatverdrag moet dus de 
voordelen voor partijen zichtbaar maken en in balans brengen. Een mogelijkheid daarvoor is om 
afspraken te maken over de innovatie en de inzet van technologie in plaats van emissiedoelstellin-
gen. De onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift is dan ook: Kunnen technologieovereenkomsten we-
derkerigheid leveren en zo de effectiviteit van een internationaal klimaatmitigatieverdrag vergro-
ten? 
 
Vanuit economisch perspectief is een stabiel klimaat een publiek goed. De markt heeft als kenmerk 
dat het onvoldoende publieke goederen levert vanwege collectieve irrationaliteit. Klimaatverande-
ring kan alleen dan worden voorkomen als landen samenwerken. Geen enkel land is in staat om 
het probleem in z’n eentje op te lossen. Internationale samenwerking op het gebied van klimaat 
lijdt echter niet alleen onder collectieve irrationaliteit. Het behalen van voldoende milieuwinst is 
extra moeilijk door de structuur van het probleem: de gevolgen van klimaatverandering zijn het 
ergst in de landen die het probleem niet veroorzaken, terwijl de kosten voor mitigatie het hoogst 
zijn in landen die weinig van de gevolgen merken. In het vakgebied internationale betrekkingen 
heet dit wel “asymmetrische externaliteiten”: het tegendeel van de situatie waarin alle betrokkenen 
ongeveer evenveel bijdragen aan het probleem en de oplossing. Het gevolg van deze belangenstruc-
tuur is dat landen met een hoge broeikasuitstoot en weinig klimaatgevolgen een sterke prikkel on-
dervinden om hun uitstoot niet te verminderen en dus om niet mee te doen aan een klimaatver-
drag. Dat staat internationale samenwerking op internationaal klimaatgebied danig in de weg en 
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leidt ertoe dat die landen die het hardst nodig zijn om het probleem op te lossen het minste belang 
hebben bij die oplossing.  
 
Verdragen met emissiedoelstellingen bieden weinig wederkerigheid, dus de prikkel om het verdrag 
na te leven is ook niet sterk aanwezig. Dit werd duidelijk bij het Kyoto Protocol, dat emissiereduc-
ties voor industrielanden oplegt. Het was een opmerkelijk resultaat dat het Kyoto Protocol über-
haupt werd afgesproken, gegeven de ongelijke probleemstructuur rondom klimaatverandering. De 
problemen begonnen bij de uitvoering. In de landen die het verdrag niet ratificeerden of de voor-
waarden tot nu toe niet hebben nageleefd, bleken de kosten te hoog of kregen andere belangen de 
overhand. En als enkele grote industrielanden, zoals de Verenigde Staten, al niet meedoen met een 
internationaal klimaatverdrag, heeft het voor grote ontwikkelingslanden, zoals China, geen enkele 
zin om wél emissiedoelstellingen op zich te nemen, hoe graag ze ook iets aan klimaatverandering 
willen doen.  
 
De enige manier om landen met hoge mitigatiekosten te verleiden om emissies te reduceren is om 
ze wisselgeld te bieden, oftewel voor wederkerigheid te zorgen. Voor een succesvol verdrag moe-
ten alle betrokken landen voldoende wederkerigheid ervaren om de kosten acceptabel te houden. 
Dit zou kunnen betekenen dat landen die hoge mitigatiekosten verwachten en weinig voordeel 
hebben bij een klimaatverdrag veel compensatie moeten krijgen. Het doel is om het verdrag “zich-
zelf versterkend” te maken, oftewel aantrekkelijk om te ondertekenen en na te leven. Beleid gericht 
op het “zichzelf versterkend maken” is verstandig onder veel omstandigheden: het is robuuster, 
inspecties op naleving zijn minder nodig en de maatregel is minder gevoelig voor politieke veran-
deringen. Op nationaal niveau is er echter altijd een overheid die een boete kan uitdelen of een ver-
gunning kan intrekken als een bedrijf of instelling de regels niet volgt. Voor internationale milieu-
verdragen is het essentieel om zelfversterkend te zijn, omdat er geen internationale instantie is die 
de naleving kan afdwingen.  
 
De meeste literatuur over post-2012 klimaatbeleid gaat over emissiereducties en economische in-
strumenten, zoals verhandelbare emissierechten of een belasting op broeikasgasemissies. Het grote 
voordeel van dit soort beleidsmaatregelen is de kosteneffectiviteit: de markt zoekt de goedkoopste 
oplossing. Het nadeel is echter dat ze zichzelf niet versterken omdat ze zich alleen op de kosten 
van klimaatmitigatie richten en de baten niet zichtbaar maken. Ze leveren weinig wederkerigheid.  
 
De compensatie die nodig is in een klimaatverdrag kan worden verminderd als de inschatting is 
dat het verdrag substantiële bijkomende voordelen heeft. Als die voordelen groot genoeg zijn, kun-
nen ze landen overtuigen om akkoord te gaan met een klimaatverdrag. Energiebesparing en her-
nieuwbare energie kunnen bijvoorbeeld energievoorzieningszekerheid verbeteren. Bovendien lei-
den ze tot minder luchtvervuiling, waardoor de overheid minder kosten hoeft te maken om die 
luchtvervuiling te voorkomen. Het probleem is echter dat die positieve bijkomstigheden wel dui-
delijk zichtbaar en gespecificeerd moeten zijn, anders worden ze niet erkend door de deelnemende 
landen. Mogelijke bijkomende voordelen van mitigatiedoelstellingen op het gebied van luchtkwali-
teit, energievoorzieningszekerheid, internationale handel en armoedebestrijding blijken echter on-
voldoende of onvoldoende herkenbaar om voldoende wederkerigheid te bieden voor de kosten van 
vergaand klimaatbeleid. 
 
Als emissiereductiedoelstellingen het niet kunnen, zijn er dan afspraken te bedenken die wel de 
benodigde wederkerigheid bieden? Emissiereducties zijn nodig, maar wat zijn ze precies? Voor 
veel emissiereductie activiteiten moet klimaatvriendelijkere technologie worden ontwikkeld en 
gebruikt. Zonder een hele reeks van technologieën zijn de benodigde emissiereducties niet te reali-
seren. Dus wat zou er gebeuren als we afspraken zouden maken over ontwikkeling en implementa-
tie van klimaatvriendelijke technologie? Zou dat wel de wederkerigheid kunnen bieden waar we 
naar op zoek zijn? 
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De economische innovatieliteratuur suggereert dat intensivering van innovatie en versnelde im-
plementatie van technologie economische voordelen kunnen opleveren voor landen. De theoreti-
sche verklaring daarvoor is dat innovatie de productiefunctie verschuift, en dus meer productie 
mogelijk maakt per eenheid input. Innovatie kan dus leiden tot meer inkomen en meer werkgele-
genheid. Vooral landen met een actieve innovatie- en fabricagesector kunnen in technologieover-
eenkomsten exportpotentieel herkennen. Omdat ze specifieker zijn, kunnen in technologieover-
eenkomsten bijkomende voordelen ook beter worden herkend. Daarnaast zijn emissiemarkten in 
theorie wel kosteneffectief, maar in de praktijk spelen marktfalen en specifieke barrières voor in-
novatie en implementatie van technologie een grote rol. Het opnemen van specifieke technologie-
overeenkomsten in een klimaatverdrag zou een gedeelte van die problemen kunnen oplossen. Het 
lijkt er dus op dat technologieovereenkomsten meer wederkerigheid bieden dan emissiereductie-
doelstellingen – immers, ze leiden ook tot emissiereducties, zijn in het belang van technologie-
exporteurs en kunnen ook nog de efficiëntie van marktinstrumenten vergroten. Maar hoe zouden 
die technologieovereenkomsten er in de praktijk uit kunnen zien? 
 
Internationale technologieovereenkomsten zijn niet nieuw. Ze worden al gebruikt voor specifieke 
andere milieuproblemen. Ruwweg zijn er vier categorieën technologieovereenkomsten: overeen-
komsten die kennis delen en coördineren; overeenkomsten die zich richten op onderzoek, ontwik-
keling en demonstratie van technologie; overeenkomsten betreffende technologieoverdracht naar 
ontwikkelingslanden, en overeenkomsten die implementatie van technologie nastreven, en stan-
daarden, verplichtingen of financiële prikkels geven. Er is veel variatie in hoe bestaande technolo-
gieovereenkomsten zijn vormgegeven, wat ze kosten, onder welke omstandigheden ze worden uit-
gevoerd, en hoe succesvol ze zijn. Alleen technologieovereenkomsten van het vierde type, gericht 
op implementatie, kunnen voldoende bereiken om klimaatverandering te voorkomen. De andere 
types kunnen wel helpen, maar zijn op zichzelf niet milieueffectief.  
 
Bepaalde typen technologieovereenkomsten zouden emissiereductiedoelstellingen dus kunnen 
vervangen. Ze zouden wel per sector, of zelfs specifiek voor een bepaalde technologie moeten wor-
den afgesproken. Als dat voor een aantal technologieën moet gebeuren, kan dat moeilijk onderhan-
delbaar en praktisch onuitvoerbaar worden. Het beste kunnen dergelijke technologieovereenkom-
sten in specifieke omstandigheden worden ingevoerd, bijvoorbeeld in specifieke sectoren waarin 
emissiehandel onvoldoende prikkels geeft of waar marktfalen een grote rol speelt; in handelsgevoe-
lige sectoren; of voor technologieën die veel baat hebben bij internationale afspraken. Voorbeelden 
zijn internationale voorschriften voor energiegebruik in gebouwen, of energienormen voor huis-
houdelijke apparatuur en auto’s.  
 
We kunnen technologieovereenkomsten verder uitwerken in fictieve maar realistische afspraken 
tussen een klein aantal landen. De voorbeelden die in dit proefschrift zijn uitgewerkt hebben be-
trekking op ammoniaproductie, biobrandstoffen, CO2 afvang en opslag, kernenergie, cementpro-
ductie en personenwagens. Alhoewel sommige van deze hypothetische verdragen zichzelf kunnen 
versterken, blijken technologieovereenkomsten nog niet zo gemakkelijk te ontwerpen. De kosten 
zijn vaak erg hoog en de verdragstekst moet rekening houden met mogelijke negatieve neveneffec-
ten van technologieën zoals de biodiversiteitimpacts van biobrandstoffen. Daarnaast kan het naast 
elkaar bestaan van allerlei technologieovereenkomsten leiden tot overlap, interactie en fragmenta-
tie van het klimaatregime, wat de transparantie niet ten goede komt. Alhoewel het een stap in de 
goede richting is, is met de huidige gegevens niet onomstotelijk vast te stellen of de naleving van 
deze technologieovereenkomsten kan worden gegarandeerd.  
 
Technologieoverdracht naar ontwikkelingslanden is een speciaal type technologieovereenkomst. 
Er is veel geschreven, maar niet veel bekend, over wat het beste werkt voor technologieoverdracht. 
Marktmechanismen, zoals het Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) van het Kyoto Protocol, 
blijken in veel projecten technologieoverdracht wel te kunnen realiseren, maar schieten tekort in 
sommige sectoren en in veel ontwikkelingslanden. Met name in de armere landen en de eindge-
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bruikersectoren (transport en gebouwen) speelt CDM nauwelijks een rol. Een technologiespeci-
fiek fonds dat institutionele aspecten van technologieoverdracht (inclusief innovatiesystemen en 
andere omgevingsfactoren) kan aanpakken zou tot betere en zelfs kosteneffectievere resultaten 
kunnen leiden. Zoals eerder geconcludeerd voor technologieovereenkomsten in het algemeen is 
een slimme combinatie van marktmechanismen en technologieovereenkomsten mogelijk de beste 
oplossing. Voor technologieoverdracht naar ontwikkelingslanden geldt dat vanwege de uitvergrote 
barrières voor realisatie van technologie nog sterker. 
 
Dit proefschrift leidt tot de conclusie dat technologieovereenkomsten wederkerigheid in internati-
onale klimaatovereenkomsten kunnen vergroten. De klimaatonderhandelingen zouden dit gegeven 
beter kunnen onderkennen. Echter, om effectief te zijn in het reduceren van emissies moeten tech-
nologieovereenkomsten wel aan een aantal voorwaarden voldoen. Ten eerste zouden technologie-
overeenkomsten zo moeten worden vormgegeven dat ze zo goed mogelijk aansluiten bij de belan-
gen van landen en bedrijven die actief zijn in die technologie. Dat zou de kans vergroten dat het 
verdrag wordt nageleefd. Ten tweede kunnen marktmechanismen en technologieovereenkomsten 
slim worden gecombineerd om tot een beter resultaat te komen. Vervolgens, indien deze verschil-
lende mechanismen worden gecombineerd in een verdrag, kunnen ze het beste samen in een over-
koepelend klimaatverdrag worden ondergebracht, om fragmentatie en ondoorzichtigheid te voor-
komen. En als laatste, indien technologieovereenkomsten in de plaats komen van een emissiere-
ductiedoelstelling voor een bepaald land, dan moeten ze implementatie van technologie als belang-
rijkste effect hebben. Alleen dan kan de milieueffectiviteit van een nieuw klimaatverdrag worden 
gegarandeerd.  
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Chapter 1 Purpose, conceptual framework and methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
Environmental problems are deeply intertwined with technology. The causes of environmental 
problems are often found in technological developments, including development of know-how, 
equipment and organisation, where they have enabled industrialisation and other intensification of 
economic activities. However, the innovation and diffusion of technology has also enabled the solv-
ing of environmental problems (e.g., Andersen et al., 2007). Technology has become an inalienable 
part of human culture in many parts of the world (Hughes, 2004). While at the root of some of the 
most difficult current global environmental challenges, technology also holds the key to the solu-
tions. 
 
Climate change is one of such challenges, and has a similar relationship with technology. The root 
causes of climate change are found in the global use of technology to produce and convert energy, 
transport persons and goods, and farm. Historically, the first rise in global greenhouse gas emis-
sions was associated with the organisational possibilities of exploiting forests for a range of pro-
ductive uses, such as shipbuilding; the second was associated with the invention of the steam en-
gine and the resulting industrial revolution. By now, across the world, diffusion of ever more inno-
vative technology is leading to unprecedented development and prosperity, but also to rapid in-
creases in greenhouse gas emissions, to such a degree that it is now widely accepted that this leads 
to a rise of global mean temperature, resulting in a range of adverse consequences (IPCC, 2007a). 
 
At the same time, studies that investigate the possible means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
while maintaining economic prosperity require greatly accelerated rates of technology innovation 
and diffusion. This technology needs to be diverse and is not confined to hardware alone; examples 
include renewable energy installations, the organisational capacity to implement climate mitiga-
tion policy, and the social and physical infrastructure to enable the implementation of energy effi-
cient appliances. Current technological advance, however, is not fast enough, and its positive ef-
fects are often undone by growth of overall output. Technological progress, for instance for safety 
or comfort, could even lead to more greenhouse gas emissions. Most studies indicate that the 
global dependence on fossil fuels for primary energy consumption will not decrease under a refer-
ence scenario in the decades to come, and that greenhouse gas emissions will continue rising at a 
fast pace (IEA, 2008a). There is consensus that far-reaching technological change is required to 
bring down emissions to a level at which the global mean temperature rise above pre-industrial 
levels would be kept below 2ºC (e.g., IPCC, 2007a; Vuuren et al., 2007).  
 
Given the global scope of climate change, its characteristics of a global public good and the need 
for social action in response to climate change to be collective action, international cooperation is 
necessary. The current international institution to address climate change, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) including its Kyoto Protocol, so far yields 
only limited progress, notably because it suffers from defection of a number of important players. 
International institutions and global governance to address global environmental problems are 
discussed extensively in the literature (see e.g., Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001; Biermann, 2007). A 
general conclusion is that when countries agree to address an environmental problem in an inter-
national treaty, mechanisms are implemented by the countries that experience most damage to 
reward compliance or to punish defection of those countries causing the problem. Indeed, there is 
no other way for enforcement of international agreements in the absence of an international insti-
tution that has the legitimacy to coerce, for instance through fines or other sanctions (Barrett, 
1994). The inability to enforce compliance is a central problem in international agreements. In 
combination with the collective-action nature of the required response to climate change, partici-
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pation in and effectiveness of any international climate agreement is challenging (Barrett, 1998; 
Victor, 2001).  
 
Although much has been written about international environmental agreements, the literature on 
the question of how innovation and diffusion of technology is addressed in, and could strengthen, 
international institutions is limited. As this question is becoming increasingly relevant in the con-
text of climate change, this thesis aims to contribute to the debate for the specific case of climate 
change.  
1.2 Climate change, rational actors and reciprocity 
1.2.1 Rational actors and public goods 
This thesis takes a rational-actor approach to the problem of designing an international institution 
around climate change. Rational actors make decisions serving their perceived self-interest. In in-
ternational relations, a rational-actor approach is commonly taken to explain and predict behav-
iour of states in international negotiations (Snyder, 2004). A rational actor framework provides an 
internally consistent framework that has considerable explanatory power, but also has serious 
limitations. Although theory assumes that rational actors optimise according to their interests, 
this is rarely the case in practice. Simon (1957) called this “bounded rationality” and argued that 
not an optimising but a “satisficing” strategy is often taken, in recognition that the optimal solu-
tion is not always apparent or achievable. Individuals, firms, governments and organisations often 
lack the information or the information processing means to optimise across all options. Transac-
tion costs may be too high, information may be unavailable or too abundant (Akerlof, 1970). 
Where the limits of the rational actor approach are reached, this thesis will also include considera-
tions of beliefs and availability of information.  
 
As a stable climate is a public good, preventing climate change implies the generation of a public 
good. The main feature of public goods is that their benefits are non-excludable, meaning that “if 
any person in a group consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from others in that group” (Ol-
son, 1965), and non-rival; consumption by any person does not reduce consumption by another. 
Clean air, for instance, is a public good as a firm that decides to reduce pollution generates benefit 
for all breathing the cleaner air, not only for itself, and the consumption of clean air does not re-
duce its availability to others. Similarly, if one country would decide to resolve climate change, the 
benefits would accrue to all countries that would otherwise be harmed. An example of a private 
good (as opposed to a public good) is a consumer good, such as food, which can only be used by 
the owner and from which other potential users can be excluded.  
 
If we apply a rational-actor approach to public good problems, the self-interested decision of the 
actors is to free-ride, resulting in the public good being underprovided (Olson, 1965). Hence, col-
lective action is necessary to provide the public good. The literature on collective action is exten-
sive and spans decades. Initially, it focussed on local problems, for instance on a hypothetical prob-
lem of cows belonging to one farmer trampling the crops of a neighbouring farm (Coase, 1960). It 
was demonstrated that how actors solve the issue depends, amongst others, on the cost structure 
of the solution relative to the damage costs. Consequentially, under conditions of incomplete in-
formation, how private actors or government would intervene also depends on the information 
available on the cost structure (Coase, 1986). For climate change, similar cost-benefit analyses have 
been carried out to clarify the cost structure, but uncertainties in the information have caused re-
sults to diverge strongly (Nordhaus, 1977; Tol, 1999; Stern, 2006). 
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1.2.2 Consequences of distributional characteristics of climate change 
The willingness of countries to embark on collective action on climate change determines what 
kind of international institution would emerge out of negotiations. That willingness is influenced 
by the costs of the solutions relative to the damage costs, and this balance is unique for every coun-
try. Their geographical, demographic, economic and social heterogeneity and consequential inter-
ests result in an asymmetric climate change problem structure. Conversely, other problems, where 
all parties have a roughly equal stake in the cause of the problem and its solution, show a symmet-
ric externality structure (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001).  
 
The single most important cause of climate change lies in the use of fossil fuels for energy use, sup-
ply and services (IEA, 2008b). Since the start of the industrial revolution, which was accompanied 
by a steep rise of energy use, most of the global energy consumption has taken place in industrial-
ised countries (Matthes, 2008). As greenhouse gases generally have long residence times and there-
fore, under current emission patterns, cumulate in the atmosphere, industrialised countries have a 
historic responsibility for almost 80% of the human-made CO2 concentrations currently in the at-
mosphere. Although this situation is changing and some developing countries have fast-rising 
emissions, because of the stock good characteristic of greenhouse gases, it takes them a long time 
to reach the same level of cumulative responsibility. For example, India will have emitted more 
than Japan only in 2031 (Botzen et al., 2008) although currently India’s emissions are well above 
Japan’s, and while Chinese greenhouse gas emissions exceeded those of the EU-27 in the year 2000 
already, their cumulative responsibility only projected to catch up with the EU around 2050 (Mat-
thes, 2008). The current perpetrators of climate change are therefore primarily the industrialised 
countries, while further in the future, emerging economies start playing a significant role.  
 
The allocation of historical responsibility to act on climate change is relevant from a moral, “pol-
luter pays” perspective, which holds that polluters should bear the costs of returning the environ-
ment to an acceptable state. In addition, industrialised countries are in a better position to reduce 
emissions: they have the economic means to invest in climate change mitigation and the innovative 
capacity to realise emission reductions. However, from a rational-actor perspective, the question at 
stake is where the costs of the solution are lowest (Coase, 1986). Many of the industrialised coun-
tries are currently “locked in” a greenhouse gas intensive economy, through long-term investments 
made years ago, such as in transport infrastructure, energy-intensive industries and power plants, 
as well as the general inertness of the socio-technical energy system (characterised, for example, by 
Geels (2005)). Their mitigation unit costs (or abatement costs, usually expressed in US$ per tonne 
CO2-eq reduced) are therefore generally higher than those in developing countries (Weyant, 1999; 
2004a). After all, developing countries still need to do most of their investments in the relevant 
sectors and do not need to prematurely phase-out greenhouse-gas-intensive technology (IEA, 
2008a).  
 
The main incentive to prevent climate change is the avoidance of harmful impacts that result from 
the rise in global mean temperature (IPCC, 2007b). The extent to which these impacts are harmful 
depends on a number of factors, which differ greatly per country. Supported by initially patchy 
empirical and modelling evidence, from the beginning of the emergence of the climate change 
problem, it was assumed that developing countries, and particularly the poor in those countries, 
would bear the gravest consequences of climate change (Schelling, 1992). Evidence continues to 
emerge that confirms this conclusion (IPCC, 2007b); modelling of impacts of climate change on 
global food supply, for instance, shows a higher risk of hunger, particularly in Africa (Parry et al., 
2005). High-income countries are generally less vulnerable, as their populations rely less on cli-
mate-dependent resources and economic activities, and resources are available to adapt to climate 
change impacts. Climate research across the board so far continues to strengthen the hypothesis 
that most damage resulting from climate change will fall to developing countries, whereas some 
industrialised countries may even see net benefits from the consequences.  
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In summary, the climate change problem structure is characterised by deep distributional imbal-
ance: First, the vulnerability for climate change impacts is highest in countries which do not hold 
responsibility for the problem, while second, the cost of mitigating climate change is highest in 
those countries which are least affected by its consequences. The result is that most costs would 
accrue to industrialised countries, while their actions benefit developing countries most. Although 
for the world as a whole it appears to make economic sense to ambitiously address climate change 
(Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007c), for those countries with low damage and high mitigation costs, there 
is a strong incentive to free-ride on any agreement that has emission reduction as its sole goal. 
1.2.3 Rational actors and institutional design 
In the field of international relations (IR), a branch of political science that studies foreign affairs 
and global issues, the relation between problem structures and demand for international institu-
tions has been studied extensively from both rational-actor and constructivist perspectives (Keo-
hane, 1984; Young, 1994; Fearon and Wendt, 2002).  
 
Rationalism in IR (sometimes also called neo-liberalism (Snyder, 2004)) takes the self-interested 
nation state as the central actor. The only reason why self-interested nation states would join in-
ternational cooperation is when it has a net value to them. The consequences for negotiation and 
agreement can be illustrated by game theory, as has been applied in IR by political scientists such 
as Martin (1992), and by economists like Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Cesar and de Zeeuw 
(1996). Because states operate in their own perceived self-interest, problems related to non-
cooperative behaviour and free-riding, particularly in international environmental agreements, are 
plenty. It follows that for problems with a mixed or unclear interest structure, agreements are dif-
ficult to bring about (Keohane, 1988). Some claim that, in the case that an effective international 
agreement is reached, it would be in everyone’s interest to live by it, so compliance is predicted to 
be high and enforcement not necessary (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Others, however, indicate that, 
when agreed reluctantly, risks of non-compliance are high (Downs et al., 1996).  
 
Whereas rationalism treats the international institution as an outcome of the exogenous environ-
ment, constructivism regards the institution as an endogenous, dependent variable that has an im-
pact on the environment itself (Wendt, 1992). An example of how constructivism affects interna-
tional institutions is the role of information. If an international institution provides new informa-
tion, such as the IPCC does for climate change, it can change beliefs of nation states. This is not 
incompatible with rationalism in IR, as with changing beliefs, the rational judgment of the situa-
tion is also modified. Fearon and Wendt (2002), supported by Herrmann (2002) and Adler (2002), 
therefore regard the rationalist and constructivist approaches to IR as different methodologies 
rather than different theories. 
 
Generalising, this thesis characterises the demand for an international institution on climate 
change mitigation in the case of rationally acting states that satisfice on their perceived self-
interests. They do so using information on costs of solutions versus damage costs of the problem, 
and adjust their positions based on continually changing insights and new information.  
 
In addition to qualitative economic analysis and IR insights, formal quantitative game theory cou-
pled with climate models (as opposed to the more generalised game theory exercised by Martin 
(1992)) has been instrumental in simulating decisions made by rational actors in the provision of 
the global public good of climate change. The global public good situation is characterised by an 
absence of an international government that can enforce compliance with supplying the public 
good (Barrett, 1994). Cooperation hence needs to be realised through the continuing consent of 
every single actor and the stability that institutions offer once agreement is reached. Game theory 
is a suitable tool to analyse the former. Most studies on international environmental agreements 
point towards non-cooperative game situations and instable coalitions (see e.g. Carraro and Sinis-
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calco, 1993). For climate change, given its problem structure, this is also the case (Barrett, 1998; 
Buchner and Carraro, 2005).  
 
Since the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, empirical evidence on the stability of emission 
reduction coalitions has become available, allowing for theoretical conclusions to be tested in 
practice (IPCC, 2007d; EEA, 2008). The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement with emis-
sion reduction targets for industrialised countries (UNFCCC, 1997a). It also has several innovative 
carbon trading mechanisms, particularly the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to increase 
compliance flexibility, provide cost-effectiveness, and enhance voluntary engagement of develop-
ing countries (Nordhaus, 2001). The Kyoto Protocol was agreed despite the problem structure of 
climate change described in Section 1.2.2, which seems to speak against the distributional aspects 
as a relevant determinant for a stable coalition.  
 
The effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, however, was weakened because of the distributional 
problem structure. Although it was finally ratified by almost all countries around the world, sev-
eral important industrialised countries defected by declining participation or by not complying 
with its terms. The reasons those countries state for defecting are high costs of mitigation and 
shifting interests. The US delegation signed the Kyoto Protocol when it was agreed in 1997, but the 
US government decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. It was clear, however, even before 
the negotiations were finalised that the US Senate would not agree to the Kyoto terms for reasons 
of economic impacts of US domestic emission reductions, and the lack of commitments for devel-
oping countries (US Senate, 1997). Canada, which ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, emits 
greenhouse gases well above its Kyoto cap, and is unlikely to comply. The main reason for Can-
ada’s non-compliance is the rise of the greenhouse gas intensive tar sands recovery to an industry 
of great economic significance since the Kyoto reference year of 1990 (Environment Canada, 2006). 
In both cases, economic interests prevailed over climate change concerns.  
 
A coalition to reduce emissions is clearly instable (Barrett, 1998; Buchner and Carraro, 2005). 
Game theory suggests one remedy for such instable coalitions: by linking an instable public good 
coalition with a stable club good coalition, the overall coalition may be stable (Yi, 1997). Club 
goods, contrary to public goods, only provide benefits to the members of the club. An example of a 
club good is a joint research programme, where a member of a research consortium gains access to 
all complementary research assets of all member firms, thereby conferring a competitive edge 
against non-member firms and reducing the profits of non-member firms. The stabilisation of the 
coalition by linking works as follows. International environmental agreements, such as agreements 
on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, typically provide a public good. A technology-oriented 
agreement typically provides a club good. Climate change coalitions based on emission reductions 
are typically not stable because of free-rider incentives inherent in public goods, but technology-
oriented agreements, if they can exclude non-members from benefiting from technology innovation 
and diffusion, could be profitable and stable. Linking the negotiations about club and public goods 
might therefore enhance the profitability and stability of the linked coalition in comparison to the 
separate public good coalition (Yi, 1997). 
  
If actors negotiating an international climate agreement act rationally, the climate change problem 
structure leads to a central barrier to international cooperation: a specific agreement to reduce 
emissions is not in the interest of those countries that are required to reduce their emissions most 
urgently. The public good of a stable climate will thus tend to be underprovided, since the self-
interested satisficing behaviour will imply free-riding. Formal game-theoretic models support this 
finding (Barrett, 1998; Nordhaus, 2001; Buchner and Carraro, 2005), despite the stylised version of 
reality that they need to take as such models can only simulate rational actors. Although linking to 
other issue areas could under specific circumstances stabilise the a climate change coalition, this 
was not done in the Kyoto Protocol and the Kyoto coalition did demonstrate instability. This 
situation is expected to persist as long as an international climate agreement fundamentally lacks 
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an enforcement mechanism (Barrett, 1994), or lacks reciprocity that modifies the incentives pro-
vided for countries to participate.  
 
1.2.4 Reciprocity and the climate agreement 
Koremenos et al. (2001), in their introduction to a special issue on rational design of international 
institutions, takes a rational-actor approach and explains the formation of international institu-
tions (such as a climate agreement) as follows: “[we] treat institutions as rational, negotiated re-
sponses to the problems international actors face”. By implication, the rules of the institution must 
be what they call “incentive compatible”, i.e. should provide participation incentives for all parties 
(Koremenos et al., 2001), in the absence of means to coerce. This can be applied to climate change 
and the discussion above, and leads to the conclusion that the only way of providing countries that 
incur high net costs of reducing emissions with incentives for participation in an international 
agreement is to provide them something in return; in other words, to provide reciprocity. As every 
single party should participate in the coalition to mitigate climate change, every single party 
should perceive reciprocity, regardless of whether it is a developed or a developing country.  
 
Keohane (1984; 1986) argues that reciprocity is “the most effective strategy for maintaining coop-
eration among egoists”. He defines two types of reciprocity. The first is specific reciprocity, which 
refers to exchanges of items of equivalent value in a specified sequence. If specific reciprocity is 
part of an international treaty, compliance is easily determined as there is limited room for inter-
pretation and no ambiguity in the commitments made vis-à-vis another party. An example of this 
was the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the predecessor of the World Trade Or-
ganisation (WTO). GATT (and WTO for that matter) has reciprocity as one of its guiding princi-
ples, has made the terms of reciprocity specific to the trade context, and has installed clear and 
enforceable conflict resolution mechanisms to enable countries to reciprocate in a specific way 
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). 
 
In most international institutions, however, reciprocity is not specific. This may be because the 
issue area is too complex, because there are large uncertainties on the issue or the outcome, be-
cause the number of actors is exceedingly large (192 countries in the UNFCCC) and diverse, the 
equivalence of actions cannot be strictly established, or the sequence of events cannot be narrowly 
defined (Keohane, 1986). Many international cooperation problems have at least one of these char-
acteristics. The second type of reciprocity, diffuse reciprocity, is therefore far more common in in-
ternational institutions, and climate change is no exception. Despite the efforts to make climate 
agreements measurable and verifiable (UNFCCC, 1997a), it remains challenging to determine the 
equivalence of commitments, as the negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol have shown.  
 
The broadest way of regarding diffuse reciprocity is Keohane’s (1986) description of “conforming 
to generally accepted standards of behaviour”. As such, diffuse reciprocity in its pure form is about 
social norms rather than about living up to specified obligations. In many studies on reciprocity, 
individuals are taken as an experimental subject. Assuming they act as rational actors, their behav-
iour can be used as a proxy of states in international negotiations. An example of diffuse reciproc-
ity are groups of friends, which, according to Berenskoetter (2007), and Fehr and Gächter (2000), 
are based on reciprocated goodwill, and have little in common with a tit-for-tat situation in spe-
cific reciprocity. Larson (1988) relates psychological issues to international negotiations, and iden-
tifies trust as an important factor for reciprocity, and a condition for collective action based on dif-
fuse reciprocity. She supports her claims with examples from the cold war and makes a number of 
interesting observations that can partly be applied to the climate change case. First of all, the mo-
tives and intentions behind a state’s pledged concessions or defections determine whether other 
countries will reciprocate – whether they will reward or punish the behaviour of the acting state. 
If there is trust in the genuineness of motives and if the intentions correspond to those of the state 
that might reciprocate, there is a higher likelihood of cooperation.  
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Confidence of a state in whether a concession of another state is genuine is influenced by a number 
of factors (Larson, 1988). First, the actors should determine whether a move is part of a meaningful 
pattern, so whether positive reciprocity leads to more cooperation, or whether the other actor is 
likely to free-ride next time. There needs to be some consistency in the actions. Second, are there 
real costs associated with the move, is there some depth of cooperation? If a move by an actor im-
plies only small costs, its intentions are less credible and reciprocation is unlikely. A third factor is 
additionality. Suppose that an actor is likely to do the concession anyhow for a certain reason, but 
attributes the move to another reason for which it requests positive reciprocal action from other 
actors. In this case, the move of the actor is less credible and less likely to be rewarded2.  
 
Most international agreements have elements of both specific and diffuse reciprocity. A review of 
international environmental agreements and their problem structures reveals that there are two 
mechanisms to reciprocate in order to ensure compliance with the treaty: coercion or positive ex-
change (meaning reward, or “transfer” in the economic literature (Altamirano Cabrera, 2007)) 
(Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001). Which mechanism is used in a treaty depends on the circum-
stances: on the position of the perpetrator and the position of the victim. In the case of a “strong 
victim”, in a position to excert power over perpetrators, coercion, such as imposing sanctions, is an 
option. In the case of a weak victim state, rewards can provide reciprocity to the perpetrator, usu-
ally in the form of side-payments to compensate for the costs of addressing the problem. For re-
wards, however, the victims need to have the resources to provide the side-payments, which is of-
ten not possible for developing countries.  
 
In the case of climate change, as argued in Section 1.2.2, the victims – countries experiencing the 
greatest climate vulnerabilities and damage costs – are mostly least-developed countries. These 
countries are neither strong nor rich and are hence neither able to enforce compliance by large-
emitting countries, nor are they able to afford compensation through side-payments to these coun-
tries. Indeed, this option would be regarded as perverse to most of those involved in the interna-
tional climate regime. Coercion or rewards are therefore not options (Barrett, 2003). As enforce-
ment by the international environmental institution is also not possible (Downs et al., 1996), an 
effective international agreement to mitigate climate change will have to be set up in such a way 
that it is self-reinforcing, i.e., that it is “attractive for countries to want to sign, and want to carry 
out the terms of agreement” (Barrett, 1994). This means that the agreement needs to provide addi-
tional means of reciprocity.  
 
Agreements can provide reciprocity to its signatories in three ways. First, the solution to the cli-
mate problem provides some inherent reciprocity for a state that has both high emissions and is 
prone to incur high net damage costs – that state would be certain to benefit from the agreement. 
It becomes more challenging for those perpetrators that perceive high costs and low benefits. For 
those states, reciprocity is not provided by preventing climate change.  
 
                                                 
2  To relate this to the climate change, there are examples from both sides of the negotiation range from the Kyoto Protocol 
period. Germany and the United Kingdom, who pride themselves on taking on stringent emission reduction commitments, 
had actually already reduced their emissions significantly since 1990. Germany had reunified and benefited from economic 
restructuring in the former DDR, leading to a decline in emissions. The United Kingdom had just had its “dash for gas”, 
which was accompanied by fuel switching from coal to gas, which coincidentally also reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 
With United States scholars and negotiators, these issues are often hailed as the “Kyoto windfalls” of the European Union 
and are used to argue that the Kyoto commitments are much harder on the United States than on the European Union. An-
other example is the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). When Bush Administration initi-
ated the APP, it had a record of frustrating international efforts to reduce emissions, and there was no confidence that the 
United States had the genuine intention to address climate change. In addition, the costs of the APP were very low and 
there were suspicions that the United States had ulterior motives: the APP provided its industry involved in clean envi-
ronmental technology access to large markets in emerging economies. These factors of intentionality, costs, and ulterior 
motives provoked the perception with the European Union that the APP was not a serious attempt to form a treaty that 
mitigates climate change. 
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The second path is through co-benefits and spill-over effects (Barker et al., 2007), or expected 
positive consequences of the mitigation actions agreed in the agreement, in other policy fields. 
Such co-benefits of climate change mitigation might provide an incentive for some parties to agree 
on mitigation actions, and comply with them. Energy efficiency and renewable energy, for exam-
ple, can lead to improved security of energy supply and to better air quality. In order to contribute 
to reciprocity needs, these co-benefits need to be visible and specific, and they need to be recog-
nised as co-benefits by countries. The extent to which co-benefits are helpful depends on the spe-
cific country context. This can go two ways: although most countries could distinguish co-
benefits, others experience substantial negative effects associated with mitigation actions, in par-
ticular fossil fuel exporting countries. In general, the reciprocity that co-benefits provide is insuffi-
cient or insufficiently recognised by countries.  
 
The third path of reciprocity relates to the inherent design of the agreement: what the agreement 
regulates, or the formal institutional goal. In the Kyoto Protocol, the formal institutional goal is the 
capping of emissions. Section 1.2.2 discussed that the inherent incentive provided by emission re-
ductions as such is insufficient for a number of countries to ensure continued participation; it does 
not lead to a self-reinforcing agreement. By revising the formal institutional goal to low-carbon 
technology innovation and diffusion, emission reductions may be achieved through low-carbon 
technology, while reciprocity may still be perceived by those states otherwise deterred by the high 
costs of mitigation but interested in technological innovation. The next section focuses on the pos-
sibilities of technology innovation and diffusion as an alternative formal institutional goal in an 
international climate agreement. 
 
The relation between the perceived costs, benefits, co-benefits and remaining required reciprocity 
is illustrated schematically in Figure 1.1. 
Total 
perceived
costs for
country X
Co-benefits for
country X
Required reciprocity to
provide to country X
Required perceived
reciprocity for
country X 
compliance in the 
absence of 
perceived (co-) 
benefits
Benefits for
country X
 
Figure 1.1 Simplified representation of the perceived costs of a problem and the reciprocity provided in the case of no per-
ceived benefits or co-benefits by the perpetrating country X (left bars), and the reciprocity that needs to be provided if 
country X experiences benefits from solving the problem as well as co-benefits (right bars) 
 
1.2.5 Technology as a potential means to provide reciprocity 
What might be the reciprocity that could be provided along with mitigation actions? A look at the 
causal chain of climate change might be useful and what kind of formal institutional goal can be 
tied to each link in the chain. A simplified picture is given below.  
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Climate change causal chain Example of formal institutional goal 
Global Mean Temperature EU: keep global mean temperature rise below 2ºC 
Greenhouse gas concentration EU: global 450 parts per million 
Greenhouse gas emissions Kyoto Protocol: National caps: allocated amount relative to 
1990 levels 
Technology innovation and diffu-
sion 
Various EU Member States; US States: Renewable portfolio 
standards as percentage of total electricity consumption 
Economic activities and human 
behaviour 
Mexico City (for air quality): “Hoy no circula”: prohibit driv-
ing for certain number plates on certain weekdays 
Figure 1.2 Climate change causal chain and how the different factors relate to potential formal institutional goals 
 
Global mean temperature and greenhouse gas concentration are global units. As nation states are 
the actors in international agreements, and their perpetrating action is the emission of greenhouse 
gases, it is not possible to allocate commitments among nations for global mean temperature and 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The only possibility is that there is a collective 
agreement that climate change should remain, for instance, within a global mean temperature rise, 
but such an agreement would necessarily be legally soft, unspecific and ineffective as it is not pos-
sible to oblige a single country to prevent its share of e.g. 0,1ºC temperature rise. It would be com-
parable to Article 2 in the UNFCCC, which pledges prevention of “dangerous human interference 
with the climate system”. In addition, global mean temperature and greenhouse gas concentrations 
as formal institutional goal would have the same incentive and free-rider problems as the current 
international regime that primarily regulates greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
For a rational institutional design encouraging participation and compliance by coalitions of 
states, it is therefore necessary to look further down the climate causal chain, at what causes 
greenhouse gas emissions and what would generate emission reductions. We then arrive at tech-
nology as both a cause of and a solution to greenhouse gas emissions, and, lastly, economic activi-
ties and human behaviour. Both are factors that can be addressed, as the examples in Figure 1.2 il-
lustrate, on the nation-state or at the sub-national or urban level. The question of the appropriate 
level of governance is investigated in an extensive literature on decentralisation versus coordina-
tion, and whether policy responses to global problems can be decentralised to lower authorities 
which are in a better position to align them with the local situation (see e.g., Hyden, 2002). In ad-
dition, the relation between a country (which negotiates an international agreement) and its firms 
(which are the holders of the both the greenhouse gas-emitting and greenhouse gas-reducing tech-
nologies) would have to be taken into account when a climate agreement has technology innova-
tion and diffusion as its formal institutional goal (Bazilian et al., 2008). However, as the topic of 
this thesis is an international agreement on climate change, and such agreements are made be-
tween nation states, the governance level discussed here will be the nation state.  
 
It is the focus of this thesis to explore whether innovation and diffusion of low-carbon technology 
can provide reciprocity in an international climate agreement by making it the formal institutional 
goal. This topic has emerged on the climate change negotiations agenda (UNFCCC, 2007; Bazilian 
et al., 2008). Throughout this thesis, technology, or technology innovation and diffusion, means 
“know-how, methods, procedures, experience of successes and failures, physical devices and 
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equipment” (Dosi, 1982) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. If accelerated innovation and diffu-
sion of technology is to provide reciprocity, it should be seen not only as a means to reduce green-
house gas emissions but as an opportunity for innovation and a more sustainable energy system 
(Bazilian et al., 2008).  
 
The Dosi definition provides insight in what kind of returns, or reciprocity, technology innovation 
and diffusion could provide, and is roughly consistent (although the wording is different) with 
other taxonomies such as the “hardware, software and orgware” (Fodella, 1989). First, the hard-
ware includes physical devices and practices but also infrastructure such as highways, railways, 
pipelines, or the electricity grid. The reciprocity hardware might provide is mainly favourable for 
those countries that would produce hardware and would be able to benefit from exporting, thus 
adding value and competitiveness, and generating employment. A clear example how this can lead 
to self-reinforcing policies can be found in the field of solar and wind energy in Germany and 
Denmark (Steiner Brandt and Tinggaard Svensen, 2006; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; REN21, 
2008) – by creating industries and employment, new vested interests are created. In the context of 
low-carbon technology, given the current market (REN21, 2008), mainly developed and some well-
placed emerging economies could be provided with reciprocity through enhanced exports, com-
petitiveness and employment. 
 
The software, secondly, includes know-how and methods, as well as experiences of successes and 
failures, summarised in the term human capabilities (Lall, 1992). Comparisons show that the lack 
of human capacity is a much greater barrier to technology adoption in developing countries than 
for developed countries (Worrell et al., 2000). As an area to provide reciprocity, human capabili-
ties may be most desired by developing countries, which is also reflected in submissions by the de-
veloping country negotiating block, G77+China, to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2008a).  
  
Lastly, “orgware” (Fodella, 1989) refers to the institutional context, such as procedures and insti-
tutional infrastructure, on the international, national and local level. North (1990) defines institu-
tions as “human-defined constraints that shape human interaction”. The term “National Innova-
tion Systems” provides a way to operationalise orgware, institutions and technology innovation 
(OECD, 1997). There is no single definition for National Innovation Systems, but the Lundvall 
(1992) definition is most commonly used: “the elements and relationships which interact in the 
production diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge (...) and are either lo-
cated within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state”. It includes the functioning of markets, 
firms, and research institutions, and the ability of governments to shape markets and manage pro-
jects. Pretty and Ward’s assessment of social capital (2001) also combines elements of software 
and orgware. Whether the term used is orgware, National Innovation Systems and or social capi-
tal, there is a clear overlap between institutional issues and human capabilities present in a coun-
try (Reddy, 1991). 
 
After reaching agreement on technology innovation and diffusion, countries that have or expect a 
strong market position for their industry in the field of the technologies that will be implemented 
as a result of the agreement are likely to be supporters and active implementers of the agreement. 
They are unlikely to free-ride. Although the source of their confidence may be first-mover advan-
tages, defined as “the ability of pioneering firms to earn positive economic profits” (Liebermann 
and Montgomery, 1987), even if more countries boast industries in the same sector (e.g., several 
European, North American and Asian countries have wind turbine producers), a far-reaching 
agreement on that sector would signify growth in all those countries. Countries tend to be opti-
mistic about their industry’s ability to provide such leadership, and thus perceive first-mover ad-
vantages. Such perceived first-mover advantages could give confidence that the agreement leads to 
benefits for a country and its industry.  
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One of the reasons why technological change is so hard to bring about is all of these factors need to 
be aligned and managed at the same time, putting significant requirements on governments and 
are therefore difficult to realise (Rock et al., 2008). However, once a path of technological change is 
taken, it tends to reinforce itself. This self-reinforcing nature of technological change finds confir-
mation in economic and social-science literature, and has been referred to as ‘path-dependency’ 
(David, 1985), ‘technological momentum’ (Hughes, 1983), and ‘technological lock-in’ (Arthur, 1989; 
and Rosenberg, 1994). A treaty that aligns with (new or vested) interests of parties otherwise not 
interested in emissions reductions would therefore more likely be self-reinforcing. This would be 
one of the reasons why technology innovation and diffusion and their establishment in an interna-
tional agreement could be seen as an opportunity, or a reward, rather than a cost.  
 
Lastly, the economic literature around what explains differences in economic growth between 
countries provides support for technology innovation and diffusion as a reward. Why some coun-
tries are developing successfully while others lag behind has been the subject of decades of study, 
and this, according to Ruttan (2002), resulted in a conceptualisation of innovation to the eco-
nomic literature that can be seen as technology innovation providing reciprocity. Innovation, in 
firms or in entire economies, shifts in the “Innovation Possibility Curve”, which defines the amount 
of income that can be generated given and thus potential for economic growth (Solow, 1957). 
Learning processes that shift this curve enable income growth, which is an underpinning from 
economic theory for the hypothesis that technology innovation and diffusion could provide more 
specific reciprocity and could be an incentive for participation in an international climate agree-
ment.  
 
If cooperation around technology innovation and diffusion is introduced as a climate agreement 
building block, alongside or in place of emission reduction targets, the question of what kind of 
technology policy is effective arises. Technology policy is traditionally divided into demand-pull 
and technology-push policy (see, e.g., Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979). Although early empirical 
work seems to conclude that demand-pull arguments dominate innovation, this conclusion was 
severely criticised on methodological grounds, and a consensus has now emerged that that the one 
cannot work without the other and demand pull and technology push need to be applied in an ap-
propriate mix (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Ruttan, 2002). In technological change to mitigate 
climate change, the demand pull is generally assumed to be provided by carbon markets, regula-
tions and changing market preferences for low-carbon goods and services, while technology push 
is given by for instance national R&D programmes and grant support. Also in an international 
agreement focusing on technology innovation and diffusion, an appropriate mix of pull and push 
measures can be applied, whereby a technology mandate or standard can be seen as a “technology-
pull” which has been applied in a number of international environmental agreements (Coninck et 
al, 2008a).  
 
If technology innovation and diffusion is to improve participation and compliance in an interna-
tional climate agreement, it should provide reciprocity to all countries, developing and developed 
alike. Such universal reciprocity would have to work in all directions – industrialised countries 
should provide reciprocity to other industrialised countries, as well as to developing countries, 
developing countries should provide reciprocity to industrialised countries as well as to other de-
veloping countries. Their interests, however, diverge; the lack of detailed data on the different eco-
nomic histories and geographical circumstance of different countries prohibit generalisations. Ar-
riving at a consensus that is sufficiently appreciative for all parties is a delicate and complicated 
matter. Hence, it is a necessity to focus the analysis on a few large emitters as the most important 
players.  
 
In most cases, country conditions are specific and it is not appropriate to generalise across coun-
tries even if they have similar characteristics. On the issue of technology transfer in the context of a 
post-2012 agreement, however, developing countries take a clear stance and argue without excep-
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tion for a much greater emphasis on making available technology and enhancing human capabili-
ties. Partly because of the rapidly changing economic and technological position of emerging 
economies, and despite the extensive literature that has generally been appreciative of both devel-
oping and developed countries’ views on technology transfer (Reddy, 1991; Lall, 1992; IPCC, 2000a; 
Karani, 2001; Forsyth, 2005; Andersen et al., 2007), a deep divide between developed and develop-
ing country positions on technology transfer seems to remain. Ockwell et al. (2008) study these 
“discourses” based on the issues of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and concludes that, al-
though there is some evidence towards straightforward solution to the difficulties (Barton et al., 
2007), the differences in discourses are the main source of the disagreement. To date, evidence re-
garding the role of IPRs in the climate change technology transfer area is very limited and provides 
an insufficient basis on which to conclude that IPRs currently pose a significant barrier to the 
transfer of climate-friendly technologies (e.g., Barton, 2007; Lewis and Diringer, 2007). On the spe-
cific issues of IPR, as an example, the different discourses remain a barrier to a way out of the de-
bate (Ockwell et al., 2008).  
1.3 Research questions and hypothesis 
The overall objective in this thesis is to contribute to the academic debate on institutional design 
of international climate change agreements by exploring the role the international technology pol-
icy could play in strengthening such agreements. More specifically, it aims to explore whether 
technology-oriented agreements can provide for greater reciprocity and as such improve the effec-
tiveness of the international regime for climate change mitigation. The central question this thesis 
attempts to answer is:  
 
Can technology-oriented agreements provide greater reciprocity and thus improve the effectiveness of the interna-
tional regime for climate change mitigation?  
 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that, indeed, technology-oriented agreements can improve the in-
ternational climate change regime by providing reciprocity. The central question can be decom-
posed into several sub-questions, which, respectively, discuss the theoretical context in which 
technology-oriented agreements could provide reciprocity, describe the structure and functions of 
technology-oriented agreements, compare them to the existing emission reduction-based climate 
agreement and inspect how technology-oriented agreements might be institutionally embedded. 
 
Specifically, we are concerned with whether and how innovation and diffusion of technology 
would provide sufficient reward for countries taking a rational actor perspective to participate and 
comply, given their complex and continually changing interests. Second, the question arises what 
design characteristics define technology-oriented agreements realised to date, whether they have 
met their goals in the past, and with what environmental and cost effectiveness. Third, if technol-
ogy-oriented agreements are to improve the effectiveness of the climate regime, how do they com-
pare to the current climate regime? The current regime, the Kyoto Protocol, is based on emission 
reduction targets and the possibility of emissions trading. What are the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the Kyoto Protocol, and how does it compare to technology-oriented agreements? Fourth, 
what is the institutional dynamic that arises when technology-oriented agreements become part of 
a climate regime? For this question, it matters whether technology-oriented agreements would be 
implemented on their own or alongside emission targets. If they are implemented independently, 
can they be environmentally and cost effective? If technology-oriented agreements are imple-
mented alongside emissions targets, how would they influence the emissions target agreement and 
vice versa? Would there be a fragmentation of the climate regime by including various types of 
agreements, would this be a bad thing and, if so, how could this be addressed? 
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1.4 Methodology 
A schematic overview of the approaches, methods from sociology, economics, engineering and in-
ternational relations, chapters and topics is given in Figure 1.3. This scheme provides a high-level 
overview of approaches taken in this thesis. From left to right, the flow represents a rough ap-
proximation of the policymaking process: from theory and design to practical implementation and 
evaluation, to ex-ante evaluation.  
 
On the left of the scheme, in Chapter 3, the theoretical underpinning for asking the central re-
search question is given. This is done by applying the rational design of international institutions 
to climate change and by studying issue linkage with technology innovation and diffusion. By ex-
amining issue linkages between mitigation on the one hand, and energy security, air quality and 
poverty on the other, it is then evaluated whether issue linkage would provide co-benefits leading 
to participation and compliance (Chapter 4).  
 
The middle two panels in the scheme summarise the empirical and comparative work in the thesis. 
Where other studies have covered the Kyoto Protocol performance, Chapter 5 discusses the per-
formance of past technology-oriented agreements. Chapter 6 uses comparative analysis to contrast 
market-based variants of post-2012 agreements and policy instruments with technology-oriented 
approaches. Chapter 7 does the equivalent for specific technology transfer policies.  
 
The forward-looking chapters in the right panel look explicitly at the institutional consequences 
of a post-2012 climate regime that is composed of various technology-oriented and emission reduc-
tion-based agreements. Chapter 8 designs six hypothetical technology-oriented agreements and 
discusses their reciprocity-related features. Chapter 9 discusses how technology-oriented agree-
ments can be embedded into the current UNFCCC regime, what their interaction with emission 
reduction-based agreements would be, and explores consequences of regime fragmentation. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Schematic overview of the approaches, methods, chapters and topics in this thesis. Chapter titles and relations in 
this thesis contrasting emission reduction-based approaches for a post-2012 regime with technology-oriented approaches. 
Chapter 3 and 4 are primarily theoretical, Chapter 5 to 7 test the theory through empirical research, and Chapter 8 and 9 
explore and project possible future developments and consequences. 
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1.4.1 Structure of the thesis: Theoretical work 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 explore theoretical arguments of why to regard technology innovation and dif-
fusion as formal institutional goal and design feature for climate change agreements. Those chap-
ters form a necessary basis to answer the more practical and policy-relevant research questions in 
Chapters 5 through 9.  
 
Chapter 2 introduces some essentials on climate change for the reader that is unfamiliar with the 
basics. Chapter 3 builds on the rational-actor literature with regard to institutional design to ex-
plain why an international climate change agreement based solely on emission reductions is 
unlikely to generate sufficient participation and compliance. This argument has been made using 
game theory and was empirically investigated in papers on rational institutional design (Mitchell 
and Keilbach, 2001), describing how actors have found ways around the free-rider problem in ex-
isting international environmental institutions through applying either coercion or exchange.  
 
Apart from solving the compliance problems within the climate change regimes, an agreement 
could be broadened or linked to other issue areas in order to generate the reciprocity that is re-
quired for the treaty to be come self-enforcing, i.e. “to be attractive for countries to want to sign, 
and want to carry out the terms of agreement” (Barrett, 1994). Chapter 3 will also explore the is-
sue-linkage argument towards technology innovation and diffusion. From a rational-actor per-
spective, the view on the desirability of technology-oriented agreements is determined by the first-
mover advantage-induced payback function on technologies that are developed and exported. In 
reality, however, rational actors face bounded rationality; they cannot act fully rationally as they 
do not have complete information or a perfect ability to act on information they do have. Firm ac-
tors (technology developers) continually search for opportunities to innovate with the aim of mar-
ket advantage. Technology innovation is therefore an inherent incentive. Countries can be seen to 
behave similarly, with the aim of economic growth and development. The benefits of technology 
innovation and diffusion do not only accrue to the first mover alone; also subsequent innovators 
gain. The payback function, and hence the actor behaviour, is favourably changed because of larger 
perceived advantages with all actors, the attractiveness of a technology-oriented agreement would 
increase. Introducing incomplete information and uncertainty might therefore improve the per-
ceived reciprocity in an agreement. 
 
We have argued above that reciprocity is can also be provided by co-benefits. This is further inves-
tigated for climate change in relation to the fields of energy security of supply, air quality, and pov-
erty in Chapter 4. The perspective taken is that of substantive policy and measures, and institu-
tional issue linkages. Chapter 4 does not only look at mitigation (which is the focus of this thesis) 
but also at adaptation, whose characteristics lead to some quite different insights than for mitiga-
tion. 
 
The fields investigated in Chapter 4 show that it is not easy to link climate change with any field 
providing co-benefits. Chapter 3 therefore explores whether technology innovation and diffusion 
could provide reciprocity. Technology-oriented agreements have been explored as such a potential 
issue linkage, but it was concluded that technology does not provide enough incentives for par-
ticipation, nor sufficient greenhouse gas reductions on its own to reduce emissions substantially 
(Buchner and Carraro, 2005). This analysis, however, was based on the strict rational-actor 
grounds that game theory prescribes and was modest in valuing the gains of technology innovation 
and diffusion. Chapter 3 takes a more evolutionary approach and discusses technology innovation 
and diffusion when states act with bounded rationality. 
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1.4.2 Structure of the thesis: Empirical and comparative studies 
Empirical data from past and present technology-oriented environmental agreements could help 
establish how technology innovation and diffusion could be incorporated in the climate regime. 
Chapter 5 first defines technology-oriented agreements (and outlines what they are not), describes 
a potential taxonomy, and discusses, based on a qualitative criteria analysis, the performance of 
international technology-oriented agreements in other environmental fields, such as renewable 
energy in the European Union, technology transfer in the Montreal Protocol and marine oil pollu-
tion treaties.  
 
Once it is clear what technology-oriented agreements might be, their general characteristics can be 
compared with those of market-based regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol. In Chapter 6, compara-
tive analysis is used to make distinctions between the main characteristics of market-based re-
gimes and technology-oriented agreements, and the consequences of those differences for cost ef-
fectiveness and participation. The cases of market-based regimes are the Kyoto Protocol and a hy-
pothetical global carbon tax, while the technology-oriented agreements are based on the types de-
scribed in Chapter 5. 
 
A special question relates to technology and its application in developing countries. Challenges 
around technology transfer are different in developing countries than in free-market, developed 
economies, as problems around knowledge and capacity, governance and institutions, and effec-
tiveness of policymaking are of a different order. Chapter 7 performs an analysis similar to Chap-
ter 6, but focuses on the issue of technology transfer to developing countries. The chapter will 
compare empirical technology transfer results of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mecha-
nism, as an example of a market-based mechanism, with the results of the Global Environment Fa-
cility, a fund-based mechanism for technology transfer.  
 
1.4.3 Structure of the thesis: Forward-looking work 
Whether technology-oriented agreements would work in practice depends on a large number of 
factors and uncertainties. Informed by the theoretical considerations around the role of technology 
in the climate change regime, and the empirical findings of existing agreements, Chapter 8 ex-
plores what concrete technology-oriented agreements may look like through designing six hypo-
thetical technology-oriented agreements: in the fields of ammonia production, sugarcane-based 
bio-ethanol, carbon efficiency in cars, cement, CO2 capture and storage (CCS), and nuclear energy. 
For each of these hypothetical agreements, the main characteristics are set out, while assumptions 
on technological feasibility, economics, country participation and emission reductions allow for a 
political feasibility assessment based on a factor/constraints framework.  
 
In Chapter 9, a different but potentially important question is posed. If technology-oriented agree-
ments are implemented, how will they function in the complex institutional context? The premise 
of this chapter is that technology-oriented agreements might have to be embedded in a climate re-
gime that simultaneously pursues cap-and-trade variants. The interactions will be discussed 
through a matching exercise between two of the technology-oriented agreements designed in 
Chapter 8 (the bio-ethanol and CCS cases) and two cap-and-trade variants by identifying their 
characteristics and where they impact on the goal attainment of the other type of agreement. The 
chapter will also explore the consequences of fragmentation of the climate change regime, which is 
an ongoing debate in international relations and international law. Chapter 10, finally, provides a 
discussion of the research questions and puts this thesis in the context of the ongoing climate ne-
gotiations.  
 
The overview below summarises the research questions and the chapters where they are primarily 
addressed.  
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Research question Chapters where the 
question is addressed 
1. Would innovation and diffusion of technology would provide sufficient 
reward for countries taking a rational actor perspective to participate and 
comply, given their complex and continually changing interests? 
Chapters 3, 4, 8, 10 
2. What design characteristics define technology-oriented agreements? 
Have they met goals in the past and what have experiences been in terms 
of environmental and cost effectiveness? 
Chapters 5, 8, 10 
3. If technology-oriented agreements are to improve the effectiveness of 
the climate regime, how do they compare to the current climate regime of 
the Kyoto Protocol? What are the advantages and disadvantages? 
Chapters 6, 7, 10 
4. What is the institutional dynamic that arises when technology-oriented 
agreements become part of a climate agreement? 
Chapters 3, 9, 10 
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Chapter 2 Background: setting the scene for technology and climate 
Climate change, global warming, the enhanced greenhouse effect. They are all more or less popu-
larised terms for the same problem: the rising global mean temperature of the world as a conse-
quence of human-induced higher atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Although the 
nature of this thesis is predominantly political science-based, this chapter explains how climate 
change works physically and aims to give the essential background to understand the political re-
sponses and the terms used throughout.  
 
2.1 The climate change problem3 
The problem of climate change has several components: the physical causes, the estimation of im-
pacts, and their distribution (IPCC, 2007a). The physical causes of climate change lay in the en-
ergy, or radiative, balance of the Earth (see Figure 2.1), and have been known for a long time (Ar-
rhenius, 1896). Incoming solar radiation consists of short-wave ultraviolet radiation, which green-
house gases cannot absorb. However, once reflected on the Earth's surface, the ultraviolet is con-
verted into long-wave infrared radiation, which is in the absorption spectrum of molecules like 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4). The infrared radiation is thus partly absorbed by such 
molecules, leading to capture of energy in the atmosphere.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Overview of the Earth's annual and global mean energy balance. All numbers are in W/m2 (IPCC, 2007d) 
 
As the gases that absorb in the infrared act similar to the glass roof of a greenhouse, these gases are 
called greenhouse gases. Without them the average temperature on Earth would be much lower, 
around -15°C, and life on Earth, which relies on liquid, not frozen, water, would probably not have 
developed into its present form. Enhancing the concentrations of these greenhouse gases, however, 
leads to a shift in the energy balance of the Earth. This shift in radiative balance is called the en-
hanced greenhouse effect, and is held responsible for climate change. 
 
The greenhouse gases, pictured on the far right in Figure 2.1, absorb the energy in the outgoing in-
frared radiation and transform it to heat. There are a number of greenhouse gases and also other 
substances in the atmosphere that can trap heat. The most important greenhouse gases are carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and the halocarbons (CFCs, HFCs and 
                                                 
3  Much of this section, including the pictures, is derived from Working Group I and II contributions to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007b; 2007d). 
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PFCs), as well as tropospheric ozone. Gaseous water is also an important greenhouse gas, but its 
phase distribution and short atmospheric residence time make it less relevant as a cause of climate 
change. In its liquid form in the atmosphere (clouds) water reflects solar radiation and has a cool-
ing effect. A number of gases and aerosols can actually cool the Earth's surface by reflecting solar 
radiation, preventing its transformation to infrared and absorption by greenhouse gases. 
 
As greenhouse gas concentrations increase, the amount of absorbed heat also increases. The ques-
tion is whether the increase is sufficient to make a difference and to call the observed rise in global 
mean temperature "man-made". Figure 2.2 shows the annual increase in concentrations of CO2 in 
various years, indicating that every year, the concentration has been rising by roughly 1 – 2 parts 
per million (ppm). CO2 concentrations, in 2005 responsible for about 60% of current additional 
greenhouse gas forcing, have risen from around 280 ppm in 1850 to about 380 ppm in 2005; an in-
crease of over a third. Methane concentrations have more than doubled in that same timeframe, 
and N2O has increased by some 18% (IPCC, 2007d).  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Compilation of changes in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere based on measurements from 1960 – 2005, 
from different measurement stations. The grey bars are the annual concentrations, and the lower black and red lines the 
five-year mean which smoothens some of the short-term variations associated with large meteorological events such as El 
Niño. The top black line shows the change in concentrations had there been no uptake of CO2 by the terrestrial biosphere 
and oceans. (IPCC, 2007d)  
 
The relation between greenhouse gas concentrations and global mean temperature is shaped by a 
number of complex processes in the atmosphere, including interaction between the atmosphere, 
the biosphere, the oceans and other water bodies, and the cryosphere. It requires advanced and 
complex models to project global mean temperature changes from greenhouse gas emissions. 
Complicating factors are the capricious water cycle and complex variations in solar influx. Models 
cannot simulate such processes perfectly, but they are able to explain the measured temperature 
rise (see Figure 2.3) only by counting with the greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC, 2007d; for an 
example of the underlying work: Barnett et al., 2005). This provides a strong indication that the 
temperature rise is indeed partly man-made. Other indicators, such as ecosystem responses, also 
show the human footprint (Parmesan and Yohe, 2003). 
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Figure 2.3 Global average temperature changes 1850-2004. The left axis shows the 1961-1990 anomaly; the right axis the 
actual temperature (IPCC, 2007d) 
 
Although the IPCC's assessment shows that the global mean temperature rise cannot be explained 
without taking human factors into account, not all sceptics have succumbed to the climate change 
hypothesis. Ever since climate change reached the policy agenda, the field has been characterised 
by extensive debate. There have been allegations that doubts of the theory were mainly spread by 
fossil fuel industries and climate-sceptic governments, similar to the initial denial of the tobacco 
industry that its products harm health (Gore, 2006). Leaving this accusation aside, and looking at 
the arguments, one can see that the initially dynamic sceptics movement has currently run out of 
steam. The arguments however also show that large uncertainties about the climate system re-
main, and its inherent complexity might never allow us to claim full proof of the climate change 
hypothesis.  
 
When the climate change hypothesis was first launched, the sceptics, unified in for instance the 
Heidelberg Appeal, resisted it by arguing that the additional greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
were not man-made. When this was established beyond doubt, the argument shifted to the chang-
ing climate itself: based on satellite data (Spencer and Christy, 1990; Christy et al., 2000), it was 
argued, there is no temperature rise and the surface temperature series are not reflecting actual 
global mean temperature changes. By establishing longer and more robust temperature records, 
and by closing the gap between the satellite, weather balloon and weather station data, this argu-
ment could also be refuted (Vinnikov and Grody, 2003). The arrows were then pointed at what is 
to blame for the temperature rise – arguments were made that natural variation, such as variation 
in solar radiation, including short-term and long-term cycles, rather than man-made greenhouse 
gases, caused temperature rises. However, the models improved and became more comprehensive, 
and are now successfully simulating the observed temperature data, including the seemingly ran-
dom variations (IPCC, 2007d). Convincingly, no global circulation model has been able to repro-
duce the rising temperatures without taking into account the human influence. Currently, the only 
sceptics who are still active point at the admittedly large uncertainties in climate modelling.  
 
The next question, after whether there is such a thing as man-made climate change, is what the 
impacts could be, and whether the impacts are severe enough to justify the disruptive and expen-
sive actions required to mitigate climate change. The science in the field of climate change impacts 
has progressed much over the past five years (IPCC, 2007b). Climate change impacts are complex 
because of the regional differences: as meteorological and geographical conditions vary from the 
one area to the other, so do the impacts of climate change. It takes an enormous amount of data to 
get a global picture of regional climate change impacts. Another issue is the range of sectors that 
are involved, leading to many different categories of impacts. Figure 2.4 summarises them in one 
picture, and outlines impacts associated to temperature change. It makes clear that impacts be-
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come more severe with greater temperature rises, that more sectors and regions come into play, 
and that more people would be affected. For instance, quite severe changes in vulnerable ecosys-
tems, such as coral reefs, happen at only a few tens of a degree centigrade, but impacts on crop 
productivity only start at about 1 degree temperature rise relative to the 1980-1999 period. The 
general picture, however, is that from about 1 to 2 degrees, widespread, costly and irreversible ef-
fects are likely to take place. 
 
Figure 2.4 does not show the possibility of large irreversible events that might respond to a 
threshold value of temperature rise. One such events might be a major change in the Atlantic ther-
mohaline circulation due to rising temperatures and river discharge (Peterson et al., 2002), and the 
consequences of that for the global climate (Chang et al., 2008). Although it is not yet well under-
stood how this may work, and which temperature rise might trigger this, the abruptness of such 
an event would lead to even higher costs as adaptation becomes more challenging.  
  
 
Figure 2.4 Estimated relation between global average rise in temperature and global climate change impacts (IPCC, 
2007b) 
 
Supported by initially patchy empirical and modelling evidence, from the beginning of the emer-
gence of the climate change problem, it was assumed that developing countries, and particularly 
the poor in those countries, would bear the gravest consequences of climate change (Schelling, 
1992). Recently, more evidence emerged that confirms this conclusion (IPCC, 2007b). One of the 
areas of research is agriculture, one of the most important sectors in many developing countries as 
a large part of the population still relies on subsidence farming for their livelihoods, and the most 
sensitive to climatic changes. Mendelsohn et al. (2006) assume a parabolic relation between tem-
perature and market impacts and model the economic effects of climate change on various sectors. 
They conclude that the location at lower latitudes of most developing countries is unfavourable in 
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the light of climate change. These countries find themselves on the declining part of the parabolic 
hill, as opposed to the industrialised countries, which are generally in more temperate climate 
zones at higher latitude and can potentially benefit from higher temperatures in sectors such as 
agriculture. Impacts of climate change on global food supply and hunger have also been evaluated, 
and show a higher risk of hunger, particularly in Africa, where subsistence farming remains a ma-
jor source of nutrition (IPCC, 2007a; Parry et al., 2005). This is exacerbated by the result that the 
expected effects of a fertilising effect for crops due to the higher CO2 concentrations in the atmos-
phere, which would partly compensates for the negative climatic consequences (Mendelsohn et al., 
2006; Parry et al., 2005, and references therein) are probably overestimated in current assessments 
and is absent in several essential crops (Long et al., 2005). 
 
Indeed, climate change seems to increase the gap between rich and poor countries (Mendelsohn et 
al., 2006). The IPCC (2007b) indicates that negative health impacts of climate change are en-
hanced for problems typically most severe in developing countries, such as malnutrition, malaria, 
and extreme weather events. For water stress, similar patterns apply. Even in the case of sea level 
rise, the vulnerability is greater in developing countries, as Figure 2.5 shows.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Relative vulnerability of coastal deltas as indicated by estimates of the population potentially displaced by cur-
rent sea-level trends to 2050 (extreme >1 million; high 1 million to 50,000; medium 50,000 to 5,000). Areas with high and 
extreme vulnerability are more likely to experience severe impacts from climate change. Most of these areas are in develop-
ing countries (IPCC, 2007b) 
 
None of these studies attempt to estimate the non-market impacts of climate change, as they are 
hard to convert into economic losses or gains. However, these impacts are by no means insignifi-
cant. They include possibly millions of additional deaths through extreme climate events over the 
coming decades, as well as impacts on health and ecosystems; Nicolas Stern (Stern, 2006) even 
compares climate change to the impact of the first World War. A large natural disaster has a con-
siderable influence on the economic prosperity of a developing country, and a large hurricane, 
apart from the loss of life, can have detrimental economic consequences (Morris et al., 2002). All of 
these results fortify the hypothesis that most damage resulting from climate change will fall to de-
veloping countries, whereas some industrialized countries may even benefit from the conse-
quences of climate change.  
 
Whether the impacts justify the high costs of mitigation (see Section 2.2) is subject to debate. The 
uncertainties that are already present in the scientific assessments multiply once costs and other 
socio-economic factors come into play. Especially in the long-term context, there are different 
views on what kind of discount rate would have to be used. The first such analysis were done by 
Nordhaus (1973). The most famous attempt at a cost-benefit analysis for climate change policy was 
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however done by Sir Nicholas Stern (2006), who concluded that the damage cost of climate 
change greatly outweigh the cost of mitigation. This has been criticised by e.g. Tol (2006), who 
argues that cost-benefit analysis over long timescales is inherently flawed. Others have argued that 
poverty reduction and economic development should get priority over climate change (Lomborg, 
2007). The IPCC (2007c) did not accept the Stern conclusions to their full extent and was critical 
of the method used, but did support the general result that cost of inaction are greater than the 
cost of action.  
 
2.2 Climate change mitigation 
Addressing climate change through its root causes means stabilisation of the greenhouse gas con-
centration in the atmosphere at such a level that it limits global mean temperature rise to an ac-
ceptable level. The natural first step is hence to establish an acceptable temperature rise, associ-
ated with a minimal level of effects of climate change. There are different types of impacts that can 
be used as an indicator for unacceptable climate change, such as several-meter sea level rises over 
the long term or crop productivity losses. Figure 2.4 shows that impacts can already be seen at 
small temperature rises; it however is not possible to reverse those effects. Any “desirable” tem-
perature rise needs to be seen as an arbitrary number.  
  
The European Union has indicated its conviction that temperature rise should not exceed 2ºC rela-
tive to pre-industrial levels. Given that the temperature rise so far has been 0,7ºC already (IPCC, 
2007d), in Figure 2.4 that would be consistent with the 1,3ºC level. This means that most corals 
would be bleached and some crop yields would decrease, especially in developing countries. How-
ever, species loss would be limited, the number of people affected by coastal flooding would be 
relatively low, and several meters sea level rise in the long term can be prevented. Scenario studies 
have subsequently shown that staying within such a temperature range would mean that green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere would have to be stabilised at 400 to 450 ppmv 
(Meinshausen, 2006; IPCC, 2007c).  
 
Reaching any stabilisation target means that the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
has to be reduced, relative to the projected levels if emissions continue developing as they cur-
rently do. This can be done either through adding less greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, or 
through removing them from the atmosphere. The former means that emissions of greenhouse 
gases should be reduced, the latter that natural sinks, such as plants or oceans, should be en-
hanced.  
 
Stabilisation of greenhouse gases should be achieved at a certain point in time. The end of the cen-
tury is often mentioned as a target year. Because this is quite far in the future, the same stabilisa-
tion level can be achieved through very different emission profiles over time. One could think 
about immediate emission reductions to allow for a gradual settling of the rising concentrations, 
and there are various "overshoot" scenarios, that let concentrations rise above the anticipated sta-
bilisation level but, through sudden deep emission reductions later on, still reach the stabilisation 
target in time (Elzen and Meinshausen, 2006; Elzen and Vuuren, 2007). Several emission scenarios 
that all lead to a 550 ppmv result are shown in Figure 2.6. Other studies on stabilisation at lower 
levels, show that this is a very difficult task at current emission levels (Vuuren et al., 2007; Ander-
son and Bows, 2008; see also the next section). 
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Figure 2.6 Different emission pathways to reach a 550 ppmv stabilisation level, including one overshoot scenario (Stern, 
2006; based on Elzen and Meinshausen, 2006) 
 
The global models that are used to compile all these variables into projections are very complex 
and it is often difficult to explain the outcome directly from the inputs. The uncertainties in emis-
sion scenarios and the way these uncertainties were communicated have led to controversies in 
popular media (Schenk and Lensink, 2007). 
 
The challenge of climate change mitigation is often expressed in emission reductions. To deter-
mine the amount of emission reductions at a certain point in time and consistent with an accept-
able stabilisation level, a baseline has to be assumed. Baseline scenarios are about as difficult to 
project as emission profiles, and have similarly large uncertainties. To avoid the baseline problem, 
emission reductions are therefore often given relative to a certain base year in the past, such as 
1990 in the case of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. National targets are often not expressed in emission 
reductions but in allowable emissions or an emission cap.  
 
Global greenhouse gas emissions have risen by about 70% between 1970 and 2004, and most of the 
rise has been due to CO2 in the energy supply and transport sectors (IPCC, 2007c). The current 
greenhouse gas emissions per sector are given in Figure 2.7, indicating clearly that not one sector is 
solely responsible for the problem, or is able to provide a solution. Much of the emissions in vari-
ous sectors, particularly energy supply, transport, buildings and industry, however, are related to 
the use of fossil fuels for energy (IEA, 2007a). This is the reason why the energy sector is most of-
ten targeted in the climate negotiations and in studies on climate change mitigation.  
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Figure 2.7 Sectoral distribution of global 2004 anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007c) 
 
This thesis will focus on climate change mitigation through emission reductions, as opposed to 
carbon sinks. It will therefore mainly look at CO2 emission reductions in the energy, transport, 
buildings and industrial sectors. The options to reduce emissions in these sectors are diverse, and 
include energy efficiency improvements, the use of non-fossil-fuel energy, the capture and storage 
of CO2, industrial process improvements and behavioural changes. The "optimal path" of emission 
profiles over the course of this century, so up to 2100, and the optimal mix of mitigation options is 
mostly computed based on models that optimise on the overall cost of reducing emissions. 
 
2.3 Economic models, climate mitigation and technology4 
There are a wide variety of analytical models being used to consider and inform climate change 
policy at national, regional, and global levels. The IPCC (2007c) found over 750 emissions scenar-
ios in the literature, and all of them consider different portfolios of technologies. The assumptions 
on success of technological innovation, learning curves, discount rates, and availability and adop-
tion of technologies, as well as the assumptions on what would happen in a business-as-usual (or 
baseline) case, determine the outcome of such an analysis (IPCC, 2000b). The outputs, as well as 
the temporal and spatial scope, sophistication, language, assumptions, system boundaries, and 
theoretical frameworks of these analytical tools vary dramatically across the different models. They 
generally require assumptions about the technical status, potential scale and rate of deployment, 
costs and future costs and social acceptability, within an assumed framework for decision making 
- typically cost minimisation.  
 
The principal forums for comparing energy/climate/Integrated Assessment Modelling models in-
clude: the Energy Modelling Forum (Weyant, 2004b), the Innovation Modelling Comparison Pro-
ject (Edenhofer et al., 2006), the US Climate Change Science Programme (Clarke et al., 2007), and 
IPCC (2007c)5. In all of these collaborations, marginal abatement cost curves on various levels of 
aggregation are used as an instrument to estimate abatement costs and potential on the national 
and global level (Elzen et al., 2007; Ellerman, 1998). Global technology-focused marginal abate-
ment cost curves, such as those prepared by Vattenfall (2007), Bakker et al. (2007) and IEA 
(2008b) are useful in considering technology priorities and relative costs. However one global 
                                                 
4  This section is based on section 2.2 in Bazilian et al. (2008). 
5  Other results showing various technology portfolios include: Strachan et al. (2007), Das et al. (2007), Boeters et al. (2007), 
IEA (2007a), Riahi et al. (2007), Vuuren (2007b), Weyant (2004b). 
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curve is not sufficient to inform a comprehensive approach. Energy efficiency (or aspects of it), for 
instance, often appears with negative marginal abatement costs in these exercises, illustrating that 
the complex nature of technology innovation and diffusion is not solely related to economic costs. 
Hence, as with any forecasting study, model outcomes are surrounded with huge uncertainties, 
and should not be taken at face value. Apart from basic uncertainties on population growth, eco-
nomic activity and large societal developments, there are many other uncertainties related to tech-
nological feasibility and costs. 
 
Vuuren (2007a) also provides a detailed technology analysis to meet the dramatic shift required to 
reach a 450 ppmv stabilisation target over a longer time horizon (to 2100). His work has formed 
the basis of the ‘lower range’ of stabilisation targets, which rarely go below 450 ppmv (IPCC, 
2007c). Vuuren et al. (2007a) impacted policy thinking on deep stabilisation levels and technology, 
for instance by demonstrating that such stabilisation levels require the application of ‘negative’ 
CO2 energy production from bio-energy with CCS (Obersteiner and Azar, 2002). William Nord-
haus (2007) developed the DICE model to consider a number of post-2012 policy options ranging 
from no action to moving into geo-engineering. The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives report 
(IEA, 2008b) shows more detail on technology’s contribution to emissions reduction targets to 
2050, and also shed light on total additional investment required to meet the scenario of 50% re-
ductions in CO2 emissions by 2050 relative to 2005 (Figure 2.8). The issue of timing, or capital 
stock turnover, is essential in considering the role of technology; creating an impetus for short-
term action. This is considered in detail in IEA (2007a).  
 
 
Figure 2.8 IEA technology portfolio for a scenario demanding 50% emission reductions relative to 2005 (IEA, 2008b) 
 
It is a recent trend that cost-optimisation modelling are accompanied by technology action plans 
or “roadmaps”. The IEA, for instance, in its Energy Technology Perspectives (2008b) considers 
roadmaps outlining a development and implementation pathway of the seventeen technologies 
included in the analysis. Likewise, the Japanese Cool Earth (METI, 2008) programme identified 
twenty-one technology pathways, and the European Commission also considered ‘technology 
maps’ for 14 technologies (EC, 2007a). The IEA modelling exercises and pathways are widespread: 
rather than making their own scenarios, the UNFCCC used the IEA numbers for its own reports 
identifying the finance and investment needs (UNFCCC, 2008a). 
 
Obersteiner and Azar (2002), noting the vast uncertainties in technology investment and deploy-
ment, utilises real-options theory to consider technological possibilities, as do Yang and Blyth 
(2007). In such cost optimisation studies, uncertainties are addressed through a probabilistic ap-
proach. Another way of reflecting uncertainties is by including them explicitly in the model as-
sumptions. Organisations less interested in cost optimisation have published energy scenarios 
based on an effective technology response to climate change via the technical feasibility of meeting 
growing global energy demand using sustainable energy technologies (e.g, WWF, 2008; Bellona, 
2008). This approach is explicitly technology-specific. It does not assume technology costs or a 
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carbon price - the costs of dangerous climate change are assumed to far exceed the costs of avoid-
ing it. Instead, it focuses on key questions of the physical resources, the capacity of the technolo-
gies themselves and the rate of industrial transitions. The results of the approaches are roughly 
consistent: they suggest that there is a reasonable chance of success, however, physical and engi-
neering constraints, regardless of a carbon price or other policy measures, limit the rate at which 
emissions can be bought down and that some overshoot of emissions may be inevitable (IPCC, 
2007c). 
 
2.4 What is technology, and what is its role in climate change mitigation? 
Perspectives on technology have changed throughout the centuries due to changing culture, new 
insights and new roles for technology. Some regard technology as a panacea to all problems that 
face humanity, others see it as a human-created monster that is out of control (Hughes, 2004). The 
relation between technology and climate change is correspondingly tense: on the one hand, tech-
nology is the cause of the problem, on the other it is a large part of the solution and has greatly im-
proved quality of life for many people. Although non-technological mitigation options such as be-
havioural changes should also play a role (IPCC, 2007c), all studies on mitigation (e.g., IPCC, 
2007c; IEA, 2007a; Stern, 2006) foresee the largest role in mitigation of climate change for envi-
ronmentally sound technology. Technology, however, is complex, means many things to many 
people, and therefore needs a specific definition in the context of this thesis.  
 
Arguably, the broadest (and undoubtedly shortest) definition of technology has been given in so-
cial science literature: "configurations that work" (Rip and Kemp, 1998). It is used to place tech-
nology in a system context: the technological system, including the infrastructure and hardware, 
as well as the social system, including institutions, together comprise the level of adoption and the 
innovative capacity. Although this definition may be useful when studying dynamics of adoption 
of technology in social systems, it is less applicable to the context of international institutions, the 
topic of this thesis – although it should be said that exploring the role international institutions 
could play in enhancing the uptake of technology in a social system would be worthwhile.  
 
Another literature that has had to come to terms with the role of technology innovation is econom-
ics. Schumpeter’s model, which first addressed the relation between technology and economic 
growth in the 1910s (translated to English in 1934), was hardly challenged for about half a century, 
until Rosenberg (1973; 1976) and Nelson and Winter (1977) revitalised it to explain historical dif-
ferences between countries. Rosenberg (1973) defines technology as “the relationship between in-
puts and outputs in the economy” and technological progress occurs when the outputs increase 
relative to the inputs. A natural question that arises is why certain economies develop in a different 
direction than others, perform better or worse than others, and hence what the role of innovation 
or technological change is. Rosenberg (1973), through a historical comparison of the US and Brit-
ish economies, arrived at the conclusion that the local resource endowments play an important 
role in the direction of technological change. In this context, resources can be natural resources, 
such as the availability of wood, but also resources such as skilled labour. Technology, in this view, 
thus pertains to much more than just physical structures; it also relates to general education and 
skills level of a country’s population. Recent publications have not challenged this view (Arthur, 
2006; Nelson, 2008).  
 
A most applicable definition of technology is given in IPCC reports. In its Special Report on Meth-
odological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer (IPCC, 2000a): "A piece of equipment, 
technique, practical knowledge or skills for performing a particular activity". In its Fourth Assess-
ment Report, the definition was expanded to "the practical application of knowledge to achieve 
particular tasks that employs both technical artefacts (hardware, equipment) and (social) infor-
mation (‘software’, know-how for production and use of artefacts)" (IPCC, 2007c). This marks the 
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viewing of "technology as an object" to "technology as an application", and it notably does not take 
the economic, more firm-based approach to technology and innovation. On earlier occasions, Dosi 
(1982) posed “know-how, methods, procedures, experience of successes and failures, physical de-
vices and equipment”. This thesis will adopt the latter definition, as the international agreements 
that would further technology focus on its application and the processes involving that, rather 
than the hardware alone. 
 
The rising greenhouse gas emissions are largely due to technology innovation and diffusion, such 
as more and larger household appliances, and in some cases the high greenhouse gas intensity of 
technology, such as the trend to heavier cars (IPCC, 2007c). Achieving the emission reductions 
required for stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations requires the development and diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies. Environmentally sound technologies are technologies that 
lead to substantial emission reductions compared to the baseline. Baselines differ per situation, 
notably per country. Where, for instance, in the US corn-based bio-ethanol can be a significant 
improvement relative to a planned switch to transport fuel from coal-to-liquids operations, in Bra-
zil this would worsen the greenhouse gas balance because of the availability of sugar-cane based 
ethanol, which has much lower greenhouse gas emissions. The appropriateness of technology will 
also depend on the eventual targets over the lifetime of the installation. For instance, although 
combined heat and power applications (CHP) reduce emissions significantly compared to the 
baseline of not using CHP, if the eventual target is to bring back emissions by over 50% within the 
lifetime of the CHP installation, the technology might be better than the baseline but not good 
enough for the policy goal.  
 
It is clear, and various literature sources have confirmed this, that technology is essential for 
achieving climate mitigation targets. What is less known, however, is the level of innovation re-
quired for these targets. Although research and development, leading to technological innovation 
and new technological solutions, would improve cost-effectiveness, the required emission reduc-
tions can be fully achieved through deployment of existing technologies (IPCC, 2001d; 2007c). The 
IEA (2008b) has developed 450 ppm-scenarios based on currently available technologies. Pacala 
and Socolow (2004) have comprehensively explained through a number of technology wedges that 
seven times 1 GtC (3.67 GtCO2) worth of deployment of technology leads to the same global emis-
sions in 2050 as now; supposedly consistent with a 550 ppmv scenario. Their estimate is based on 
technologies known today, such as wind energy, hybrid cars, and nuclear energy. What kind of 
investment is needed depends on the stage of technological development – it is not of much use to 
do fundamental research on a technology that is near commercialisation. Diffusion of available 
technologies that currently are more costly than conventional ones would bring costs down fur-
ther than large investments in research and development, which are unable to overcome the com-
mercialisation barriers. The rate of diffusion also matters for making best use of learning effects.  
 
The policy conclusion from the findings of climate change mitigation and technology forecasters is 
that climate policy that reduces greenhouse gases and implements technology is required on a 
rather short term to bring down emissions in time for the lower stabilisation levels. A policy based 
on technological innovation push role alone is insufficient to address the problem.  
 
2.5 The political playing field 
The international politics of climate change started with the inception of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. Although the IPCC is essentially a science-based organi-
sation, its principles and procedures include a significant government role. The IPCC Plenary es-
tablishes the IPCC’s strategic plans, determine which reports will be compiled, and approve the 
Assessment and Special Reports. The IPCC Principles and Procedures prescribe that every IPCC 
report should be accompanied by a Summary for Policymakers (SPM), which needs to be approved 
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line by line by IPCC’s 180 governments in a process that is essentially a full-fledged text negotia-
tion. The scientific integrity is guaranteed by not allowing the SPM to contradict or paraphrase 
the body report text in any way. In the IPCC, the scientists have the last word.  
 
The IPCC already in its First Assessment Report, published in 1990, concluded that climate 
change is occurring and that addressing it requires international collaborative action. This is re-
flected in the objective that parties to the UNFCCC agreed to in 1992 during the Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro. Specifically, 191 of the world's nations have now ratified the UNFCCC, which ex-
plicitly states as its goal the "stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system [...] within a timeframe sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally [...], to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."  
 
The UNFCCC is a pledge-and-review type of agreement and is binding to its participants. The 
phrasing of the commitments, however, leaves so much room for interpretation that it is in reality 
a soft-law treaty, with targets that make measurement of compliance impossible. This deliberate 
ambiguity has been reported to lead to only very limited action (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Tomp-
kins and Amundsen, 2008). In response to this, in 1997, the UNFCCC Parties met in Japan to ne-
gotiate the Kyoto Protocol, which is based on a clear and binding targets-and-timetables approach. 
The negotiation process in Kyoto was dominated by several major blocs of countries, united by 
their common interests. Each bloc was interested in a Protocol design that would minimise the 
domestic economic impact. Some countries, especially the United States and its allies at the time 
(Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), argued for the inclusion of market mechanisms 
within the Protocol. In contrast, the European Union (EU) argued for strong targets and against 
the inclusion of market-based policy mechanisms, as they would allow countries to avoid domestic 
emission reductions. The Economies in Transition, mainly Eastern Europe and Russia, were char-
acterised by economic transformation since 1990, and strongly reduced emissions. The developing 
countries, including China and united in the G-77, were chiefly aiming at preventing emission re-
duction targets for developing countries and argued for industrialised countries to, in line with the 
UNFCCC, take action first and provide sufficient funding for technology transfer and adaptation.  
 
The resulting Kyoto Protocol, to which all UNFCCC Parties agreed in 1997, contained quantitative 
emission targets for Annex-I countries, an emissions trading provision, the possibility of using the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to on the one hand allow non-Annex I countries to pursue 
sustainable development and provide them with incentives to reduce emissions, and on the other 
allow Annex-I countries to achieve their Kyoto targets in a more cost-effective way. The Kyoto 
Protocol entered into force in February 2005, after Russia decided to ratify. Currently, all Annex-I 
countries have ratified it, including most recently Australia. The only Annex-I country that re-
jected the Kyoto Protocol, at the same time the largest contributor to global greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the United States, gave two reasons for its rejection: that the economic consequences would 
be too severe, and that developing countries, particularly China, which was not subjected to emis-
sion targets.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol is generally designed as a market-based instrument. Market-based approaches 
are often only thought of as national or regional policy instruments. The Kyoto Protocol, however, 
shows that also international policy instruments can use a combination of the market and eco-
nomic incentives to reach a policy goal. The Kyoto Protocol is notably not a regulatory (sometimes 
also named command-and-control) approach, as the EU initially favoured. UK delegates at the 
time constructed a list of “policies and measures” that would qualify for compliance with the fu-
ture Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). The list was eventually never used; the EU has since embraced 
market mechanisms and has gone on to establish its own internal emissions trading system. 
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The Kyoto Protocol has not gone without criticism from scholarly circles. There is a large body of 
literature covering the merits and drawbacks of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., Cooper, 1998; Ott, 2001; 
Victor, 2001). The literature seems to converge on a number of main points on which a new climate 
agreement should be improved: 
• Participation should increase to include the United States. For this, an agreement would have 
to be designed that takes away its concerns. Also, the large emerging economies would need to 
be involved in curbing emissions (Victor, 2001). 
• Compliance and particularly enforcement mechanisms need to be strengthened, preferably by 
designing a treaty that is self-enforcing (Barrett, 1998; Victor, 2001).  
• Environmental effectiveness, both in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and induc-
ing technological change, should be greater than is currently the case. The reason is that the 
measures resulting from the Kyoto Protocol obligations are insufficient to solve the climate 
problem – the period over which the emission reductions are needed does not incentivise tech-
nological change. (Ott, 2001; Cooper, 1998). 
• Technology transfer to developing countries should be enhanced. Technology transfer is men-
tioned in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol but is not tied up with concrete targets or obli-
gations (Sathaye et al., 2006). 
• Net economic impacts of the agreement should be predictable and as low as possible. The rea-
son for this improvement relates to the earlier point of participation of the United States and 
other countries (Victor, 2001; Cooper, 1998). 
 
Before the ink was dry on the Kyoto treaty, it was clear that the negotiators from several parties 
had stepped out ahead of their own domestic politics. In the United States, for example, the Senate 
voted preceding the Kyoto negotiations to repudiate the agreements in the Berlin Mandate (US 
Senate, 1997), an agreement made at the first Conference of Parties in 1995 that helped establish 
Kyoto. In 2001, the Bush Administration formally exited the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and therefore a major player, however, the United 
States had to do something. It decided to make technological research and development the central 
pillar of its climate policy, and has since 2001 invested heavily in research and development of 
greenhouse gas reducing technologies. Internationally, it has set up institutions that also aim to 
further technologies, particularly through knowledge sharing and coordination (Coninck et al., 
2008a). The most well-known examples are the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP) and the CO2 capture and storage-specific Carbon Sequestration Leadership 
Forum (CSLF).  
 
Views of these political initiatives of the United States are mixed. Some see them, and particularly 
the APP, as a step in the right direction and argue that one cannot pass judgment until it has been 
given a chance, and that technological innovation is also important. Others regard it as a purpose-
ful and deliberate distraction of the real issue, and a poor replacement for dropping out of Kyoto 
(Asselt, 2007). So far, it seems that the latter are closest to the truth – it is unlikely that the APP 
will deliver anything close to the Kyoto emission reductions, or make much of a difference in the 
future. 
 
The commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol extends from 2008 until 2012, and it will have to 
prove whether it is effective, and whether its Parties will comply to its conditions – notably a 6-8 
% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990. Broad ratification of Kyoto, of 175 
countries and its entry into force thanks to Russia's ratification, are among its successes. Prospects 
for compliance of the EU, Australia and Russia look good, for Japan slightly less well, and for Can-
ada dim. The developing countries only participate through the voluntary, project-based market 
mechanism the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which has taken off quickly and is cur-
rently the largest CO2 trading mechanism worldwide (World Bank, 2006a). Over 1100 projects are 
registered with the UNFCCC, and almost 4000 are in the pipeline (UNEP/Risoe, 2008).  
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Negotiations on what will happen after Kyoto, including types of commitments, developing coun-
try involvement, and the role of technology, have started officially with the adoption of the Bali 
Action Plan in December 2007. This plan sets a deadline for finalising the negotiations of COP15, in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, and mentions five fields of agreement: a shared vision on climate 
change, mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance. At the time of writing, it was still unclear 
what type of proposals would be considered under these tracks, although submissions have been 
made by various countries and negotiating blocks (UNFCCC, 2008b). The technology track and 
the possibilities it offers for a broadly acceptable and effective climate agreement are the topic of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 Technology in the climate change regime6 
Abstract 
This paper explores how including technology in a climate treaty design can augment the institu-
tional solutions offered by current political theory. It does so in three steps. First, the paper de-
scribes features of climate change that are relevant to rational actors and expands current thinking 
in international relations and rational design of institutions based on those features, to confirm the 
economic conclusion that an emission target-based regime is not a rational design. Subsequently, it 
looks at technology as a possibility to provide reciprocity and prevent free-riding in the institu-
tional design of a climate change treaty. Climate-friendly technology is required to achieve emis-
sion reductions, it was introduced in the Bali Action Plan agreed in 2007, and might, as this paper 
argues, make a treaty more self-enforcing. Lastly, technology-oriented agreements, as an institu-
tional form to include technology in the climate regime, are explored. Technology-oriented agree-
ments are defined as agreements aimed at advancing technologies to address climate change. They 
have advantages such as better prospects on self-enforceability and better cost predictability, but 
also issues such as reduced cost-effectiveness and flexibility compared to emission-reduction 
agreements. Regardless of whether technology-oriented agreements would replace or complement 
a cap-and-trade agreement, embedding in the current climate regime needs to be coordinated to 
prevent fragmentation of the environmental effectiveness. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to provide, founded on international relations theory, an explanation of the 
current climate negotiations situation, and explore the role of technology in a future treaty design. 
To that aim, it combines insights from the rational institutional design literature with recent cli-
mate change science, mitigation, and technology insights. It also explores views on technology-
oriented agreements along with their advantages and drawbacks.  
 
In the field of institutional design, over the past decades, approaches founded on economically ra-
tional behavior theory (Coase, 1986) and expanded with methods and insights from international 
relations have led to the recognition that the design of international institutions matters to the ef-
fectiveness of international governance (Keohane, 1984). Institutional design has emerged as a sub-
field of international relations theory and is still under development, with notable additions in the 
field of international law (see e.g. Raustiala, 2005), rational design of institutions (Koremenos et 
al. (2001) and networks (Slaughter, 2004). In terms of classical coordination games with a rela-
tively symmetrical distribution of costs and benefits (e.g., Martin, 1992; Mitchell and Keilbach, 
2001), or with obvious reciprocal elements or peer pressure (Simmons, 2000), the outcomes of in-
ternational treaties seem predictable. For problems with asymmetrical interests and for issues that 
require deep cooperation to be solved, it has been argued that in the case of "strong victims" and 
even "weak victims", positive exchange or negative coercion may be employed to reduce the exter-
nalities, i.e., rewarding compliance or sanctioning defection, respectively (Mitchell and Keilbach, 
2001; Sell, 1996). However, no obvious answer from the institutional design community has risen 
as of yet for the case of not only weak, but also poor victims, incapable of providing rewards to 
perpetrators or coercing them into agreement and compliance (Sell, 1996). This paper will clarify 
that climate change can be classified as exactly such a case, that the current deadlock is due to this 
very nature of climate change, and that the difficulty to act is consequential of this inherent situa-
tion structure. Technology as a rational design feature has not been discussed in the international 
relations literature, and this paper aims to fill part of that gap.  
 
                                                 
6  This chapter was submitted to International Environmental Agreements.  
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The anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are thought to cause global temperatures to rise 
and an array of adverse effects to happen (IPCC, 2007d). This issue of climate change has received 
increasing recognition as a global environmental problem since the early 1990s. In response, the 
international community set up the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which aims at "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" 
(UNFCCC, 1992). In the Kyoto Protocol, which was agreed three years after the UNFCCC entered 
into force, specific greenhouse gas reduction targets for industrialized countries were agreed 
(UNFCCC, 1997a). On the basis of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (UNFCCC, 1992), 
developing countries were exempted from commitments but the Kyoto Protocol did enable volun-
tary participation via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
 
After the Kyoto Protocol was agreed and while it was implemented, numerous papers were pub-
lished in the field of political science, subjecting the protocol to general rules of institutional de-
sign (for a review, see Böhringer, 2003). The Kyoto Protocol was criticized for not taking account 
of requirements of participation, flexibility and compliance (Barrett, 1998; Victor, 2001). Indeed, 
the protocol had mixed results. Part of the criticism was proven right, as the United States, the 
largest greenhouse gas emitter, dropped out, and other developed countries may not comply. At 
the same time, however, in those countries where the protocol was seriously pursued, a carbon 
market now flourishes and most of the alleged design flaws have proven unproblematic. In addi-
tion to assessment, there is no lack of proposals for improved designs of a post-2012 climate regime 
for after the Kyoto period ends, in 2012 (Bodansky, 2004). Most of it builds on Kyoto by proposing 
economic instruments such as the emissions trading scheme that Kyoto has introduced (Höhne, 
2005). Subsequent assessments of post-2012 proposals have attempted to overcome the criticism, 
but could never quite reach a workable treaty with a functional design (Aldy et al., 2003).  
 
Since the 11th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, the discussion of post-2012 regimes 
has an official place both under the UNFCCC and among the parties of the Kyoto Protocol. After 
years of dialogue, the 13th COP in Bali resulted in a much welcomed Action Plan. The Bali Action 
Plan calls for a shared vision on long-term commitments and outlines four additional negotiation 
tracks: mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology (UNFCCC, 2007). The plan does not in-
clude a reference to commitments, but indicates that agreement should be reached by COP15 in 
Copenhagen, in December 2009.  
 
Although the results of Bali point at some progress relative to the failed negotiations at earlier 
COPs, they are by no means a guarantee that the deadlock in the climate negotiations is now re-
solved. The negotiations in Bali were difficult and long, and consensus could only be reached by 
significantly watering down the ambitious text that appeared in earlier drafts. Statements of the 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC itself reveal some pessimism about the chances for a mean-
ingful agreement in 2009, and recent meetings in 2008 have made little progress on the various 
agenda items. Views on how mitigation and adaptation should be addressed diverge between de-
veloped and developing countries negotiation blocs, as well as within these blocs, including the 
emerging economies whose involvement is essential for a credible Kyoto follow-up. Particularly 
the fields of finance and technology are relatively new in the negotiations and there are hopes that 
these issues will yield concrete results.  
  
This paper looks at technology, and focuses on one of the possible forms to incorporate technology 
in the climate negotiations: technology-oriented agreements. Elsewhere, technology-oriented 
agreements are defined as “all agreements that are aimed at advancing research, development, 
demonstration, and/or deployment of technologies” (Coninck et al., 2008a). There is some mention 
of technology in reviews of potential post-2012 climate regimes, and some proposals have been 
made, although their role is small compared to economic instruments. Most proposals for post-
2012 climate policy have a technology component, although almost always focusing on R&D and 
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excluding deployment, so without prospects for significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
through the technology component (Bodansky, 2004). Some agreements aim more directly at 
technology, but provide little incentives for deployment (e.g., Barrett, 1998; 2003). Such proposals 
have thus been dismissed as unacceptable from the climate point of view (Berk and Elzen, 2001; 
Höhne, 2005). A notable exception is a proposal by Edmonds and Wise (1998), who propose a 
global CCS mandate but present it exclusively as a “backstop” option. Recently, a review paper of 
existing and future technology-oriented agreements in different environmental fields analyzed 
how effective they have been in the past, and what their role may be in the climate change regime 
(Coninck et al., 2008a). The most significant technology-oriented agreement in climate change is 
the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), which aims at facilitating 
investments in climate-friendly technologies. The APP was initiated by the United States, with 
Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, in 2005, and joined later by Canada, but has not 
resulted in significant deployment of technology (Asselt, 2007).  
 
Technology-oriented agreements bear some resemblance to the policies and measures (or actions) 
approach advocated by the European Union in the pre-Kyoto climate negotiations (UNFCCC, 
1997b; Ott, 1998), which was at that time rejected, amongst others on instigation of the United 
States, in favor of a cap-and-trade agreement. At the time, an agreement that leaves flexibility for 
the market to find the most cost-effective solution was preferred. Whether technology-oriented 
agreements are old wine in new bottles remains to be seen, and might also depend on new circum-
stances. For instance, the possibility that a new technology like CO2 capture and storage might 
generate relatively affordable CO2 reductions without the need to shift away from cheap coal in-
creases the faith of the private sector as well as fossil fuel-reliant countries that pursuing the de-
ployment of such technologies generates the momentum needed for deep reductions in emissions, 
without immediate major disruptions in the energy sector (IPCC, 2005).  
 
It should be noted upfront that technology-oriented agreements could be pursued both parallel to 
and in place of an emission target-based approach (Sugiyama and Sinton, 2005; Coninck et al., 
2008a). This paper oscillates between technology-oriented agreements being an addition to and a 
replacement for an emission target-regime, but this does not affect the outcome of this analysis. A 
single technology-oriented agreement would normally never operate in an institutional vacuum, as 
it by definition addresses one technology, and there is not one technology that can address climate 
change by itself. There will thus always be interactions with other agreements relevant to climate 
change, regardless of whether they are other technology-oriented agreements or emission reduc-
tion agreements. The question whether a technology-oriented agreement replaces or complements 
an emission-target aimed agreement, therefore matters under every each scenario. As a starting 
point, this paper will describe and evaluate a technology-oriented agreement on a stand-alone ba-
sis. The focus is on the question what dynamic technology and technology-oriented agreements 
would introduce in the climate negotiations. In various places in the paper, technology-oriented 
agreements are related to the situation around the current Kyoto Protocol and its most commonly 
proposed follow-ups – an international cap-and-trade agreement.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, some relevant features of climate change are described in 
Section 3.2. Next, in Section 3.3, rational-actor outcomes of agreeing on an emission target-based 
climate regime are analyzed and the theoretical model is expanded. Technology-oriented agree-
ments are introduced in Section 3.4, and their prospects are discussed in Section 3.5. Finally, a way 
forward is suggested in Section 3.6. 
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3.2 The difficulty of rationally designing a climate change regime: redistribution 
and depth of cooperation 
If one conclusion can be drawn from the history of international climate change negotiations, it is 
that it is very difficult to reach agreement on mitigating climate change. Making suggestions for 
improvement requires understanding of the issues behind the sole goal of greenhouse gas emission 
reduction. A deeper look into the causes of the difficulties can facilitate reaching agreement in the 
negotiations. This section sets out with two major issues that inhibit an outcome on climate 
change mitigation: the redistributional character of climate change, and the issue of depth of coop-
eration.  
 
Climate change has a number of characteristics that qualify it as a "redistribution issue", which for 
this paper is defined as "an issue that requires a more proportional distribution of commodities in 
order to be solved in a just manner". In the context of climate change, the perception of what is 
"just" pertains both to who bears the burden of preserving the collective good of a stable climate 
(i.e. who reduces greenhouse gas emissions), and who would suffer the most from impacts of cli-
mate change. Developed states generally emit more greenhouse gases and are in a better position to 
cope with the impacts of climate change, while developing countries are more vulnerable and bear 
a smaller responsibility for the problem. This characteristic feature intertwines the climate change 
problem closely development questions. For designing international institutions for climate 
change, it is important to understand the diversity in players in the culprits for the problem, the 
ones who will bear the cost of solving it, and those who will bear the costs of collective inaction.  
 
In order to prevent climate change, the concentration of all greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
including CO2, will need to stabilize. CO2 concentrations before the industrial revolution (around 
1850) were about 280 parts per million (ppm);. Current concentrations of CO2 are over 380 ppm, 
and concentrations of the whole basket of greenhouse gases are already well over 400 ppm CO2-eq 
(IPCC, 2007a). Early models indicate that a concentration of 550 ppm CO2-eq (or double the pre-
industrial level) would be low enough to stay below a global mean temperature rise of 2°C (IPCC, 
2001a), but the current consensus is that stabilization at 450 ppm or even lower would be neces-
sary to prevent the severest of effects (Elzen and Meinshausen, 2006; Hansen et al., 2008; Ander-
son and Bows, 2008). The emission reductions associated with such a stabilization level are daunt-
ing, require emission reductions in both industrialized countries and major developing country 
emitters, and would have profound impacts on the way energy is used and produced. The availabil-
ity of reliable and affordable energy is an important precondition for virtually all economic activi-
ties. In 2003, 80% of all primary energy used in the world originated from fossil fuels. This share is 
lower than the 85% of fossil energy in 1973, but the use of energy has also increased by about 75% 
(and counting), so the absolute use of fossil fuels is still on the rise (Raupach et al., 2007). Most 
energy scenarios project doubling of CO2 emissions by 2050 relative to 2000, due to increasing en-
ergy use and persistent share of fossil fuels in the energy mix (IEA, 2007a). However, in order to 
stabilize concentrations at low levels, global emissions will need to peak before 2015 and decline 
thereafter. It has been argued that it is technically feasible to achieve such goals with the current 
portfolio of technologies (IPCC, 2007c), and options to reach such levels have been outlined in 
several comprehensive approaches (IPCC, 2007c; 2001a; Pacala and Socolow, 2004). 
 
Currently, CO2 emissions in the industrialized countries are about half of the global emissions, 
while these countries constitute only about 20% of the world's population (IEA, 2007a). The lion's 
share of the greenhouse gases that have cumulatively been emitted over the past 150 years origi-
nates from the industrialized countries. These countries are also in the best position, both having 
the required economic means, institutional maturity, and level of technological development, to 
invest in addressing climate change. These factors have led to the political consensus that the ac-
tions to reduce CO2 emissions would be taken (or at least paid for) in industrialized countries 
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first, as reflected in the earlier mentioned UNFCCC7. On the other hand, however, it can be argued 
as well that the industrialized countries have been conditioned more than developing countries 
towards a fossil-fuel-based, high energy-using society. It makes deep emission reductions for those 
countries that have chosen an energy-intensive path in the past, unknowing of the consequences in 
the future, more disruptive and costly, as well as more difficult to achieve as it involves a more pro-
found breach with prevailing practices. In addition, the situation is changing: large industrializing 
countries are responsible for an increasing share of global greenhouse gas emissions, making them 
an indispensable part of the solution.  
 
The main incentive to prevent climate change is the aversion of harmful impacts that result from 
the rise in global mean temperature (IPCC, 2007b). Supported by initially patchy empirical and 
modelling evidence, from the beginning of the emergence of the climate change problem, it was 
assumed that developing countries, and particularly the poor in those countries, would bear the 
gravest consequences of climate change (Schelling, 1992). Recently, more evidence emerged that 
confirms this conclusion (IPCC, 2007b). Modelling of impacts of climate change on global food 
supply show a higher risk of hunger, particularly in Africa, where subsistence farming remains a 
major source of nutrition (Parry et al., 2005). Indeed, climate change seems to increase the gap be-
tween rich and poor countries (Mendelsohn et al., 2006), even excluding non-market impacts of 
climate change, such as premature deaths. To make things worse, the assumed positive effects of 
the higher CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere on CO2 fertilizing of crops are probably overes-
timated in current assessments and absent for several essential crops (Long et al., 2005). All of 
these results fortify the hypothesis that most damage resulting from climate change will fall to de-
veloping countries, whereas some industrialized countries may even benefit from the conse-
quences of climate change.  
 
There is another redistribution issue that is less discussed in literature, and that touches upon the 
Brundtland definition of sustainable development: the issue of intergenerational redistribution. If 
climate change is not prevented, later generations will bear the burden of the present generation's 
free-riding. If climate change is prevented, most of the benefits will be reaped by the later genera-
tions, while the costs are borne by the present generation. This simple way of putting it leads to 
the conclusion that a rational, self-interested present generation will not act on preventing climate 
change, which further complicates the incentive structure for mitigating climate change. Although 
the literature informs us that redistribution issues can be addressed in various ways (see Sec-
tion 3.3), a solution to generational redistribution issues (or even a consistent framework to de-
scribe them) has not yet been proposed (Barrett, 2007). This paper will therefore focus on the ma-
terial redistribution issues around climate change, and leave the intergenerational issues outside of 
its scope.  
 
The second complicating factor is that the "depth of cooperation" required to address climate 
change is unprecedented in environmental issues, and perhaps even in all international govern-
ance. Depth of cooperation is defined as that extent to which an international treaty diverts behav-
iour from the national baseline (Downs et al., 1996). Given the intrusiveness of measures to reduce 
greenhouse gases into every single aspect of our economic activities, the depth of cooperation for 
any environmentally effective climate change treaty can be considered large.  
 
Related to that, and adding complexity, is the breadth of actors that needs to be involved, con-
vinced, stimulated or coerced into action. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves lifestyle 
aspects, industrial practices, energy production, mobility, buildings and agriculture. The actors are 
therefore multilayer: apart from governments, they include individual consumers, appliance users, 
                                                 
7  See e.g., the EU Climate Package, 2008, the Bali outcomes, and various speeches at the Major Economies Meeting, April 17-
18, 2008, Paris, France. 
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vehicle drivers, businesses, manufacturers, real estate developers, urban planners, the metal and 
cement industry, the electricity sector, the fossil-fuel industry, airlines and farmers.  
 
Given the demand for profound societal changes, it has been argued that the technologies that 
need to be implemented and the measures that need to be taken require more than just bringing 
down a number of barriers to making technologies ripe for the market; they require a change in the 
"socio-technical system" (Shove, 1998; Hofman, 2005). There is a significant body of literature on 
sociological aspects of technology and technology system dynamics, part of which will be dis-
cussed in Section 3.5. Globalization of innovation plays into this, which has been noted (Archibugi 
and Michie, 1995) but is generally not reflected in discussions of an international agreement. Al-
ready complex in the national context, including the aim of technological change in international 
policies is likely to be very challenging.  
 
Although there are other reasons to pursue a more sustainable energy system, to increase energy 
efficiency and to use non-fossil sources of energy (such as security of energy supply or air quality) 
reduction of CO2 emissions is the only compelling reason to make those changes as immediately 
and profoundly as a 450-ppmv or even a 650-ppmv scenario would require. As costs are high 
(IPCC, 2007c), the required depth of cooperation and associated compliance problems are very 
real. 
 
The above shows that situation structure of climate change is characterized by three complicating 
components. Firstly, by reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions and letting developing coun-
tries increase theirs, industrialized countries would redistribute the right to use fossil-fuel-based, 
cheap energy to developing countries, in order to provide them with the opportunity to develop. 
Secondly, the industrialized countries have to make profound changes in their energy system in 
order to prevent the negative consequences that will primarily take place in developing countries. 
Any climate treaty would therefore need to result in an unprecedented depth of cooperation. And 
thirdly, future generations benefit from preventing climate change, while present generations bear 
the costs.  
 
3.3 Rational design of international institutions, and climate change 
Rational actors make self-interested decisions. If a rational-actor framework is consistently ap-
plied to public good provisions, the self-interested decision is to free-ride, and the public good will 
be underprovided (Olson, 1965). Applying this to climate change, the public good of a stable cli-
mate will be underprovided as the self-interested action will be free-riding (Buchner et al., 2002). 
This behavior is expected in all international environmental agreements, which lack enforcement 
mechanisms (Barrett, 1994) and thus a credible way to punish defectors. International agreements, 
especially if they feature a degree of depth of cooperation, should therefore be designed in such a 
way that they are self-enforcing, i.e., “attractive for countries to want to sign, and want to carry out 
the terms of agreement” (Barrett, 1994).  
 
This section will show that the current deadlock in the climate negotiations – a Kyoto Protocol 
that some countries comply with and some will not, others refused to join, and shaky progress to-
wards a follow-up – can be reproduced in a “rational design” framework. For this, I incorporate the 
features of the situation structure of climate change as described in the previous section, in the 
theoretical framework for rational design of institutions by Mitchell and Keilbach (2001). They 
apply a number of dependent and independent variables from Koremenos et al. (2001) in a ra-
tional-choice-based approach of institution-making to international environmental agreements. 
They thus create a model that can be used to predict and explain the outcome of international en-
vironmental agreements.  
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Mitchell and Keilbach evaluate the compliance and enforcement structure of a number of envi-
ronmental treaties. As a result, they argue that in cases of symmetric externalities, where several 
states cause an externality and all of them also experience damage, the international institution 
can rely on narrow issue-specific reciprocity and is merely a coordination game. Conversely, when 
asymmetric externalities are in play, the situation becomes more complex and other means than 
just coordination are necessary to formulate an international response to the problem. The victim 
state could refer to a "negative linkage" in the form of coercion or other means of sanctioning, or it 
could use a "positive linkage" and reward the state that complies with the international agreement. 
Apart from the question whether the situation structure involves symmetric or asymmetric exter-
nalities, Mitchell and Keilbach consider the political strength of the victim. They arrive at a 
scheme of choices as depicted in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Outcomes of institutional design as a consequence of situation structure (after table 2 in Mitchell and Keilbach, 
2001) 
Political 
strength: 
Strong victim Weak victim Examples 
Symmetric 
externality  
Issue-specific reciprocity 
Whaling among whaling nations 
Ozone depletion among ozone depleting 
nations 
Asymmetric 
externality 
Coercion  
(negative 
linkage) 
OR  
Exchange  
(positive 
linkage)  
Exchange 
(positive 
linkage)  
Ozone depletion between industrialized 
(strong victims) and developing nations 
Whaling between whaling and non-whaling 
states (strong victims) 
Rhine river chloride between 
France/Germany/Switzerland and the 
Netherlands (weak victim) 
 
Where Mitchell and Keilbach halt their analysis at the notion of weak versus strong victims, 
where they define "strong" victims as able to exert coercion over the perpetrating states, one could 
take another step and consider the economic abilities of both the victim and the perpetrator. This 
is relevant if countries want to choose between coercion and exchange, as poor states cannot re-
ward, rich states are less sensitive to rewards than poor states, and weak states cannot coerce 
strong states. If, for the examples in Mitchell and Keilbach, one would classify the victims and 
beneficiaries as "rich" and "poor" besides being only strong or weak, additional insights arise (Fig-
ure 3.1). 
 
Consider the case of a strong and rich victim, such as the United States in the "whaling between 
whaling and non-whaling states" and a rich and weak perpetrator, Iceland in this case. Iceland 
would like to continue whaling and is thus the perpetrator, while the United States was commit-
ted to halting whaling, and was the “victim” in the context of the international agreement. Al-
though the interest of the whaling states of re-introducing commercial whaling may be partially 
economic, partially also cultural and social issues are at stake. In Iceland, whaling is a cultural 
heritage as much as a profession; the country identifies itself with whaling. Leaving the whalers 
unemployed therefore has a social cost far beyond economic costs. If the United States would offer 
rewards for complying with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), 
it would unlikely be sufficient as the cost is not the dominant consideration for complying with 
the ICRW. Negative linkage is therefore the only option for the United States to make Iceland 
comply. 
 
In Mitchell and Keilbach's terms, the creation of the Financial Mechanism under the Montreal 
Protocol has the same background of a strong victim (the developed world in general). However, 
the analysis does not acknowledge that the perpetrators in the case of the Financial Mechanism of 
the Montreal Protocol are the developing countries, which often do not prioritize environmental 
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issues, especially if they are costly to implement and if the problem is not harming them8. In this 
case, where the perpetrators lack the resources to address the environmental issue, positive ex-
change works; in this case the developed countries reward the developing countries for complying 
with commitments in the Montreal Protocol.  
 
Next, in the Rhine river chloride case, the Netherlands is both a weak and a rich victim. The Neth-
erlands paid considerable rewards to the perpetrators, primarily France, to reduce chloride dump-
ing; a positive exchange helped in this case. But what would have happened had the Netherlands 
not been a rich country, able to devote significant resources to reward France and Germany for 
cleaning up? The options would have been very limited, and it is likely that the Dutch would have 
had to cope with the environmental problem. The inclusion of the rich/poor victim cases leads to 
the expansion of Table 3.1 as shown in Figure 3.1. It shows that in case of asymmetric externalities, 
it shows that the institutional design depends on 1) in the case of a strong victim (whether the 
perpetrator and victim are relatively affluent.  
 
Political 
strength 
Economic 
strength 
Design 
outcome 
Example 
    
 Rich 
perpetrator 
Coercion 
(negative 
linkage) 
Whaling between 
whaling and non-
whaling states 
Strong  
victim 
   
 
 
Poor 
perpetrator 
 
Exchange 
(positive 
linkage) 
Multilateral Fund of 
Montreal Protocol 
    
   
 Rich victim 
Exchange 
(positive 
linkage) 
Rhine river chloride 
Weak  
Victim 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric 
externality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor victim 
 
No clear 
outcome 
 
Climate change 
Figure 3.1 Expansion of Mitchell and Keilbach’s analysis of design of international environmental institutions. In the case 
of climate change, the main perpetrators are the rich, strong developed nations, while the victims are the poor, weak devel-
oping nations. 
 
For climate change, the main perpetrators are the rich, strong developed nations, while the victims 
are the poor, weak developing nations. It should be noted that this approximation is highly styl-
ised and simplified. The reality of climate change is more complex than Figure 3.1 suggests. For ex-
ample, the position of countries is changing. Increasingly, developing countries are perpetrators as 
well as victims, although it will be a several decades before China’s cumulative or per-capita 
greenhouse gas emissions will equal those of the United States. At the same time, China and India 
are making renewable energy targets law. For a complete picture, more and mutually dependent 
issues need to be taken into account. In addition, the estimates and interpretations of interests of 
                                                 
8  The damage of stratospheric ozone depletion is mainly done in high latitude, where the ozone layer is already thin and low 
temperatures that are needed to generate the catalytic reaction surface needed for rapid ozone depletion. Most industrial-
ized countries are situated at those high latitudes, whereas most developing countries are in lower latitudes. At the time of 
the negotiation on the Financial Mechanism, most industrialized countries already had national policies to phase out 
CFCs. 
Technology in the climate change regime 
 
  61 
states reflected in this paper reflect their positions in the climate negotiations around the Kyoto 
Protocol. In the United States, notably, the efforts on the state and municipal level have grown 
considerably, and more recently also on the national level. However, even given the simplifications 
in the model above, it explains that climate change ranks in the category where the victims are 
both unable to sanction and unable to reward. Because the most affected victims of climate change 
will primarily be located in developing countries, the demand for a regime addressing the problem 
is projected to be low, and the current difficulties in arriving at a post-2012 climate agreement 
make sense.  
 
In the light of the above, to what extent are the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol designed ration-
ally? Although an international regime on climate change to address the issue has been established 
in the UNFCCC, in that sense confirming the ability of the international community to respond to 
such a problem, the depth of cooperation in the UNFCCC is by no means sufficient to begin solv-
ing the problem. Acknowledging this, the Parties to the UNFCCC agreed on the more substantive 
Kyoto Protocol five years after the Framework Convention was agreed. In the Kyoto Protocol, the 
industrialized countries agreed to quantitative targets for greenhouse gas emissions of (for the ma-
jor players the United States, Japan and the European Union) 6 to 8% below their 1990 emissions. 
These emission reductions have to be achieved in the period 2008 to 2012. Trading in emission al-
lowances is possible between industrialized countries. Developing countries have no obligation 
under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions. However, the Kyoto Protocol rewards voluntary 
emission reductions in developing countries through the CDM. The emission reductions generated 
by CDM projects in developing countries can be sold in the international greenhouse gas allow-
ances market and can be purchased by industrialized countries to achieve their Kyoto emission 
reduction targets. 
 
Given the situation structure and the redistribution issues involved, from a rational-actor view-
point, it is surprising that the Kyoto Protocol was agreed in the first place. Constructivists were 
enthusiastic, but rationalists expressed doubts whether the terms would ever be implemented. 
They were partly proven right – the United States did withdraw. Whether the history of the Kyoto 
Protocol proves the rational design framework right or wrong is an open question. Rational-actor 
theory predicted US defection, but not the (likely) EU compliance. Looking forward, although un-
certainties have been reduced and awareness of the consequences of climate change has increased, 
the situation structure as explained in the previous section in relation to redistribution and depth 
of cooperation has not drastically changed between 1992 and the present. 
 
The result of the analysis above is that the “rational design” framework can explain the outcomes 
of the current international climate regime. In this situation, issue linkage to another area than the 
single issue addressed in the treaty is the rationally proposed recipe (Koremenos et al., 2001). The 
candidate for issue linkage in this paper is technology. Game theorists have already looked into 
this possibility by evaluating the environmental outcome using applied game theory analysis. This 
analysis demonstrates that the greenhouse gas emission reduction based on technological coopera-
tion rather than cooperation to achieve emission targets will not have comparable substance 
(Buchner et al., 2002; Buchner and Carraro, 2005). Although an insightful way to formalize the 
situation structure, this analysis assumes perfect information with the actors and no reciprocal 
means, both of which does not fully resemble reality. The predictive capacity of such games is 
therefore limited. Also given the outcome of COP13 at Bali, which defined a technology track, it is 
useful to view technology-oriented agreements in the framework of rational design of an interna-
tional institution for climate change.  
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3.4 On technology-oriented agreements 
Technology-oriented agreements are “all agreements that are aimed at advancing research, devel-
opment, demonstration, and/or deployment of technologies. With respect to technology-oriented 
agreements to address global climate change, these technologies would be aimed specifically at 
reducing GHG emissions” (Coninck et al., 2008a). This section builds on existing literature to ex-
plain what technology-oriented agreements are, how they are viewed, what they might look like 
and how they could be embedded in the existing international regime for climate change. 
 
3.4.1 Categories of technology-oriented agreements 
Coninck et al. (2008a) identify four different categories of technology-oriented agreements: 1) 
knowledge sharing and coordination; 2) research, development and demonstration; 3) technology 
transfer; and 4) technology mandate, standards and incentives. They evaluate existing examples of 
all these types of agreements in different environmental fields, and arrive at the conclusion that all 
technology-oriented agreements types can make a valuable contribution to the climate change re-
gime, as they can address market failures and reduce transaction costs. Moreover, they conclude 
that Type-4 agreements can be environmentally effective on their own, i.e., Type-4 agreements re-
duce emissions, so enough of them could achieve the same environmental outcome as an emission 
reduction agreement. This is a notable conclusion, as the role of technology-oriented agreements is 
thought to be limited to the reduction of market failures and transaction costs in a cap-based cli-
mate agreement – for cap-and-trade provides the most cost-effective outcome. Technology-
oriented agreements are hence viewed mostly as complements to an emission targets-based ap-
proach to climate change mitigation. However, examples of successful Type-4 agreements exist, 
and technology-oriented agreements hence could theoretically form the backbone of an environ-
mentally effective international agreement on climate change.  
 
The conclusion on Type-4 technology-oriented agreements touches upon the most fundamental 
dichotomy in the discussion on climate regimes is the choice between effect and effort-based re-
gimes9 in the post-2012 context. Proposals for new treaty designs vary widely, both in aims and in 
architecture. All of them aim to address one or more of the main perceived problems of the Kyoto 
Protocol: the rejection by the US, the low involvement of large developing countries, the costs, the 
limited emission reduction, lack of incentives for long-term technological innovation, and the 
compliance arrangements (Aldy et al., 2003). All proposals for post-2012 regimes, including sec-
toral or technology-oriented proposals, can be characterized as either "effort-based" or "effect-
based" treaties, while at the same time, they can be weaker or stronger in the commitment they 
ask. 
 
"Effort-based" treaties fix a maximum effort of the signatories to the treaty and therefore incur an 
uncertainty on the effect of the treaty. For example, if a tax on CO2 emissions would be installed 
by every country (as proposed by Cooper, 1998), it is clear how much the cost per ton of CO2 is, 
and therefore how much measures to avoid emissions of CO2 will cost in the worst case. It is how-
ever uncertain what will be the effect in terms of the actual reductions of CO2, as this depends on 
price elasticities of a number of relevant sectors and products. "Effect-based" treaties work exactly 
the other way around; they fix an outcome of the treaty but allow uncertainty on the effort re-
quired to achieve that outcome. In the climate change world, the best-known effect-based treaty is 
the Kyoto Protocol, where the environmental outcome in terms of emission reductions is central, 
but the uncertainties around economic impact was one of the reasons why the United States re-
jected it.  
 
                                                 
9  The economic literature on this fundamental issue spans over several decades. One of the first papers is Weitzman (1974). 
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There are also hybrid proposals, which combine elements of effect-based and effort-based treaties. 
Ultimately, however, the treaty will have to prioritize between the two; when a treaty features 
deeper cooperation, one of the two elements will eventually be dominant. An example of a hybrid 
proposal is the "safety valve" approach (Victor, 2001), where an effect-based cap-and-trade system 
puts a maximum on the price paid for the credits, and is therefore in essence an effort-based sys-
tem, as the costs in this case are capped, and not the emissions. A more genuine form of hybrid sys-
tems would be a staged approach, where one group of countries adopts an effect-based and an-
other an effort-based approach and the basic treaty design differs for different countries.  
 
Table 3.2 characterizes different examples of existing technology-oriented and emission reduction 
agreements or proposals for post-2012 regimes on whether they are dominantly effect- or effort-
based, and whether they are weak or strong in terms of commitments. The distinction in depth of 
cooperation is an interpretation of the author. The IR literature has established that the perception 
of the cost of the concession in an agreement is in the eye of the beholder (Larson, 1988), and thus 
so is the depth of cooperation. The categorization as “strong” or “weak” in Table 3.2 is a combina-
tion of the cost to the actor, and the contribution it is likely to make to solving the problem.  
 
Table 3.2 Attribution of existing proposals to effect- or effort-based, and emission-target or technology-based agreements. 
The literature citations provide reference to where the agreements are assessed. 
General 
design 
Cooperation 
depth 
Examples of emission-
based proposals 
Examples of technology-oriented 
agreements and proposals 
Strong 
Multi-stage approach (Berk 
and Elzen, 2001), Brazilian 
proposala, Kyoto Protocol  
EU Renewable Energy Directive, 
MARPOL treaty (Coninck et al., 
2008a) or the Backstop Protocol (Ed-
monds and Wise, 1998) 
Effect-
based 
Weak 
Intensity targets, weak sec-
tor-based emission targets 
(Baron, 2006) 
Moderate technology deployment 
agreements, moderate technology 
standards (Barrett, 2003) 
Strong 
Carbon tax (Cooper, 2000), 
emissions trading with 
safety valve (Victor, 2001) 
Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean De-
velopment and Climate (Coninck et al., 
2008a) Effort-
based 
Weak Voluntary intensity targets 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Fo-
rum (Coninck et al., 2008a)  
a See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/1997/agbm/misc01a03.pdf. 
 
Table 3.2 has two main messages. Firstly, in both categories of emission-based and technology-
oriented agreements, there is a genuine breadth of options for treaties that all address climate 
change in one or the other way. This means that at the climate change negotiation table, there is an 
actual choice of directions, or there may even be potential for parallel agreements for groups of 
countries that favour the one or the other policy. Secondly, technology-oriented agreements can be 
effect-based, i.e. drafted in such a way that they have environmental effectiveness as their prime 
goal, and can show a significant depth of cooperation. 
 
3.4.2 What technology-oriented agreements could look like in practice 
At this point, a discussion of the concrete design of technology-oriented agreements is challenging 
as thinking on it has only recently begun. Many assumptions are premature and the positions of 
major stakeholders remain to be shaped. Still, in the interest of the understanding of the role of 
such agreements, it is important to clarify how they may work in practice and which proposals are 
currently floating around.  
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Technology-oriented agreements are often mentioned as a subcategory of a wider and as of late 
much-discussed type of agreements: sectoral agreements (Baron, 2006; Bodansky, 2007). Factors 
that would make sectors susceptible for sectoral agreements have been identified in a comprehen-
sive paper by Bradley et al. (2007), and include the share of total world greenhouse gas emissions, 
exposure to international trade issues, the number and concentration of actors, uniformity of 
products or processes, whether the government has a role in the sector, and whether data avail-
ability and reliability are issues. The reasons for these factors can be readily explained. Trade-
sensitive sectors are potentially disproportionally affected by emission target approaches, as they 
cannot charge the costs of carbon abatement on their customers in a competitive global market 
where other countries do not have emission targets. If the emission reduction potential is small, 
and the number of actors is large, making an international agreement might be cumbersome and 
complicated for only a limited result. Homogenous processes or products and availability of high-
quality data make monitoring and enforcement of the agreement much easier. As sectoral agree-
ments are often thought of as an agreement between governments with consent of the private sec-
tor, it seems better for the outcome of such an agreement when the government already is engaged 
in the sector. 
 
Several studies have identified hypothetical sectoral or technology-oriented agreements. They in-
clude: 
• Backstop Technology Protocol: the industrialized countries commit to capture and storage CO2 
from all new power stations and synthetic fuel plants from 2020 onwards. Developing countries 
commit to do the same as soon as their per capita GDP exceeds a certain amount (Edmonds and 
Wise, 1998);  
• Iron and steel benchmarks: developing countries comply with an expert-judged benchmark for 
energy (or carbon) efficiency in iron and steel plants. Industrialized countries provide incen-
tives for beyond-benchmark improvements through a Technology Finance and Assistance 
Package (Schmidt et al., 2006);  
• Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI): the World Business Council on Sustainable Develop-
ment initiated CSI, which aims to establish country baselines and carbon intensity targets for 
the cement sector. Developing country participants would work with a no-lose baseline, 
whereby they would be rewarded when they reduce emissions below the baseline, but not pun-
ished when they exceed it (Baron and Reinaud, 2007); 
• Sugarcane-based bioethanol: The EU, Brazil and a number of suitable countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa agree to develop a large-scale sugarcane-based bioethanol industry in Africa. The EU fi-
nances the technology transfer by Brazil to Africa, and provides a guaranteed market for bio-
ethanol (Coninck et al., 2007). 
 
Technology-oriented agreements would come about by negotiation, taking into account specific 
technological and geographical circumstances, and in a bottom-up manner. It is not the premise of 
this paper to provide the most viable design of a technology-oriented agreement, although the ex-
amples above give an idea on what such agreements may look like in practice. The process of nego-
tiating a number of technology-oriented or sectoral agreements in parallel might be challenging 
from a negotiation management point of view. The next section therefore discusses how technol-
ogy-oriented agreements might be embedded in the current international climate policy context of 
the UNFCCC.  
 
3.4.3 Institutional embedding of technology-oriented agreements 
The UNFCCC, as well as other international organizations, are no strangers to technology. They 
have set up mechanisms aimed at technology, with varying degrees of success (Coninck et al., 
2008a). The UNFCCC’s main achievements with regard to its specific aim of promoting technol-
ogy transfer to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 4.5) are the establishment of an Ex-
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pert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), and the formulation of a number of “technology need 
assessments” of various developing countries. The term of this work program ended recently. Ne-
gotiations on a follow-up have maintained the EGTT and extended its mandate to the technology 
track of post-2012 climate policy. Discussions around technology transfer in the UNFCCC have so 
far proven difficult because of diverging positions of industrialized and developing countries on 
acknowledgment of earlier accomplishments and the level of future financing and engagement.  
 
The UNFCCC’s financial mechanism is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is a fund, 
effective in implementing projects using new and cleaner technologies in developing countries, but 
its funding is limited, and therewith scope of impact. Technology is also indirectly included in the 
CDM. This mechanism has seen a boost in project implementation, greatly exceeding the effects of 
the GEF, and involving notable technology transfer in various sectors (Haites et al., 2006). For 
some technologies, the CDM has proven an effective incentive mechanism, but for other technolo-
gies that would be useful from the perspective of sustainable development (e.g., PV for rural elec-
trification and end-use efficiency), it has so far hardly made a difference. This again indicates that a 
market-based instrument does not necessarily lead to the preferred technological change. In addi-
tion, the post-2012 demand for certified emission reductions of the CDM depends on the emission 
reduction targets agreed as part of the eventual follow-up of the Kyoto Protocol, which are uncer-
tain as of yet. Although in principle a successful mechanism, the future of the CDM is in the hands 
of the negotiators of a post-2012 agreement based on emission trading. 
 
Various ways exist in which technology-oriented agreements could be embedded in the UNFCCC 
context, through ongoing negotiations that provide a policy window to incorporate new insights. 
They include the abovementioned discussions on technology transfer in the UNFCCC under Arti-
cle 4.5, but recently notably the technology track under the Bali Action Plan and the EGTT man-
date. The Bali Action Plan and the EGTT mandate have opened the possibility to agree on technol-
ogy under the UNFCCC umbrella. There is now speak of an “Enhanced Technology Framework” 
which could have technology-oriented agreements as one of its components.  
 
Another possibility is to set up a separate agreement outside of the UNFCCC context, such as the 
United States have done in the case of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Cli-
mate (APP) in 2005. The APP is essentially a technology-oriented agreement but its commitments 
are limited to knowledge sharing and possibly some technology demonstrations. Considering the 
issues around agreeing on mitigation efforts, a limited number of players is often suggested to 
streamline agreement, and the group of seven countries that are part of the APP form a significant 
group in terms of world population, GDP, energy use and CO2 emissions. However, the formation 
of the APP has caused unrest with the Kyoto Parties, and the APP participants have been accused 
of undermining rather than fortifying climate change mitigation efforts in the existing institutions. 
So far, the APP has not proven effective in bringing down emissions or advancing technology 
(UNFCCC, 2008c; Asselt, 2007). An alternative agreement outside of the UNFCCC would only be 
worthwhile if it would lead to significant addition action compared to the UNFCCC. 
 
3.5 Views on technology in the international climate regime 
The Bali consensus reflects the expectation that technology will play a major role in the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. From past experiences in technological development, theories on ra-
tional design of international institutions, and the specific characteristics of the climate change 
challenge, some leads can be given on how an international regime for climate change can be de-
signed in such a way that it is environmentally effective by being effect-based and to some extent 
self-enforcing, as well as instrumental in bringing about the required technological change. 
Whether involving technology would aid or frustrate climate change mitigation is subject to de-
bate. Some of the views are reviewed and analyzed here. 
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3.5.1 Views and considerations on the dynamic of technology-oriented agreements 
It has been convincingly argued that environmental externalities and technological market failures 
reduce the effectiveness of cap-and-trade policies (Jaffe et al., 2005), and modelling suggests that a 
combination of technology-oriented R&D and sector-based emission targets, taking into account 
the imperfect market incentives for technological development and the differences between sec-
tors, leads to a more economically efficient outcome (Otto et al., 2006). But even this enlightened 
economic view fails to account for the specifics of technologies, such as the different stages of de-
velopment of technologies, the processes underlying adoption of technologies by users, infrastruc-
ture needs, desired or undesired lock-ins and path dependencies, and the different turnover times 
for various technologies, resulting in varying natural moments of technology replacement (see 
Grübler and Nakicenovic, 2002). Another weak point of the narrow emission-reduction approach 
is that it does not take co-benefits of the measures into account, leaving these positive externalities 
invisible for the negotiating parties. Consequently, emission reduction agreements are less condu-
cive to specific reciprocity to increase chances of agreement and compliance. 
 
The question then arises whether technology-oriented agreements might improve on emission tar-
get-based agreements. Firstly, for a self-enforcing, effect-based treaty, Parties should have an inter-
est in its implementation. Upon agreeing on a technology-oriented agreement, countries that have 
or expect a strong market position for their industry in the field of the technologies that will be 
implemented as a result of the agreement are likely to be supporters and enthusiastic implemen-
ters of the agreement (Steiner Brandt and Tinggaard Svensen, 2006). They are unlikely to free-ride. 
Even if more countries boast industries in the same sector (e.g., several European and Asian coun-
tries have wind turbine producers), a far-reaching agreement on that sector would signify growth 
in all those countries. They are likely to view technology-oriented agreements as an opportunity 
rather than a cost.  
 
This issue relates strongly to first-mover advantages, and the question is whether these advantages 
can actually be realized. First-mover advantages are much debated in economic and management 
literature, mostly at the firm level. Liebermann and Montgomery (1987) define it as “the ability of 
pioneering firms to earn positive economic profits”. The most important source of first-mover ad-
vantages for climate-mitigation technologies, which are characterized by high capital costs and 
low turnover rates, is which firm can supply the technology first against an affordable cost10. 
Countries tend to be optimistic about their industry’s ability to provide such leadership, and thus 
perceive first-mover advantages. Such perceived first-mover advantages could give confidence that 
a technology-oriented agreement leads to benefits for a country and its industry. A treaty that 
aligns with (vested) interests of parties otherwise not interested in emissions reductions would 
therefore more likely be self-enforcing. 
 
Lastly, the level of technological development, or the maturity of a technology, determines what is 
the most effective way of designing a technology-specific international or domestic policy (Sandén 
and Azar, 2005). Near-commercial technologies, i.e. technologies that are advanced but that still 
face cost barriers inhibiting market entry, will most likely benefit from market-based instruments 
to enhance diffusion, such as subsidies or tax benefits; instruments that contribute to the “learning 
by doing” factor of the learning curve. Such efforts, however, are misplaced for technologies in the 
research or demonstration phase. Those technologies should be supported by targeted research 
and development support, or specific support for demonstration projects; on the “learning by 
searching” part of the learning curve (Smekens, 2005). Notably the demonstration step, which is 
                                                 
10  A related issue is Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), which exist to provide incentives for innovation. For energy technolo-
gies, IPR is generally regarded as an issue that can be resolved through payments of royalties (see, e.g., Barton, 2007), which 
is a very small part of overall investment  
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the essential bridge between the research and the mature-market phase, is often neglected in poli-
cymaking, as it is both costly and risky. 
 
3.5.2 Advantages of technology-oriented agreements 
A number of advantages of technology-oriented agreements relative to emission-based approaches 
can be identified: 1) ease of implementation, particularly for developing countries; 2) political fea-
sibility; 3) cost predictability; 4) compliance; and 5) compatibility with innovation trajectories.  
 
First, the ease of implementation, or administrative feasibility, would be better compared to a cap-
and-trade system, as the policy instrument is more straightforward. Although emissions trading, 
according to economic theory, is the economically optimal way of providing incentives for green-
house gas reductions, it is institutionally quite challenging: emissions trading is a relatively com-
plex instrument, it needs a functioning legal system both in the states and on the international 
level, and it may not work optimally due to "friction" factors in markets, hedging behaviour of 
countries and firms, and because of imperfect or asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). A rela-
tively developed governance system as the European Union already has difficulties implementing a 
domestic emissions trading scheme (Egenhofer et al., 2006), and it can be expected that the diffi-
culties in developing countries will be even larger (Greenspan Bell, 2006).11 Technology-oriented 
agreements can be made less complex, may provide more of a basis to include developing countries 
and may increase the likelihood that they actually comply. On the other side, one would need sev-
eral technology-oriented agreements, which would add to the institutional complexity and in-
creases the risk of fragmentation. This is discussed in the next section.  
 
Second, it was argued in Section 3.3 that the positions of negotiating states in the UNFCCC give 
little hope for an agreement on emission reductions, although the recent developments around Bali 
have shown some convergence. The United States, at this point, is unlikely to participate in an in-
ternational regime that requires mandatory emission reductions (although it may implement a cap 
domestically) (Ueno, 2007). The large developing countries, who have recently experienced rapid 
economic growth and rising CO2 emissions, are likely to resist obligations for non-Annex I Parties. 
The reason for their concerns partly relates to competitiveness of their industries. Technology-
oriented (or sectoral) agreements can be designed in such a way that they affect only part of the 
economy, can be perceived as relatively harmless, and could also take competitiveness concerns 
away as all global sectoral players would make comparable efforts. In addition, the “perceived first-
mover advantages”, introduced in the former section, may play a role. The potential for a meaning-
ful agreement in technology-oriented agreements appears to be larger than for emission targets as 
it matches better with the interests of several important players.  
 
Third, cost of an agreement on technology are more predictable. More than with generic national 
emission reduction targets, it is clearer what the costs of a technology-oriented agreement will be, 
because the treaty would specify into some detail which measures are to be implemented in which 
sectors. In this respect, a technology-oriented agreement, and even a group of them covering many 
sectors in an economy, compares favourably to an economy-wide cap on emissions or even a car-
bon tax. The flipside of this advantage is the lack of flexibility, which is discussed in the next sec-
tion.  
 
A fourth advantage relates to compliance. International institutions, notably those addressing en-
vironmental problems, often lack the legal mandate to sanction defecting states. Enforcement is 
hence one of the fundamental problems in the design of international environmental institutions. 
                                                 
11  This institutional complexity may explain why early environmental law is largely based on straightforward command and 
control measures rather than market-based approaches. In case of weak institutions and unfamiliarity with more sophisti-
cated market-based instruments, regulation might be the better choice. 
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There is a continuing literature discussion whether the lack of enforcement actually reduces 
chances of compliance and affects the depth of cooperation (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Downs et 
al., 1996; Simmons, 2000; Raustiala, 2005). The discussion is around the question if compliance 
with international agreements is usually good because of peer pressure and effectiveness of the 
agreements changing behaviour, or because countries are reluctant to agree on agreements that 
they are unlikely to comply with. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, this is convincingly shown. 
Showing its commitment to taking on a costly and stringent target for greenhouse gas emissions, 
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2002. Internally, however, not much had hap-
pened in terms of domestic measures, and Canada's greenhouse gas emissions rose by nearly 27% 
between 1990 and 2004, which left Canada almost 35% above their Kyoto target of -6% (Environ-
ment Canada, 2006). The rise in emissions was mainly due to the carbon-intensive tar sand exploi-
tation industry, a sector that started flourishing in the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether Can-
ada will comply with the Kyoto Protocol by buying emissions allowances on the global CO2 mar-
ket, or whether it will decide to not comply. In Canada's case, the initially lukewarm domestic 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol might turn into defection. Broadening the issue of climate 
change towards technological development might increase support for a climate change agree-
ment. One could for instance imagine that Alberta's oil and gas sector could use its favourable po-
sition to develop cleaner technologies that could later be exported to the United States and other 
fossil-fuel-producing countries, and which would increase their support for an international 
agreement as it provides for reciprocity. If such situations could be foreseen and anticipated by 
states, technology-oriented agreements could increase chances of general compliance.12  
 
There have been proposals for increasing compliance for post-2012 regimes, for instance by making 
the cost of the treaty more predictable by the earlier mentioned "safety valve" or by making a tech-
nology-oriented R&D agreement self-enforceable via an encouraging signing-up scheme (Barrett, 
2003). The latter has been evaluated on environmental outcome in the above-mentioned study by 
Buchner and Carraro (2005), who use applied game theory analysis to demonstrate that the green-
house gas emission reduction based on technological cooperation rather than cooperation to 
achieve emission targets will not have comparable substance. However, in their analysis, they do 
not take into account the potential self-enforceability of technology-oriented agreements that fur-
ther the technological interests of countries, nor the favourable attitude of business for certain 
technologies, both of which are indeed hard to approximate in any model, even qualitative ones. 
 
A last advantage is more theoretical, and although not central to the analysis in this paper, it might 
be worth mentioning. Emission reduction agreements, particularly cap-and-trade, are technology-
blind, which leaves economic flexibility but is not necessarily most environmentally effective. A 
technology goal has a wholly different dynamic than an emissions target. Including the concept of 
technology in an agreement therefore raises a host of questions of different nature than the ques-
tions for emission target-based approaches. How do technologies and policy interact? What is ef-
fective and efficient technology policy? How is technology perceived and implemented in society? 
Technological change takes more than merely the change of technology; it often requires a change 
of the context in which the technology operates as well. Consequently, technologies are intro-
duced at a certain pace, which is not only determined by economic factors such as incentives, but 
also by user preferences and habits, technological maturity, and technology-specific turnover fac-
tors. A useful framework may be the "co-evolutionary, multi-level perspective" that has been intro-
duced by Frank Geels (2005), based on a decades-long debate in the sociology of technology. In 
this framework, the starting point is the present socio-technical system. Although the system is 
stable and firmly locked in by a multiplicity of social, economic, technological, and cultural factors, 
it is still dynamic. Innovation takes place, but is strictly "incremental" - it will not spontaneously 
                                                 
12  On another note, the “windfall emission reductions” that the UK and Germany have experienced since 1990 might have to 
be considered too.  
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lead to the overturning of the whole system, but establishes the system even more firmly, and en-
hances the stability of the system through the "path dependency lock-in" (see also Arthur, 1989).  
 
System innovations will hence not come about unless modifications in the multiple dimensions are 
introduced simultaneously. In the case of climate change, hydrocarbon regime, responsible for 
much of the emission of CO2 to the atmosphere, is a the socio-technical regime. In order to provoke 
technological change in that regime, the landscape should create favourable windows of opportu-
nity that give novelties the chance to step in, but this will not happen unless the novelties have 
been given the chance to develop and give themselves a place in the multi-dimensional reality. The 
change of a socio-technical regime, therefore, requires alignment of landscape developments, in-
cluding appropriate timing (Zundel et al., 2005), and the maturing of the new technologies in a 
socio-technological context.  
 
Although the notions of technological dynamics appear to slowly trickle through at the national 
level, they are not commonly incorporated in international policy-making. The Kyoto Protocol is 
one of the examples of international treaties where the notion of accumulating niches or techno-
logical co-evolution are not addressed. Specific attention to the processes that lead to technologi-
cal change may help the feasibility of an agreement, through improving on applicability, appropri-
ateness and types of incentives given. 
 
3.5.3 Disadvantages of technology-oriented agreements 
The disadvantages of sectoral or technology-oriented agreements relate very much to the advan-
tages that are generally attributed to emission-target-based approaches: environmental effective-
ness, cost effectiveness, and flexibility. In addition, particularly for technology-oriented agree-
ments, there is a risk of governments playing an important role in “picking technology winners” – 
something that can be better left to the market.  
 
One of the clear advantages of an emission target was explained in Section 3.4: it is an effect-based 
agreement, which fixes the environmental outcome and therefore (assuming full compliance) guar-
antees the environmental effectiveness of the agreement (Aldy et al., 2003; Bodansky, 2007). Al-
though in principle technology-oriented agreements can also be designed in an effect-based way, 
adding up to the same result as an emission-target agreement, there is a complication that distorts 
the environmental effectiveness, which relates to the transparency of the agreement as a whole. A 
range of sectoral and technology-oriented agreements could lead to fragmentation of the climate 
regime, with potentially negative consequences for goal attainment (Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002; 
Raustiala and Victor, 2004). Administrating all technology and sectoral agreements under one 
umbrella, most likely the UNFCCC, would help, but knows many challenges. The Bali consensus 
has put the UNFCCC in a position to make progress in the technology field, but the inclusion of 
technology (and finance) to the discussions will add to the complexity of the negotiations (even 
though, as argued above, the individual technology-oriented agreements are likely to be easier to 
implement).  
 
Another often-mentioned problem with agreeing on technology by governments is that govern-
ments lack the expertise and the information to make the right choices of technology winners (see 
e.g., Nelson and Langlois, 1983). In some technology-oriented agreements, this can be avoided. In 
the “Backstop Protocol” (see Section 3.4) for instance, the technology favoured is CO2 capture and 
storage (CCS), but it is phrased in a way that fossil-fuel-fired electricity production without CCS 
is phased out. Power producers therefore have the option to not use fossil fuels but renewables for 
electricity production, and the agreement would be technology-prescriptive in a limited way. But 
generally, especially among economists, the contention is that governments should leave the tech-
nology choice to the market. The role of the government would have to be to shape that market 
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rather than to micro-manage technology, while technology-oriented agreements clearly attribute a 
bigger role.  
 
Perhaps the largest disadvantage to technology-oriented and sectoral agreements is on cost effec-
tiveness and flexibility. In Bodansky’s (2007) words: “An economy-wide approach gives countries 
maximum flexibility to reduce emissions in whatever sector is cheapest, and discourages emission 
leakage from regulated to unregulated sectors. By contrast, focusing on particular sectors restricts 
options and thereby raises costs”. This summarizes well that the cost-effectiveness and flexibility 
of a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme is unmatched, and from an economic viewpoint is 
clearly preferred over a sectoral or technology-oriented approach. However, if indeed cost effec-
tiveness was the only compelling criterion for countries to join and comply with an international 
agreement, the Kyoto Protocol and the follow-up negotiations would have been less problematic. 
History has taught us that this is not the case. Although cost effectiveness is important and should 
be maximized as much as possible, the necessity of having an overall framework that meets ap-
proval of the most important countries and credibly addresses climate change appears to be larger. 
 
3.6 Conclusion: a way forward for technology in the climate regime? 
This paper argues that agreement on deep emission reductions is not necessarily in line with ra-
tional interests of important actors in the climate change arena. Treaties that are designed to 
strictly pursue a single policy goal, such as greenhouse gas emission reduction, have many benefits: 
they are effect-based, and, in the case of a worldwide, multi-gas, cap-and-trade system, they allow 
for much flexibility in achieving the targets in different countries, sectors, and by reducing a range 
of greenhouse gases. The cost-effectiveness, in theory, is therefore optimal.  
 
However, such emission-based agreements have disadvantages that technology-oriented agree-
ments may solve. The current state of negotiations demonstrates that participation and compli-
ance are difficult. The consensus reached in Bali includes a mitigation track, but also a technology 
track. This paper argues that some of the arguments against technology-oriented agreements can 
be refuted. Firstly, technology-oriented agreements can be designed in an environmentally effec-
tive way; they can be effect-based just as well as emission-based agreements, and potentially at 
greater cost certainty. Secondly, technology-oriented agreements can make use of Parties’ per-
ceived first-mover advantages of technological leadership. Thirdly, they allow for more flexibility 
of alignment with strong vested interests in important sectors, notably the fossil-fuel industry. 
This would increase the scope of agreement, and would make the treaty more self-enforcing. 
Lastly, technological maturity and dynamics of the socio-technical system can be taken into ac-
count, which could lead to greater ease of implementation and lower costs relative to an agreement 
that does not take these factors into account. In addition, technology-oriented agreements can be 
institutionally embedded in existing agreements, particularly the UNFCCC, potentially by creat-
ing subgroups of countries signing up to various technology-oriented agreements.  
 
Technology-oriented agreements, however, are no panacea. Compliance is by no means a certainty, 
they are less cost-effective than emission reduction agreements, and fragmentation and poor de-
sign might pose a threat to environmental effectiveness. A number of recommendations can be 
made to address the disadvantages of taking technology-oriented agreements further: 
• To ensure environmental effectiveness, focus on implementation (effect-based) where this is 
technologically appropriate; 
• Be technology-specific where necessary but allow for as much technological flexibility as possi-
ble to allow the market to pick the technological winners;  
• To prevent potential fragmentation, use the UNFCCC as an umbrella convention, and allow 
time and resources for managing more complex negotiations; 
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• To increase acceptability and compliance for self-enforceability of the agreement, make use of 
perceived first-mover advantages and vested interests.  
 
This paper has argued the difficulty in reaching agreement on a post-2012 international climate 
regime reflects the perceived self-interests of the players, and that a possible way forward for an 
international agreement on climate change mitigation is to link the climate change issue to tech-
nology. There are reasons to believe that technology-oriented agreements can create leverage for 
those countries otherwise unwilling to reduce emissions. It was argued earlier that a compilation 
of technology-oriented agreements can provide an environmentally effective replacement of an 
emissions-trading-based agreement. However, focussing exclusively on technology-oriented 
agreements would lose much of the benefit, particularly in cost-effectiveness and market pull, of 
emission targets, for instance in a cap-and-trade regime context. A well-designed, complementary 
combination of technology-oriented agreements and emission target-based approaches could shift 
vested interests, could make an overall treaty more self-enforcing, and could make preventing cli-
mate change more feasible. 
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Chapter 4 Widening the scope of policies to address climate change: 
directions for mainstreaming13 
Abstract 
Both mitigation of and adaptation to climate change require actions to be taken in many sectors of 
society, but so far this is hardly happening. This paper suggests possibilities for widening climate 
change policy by strengthening inter-linkages between climate policies and various relevant policy 
areas to mainstream climate change concerns. It argues that, if these inter-linkages can be 
strengthened and policy coherence is improved, the effectiveness of climate policy can be enhanced 
while also supporting these other policy areas. The contention in this paper is that improved pol-
icy coherence and mainstreaming requires climate policies to go beyond the UNFCCC framework 
to realise its full potential and to better deal with possible trade-offs. The potential benefits in the 
policy domains of poverty reduction, rural development and agriculture, disaster management, en-
ergy security, air quality and trade, and finance are examined, and the institutional and organisa-
tions linkages highlighted. Finally, opportunities for mainstreaming are identified to make better 
use of possible synergies between climate and related policy areas. 
4.1 Introduction 
There is ample evidence now that anthropogenic climate change poses serious threats to develop-
ment (IPCC, 2007b). Despite international agreement, laid down in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) that dangerous human interference with 
the climate system should be prevented, climate policy faces many challenges (see amongst others 
Barrett, 1998; Victor, 2001). One of them is that many climate-relevant decisions continue to be 
taken in different policy areas with little or no regard to climate change. Both mitigation of and 
adaptation to climate change require actions in many sectors of society, but climate change con-
cerns are so far hardly integrated in the decision-making in those sectors. Most analyses of post-
2012 climate policy so far have focussed on the design and stringency of the post-2012 agreements 
within the UNFCCC or alternatives to the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (see e.g. Aldy et al., 
2003; Höhne, 2005). This paper aims to assess the inter-linkages between climate change policy 
and a number of other policy domains and the opportunities and challenges for mainstreaming 
climate change therein (Huq et al., 2004; Huq and Reid, 2004). The policy domains of poverty re-
duction, rural development and agriculture, disaster management, energy security, air quality and 
trade and finance are examined for such inter-linkages. 
 
The contention in this paper is that the effectiveness of climate change policies can be enhanced by 
mainstreaming climate change in other policy areas. Establishing appropriate linkages between 
functionally linked issues enhances the opportunities for problem solving and can increase the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of policy making. Realisation of this potential, this paper argues, requires 
climate policy makers to widen their scope and go beyond the UNFCCC framework. This paper, 
hence, explores the possibilities to widen climate change policy by providing possible directions 
for mainstreaming and establishing institutional and organizational inter-linkages between cli-
mate change policy and a number of relevant policy areas (Asselt et al., 2005; Bouwer et al., 2006). 
The paper in this way contributes to the discussions on a post-2012 climate regime.  
                                                 
13  This paper was published in Environmental Science and Policy (Kok and Coninck, 2008). It is to a large extent based on 
the report “Beyond Climate. Options for broadening climate policy” (Kok and Coninck, 2004). It has also benefited from 
the outcomes of the Development and Climate programme (Kok et al., 2006). This research was originally supported by the 
Netherlands Research Programme on Climate Change, Scientific Assessment and Policy Analysis. The complete report, on 
which the article is largely based is “Beyond Climate: Options for broadening climate policy” and is available via 
www.mnp.nl. We thank Harro van Asselt, Stefan Bakker, Cees van Beers, Frank Biermann, Laurens Bouwer, Joyeeta 
Gupta, Jan van Heemst, Bert Metz, Jan Verhagen and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
the paper.  
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The aim of a mainstreaming strategy, as part of climate policies, is to capture the potential in other 
policy areas and sectors for implementing climate-friendly and climate-safe development pathways 
(Munasinghe et al., 2002). It would help to enhance the climate change regime by increasing policy 
coherence, minimising duplications and contradictory policies, dealing with trade offs and captur-
ing the opportunities for synergistic results in terms of increased adaptive capacity and lower 
emissions. It may also help to make climate change policies more acceptable to both industrialised 
and developing countries (Davidson et al., 2003; Gupta 1998; Gupta and Hisschemöller, 1997). The 
importance that countries for example attach to health and air quality can result in addressing 
climate change indirectly, but only if these policy activities are well aligned.  
 
It is however also clear that a mainstreaming strategy comes with challenges of its own. We iden-
tify four main problems. Firstly, during recent decades, the number of international (environ-
mental) treaties and the institutional density on the international level increased dramatically. 
This has taken up a large part of the political manoeuvring space. Given the existence of different 
regimes, with their own rules, dynamics, culture and ambitions, improving policy coherence and 
mainstreaming climate change into them may lead to friction. Climate change is often only one of 
many issues that need to be addressed and a risk of mainstreaming overload arises. Secondly, exist-
ing international policy frameworks are usually not designed to promote mainstreaming and the 
organisational structures with their vested interests complicate this further. This often results in a 
lack of cooperation, coordination and joint decision-making on different levels, hindering any 
mainstreaming strategy. Thirdly, there is the issue of communication and understanding. Different 
communities operate on different spatial and time scales, have different priorities and speak differ-
ent languages. This is especially the case for climate change: a long-term problem characterised by 
intrinsic uncertainties. And fourthly, it needs to be acknowledged that climate change is not al-
ways synergetic with other policy areas. Between climate change and energy security of supply for 
example, clear trade-offs can be identified for coal-producing countries. Improving on institutional 
inter-linkages help dealing with these trade-offs (OECD, 2005a; Kok et al., 2006).  
 
This paper aims to strike a balance between the opportunities and limitations that a mainstream-
ing strategy has on offer for future climate policies. In the analysis, a distinction is made between 
climate change adaptation (Section 4.3) and mitigation (Section 4.4), as the interactions are nota-
bly different for both elements of climate policy. In these sections, the following issues are subse-
quently addressed. It starts with an analysis of what the potential synergies and trade-offs be-
tween climate change and other policy areas are. Although in some areas, modelling exercises are 
available to arrive at quantitative estimates of synergies (particularly in the field of air quality and 
climate change mitigation) in most there is insufficient quantitative information to pursue the 
same level of precision. Subsequently, we identify policy options for mainstreaming. Although we 
recommend directions for mainstreaming, to go deeply into this for every policy area is beyond the 
scope of this paper. This has two main reasons. The paper would become overly expansive and the 
general message, that there is a considerable underused cost-effective potential for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation that can be exploited through mainstreaming, would be lost in detail. 
Furthermore, in mitigation but particularly in adaptation, it is highly context dependent, whether 
a particular recommendation can be carried out and would be effective. To conclude, this paper 
suggests ways forward on the institutional level to make better use of the possible synergies be-
tween climate change and the other areas (Section 4.5), and ends with a discussion of the conclu-
sions (Section 4.6).  
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4.2 Approach 
The approach in this paper is to start from development and societal priorities of countries and 
sectors to identify opportunities for widening the scope of climate change policy. So, this paper 
looks for opportunities realising such primary objectives as poverty alleviation, improving health, 
food and energy security, while also realising climate benefits. By aligning development and cli-
mate objectives, mainstreaming climate change adaptation and/or mitigation can help to “make 
development more sustainable” (Davidson et al., 2003). From a climate change perspective, this 
means development that reduces vulnerability to climate change impacts (adaptation) and/or de-
velopment with lower greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation). Earlier analysis has reviewed the 
existing literature on the potential for this in a number of policy areas (Kok and Coninck, 2004). 
This paper summarises the main findings and brings them together in a coherent framework to 
discuss the potential of a mainstreaming strategy as part of the effort to combat climate change. 
 
As a first step this paper explores the potential for mainstreaming climate in other policy areas, by 
looking at the material (or factual) inter-linkages. Material inter-linkages are inherent physical connec-
tions between policy domains. Analysing material inter-linkages helps to identify the potential of 
enhancing collaboration between different issues because of the way they interconnect. Material 
inter-linkages between air quality and climate change are for instance, that ozone is both an air 
pollutant and a greenhouse gas or that certain air pollutants can be chemical precursors for green-
house gases. In the second step possible measures are identified that either are synergetic or result in 
trade offs between different policy goals. A possible measure may, for example, be to increase the 
use of domestic coal, without applying carbon dioxide capture and storage. In that case, the energy 
security situation of a country may be improved, but the climate change problem is worsened. In 
the third step possible policy options for mainstreaming climate adaptation and mitigation in these 
other policy areas are analysed.  
 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the policy areas for which this paper explores the possibilities for 
mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation. This selection is not meant to be ex-
haustive for all areas that interact with climate change, but provides an overview of some the most 
relevant policy areas to look at. Other possible policy areas to look at would include water (see for 
example Cooperative Programme on Water and Climate (2006) and forestry (see for example 
Trines et al. (2006)). 
 
Table 4.1 Policy areas for which this paper examines the possibilities for mainstreaming climate change adaptation and 
mitigation 
Adaptation Mitigation 
Poverty reduction 
Rural development and agriculture 
Disaster management 
Energy security of supply 
Air quality and health 
Trade and finance 
 
The last part of this paper considers the institutional and organisational inter-linkages that are necessary 
to capture the potential identified. These are connections between different institutions that rule a 
specific policy domain and/or the organisations that are active in that domain. By looking at this, it 
is possible to examine whether different institutions and organisations are compatible, synergetic, 
incompatible or contradictory. This helps to identify ways in which the combined impacts of insti-
tutions and organisations can be enhanced (Asselt et al., 2005). The assumption is that also on the 
institutional and organisational level changes need to take place before the policy options for 
mainstreaming can be implemented effectively. Although this needs to start within countries, this 
paper will focus on the level of international institutions that have to provide the conditions that 
enhance national implementation.  
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4.3 Widening climate change adaptation efforts 
Adaptation to climate change comprises all efforts to reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change (IPCC, 2001a). Vulnerability is a function of exposure, sensitivity to impacts and the in-
ability to cope or to adapt. This section discusses the material inter-linkages, possible measures 
and policy options for mainstreaming climate adaptation in poverty reduction, rural development 
and agriculture, and disaster management. 
 
4.3.1 Material inter-linkages with climate change adaptation 
Strong material linkages exist between climate change adaptation and poverty reduction, rural 
development and agriculture, and disaster management. These linkages come about through the 
following characteristics of impacts of climate change, that: a) will likely be highest in developing 
countries; b) would be severest for sectors that are highly climate-dependent, notably agriculture; 
and c) are likely to hit the poorest part of the populations most as they are less able to cope or to 
adapt.  
Poverty reduction and the fight against hunger and malnutrition are the highest priorities on the 
(international) development agenda. In many developing regions, natural resources are especially 
relevant as a means to lift the rural poor above the poverty line, focusing attention on rural devel-
opment (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). In 2000, all 191 UN States agreed to halve 
poverty and hunger by 2015 in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Millennium Declara-
tion, 2000). In 2000, about 1.1 billion people (or 23% of the total population of developing coun-
tries) lived on less than US$1 a day (UNDP, 2004). It is, however, increasingly recognised that 
meeting development goals, including the MDGs, will become more difficult as a result of climate-
change impacts (DFID, 2002, UN Millennium Project, 2005). Climate change will for example re-
duce economic growth, threaten investments and lower food production and these impacts will be 
felt most strongly by the poor. 
 
FAO's latest estimates (1997-99) indicate a total of 815 million undernourished people in the world 
of which 777 million in the developing countries. For the developing countries, the latest figure 
represents a decrease of 39 million since 1990-92 (the benchmark period used at the World Food 
Summit in 1996 (FAO, 2005)). Climate change is starting to become an additional stress factor for 
agricultural production, having a negative impact on the productivity of the land, especially in 
low-latitude countries (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). In developing countries, many people are di-
rectly dependent on the natural resource base for food production and other services, either for 
subsistence or for income through selling of agricultural products. Agriculture has always been one 
of the most climate-sensitive economic sectors. Some 40% of the world’s land area is located in en-
vironments which are prone to water scarcity (Kabat and Schaik, 2003), most of them in develop-
ing countries. The major characteristic of these land areas, often denoted as “drylands”, is the ex-
treme spatial and temporal variability of precipitation.  
 
Societies evolving in these environments have, over the centuries, developed a broad range of 
mechanisms to cope with climate variability (Falkenmark and Rockström, 1993, Leisinger et al., 
1995; Dietz et al., 2004). These mechanisms are increasingly challenged as traditional weather pat-
terns are changing and the number of reported climate-related disasters is rising rapidly. Although 
currently the cause for this trend cannot be attributed to climate change, and much of the rise is 
probably due to population growth, particularly in coastal areas, and improvements in reporting, it 
is likely that climate change will reinforce the trend towards more frequent, more severe and more 
costly climatic disasters (IPCC, 2001c; Aalst, 2006).  
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4.3.2 Possible measures 
Offering economically viable opportunities for the sustainable management of natural resources 
needs to be at the core of any rural development planning. Economic development of the poor is 
necessary to provide income to decrease their vulnerability and to empower them to cope with the 
impacts of climate change. It is at the same time also clear that natural resources alone often do not 
provide sufficient income and employment opportunities in rural areas to support sustainable 
forms of development to all (Heemst and Bayangos, 2004; Verhagen et al., 2004). The measures 
identified can be grouped in resource management for sustainable land-use, specific activities 
aimed at rural and agricultural development and specific measures for climate proofing agricul-
tural practice, also taking into account a future increase in climate related disasters. Implementa-
tion of these measures can be stimulated through policies taken in the three areas addressed in the 
previous section.  
 
Over the last decades food production has more than kept pace with global population growth. 
This has mainly been achieved through agricultural intensification. In order to increase production 
per hectare (Evans, 1998), the global irrigated area has increased and the use of purchased inputs 
(e.g. fertilisers) and new technologies has grown. The expansion of agricultural land has slowed 
down over the last few decades. Changing consumption patterns and diets have caused the in-
crease in cereal production to slow down, but the quantity of livestock products to rise (Delgado 
et al., 1999).  
 
In general, increased food production has come at a cost. Natural resources, in particular soil and 
water, are overexploited. This undermines the very base of these production systems via erosion 
and soil fertility loss, and reductions in water quality and quantity. Sustainable land use depends 
on maintaining environmental functions such as water supply, biodiversity and carbon stocks. It is 
possible to increase food production in an environmentally sustainable way while at the same time 
avoiding overexploitation and vulnerability to climate change. Good management of the natural 
resource bases (including agricultural production) takes into account the different social, eco-
nomic and environmental concerns that are important from a sustainable development perspec-
tive. This requires an integrated and synergistic resource management approach that embraces lo-
cally appropriate combinations of livelihood strategies for farm households (Dixon et al., 2001). 
The exact measures will differ per area and crop, and it goes beyond the scope of this paper to de-
tail them further (see Verhagen et al., 2004). 
 
Activities crucial to boosting development in rural areas include increased agricultural production, 
small-scale industrial enterprises and tourism. Non-food crops with added value such as energy 
and raw materials are also interesting options. Depending on local resources and price levels, this 
could open up new opportunities for rural development. The production of non-food crops, for ex-
ample, for industrial processes and as bio-fuels, would create new options for farmers as long as 
this fits in sustainable land use and, notably, does not occur at the expense of pristine areas. The 
substitution of fossil fuels would also lead to reduced emissions of greenhouse gases and positive 
linkages with mitigation (see Section 4.4). It is interesting to note that economic development, 
reducing vulnerability, and climate change mitigation can come together this way, provided that 
small-scale farmers will benefit from these new opportunities (ENDA et al., 2006). If the world 
moves towards a bio-based economy, the area cultivated with non-food crops can increase dra-
matically. As with other cash crops, competition for land with food crops will be a concern for 
food-insecure areas. 
 
Measures for sustainable resource management and rural development can make a contribution to 
disaster risk management. Risk prevention is highly synergetic with climate adaptation measures 
(Sperling and Szekely, 2005). Often, in early-warning, rural planning, and other information sys-
tems, the present climate variability is taken as the benchmark. Incorporating possible future cli-
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mate changes will be increasingly possible as regional and local projections for climate change pat-
terns improve and contribute to better preparedness.  
 
Addressing the trade-offs between climate change impacts and the other policy areas to avoid mal-
adaptation could be defined as a “minimal approach”. Such an approach would screen measures on 
their climate resilience, and only allow those that are minimally vulnerable to a changing climate, 
and to minimise future negative impacts of climate change by climate proofing agriculture. A 
“maximal approach” would expand on the minimal approach by trying to achieve multiple divi-
dends and potential synergies in the field of poverty reduction, agricultural production and disas-
ter reduction and climate change. This would yield a basket of measures, including resource man-
agement for sustainable land-use, specific activities aimed at rural and agricultural development, 
and non-food use of biomass. 
 
4.3.3 Policy options for mainstreaming 
The previous section has identified measures that make livelihoods more sustainable, while also 
reducing the vulnerability to climate change impacts. This section provides an overview of polices 
for international organisations that offer opportunities for mainstreaming adaptation to climate 
change in these policy areas.  
 
The need for mainstreaming climate change adaptation in development planning and cooperation 
is increasingly recognised. This is for example illustrated by the declaration of development and 
environment ministers of OECD countries (OECD, 2006), that states that OECD-countries will 
work to better integrate climate change adaptation in development planning and assistance. The 
2007 EU Green paper on options for EU action identifies integration of adaptation into EU exter-
nal relations as an important pillar of its work (EC, 2007b). As a significant part of development 
assistance is directed at activities that are potentially affected by climate change (OECD, 2005a). 
There is a whole suite of policy frameworks for development planning and development coopera-
tion that currently hardly pay any attention to climate change risks (OECD, 2005a) and in which 
climate change adaptation can be mainstreamed at the project, national or sectoral level. An exam-
ple is the process leading to Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs).  
 
The PRSP process is relatively new and still evolving. Various reviews have noted the opportunity 
to influence the process leading to a PRSP, emphasise them as mechanisms for mainstreaming cli-
mate change policies and strategies as well as the need to go beyond the national level and inte-
grate climate adaptation into local-level planning and implementation (VARG, 2003; Eriksen and 
Naess, 2003; Agrawala and Berg, 2002), following the extensive decentralisation processes that are 
taking place in many developing countries. Reviews of the integration of environmental concerns 
in PRSPs conclude however that many PRSPs pay little to very little attention to basic issues of 
environmental health, natural resource degradation and vulnerability to environmental hazards 
(Bojo and Reddy, 2004). This is consistent with a review of country-level progress on the imple-
mentation of the seventh MDG, on ensuring environmental sustainability, that shows that envi-
ronmental issues do not receive much attention outside of MDG 7 (Lee and Ghamine, 2005). Yet, 
reviews also state that positive examples exist. There are several examples of PRSPs providing 
promising links, for example in the case of Tanzania (Mwandosya, 2006). These examples clearly 
deserve a following and could be put forward as “best practices” to enhance up-scaling of these 
experiences.  
 
For vulnerable areas and groups, additional efforts will be necessary to adapt to changes in cli-
matic conditions. Relevant agricultural decisions are taken mainly at the local and national level, 
but international policies also influence these choices. Organisations like the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
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can guide local and national decisions by showing best practices and by helping to improve (sub-
)national policy frameworks.  
 
Increasingly, the links between vulnerability for disasters and climate change adaptation are ac-
knowledged in the development and international aid communities, and some governments have 
even formulated policy objectives to integrate disaster reduction in poverty reduction policies 
(DFID, 2006; Schipper and Pelling, 2006). Development policies would provide the framework 
that can bring disaster reduction and climate change adaptation together and strengthen both 
(Sperling and Szekely, 2005). Measures may be most effective if they are structurally applied in 
“natural disaster hotspots” (Dilley et al., 2005). Examples of policies that can be undertaken by 
donors to support countries to mainstream disaster reduction and adaptation in development 
planning include: a) support for improving government response capacity as part of sustainable 
development policies; b) support for provision of information and capacity to the most disaster-
prone regions and communities to leave them more prepared (especially those recovering from ear-
lier shocks); c) support for making disaster preparedness part of the national development plan-
ning; d) support for early warning systems and capacity in responding to disasters; and e) encour-
aging affected governments to take a more systematic approach to disaster preparedness. 
 
The importance of structural conditions that determine the vulnerability of farmers, although not 
directly linked to climate change adaptation policies, is illustrated by the fact that farmers and 
countries that depend on commodity exports could benefit from changes in agricultural subsidy 
policies. Subsidy-reform would allow farmers to strengthen their position in the market and invest 
in development of the sector, thus reducing farmers’ vulnerability.  
 
Based on the above, Table 4.2 provides an overview of policy options for mainstreaming climate 
change adaptation. These policy actions are not very specifically elaborated as adaptation efforts 
are intrinsically local in nature and implementation is context dependent.  
 
Table 4.2 Policy options for mainstreaming climate change adaptation in poverty reduction, agriculture and land use and 
disaster reduction. 
Is
su
e 
Area of interaction Policy options for mainstreaming climate change adaptation 
Synergy: biodiversity and conserva-
tion of natural resources with pre-
vention of land degradation and 
climate change adaptation 
Payment of the poor for ecosystem services if these 
lead to climate change-proof environmental manage-
ment.  
Synergy: sustainable livelihoods as 
an approach to reducing poverty 
and dealing with climate change 
Three strategic entry points for adaptation: (1) reduc-
tion of vulnerability of livelihoods, e.g. livelihood di-
versification; (2) strengthening local capacity and 
reducing sensitivity; (3) risk management and early 
warning 
Po
ve
rt
y 
re
du
ct
io
n 
Synergy: Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Papers and National Strategies 
for Sustainable Development  
Mainstreaming adaptation measures in policy 
frameworks and programmes for poverty reduction 
and sustainable development mechanisms, using 
documented “best practices” 
Synergy: drought resistance 
Increased water use efficiency, improved soil crop 
management, insurance 
Synergy: more efficient use of in-
puts (nutrients and water) 
Precision agriculture, improved soil and crop man-
agement 
Synergy: more resistance against 
pests and diseases 
Climate change resilient crops, insurance 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
Synergy: dealing with climate vari-
ability 
Early warning systems, also helpful in dealing with 
climate change 
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Is
su
e 
Area of interaction Policy options for mainstreaming climate change adaptation 
So
ils
 a
nd
 
si
nk
s 
Synergy: combating land degrada-
tion, overexploitation 
Intensification of agriculture, freeing land for carbon 
management. 
Extensification: enhancing carbon management, zero 
tillage 
Synergy: effects of flooding in de-
graded and deforested areas 
Arrange landscape planning to minimise the effects of 
flash floods 
Synergy: drought prevention Early warning systems aimed at land managers 
D
is
as
te
r 
re
du
c-
ti
on
 
Synergy: natural disaster risk re-
duction; increasing resilience to 
floods and droughts 
Landscape planning and (micro-) insurance 
Su
bs
id
ie
s Trade-off: current agricultural sub-
sidy regime is not enhancing resil-
ience or sustainable land use 
Moving subsidies moving towards rewarding farmers 
for sustainable land use (reduces their vulnerability)  
 
4.4 Widening climate change mitigation efforts 
Mitigation of climate change includes all anthropogenic efforts that reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions or enhance their sinks (IPCC, 2001b). Greenhouse gas emissions arise from almost every 
thinkable economic activity through the use of fossil fuel-based energy or changes in land use. This 
section will discuss the material inter-linkages, possible measures and policy options for main-
streaming climate change mitigation in security of energy supply, air pollution and health, and 
trade and finance. 
 
4.4.1 Material inter-linkages with climate change mitigation 
Security of energy supply is an important priority for energy import-dependent countries. In 
most countries, the reliance on imported energy is expected to increase over the next decades 
(IEA, 2005); for the European Union, for instance, the self-sufficiency is expected to decrease from 
around 55% in 2000 to 30% in 2030 (EC, 2006). The principal aim of energy security policies is to 
ensure the reliable supply of affordable energy. Currently, the most used and cheapest energy 
source is fossil fuels, and because of rising oil and gas prices, particularly coal is on the rise. The 
main material linkage between security of energy supply and climate change relates to the green-
house gas emissions resulting from the dominant use of fossil fuels in our energy system. IEA 
(2007b) distinguishes four areas of energy insecurity, of which “concentration of fossil fuel re-
sources” is the one most pertaining to climate change, as means to address it “include moving away 
from fossil fuels”. Tension between the rising energy demand and the limited number of countries 
that control the available resources on the one hand, and the need to reduce CO2 emissions on the 
other, is growing. While reducing dependence on imported energy is a key objective in most coun-
tries and clear synergies with climate change mitigation are possible, the benefits of increased use 
of domestic energy carriers is rarely accounted for (Egging and Oostvoorn, 2004).  
 
Air pollution is a severe cause of health problems in both developing and industrialised countries, 
and in all countries alike, policies are developed to address it. Research on air pollution and 
health shows that there is a large potential for synergies between air pollution and climate change 
policy, especially in the technological measures taken to abate both (Alcamo et al., 2003; Syri et al., 
2001). The material inter-linkages between air quality and climate change are diverse. Firstly, air 
pollution and greenhouse gases share the same atmosphere, which enables physical interaction 
and therefore creates strong material linkages. There are health-affecting air pollutants, notably 
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ozone and soot that are also contributors to climate change. Reduction of atmospheric concentra-
tions of these substances automatically has a double effect as it reduces air pollution and mitigates 
climate change. In addition, there are indirect effects of air pollutants on climate change and vice 
versa. For instance, emissions of sulphur oxides, which lead to inter alia acid rain, also enhance for-
mation of sulphate aerosols, which have a short-term cooling effect. It has been emphasised that 
the reductions in sulphur emissions for the sake of air pollution control may lead to enhanced cli-
mate change (e.g., Stanhill and Cohen, 2001; Wild et al., 2005), and even that sulphur can be delib-
erately emitted to mitigate climate change (Wigley, 2006; Crutzen, 2006). Secondly, air pollution 
is often caused by activities that also produce greenhouse gas emissions, such as industrial produc-
tion, electricity generation and transport (Sliggers, 2004).  
 
The interactions between trade and finance and climate change mitigation take place in different 
ways. Trade liberalisation policies usually increase economic activity, and hence greenhouse gas 
emissions. On the other hand, climate policy may have an impact on trade flows by affecting the 
competitiveness of countries, or may lead to innovation and diffusion of new technologies, in turn 
opening greenhouse gas abatement opportunities (Charnovitz, 2003). Direct and indirect subsi-
dies on fossil fuels are important policy disturbances that artificially reduce prices of fossil fuelled 
energy and affect climate change in two ways. In the first place, artificially lowered prices lead to 
more consumption and hence greenhouse gas-intensive trade and production. Secondly, these sub-
sidies also artificially increase the relative prices of alternative energy options, such as renewable 
energy (Beers, 2004).  
 
4.4.2 Possible measures 
Measures that meet the objectives of energy security policies as well as mitigation of climate 
change are ample (Holdren and Smith, 2000). For example, energy efficiency measures can be im-
plemented against low cost, but are difficult to implement because of a variety of social and system 
limitations (Shove et al., 1998). Renewable energy use in the transport sector – because of its al-
most-exclusive oil dependence the sector most susceptible to security of supply problems – is an 
area where many opportunities have been identified, but costs are often higher than the costs of 
conventional oil, and the large-scale cultivation of bio-energy crops may lead to deforestation and 
food security problems. In the heating and electricity sector, synergetic measures can be identified, 
as well as trade-offs. The use of renewable fuels or nuclear can lead to lower energy imports and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but switching to coal to reduce dependence on oil or gas will 
increase CO2 emissions, provided CO2 capture and storage is not applied. 
 
Air quality improvements and climate change can be synergetic when the use of fossil fuels is ad-
dressed (Rabl and Dreicer, 2002). This means that either the use of fossil fuel is made more energy-
efficient or is avoided through the switch to renewable and nuclear energy. This can be done in the 
energy sector, in industry, households and in transport. In addition, to address air quality alone, 
end-of-pipe technologies can be used. However, these have a negative effect on climate change, as 
they tend to decrease plant efficiency and increase its carbon intensity. The use of sustainably 
grown biomass, which is good for climate change, may be bad for air quality if the flue gases are left 
untreated (Bakker et al., 2004).  
 
Table 4.3 gives an overview of the main interactions of the measures identified. Many measures are 
related to the energy sector and address the fuel mix in particular. The most promising options are 
those with synergies in climate change, air quality and security of energy supply. A “+” indicates a 
synergy between the measure and the policy field of climate change, air quality or security of en-
ergy supply; a “-” indicates a trade-off. “0” indicates that no interaction in particular can be dis-
cerned. A “+/-” indicates that the effect can be positive in some regions and negative in others, de-
pending on the circumstances. The options that have a “+” in one of the columns, and a “-” in one of 
the others may signal trade-offs that need to be addressed. 
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Table 4.3 Inter-linkages between measures dealing with air pollution, security of energy supply and climate change mitiga-
tion  
Sector Measures Air quality Security of energy 
supply 
Climate change 
mitigation 
Conversion of efficiency 
improvement 
+ + + 
Photovoltaic + +/- + 
Wind energy + +/- + Renewable 
electricity 
Biomass 0/- + + 
Hydro + +/- + 
Nuclear + + + 
Fuel switch for coal → gas + - +/- 
More use of coal - + - 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
More use of coal, but combined 
with CO2 capture and storage 
+/0 + + 
Hybrid electric cars + + + 
Fuel cell technology + + + 
Fuel efficiency + + + 
Fuel switch for petrol -> diesel - 0 + 
T
ra
ns
po
rt
 
Coal to liquids - + - 
Energy efficiency  + + + 
Material efficiency  + + + 
In
du
st
ry
 
Air pollutant scrubbers + 0/- - 
Fuel switch for local heating and 
cooking 
+ - + 
Efficient cook stoves + + + 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
Solar home systems for lighting + + + 
 
Table 4.3 shows that synergies between the three issue areas can be realised by using the right 
technologies. Examples of potentially promising options are improving energy efficiency and low-
carbon energy sources (which both address climate change and air pollution), along with ensuring 
energy supply security by: 1) focusing on domestically available resources and making domestic 
reserves or 2) focussing on supply of fuels that have a wide geographical spread in countries that 
are not or less susceptible to political turmoil. More low-carbon energy sources can be achieved by 
shifting from oil to gas, bio-fuels or hydrogen in the transport sector and deployment of renewable 
and nuclear energy. 
 
Addressing the trade-offs between climate change mitigation and the other policy areas could be 
defined as a “minimal approach”. Such an approach would be aimed at minimising the negative 
impacts of non-climate policy developments on climate change. The mix of policies and measures 
comes into play on a global level or in countries crucial to climate negotiations, and involve four 
crucial components: “greening” of investments in the energy sector; phase-out of subsidies on fossil 
fuels; addressing the vested interests in fossil fuels; and using clean coal technologies to meet the 
growth in large developing countries through technological cooperation or mandatory interna-
tional technology-oriented agreements (Coninck et al., 2008a). 
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A “maximal approach” would achieve the above goals, extended with policies and measures that 
can be undertaken in the field of climate change mitigation, reduction of air pollution, and security 
of energy supply, yielding a basket of measures that have a “triple dividend” and use the potential 
synergies. These measures include energy conservation; a fuel switch to hydrogen in the case of 
transport; hydrogen generated by coal gasification with CO2 capture and storage; and mass transit 
systems and vehicle maintenance programmes. 
 
4.4.3 Policy options for mainstreaming 
The previous section has identified measures that are synergetic for energy security, air quality and 
climate change mitigation. This section provides an overview of policies that offer opportunities to 
mainstream climate into these policy areas. 
 
Regional circumstances affect the available and possible options for integrated security of energy 
supply and climate change mitigation policies. Many regions can currently not do without fossil 
fuels to meet their energy demand, so it will be necessary to at least reduce the negative impacts of 
their use. In addition, several countries are economically dependent on the export of fossil fuels. As 
indicated above, using technologies that do not compromise the interests of the fossil-fuel export-
ing countries, such as CO2 capture and storage combined with hydrogen production (allowing for 
the continued use of gas and coal, and possibly also oil) could prove beneficial for those economies, 
for energy security of supply and for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These measures are, how-
ever, difficult to realise on an international level in an international agreement, as the security of 
energy supply is not commonly regarded as a collective action problem but as a field where coun-
tries simply compete based on price. There is limited cooperation though in alliances such as the 
European Union or via such organisations as the International Energy Agency. Fossil-fuel export-
ing countries and industrialised fossil-fuel importing countries could make an agreement on trans-
fer of climate-friendly technologies in exchange for fossil fuels supply. Large oil and gas companies 
could be vehicles for such international technology initiatives, either via principles of corporate 
social responsibility and voluntary agreements, or enforced by legislative measures on energy effi-
ciency and environment.  
 
Trade policies offer a limited number of opportunities for enhancing climate policy so far. Envi-
ronmental policies aimed at incorporating the negative environmental external effects of produc-
tion processes could affect trade flows towards more sustainable production. In terms of financing 
of projects, mainstreaming mitigation concerns in different financing areas is a considerable oppor-
tunity in making investments more sustainable. A significant share of global foreign direct invest-
ment is done via multilateral banks, and for example the World Bank is working towards a low-
carbon investment framework (World Bank, 2006b). In addition to financing, Beers (2004) has 
identified the area of energy subsidy reform as being crucial for using trade and finance regimes to 
address climate change mitigation. For example, in the second half of the 1990s, energy subsidy 
rates of 40% for coal in China were reported. The subsidy rate of all energy sources taken together 
is 11%, with both industrialised and developing countries boasting significant subsidy regimes 
(IEA, 1999). If OECD countries would remove fossil fuel subsidies and assist non-OECD countries 
in their energy subsidy reform through financial and technology transfers, they could require that 
non-Annex-I countries accept greenhouse gas obligations as part of the bargain (Beers and Moor, 
2001).  
 
International treaties aimed at reducing air pollution are mainly regional, although it is increas-
ingly recognised that air quality is also a global problem (Holloway et al., 2003; Sliggers, 2004). 
This recognition may generate possibilities for harmonising air pollution measures with climate 
agreements, in the case that full integration of the policy areas is not feasible. Energy security of 
supply, conversely, is mainly a national issue, with only some room for bilateral cooperation or co-
operation in the context of, for example, the European Union. Policy harmonisation both ways 
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(energy security in climate policy as well as vice versa) would be difficult here because of the dif-
ferent policymaking levels. Mainstreaming with respect to policy options and measures would 
therefore be relevant here. 
 
Table 4.4 gives a number of policy options to create synergies between security of supply policies, 
air quality and health, and climate mitigation. The table points out the countries for which the in-
teractions are most relevant, and further provides information on how climate policy concerns can 
best be integrated in other policy areas. 
 
Table 4.4 Policy options, and relevant countries and regions, for integrating climate change mitigation concerns in security 
of energy supply, air quality and health, and trade and finance 
Issue  Area of interaction 
Relevant 
countries or 
regions 
Policy options for mainstreaming climate change 
mitigation 
Synergy: more efficient use 
of energy Global Energy-saving policies to reduce demand  
Trade-off: use of coal to 
meet increasing energy 
demand 
India & China, in 
particular 
Policy package for more efficient and cleaner fossil 
fuel use and incentives for development of new 
low-CO2 coal technologies  
Synergy: reduced use of 
fossil fuels through use of 
renewable and nuclear 
energy and other fuels 
Energy-dependent 
countries with 
much potential for 
renewable energy  
There are many interests that can be served by 
applying renewable energy sources. E.g., for 
transport, fuel switch to gas and in the longer term 
to hydrogen is an option, or more use of biomass. 
Countries and parties could be encouraged by 
helping them to see the interests 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly
 
Trade-off: conviction 
enhancing renewables 
means an economic threat 
to energy-exporting regions 
in the world. 
OPEC, gas-
exporting 
countries, United 
States 
Technological cooperation in climate-friendly fossil 
fuel applications: fossil based hydrogen, CO2 
capture and storage & clean fossil fuel technologies 
Synergy: urban air pollution 
caused by the same 
activities as greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Global 
 
Energy conservation in supply and demand 
For transport, fuel switch to gas and, in the longer 
term, to hydrogen, mass transit systems and vehicle 
maintenance programmes 
Decentralised renewable energy for electricity, 
cooking and lighting 
Synergy: access to modern 
energy services in rural 
areas reduces indoor air 
pollution and GHG. 
Developing 
countries 
Modern energy provision with renewable energy, 
more efficient heating and cooking techniques and 
clean fossil fuel use 
A
ir
 p
ol
lu
ti
on
/H
ea
lt
h 
Synergy: both ozone and 
soot are significant air 
pollutants; both contribute 
to climate change. 
Global Include ozone and soot in climate negotiations 
Trade-off: energy subsidies 
favour greenhouse-gas 
emitting activities 
Global 
Reduction or elimination of subsidies for fossil 
fuels, more subsidies for climate-friendly energy 
supply as part of electricity reform and 
liberalisation 
T
ra
de
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
e 
Trade-off: huge investments 
still targeted at fossil fuels  Global 
Reducing energy consumption so less investment 
is needed 
Introducing GHG taxes or border tax adjustment 
to favour climate-friendly investments, goods and 
services 
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4.5 Institutional and organisational inter-linkages 
This section examines the institutional and organisational inter-linkages to identify ways in which the 
impacts of international institutions and organisations can be enhanced. International organisa-
tions have to satisfy the demand for coordination in areas where the actions of individual countries 
do not lead to the best outcome for everyone. In trans-boundary environmental issues, interna-
tional treaties have mushroomed over the past decades (Raustiala and Victor, 2004). The institu-
tional landscape has therefore become increasingly dense and complex, and overlaps are bound to 
occur. Overlap, in the meaning that an outcome of one treaty has an impact on the outcome of an-
other, can reduce the effectiveness of treaties, but can also be used to mainstream other interests 
and mobilise synergies. The institutional inter-linkages are discussed simultaneously here for cli-
mate change adaptation and mitigation.  
 
There is a long list of relevant institutional and organisational arrangements that could be applied 
in the different policy areas from the previous two sections. An overview is provided in Table 4.5. 
Each of these treaties, organisations or platforms offers opportunities to mainstream climate 
change adaptation and mitigation. Table 4.5 also outlines the “windows of opportunity”, clearly 
indicating that work on mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation can start imme-
diately.  
 
The importance of mainstreaming climate is also increasingly recognised amongst the Rio Conven-
tions, as there is a clear convergence of objectives on land use and climate change from the three 
Rio Conventions, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), along with the Ramsar Convention and the UN Forum on Forests. The Rio 
Conventions have set up a Joint Liaison Group to enhance coordination between them. At the in-
dividual country level, implementation of the various environmental agreements needs to converge 
to a greater extent (UNCCD, 2004), as many synergies exist between the different options imple-
mented under the different conventions (CBD, 2003). The Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel 
(STAP) to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has designed a tool to improve the inter-
linkages in GEF funded projects (STAP, 2004). Moreover, there is a need for parties to focus on an 
environmental governance framework that links environment with the broader development 
agenda. 
  
Table 4.5 Windows of opportunity in institutional and organisational inter-linkages from the perspective of climate 
change  
Issue linked 
with climate  
Institutional and/or organisational 
linkages  Window of opportunity  
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Funding of adaptation-related activi-
ties  
Show importance of climate change 
adaptation for realising MDGs 
Poverty 
United Nations: Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), bi- and multilat-
eral donors (World Bank, UNDP, donor 
countries) 
Official Development Assistance 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
(MEA) co-ordination UNEP 
UN Convention on the Combat of De-
sertification (UNCCD) 
Joint Liaison Group Rio-Conventions, 
MEA co-ordination UNEP 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) Joint Liaison Group Rio Conventions, 
MEA co-ordination UNEP 
Environment 
and 
biodiversity 
International water agreements MEA co-ordination UNEP 
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Issue linked 
with climate  
Institutional and/or organisational 
linkages  Window of opportunity  
Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) / Consultative Group on Interna-
tional Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
Intensification of existing co-operation, 
use of extension services 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agricultural subsidy reforms under de-
bate 
UNCCD and CBD Use environmental services as base for 
improved co-ordination 
United Nations Forum on Forests Relevant for sinks and avoided defores-
tation 
Rural devel-
opment and 
agriculture 
 
Commission on sustainable Develop-
ment – Agriculture and land use, 2008-
2009 
Agriculture, rural development, land, 
drought, desertification, and Africa 
Disaster re-
duction 
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Risk reduction frameworks for disaster 
reduction and adaptation that can be 
combined 
Inter-agency taskforce on climate 
change and disaster reduction 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
Greening of decisions  
Special focus on subsidies counterpro-
ductive to climate change mitigation 
Regional trade and investment agree-
ments 
Greening of regional trade and invest-
ment agreements 
Trade and 
finance  
International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, Regional Development banks, Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 
Greening of the decisions 
Greening of finance / investments 
UNFCCC Tropospheric ozone and soot in inter-
national climate agreements 
Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) 
Inclusion of CO2  
Montreal Protocol (MP)a Exclusion of greenhouse gases as CFC 
substitutes; aligning financial mecha-
nisms MP and UNFCCC 
Air quality 
and health  
 
World Health Organisation Intensification of existing cooperation 
OPEC, Gas Exporting Countries Forum, 
International Economic Forum, Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IAEA) 
High oil prices increase the potential of 
combining this agenda with climate 
change 
Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment – Energy and climate, 2006/2007 
Follow up the 2006/2007 CSD cycle 
Use public-private partnerships set up 
after World Summit on Sustainable 
Development  
Security of 
energy sup-
ply (includ-
ing sources 
of energy for 
develop-
ment)b 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) 
Energy for development more promi-
nent within MDGs  
a It should be noted that the Montreal Protocol, which targets stratospheric ozone, it not relevant for the tropospheric ozone 
air pollution referred to in the text of this paper. 
b Security of energy supply is among other things composed of access to affordable energy. For developing countries, especially 
large, rapidly growing economies, this has a large interaction with climate change as their growth in energy use is contributing 
significantly to the increase in greenhouse gas emissions. This is the reason why in the list of institutional linkages, the Com-
mission on Sustainable Development and the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2000) are recognised as such. It should be 
emphasised, however, that due to the scale of providing energy to the poor, electrification is not expected contribute much to 
climate change, even if this energy is provided through fossil fuels. 
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In terms of adaptation, establishing links to risk-management practices in national sectors as well 
as development assistance by bi- and multilateral donor institutions would be among the first on 
the priority list for mainstreaming climate change adaptation. Although adaptation is essentially a 
local process, international policies are influencing these local processes and can hence enhance 
mainstreaming adaptation at the national and local level. The incorporation of climate change risks 
in the reduction of weather-related natural disasters is already gaining attention (Burton and Aalst 
2004; Aalst and Helmer 2004). Capacity-building of integrated climate risk management can be 
improved through conventional development assistance and programmes, such as those operated 
by the UNDP, the International Red Cross, World Bank and bilateral donors. Specific attention 
has to be paid to mainstreaming climate change in risk management approaches such as Integrated 
Water Resource Management and Integrated Coastal Zone Management, either financed from 
domestic budgets and/or donor sources. Associated national and multilateral institutions, such as 
the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, development agencies and NGOs, can al-
ready start supporting these linkages.  
 
In the field of mitigation of climate change, efforts are underway to establish links between the 
WTO and climate change mitigation. These have so far not led to very concrete results. As men-
tioned, World Bank has developed an investment framework, both to make projects more climate-
proof, but also to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions associated with World Bank activities 
(World Bank, 2006b). This could be replicated and institutionalised in other relevant financing 
institutions, such as the regional development banks. The links with air quality could be addressed 
through the successful Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), 
which in recent meetings has discussed climate change and is looking into the possibility of main-
streaming climate change in its activities, or even including CO2 in its basket of gases. Continua-
tion and deepening of these efforts would be particularly useful as it provides best practices for 
countries not included in the CLRTAP but interested in reducing air pollution and how to best 
combine this with climate change mitigation. Institutional linkages between development, climate 
change and energy security of supply have been firmly established and extensively discussed dur-
ing the CSD-14 (CSD, 2006). These different agenda’s are converging. The follow-up policy-
oriented discussions during CSD-15 have however not led to an agreement on how to operational-
ise the linkages between development, energy security and climate change further. The potential of 
the CSD to contribute to these issues therefore remains uncertain. A new opportunity arises with 
the focus of CSD 2008/2009 on agriculture, rural development and land use. 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Currently, the potential of mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation remains un-
derexploited. This paper has identified and assessed potential directions to widen the climate re-
gime by mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation in a number of policy areas. Im-
plementing this strategy could enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the climate regime. As it 
is clearly going beyond what is currently discussed and agreed upon within the UNFCCC, a main-
streaming strategy would be additional to the climate convention, and should not be seen or pur-
sued as a substitute. 
 
The reasons for seeing mainstreaming as an additional strategy differ for adaptation and mitigation 
of climate change. With respect to adaptation, there is a risk that the issue gets buried in other 
agendas, with the result that the climate issue loses attention. Any next UNFCCC agreement 
therefore needs to be stronger on adaptation to climate change. With respect to mitigation, there 
is a concern that mainstreaming on its own is unlikely to be environmentally effective as it will not 
give certainty on achieving the emission reductions that are required to realise mitigation targets.  
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One of the advantages of a mainstreaming strategy is that it can be implemented immediately, 
without a formal connection to the UNFCCC process, and in this way help the climate regime 
forward at a time that international negotiations on both climate adaptation and mitigation are at 
a crucial stage. Although the opportunities for mainstreaming climate change are increasingly rec-
ognised by analysts, and (inter)national policies are starting to be formulated, implementation is 
still in its infancy.  
 
With respect to the implementation of mainstreaming climate change adaptation, mainstreaming 
can be a key component of any national, sectoral or international development framework or pro-
ject. At the very least, climate change adaptation needs to be mainstreamed in all relevant national 
and sector planning processes to avoid mal-adaptation that limits realising the specific national 
and sectoral development goals. Especially in developing countries, this will be of great importance 
for climate proofing of development planning and assistance.  
 
The institutional embedding for mainstreaming climate change mitigation is likely to differ per 
related issue. In air quality, for instance, the organisational landscape is relatively clear and linking 
greenhouse gases with air pollutants seems possible to a certain degree. In energy security of sup-
ply, there is much less international coordination, which leads to the recommendation that trade-
offs can be prevented by aiming at measures on the technological level, as well as recommending 
national policies. A minimal approach, addressing the trade-offs only, would already be useful, and 
is within the scope of what the international community can do.  
 
It is also clear that a mainstreaming strategy has its challenges and this paper has addressed sev-
eral reasons. Although policy integration is long recognised as a cornerstone for sustainable devel-
opment, progress has been limited. There is no reason to assume this would be different for main-
streaming climate change adaptation and mitigation. The paper has shown that in different policy 
domains initiatives start to emerge, but that this still is really only the beginning of a process that 
needs to be fostered by the international community to become effective. Success will critically 
depend on further operationalisation at a practical level and up-scaling of these directions for 
mainstreaming in the specific contexts of each of the policy domains addressed in this paper. 
Mainstreaming can make an important contribution to addressing climate change, but, to realise 
any of its potential, requires strong political will and active follow up in implementation. 
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Chapter 5 International Technology-Oriented Agreements to address 
climate change14 
5.1 Introduction 
There is widespread agreement that achieving the dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions necessary to stabilize GHG concentrations at between 450 and 750 parts per million 
(ppm) would require innovation and large-scale adoption of GHG-reducing technologies through-
out the global energy system (IPCC, 2001a). Alongside policies aimed directly at mandatory GHG 
emissions reductions—such as a GHG cap-and-trade system or tax—much discussion has there-
fore surrounded policies targeted instead at technology research and development (R&D) activi-
ties and technology-specific mandates and incentives. The associated debate is therefore not so 
much over the importance of new technology per se in solving the climate problem, but rather over 
what the most effective policies and institutions are for achieving the dramatic technological 
changes and associated emission reductions necessary for stabilization.  
 
For example, one frequently cited study (Pacala and Socolow, 2004) found that stabilizing carbon 
dioxide (CO2) concentrations at about 500 ppm would require a 50 percent reduction in global 
CO2 emissions below baseline within the next 50 years and then a more significant decline over 
the following 50 years. Achieving this magnitude of reduction would require very substantial in-
creases in the penetration of a wide range of energy-supply and end-use technologies, including: 
technologies that increase demand- and supply-side energy efficiency; renewable energy technolo-
gies (solar, wind, biomass, tidal, geothermal, wave); nuclear energy; and CO2 capture and storage. 
Doing so at reasonable cost would require substantial cost-reducing innovations through research, 
development, and learning. 
 
Existing agreements—such as in the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) 
—have emphasized mandatory GHG reduction targets. However, the protocol’s limitations with 
respect to participation and effectiveness have become apparent, as the United States and Austra-
lia have withdrawn and Canada largely has reneged. Meanwhile, an array of climate technology 
policies has emerged, at both national and international levels. Such policies include government 
funding for research, development, and demonstration of new technologies, subsidies and man-
dates for the production of alternative fuels and associated technologies (e.g., renewable portfolio, 
building, and biofuel standards), loan guarantees for investments, technology performance stan-
dards (e.g., for energy efficiency), and the provision of information to encourage improved decision 
making by equipment purchasers. There also are voluntary agreements of international scope, such 
as the Asian Pacific Partnership. 
 
Following these developments, growing attention has turned to the possible role of international 
technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) as part of the architecture of international climate-
change policy. This attention is due in part to the willingness of the United States and some of the 
more rapidly growing developing countries to initiate new and engage in existing TOAs, as well as 
a growing sense that emissions targets alone may be an insufficient response to the long-term 
global climate change problem. Another potentially attractive feature of policies targeted at the 
innovation and adoption of GHG-reducing technologies is that they might have higher co-benefits 
than GHG emissions-reduction policies alone. For example, renewable standards might help pro-
                                                 
14  This paper was published with Carolyn Fischer, Richard Newell and Takahiro Ueno in Energy Policy (Coninck et al., 
2008a). The authors thank Joseph Aldy, Merrilee Bonney, Jos Bruggink, Barbara Buchner, Paul Koutstaal, Cédric Philibert, 
Graham Pugh, and Remko Ybema for useful comments on previous versions of the paper. Funding from the Dutch Gov-
ernment, Ministry of Finance, and MISTRA, the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research, is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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mote energy security by diversifying fuel sources, and energy-efficient technologies can lower op-
erating costs. Such ancillary benefits might help promote greater participation and stringency in 
an international climate agreement. Emissions policies also have ancillary benefits, but they cannot 
be managed as specifically as can technology mandates.  
 
Furthermore, since markets for technology and technological change have their own problems, 
policies that address these problems directly generate their own benefits in addition to pure emis-
sions reductions. Additional interest in technology strategies is generated by the fact that strict 
future targets cannot be set credibly today, so substantial progress and cost reductions could en-
able more effective (and credible) emissions policies in the future. For all these reasons, there is 
growing recognition that TOAs could play a substantial role in post-2012 international climate 
policy discussions. 
 
It is less clear, however, what specific form future TOAs might take, how large a role TOAs might 
play within an international climate-policy framework, whether their role should be as comple-
ments to or substitutes for emissions-based agreements, or how effective they might be in advanc-
ing certain international climate-policy objectives. Such objectives include reducing GHG emis-
sions, increasing technological advances, reducing costs, and increasing the participation and 
compliance incentives for various large countries.  
 
This paper therefore explores the extent to which TOAs can play a constructive role in addressing 
the unprecedented problem of climate change. In Section 5.2, we identify four main types of TOAs, 
describe several motivations for considering TOAs, and lay out key criteria for evaluating these 
agreements. Section 5.3 evaluates both current examples and recent proposals for different types of 
agreements, as well as a potential portfolio of TOAs. Then in Section 5.4, we consider how TOAs 
might be embedded within a complementary framework along with other climate-mitigation 
strategies, and what linkage with other international issues may occur, such as with international 
trade and development. We conclude in Section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Technology-Oriented Agreements 
5.2.1 Types of TOAs 
We define the scope of technology-oriented agreements as including those international agree-
ments that are aimed at advancing research, development, demonstration, and/or deployment of 
technologies. With respect to TOAs to address global climate change, these technologies would be 
aimed specifically at reducing GHG emissions. This is in contrast with agreements framed primar-
ily in terms of emissions targets, such as the Kyoto Protocol, or emissions-intensity targets. While 
both types of agreements may have GHG reductions as their ultimate aim, commitments to actions 
under TOAs are framed in terms of technological development activities or technology-specific 
mandates and incentives, rather than in terms of emissions. Within this group of agreements, there 
are four broad types of TOAs: (1) knowledge sharing and coordination; (2) research, development 
and demonstration (RD&D); (3) technology transfer; and (4) technology deployment mandates, 
standards, and incentives. 
 
Activities undertaken under knowledge sharing and coordination agreements include meeting, 
planning, exchange of information (e.g., the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum or the task-
sharing within International Energy Agency Implementing Agreements), and possibly the coordi-
nation and harmonization of research agenda and measurement standards. RD&D agreements in-
clude jointly agreed RD&D activities and funding commitments (e.g., the ITER fusion project) or 
mutual agreements to expand or enhance domestic RD&D programs. Technology-transfer agree-
ments include commitments for technology and project financing (e.g., the Global Environment 
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Facility), particularly flowing from developed to developing countries, as well as potentially facili-
tating international licensing and patent protection. A fourth class of TOAs is comprised of inter-
national agreements encouraging technology deployment by establishing deployment mandates for 
a specific technology or group of technologies (e.g., renewable portfolio standards), international 
technology performance standards (e.g., automobile fuel economy or appliance efficiency), or tech-
nology deployment incentives (e.g., renewable subsidies).  
 
Thus, efforts under TOAs may involve efforts to “push” technologies by subsidizing or otherwise 
fostering RD&D or efforts that “pull” technologies into the market by providing incentives for or 
mandating their use. In the latter case, however, those incentives are targeted toward promoting 
technologies and not more broadly at emissions reductions. Our discussion of TOAs therefore goes 
beyond, and does not address, several “bottom-up” efforts to develop emissions targets and climate 
policies whereby sector-level targets, performance standards, and technological options are used 
to allocate overall emissions-reduction obligations based on technical possibilities (e.g., Höhne, 
2005; Groenenberg, 2002; Sijm et al., 2001). Our objective, in contrast, is focused on agreements 
that directly target technology. We, like Blok et al. (2005), also consider a broader scope for TOAs 
than studies restricting TOAs to voluntary R&D agreements, which lack certainty regarding re-
ductions of GHG emissions (Berk et al., 2002; Höhne, 2005).  
 
The flexibility exists to design agreements according to technological needs so that they take into 
account the level of development of each technology. Some technologies, such as organic solar 
cells, require fundamental research in order to develop into a technology that will eventually be 
ready for use. Other technologies, such as a number of clean coal technologies, may not benefit 
considerably from more fundamental research and development but may instead benefit from more 
operational experience in demonstration. Energy-efficient technologies may require only greater 
financial incentives or mandates to increase their penetration; TOAs could be tailored toward 
those specific ends. Whether TOAs are designed for the short term or long term also may be re-
garded in a technology-specific manner. However, the further one looks ahead, the less clear it is 
which technologies will be relevant and preferable from a technical or economic perspective.  
 
5.2.2 Motivations for Technology-Oriented Agreements 
With the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto 
Protocol entered into force and ratified by a large number of the countries around the world, an 
international climate regime is already in place. An important question, however, is to what extent 
the transaction costs of modifying the current international policy direction could justify the bene-
fits of a possibly better regime with broader participation. The Kyoto Protocol establishes emis-
sions targets and timetables for the industrialized countries that have ratified it and allows for 
flexibility across those countries and across sectors in achieving those targets. The ensuing price 
that these reduction targets place on GHG emissions in those countries (e.g., through the ETS) 
provides an incentive for the near-term adoption of GHG-reducing technologies. It also allows for 
flexibility between industrialized and developing countries in achieving reductions through the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is designed to lead to the adoption of GHG-
reducing technology in developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol is intended to provide a com-
plete, short-term answer to the need for GHG emissions reductions, with the intention to con-
tinue with further reductions after the first commitment period ends in 2012.  
 
Given this broad-based support, it is reasonable to ask why one would need to consider agree-
ments specifically aimed at technologies. The added value of TOAs should be evaluated in the con-
text of the complex interplay of near-term supply and demand for technology, longer-term market 
incentives for technology innovation, and international trade. Climate change policy has benefited 
from research across many other disciplines, including economics, science and engineering, politi-
Chapter 5 
 
94 
cal science, law, and sociology. In this context, the economic perspective is especially relevant, as it 
pays particular attention to the operation of markets and the relative costs and benefits of different 
policy strategies. Nonetheless, each perspective has considered the role of technology in climate 
policy in different ways and each provides alternative motivations to look at TOAs in detail. Al-
though we may oversimplify these perspectives below, the discussion illustrates the richness and 
variety of arguments for enlarging the degree of technological specificity in international climate-
change agreements.  
 
An economics perspective 
Economics brings two related perspectives to policy in general and to climate policy in particular. 
One perspective is cost-effectiveness, which takes as given the goals set out by policymakers and 
seeks out the least-cost means of attaining those goals. Cost-effectiveness is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for economic efficiency. Economic efficiency calls for setting policy goals 
based on a clear identification of “market failures”—deficiencies in private markets to properly al-
locate resources—and the potential implementation of policies that directly correct these deficien-
cies. Efficiency requires setting the stringency of policies to maximize net benefits by equating in-
cremental benefits and costs. Both perspectives have a useful role in advising the policymaking 
process. Policymakers who decide not to pursue the economically efficient policy may still prefer 
cost-effective implementation.  
 
In the economics of climate change, the most immediately relevant market failure is the environ-
mental externality of global warming and related climate effects. Individuals, firms, and even coun-
tries, in the case of climate change, do not face the full social costs of their GHG emissions, leading 
to a level of GHG emissions that is too high from a societal perspective. The economist’s policy 
prescription for environmental externalities is to “put a price” on the externality—for example 
through a GHG tax or cap-and-trade system—thereby forcing individuals and firms to internalize 
the cost that they are placing on everyone else when they emit GHGs.  
 
When considered alongside policies that impose an emissions price, additional technology policies 
may not seem necessary or desirable. After all, this price places a financial value on GHG reduc-
tions and like other market prices (such as energy prices) induces households and firms to buy 
technologies with lower GHG emissions the next time they are in the market. This market-
demand pull in turn encourages manufacturers to invest in R&D efforts to bring new lower-GHG 
innovations to market, just as they do for other products and processes. There are nonetheless sev-
eral economic rationales for considering technology-oriented policies within a portfolio of climate 
policies (Jaffe et al., 2005; Newell, 2007).15 These technology market problems are not as relevant 
for environmental problems addressed over the course of years as they are for climate policy devel-
oping over decades or centuries and requiring much more dramatic changes in technology.  
 
First, the economics literature on R&D points to the difficulty firms have in capturing all the bene-
fits from their investments in innovation, which tend to “spill over” to other technology producers 
and users. This market reality can lead to underinvestment in innovative efforts—even given intel-
lectual property protection—potentially warranting policies that directly target R&D. In a related 
manner, the fact that knowledge can be relatively inexpensive to share, once it is produced, raises 
the possibility that research coordination can conserve on R&D resources by reducing duplicative 
efforts. This innovation underinvestment problem may be worsened in the case of GHG-reducing 
technology, in which the assets involved are often very long-lived, and the market for innovations 
resulting from R&D relies heavily on the stability of domestic and international public policy 
rather than natural market forces (see below). 
 
                                                 
15  See Jaffe et al. (2003) for an overview of issues at the interface of environmental policy and technological change. 
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Second, adoption externalities may be relevant in the adoption and diffusion of new technology, 
including learning-by-using, learning-by-doing, or network externalities. For a number of reasons, 
the cost or value of a new technology to one user may depend on how many other users have 
adopted the technology. In general, users will be better off the more other people use the same 
technology, so there is a benefit associated with the overall scale of technology adoption. The sup-
ply-side counterpart, learning-by-doing, describes how production costs tend to fall as manufac-
turers gain production experience. If this learning spills over to benefit other manufacturers with-
out compensation, it can represent an additional adoption externality. Finally, network external-
ities exist if a product becomes technologically more valuable to an individual user as other users 
adopt a compatible product (as with telephone and computer networks). These phenomena can be 
critical to understanding the existing technological system, forecasting how that system might 
evolve, and predicting the potential effect of some policy or event.  
 
Third, market shortcomings arise through incomplete information. While all investment is charac-
terized by uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with the returns to investment in innovation 
often is particularly large. Potential returns also are asymmetrically distributed and the developer 
of new technology typically is in a better position to assess its potential than others and may find 
investors sceptical about promised returns. In the context of environmental problems such as cli-
mate change, the huge uncertainties surrounding the future effects of climate change and the mag-
nitude of the policy response and, thus, the likely returns to R&D investment, exacerbates this 
problem further. Another type of information problem relates to the inability of current policy-
makers to credibly commit to a long-term emissions path. As a result, it is possible that the feasible 
near-term emissions price and/or the expected long-term emissions price is lower than the socially 
desirable level, thus providing an insufficient market inducement for GHG technology R&D. In 
addition, incomplete information lies at the source of principal-agent problems, as when a builder 
or landlord chooses the level of investment in energy efficiency in a building but the energy bills 
are paid by a later purchaser or a tenant. In general, to the extent that consumers undervalue en-
ergy efficiency for any reason—information problems, limits to decision-making, or plain myo-
pia—they will demand insufficient improvements and innovations in energy-using products. 
 
In sum, the interplay of technology and the environment therefore involves the interaction of two 
analytically distinct but linked sets of market failures (Jaffe et al., 2005). The consequences of this 
interaction can be complex. The fact that markets underinvest in new technology strengthens the 
case for making sure that environmental policy is designed to foster, rather than inhibit, innova-
tion. In cases where environmental externalities have not been fully internalized, it also is likely 
that the rate of investment in such technology is significantly below the socially desirable level. 
And it seems unlikely that environmental policy alone will create sufficient incentives.  
 
It is a basic principle of economics that for sound policy you need at least as many policy instru-
ments as there are market problems to be addressed (Tinbergen, 1956). Hence, the optimal set of 
climate policies also likely includes instruments explicitly designed to foster innovation, and pos-
sibly technology diffusion, in addition to GHG emissions policies that stimulate new technology as 
a side effect of internalizing the GHG externality. Likewise, long-term technology R&D alone is 
not sufficient because it provides no direct incentives for adoption of new technologies and be-
cause it focuses on the longer term, missing near-term opportunities for cost-effective emissions 
reductions (Philibert, 2003; Sandén and Azar, 2005; Fischer and Newell, 2007). Of course the value 
of any particular policy will depend on the actual benefits and costs of that policy given its specific 
design and the policy and market context in which it is applied. 
 
An engineering perspective 
The engineering perspective on climate policy typically has focused on estimates of the technical 
potential for emissions reductions from different technology strategies and the development paths 
of those technologies (see, for example, Pacala and Socolow, 2004). In related projections, future 
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energy use and associated emissions are based on technical estimates of how large a role particular 
technologies could play in the future. The limiting factors tend to be the physical characteristics of 
a resource (e.g., land availability for bio-energy, solar radiation for photo-voltaic energy), the tech-
nical feasibility of certain options (e.g., conversion efficiency of coal-fired power plants or a wind 
turbine), and the learning rate of the technology (i.e., how much costs are assumed to decrease 
with increased cumulative production).  
 
Based on a GHG-stabilization scenario, a business-as-usual scenario, and assumptions on present 
and future costs, studies estimate whether it is technically possible to achieve the required degree 
of emissions reductions. The message emanating from such exercises typically is that the magni-
tude of required changes in the energy system is daunting but also that currently available tech-
nologies are able to very substantially cut GHG emissions. The penetration of such technologies 
depends, however, on further cost reductions and the existence of policies that provide an incen-
tive for or mandate their adoption. 
 
An international relations perspective 
The international relations literature typically views international politics as a consequence of ra-
tional choice by countries and relies on game-theoretic perspectives that see politics as strategic 
interactions of rational actors (Stein, 1990; Martin, 1992). The current political gridlock of the in-
ternational climate regime also can be seen as a consequence of strategic choice. Because countries 
can benefit from mitigation efforts by other countries, they have incentive to free ride on others’ 
efforts, leading to cooperation that is less successful than desirable from a global perspective. Fur-
thermore, asymmetrical burdens and benefits of climate protection worsen the situation. The costs 
of mitigation fall primarily on the major energy producing and consuming countries, while the 
benefits of avoided climate damages arguably accrue primarily to the least developed countries 
that produce and consume less energy (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). Therefore, major emitters may 
have an inadequate incentive to reduce their emissions to an extent that would satisfy the needs of 
potential victims.  
 
In addition, nations are supreme authorities and there is no international authority that can en-
force international agreements. Therefore, even if nations agree to treaties, their compliance is not 
guaranteed. Even without enforcement authorities, however, nations would be motivated to com-
ply with international commitments. For example, if states betraying commitments are punished 
by other states through countermeasures, they will be restrained from defection. This reciprocity 
mechanism may work for trade issues, such as tariff reduction and non-tariff barrier removal. 
However, it seems unlikely to work for climate-change mitigation, because weak victim states are 
unlikely to be able to punish non-complying nations through countermeasures. In the GHG-
mitigation case, equivalent countermeasures are more emissions, which are not substantial threats 
to noncompliant nations.  
 
Despite these difficulties, some researchers in the field of political economy speculate that TOAs 
could alter this dynamic. First, network externalities associated with technologies could change 
the calculation of national interests. According to Barrett (2003), once the aggregate scale of 
economies of joining a hypothetical technology diffusion agreement reaches a critical mass, tar-
geted technologies could become standards. In that case, joining agreements and following stan-
dards would be a better strategy than non-participation. This speculation has been contested, 
however, because the existence of such a tipping point is a technology-specific matter and is very 
unlikely to exist for technologies (e.g., carbon capture and storage) that will always entail added 
costs relative to alternatives (see e.g., Philibert, 2004) Second, adding new components to agree-
ments could expand the “zone of possible agreements” (Sebenius, 1983) and make international 
cooperation more likely by changing the strategic interactions between the Kyoto parties and the 
current non-parties. In addition to emissions reductions, accelerating technological progress is of 
continual concern to governments. However, some game theoretic modelling of the benefits from 
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international cooperation on R&D and has shown there are few positive effects in terms of par-
ticipation (Buchner and Carraro, 2005).  
 
A sociological perspective 
The sociological perspective typically focuses on the role of technologies and technological change 
in the context of a “sociotechnical system” (see e.g., Geels, 2004; Bijker et al., 1987). In this perspec-
tive, technologies are considered to be embedded in society and social institutionalization, 
whether it is formal or informal, is part of any technological change, whether the user society is the 
general public (e.g., for the use of more energy-efficient appliances) or operators and business 
managers of power plants (e.g., for the adoption of CO2 capture technologies). From this perspec-
tive, the dynamics of technological change can only be understood in symbiosis with social 
changes.  
 
Theories of energy transition and industrial transformation make a distinction between different 
levels of technological and social co-evolution: the landscape level, the regime level and the niche 
level. In terms of climate-change policies, the landscape level refers to geopolitical developments of 
an ideological and institutional nature that determine the character and direction of international 
negotiations and the nature of framework agreements about climate change. The regime level re-
fers to the present configuration of the energy sector in terms of the balance between market forces 
and regulation and the role and power of prominent stakeholders. Finally, the niche level refers to 
specific types of technologies and installations that are on the verge of entering the market and 
possibly could lead to a new energy regime with a different balance of markets and regulations and 
a different set of key stakeholders. A transition starts with the establishment and accumulation of 
technological niches, eventually leading to change of the larger technological landscape (Geels, 
2004), although the way of bringing about these changes is disputed (Berkhout et al., 2003). Ac-
cording to many studies, the pathways toward regime shifts are likely to be a nonlinear sequence 
of events, rather than continuous linear development (e.g., Sandén and Jonasson, 2005). Navigating 
such transitions by policies, therefore, is almost impossible. Nonetheless, policies can facilitate 
niche formation and accumulation and then a dominant technological regime can arise in an unex-
pected manner.  
 
Profound changes in the energy system, such as those required for significant GHG reductions, 
involve not only individual technical changes but a technological regime shift. From a sociological 
perspective, this goal is fulfilled by the development of long-term technological pathways that fa-
cilitate a careful, but nonlinear transition. TOAs may be more capable of incorporating specific 
policy approaches, such as measures aimed at strategic niche management16, than agreements 
based solely on emissions targets. 
 
5.2.3 Criteria for assessing TOAs 
As with any policy goal, a variety of criteria can be brought to bear upon the choice of policy in-
struments to achieve environmental protection (see e.g., Bohm and Russell, 1985). The literature 
evaluating post-2012 climate regimes has identified a wide variety of evaluation criteria specifically 
oriented toward the assessment of alternative international climate policy approaches (Philibert 
and Pershing, 2001; Aldy et al., 2003; Höhne, 2005; Elzen, 2002; Berk et al., 2002; Torvanger et al., 
2004). Taking into account previously identified criteria as well as the particulars of TOAs, we 
consider five criteria in our assessment of the potential of TOAs to make a significant contribution 
                                                 
16  Strategic niche management is based on the idea that in order to make new technologies flourish, it is necessary to create 
protected environments (technological niches) in which actors can experiment with technologies and rules that deviate 
from the dominant regime. Strategic niche management involves the deliberate creation of such protected environments for 
targeted technologies so that actors learn to improve the technology and societal embedding. Eventually, the technological 
niche can evolve into a market (Raven, 2005). 
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to the international climate policy framework: (1) environmental effectiveness; (2) technological 
effectiveness; (3) economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness; (4) incentives for participation and 
compliance; and (5) administrative feasibility.  
 
Environmental effectiveness  
In the global climate context, environmental effectiveness measures the degree to which an agree-
ment would reduce GHG emissions and atmospheric GHG concentrations if the participating par-
ties adhere to the agreement. A key issue that arises in this regard is the timing and degree of cer-
tainty associated with the GHG effects of TOAs, which will vary widely across different types of 
agreements. For example, basic research and development tend to be associated with environ-
mental effects farther in the future than technology demonstration, transfer, or near-term deploy-
ment policies. As one moves from knowledge sharing and RD&D to technology transfer and stan-
dards, the degree of certainty surrounding GHG reductions increases. Another difficulty is related 
to establishing a counterfactual of what would likely happen in the absence of a policy, which can 
be particularly problematic with respect to the measurement of technological change and the ef-
fects of technology policies. 
 
Technological effectiveness 
Technological effectiveness refers to the specific contribution a TOA makes in advancing science 
and technology. Specific metrics of technological effectiveness will differ depending on the stage of 
the technological change process at which different TOAs are directed, such as effectiveness at 
stimulating new scientific and technological breakthroughs, bringing new innovations to market, 
or lowering the cost and increasing the penetration of existing technologies. These metrics should 
be applied as appropriate for the different types of TOAs, as the aims are different. For instance, 
fundamental and applied research is directed toward scientific achievements and innovation rather 
than technology adoption, whereas technology-transfer agreements are oriented toward encourag-
ing technology diffusion rather than path breaking innovations. 
 
Economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness  
Cost-effectiveness seeks out the least-cost means of attaining a given goal, while economic effi-
ciency additionally calls for setting the goal to maximize net benefits by equating incremental 
benefits and costs. With respect to the ultimate objective of reducing GHGs, cost-effectiveness 
means achieving GHG reductions in a manner that equalizes the cost of incremental reductions 
across all sectors and countries. With respect to furthering specific technological development 
goals, cost-effectiveness means achieving these technological goals at the lowest possible total 
cost. Efficiency would add to this condition the further requirement that the policy target, be it 
emissions-based or technology-based, is chosen so that the marginal costs of achieving it are equal 
to the marginal benefit. Given the difficulties associated with quantitatively valuing the costs and 
particularly the benefits of climate-change mitigation, the efficiency goal is somewhat elusive. 
 
Given the need for substantial long-term technological developments to significantly reduce GHG 
emissions, cost-effectiveness across time—or dynamic cost-effectiveness—is a particularly impor-
tant assessment criteria for GHG policies in general and TOAs specifically. Dynamic cost-
effectiveness implies that investments in technological development (e.g., R&D) occur to a point 
where the incremental investment equals the expected incremental reduction in future GHG 
abatement costs (in present value terms). Note that the desired amount of near-term investment in 
technological advance will depend on the magnitude of anticipated future reductions. Likewise, 
the economically feasible extent of abatement in the future will depend on the magnitude and suc-
cess of near-term investments in technological development. The extent to which an agreement 
allows for flexibility in the presence of new information also will influence its economic efficiency. 
Because new information that resolves various uncertainties related to the benefits and costs of 
GHG mitigation can be highly valuable, sequential decision making processes and flexible policies 
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that adapt to this new information can have substantial advantages over more rigid approaches 
(Arrow et al., 1996). 
 
Incentives for participation and compliance  
In addition to the other criteria, which also would apply to policies implemented at national or 
sub-national levels, international agreements face the additional challenge of providing sufficient 
incentives for individual nations to participate in the agreement and comply with its terms. An 
absence of sufficiently coercive powers at the international level tends to imply that international 
agreements to which it is not in a nation’s self-interest to abide by will suffer from a low level of 
participation or compliance. A substantial amount of thought has gone into consideration of how 
climate agreements might be structured to create the conditions in which enough countries agree 
to participate and comply so that the agreement is effective. A key element of any country’s par-
ticipation incentives will be the economic costs the agreement imposes relative to its perceived 
environmental, economic, and political benefits.  
 
Administrative feasibility  
Administrative feasibility pertains to whether the legal, institutional, and practical means exist to 
implement a TOA in an effective and cost-effective manner. This will depend on the range of exist-
ing experience and social structures associated with similar policies enacted at a domestic or in-
ternational level or the practicability of building these structures. Administrative feasibility also 
relates to the practical ability to measure compliance and ensure enforcement. For example, the 
issue of measuring whether efforts are new or additional raises important questions for the design 
of specific TOAs.  
 
5.3 Evaluation of TOAs 
We now examine TOAs at the general level in the case of specific existing and proposed climate-
related agreements as well as existing non-climate agreements. Table 5.1 shows an overview of the 
existing and prospective TOAs we examined according to the type of TOA. We include existing 
TOAs analyzed by Ueno (2006), as well as several other existing TOAs and prospective agree-
ments as outlined by Bodansky (2004).  
 
5.3.1 Knowledge sharing and coordination 
The least demanding type of TOA we examine is knowledge sharing and coordination. Agreements 
of this type generally will not lead to high environmental effectiveness by themselves, and they are 
broadly seen as a useful addition to approaches that guarantee emissions reductions. Knowledge 
sharing and coordination TOAs can have several different forms, from labelling agreements to in-
ternational research coordination. Knowledge-sharing and coordination agreements have relatively 
low costs, combined with a high level of exchange of information among stakeholders in countries 
and with raised awareness of the opportunities, pitfalls, and barriers of the targeted technologies. 
In cases where a technology is in an advanced stage of development and can be implemented at 
low cost but other barriers inhibit its diffusion, these agreements can be environmentally effective 
and contribute to diffusion. In the case of technologies that are in the RD&D phase, knowledge-
sharing agreements can identify RD&D needs, but the practice in the agreements evaluated below 
shows that they tend not to lead to additional funding. 
Chapter 5 
 
100 
Table 5.1 Technology-Oriented Agreements Examined. All TOAs except those in the category “Prospective TOAs” are 
real-world examples 
Knowledge 
sharing and 
coordination 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) and the International 
Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) 
Methane to Markets Partnership 
Task sharing in International Energy Agency Implementing Agreements 
(IEA-IA) 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) 
Energy Star bilateral agreements 
RD&D European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) 
ITER fusion reactor 
Cost sharing in International Energy Agency Implementing Agreements 
(IEA-IA) 
The Solvent Refined Coal II Demonstration Project (SRC-II) 
Technology 
transfer 
Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
Technology 
mandates and 
incentives 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) 
European Union Renewables Directive 
Prospective TOAs Carbon capture and storage technology mandate (Edmonds and Wise) 
proposal 
Zero-Emission Technology Treaty (ZETT) proposal 
Barrett and Benedick proposals for combined technology R&D and 
standards 
 
The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum and the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy 
The United States has developed several partnerships and forums for promoting specific technolo-
gies. The U.S. Climate Change Technology Program strategic plan provides a useful overview of 
the programs we discuss herein, as well as other programs with international components (US 
DOE, 2006). In 2003, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) and the International 
Partnership for Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) were launched. The CSLF’s objective is to “facilitate 
the development of improved cost-effective technologies for the separation and capture of carbon 
dioxide for its transport and long-term safe storage; to make these technologies broadly available 
internationally; and to identify and address wider issues relating to carbon capture and storage” 
(CSLF, 2003). The IPHE, similarly, aims to “serve as a mechanism to organize and implement effec-
tive, efficient and focused international research, development, demonstration and commercial 
utilization activities related to hydrogen and fuel cell technologies” and works as a forum for ad-
vancing policies and standards (IPHE, 2003).  
 
Both forums aim at collecting and sharing scientific and technical research results and occasionally 
publish working papers to address a specific topic in the field of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) or 
the hydrogen economy. The activities undertaken by CSLF and the IPHE have thus far consisted 
primarily of organizing meetings where knowledge and experiences are shared among the coun-
tries involved. Also, both forums have a procedure for recognizing existing projects.  
 
These forums have provided an opportunity for discussion and interaction that can help build 
trust between parties without the pressure of negotiation. This relationship building tends to oc-
cur at an intermediate level among primarily energy ministry participants familiar with energy 
technology, while in contrast IEA Implementing Agreements foster interaction among researchers 
and climate negotiations tend to involve foreign ministry and environment ministry representa-
tives from higher levels in governments. Such interactions may prove important to the longer term 
incentives for participation by countries, which have an array of internal specialties and interests. 
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Budgets for the organizations are nonetheless very limited and it is difficult to establish that the 
CSLF or the IPHE have had a discernable direct impact on the research and development of CCS 
or the hydrogen economy. These types of forums could nonetheless have an indirect effect by influ-
encing domestic R&D funding priorities. The environmental effectiveness of these efforts is also 
difficult to evaluate, but is likely to be limited. Given the rising number of participants—the CSLF 
started with 13 countries and now has more than 20, including Saudi Arabia and China—the ini-
tiation by the United States, and the low entry conditions, the incentives for participation are sig-
nificant. Compliance with the partnership’s charter does not require significant diversion from 
business-as-usual other than attendance at twice-yearly meetings by national delegates. Due to the 
low complexity, administration is straightforward.  
 
The Methane to Markets Partnership 
The Methane to Markets Partnership was established in 2004. The partnership focuses on “the 
development of strategies and markets for the recovery and use of methane through technology 
development, demonstration, deployment and diffusion, implementation of effective policy frame-
works, identification of ways and means to support investment, and removal of barriers to collabo-
rative project development and implementation” (Methane to Markets, 2004). The partnership, 
initiated by the United States and based on a domestic, voluntary methane reduction program, as-
serts it could reduce GHG emissions by 180 MtCO2-eq in 2015, although no specific target is set. 
The partnership relies on bringing together governments and the private sector to facilitate the 
identification of cost-effective opportunities. Indeed, reduction of methane emissions in the sec-
tors defined— landfill gas, oil and gas sector, agriculture and coal mines)—is relatively inexpen-
sive.  
 
The environmental effectiveness of the partnership could be significant but the aspirations are op-
timistic, so the projections should be regarded with care. The assumed diffusion rate of methane-
reducing projects, for instance, is very high. The partnership seems unlikely to develop new tech-
nologies, although it could encourage diffusion and modification of existing approaches. If the 
partnership lives up to its goals—which is uncertain—it could be cost-effective due to its focus on 
the relatively low-cost mitigation option of methane reduction and its emphasis on information 
provision and market development. Incentives for participation are high for both the private sector 
(which sees the partnership as an opportunity to enhance business) and for the host countries of 
the technology, who see both economic and environmental benefits. The administrative feasibility 
is high as it is not a complex organization and there is experience with something similar on the 
domestic level. The additionality of actions taken under the Methane to Markets Partnership is 
difficult to establish relative to CDM project activities that also involve methane emissions reduc-
tion.  
 
Task-sharing within IEA Implementing Agreements 
International Energy Agency Implementing Agreements (IEA-IA) use two primary mechanisms: 
task-sharing and cost-sharing. Cost-sharing is where one contractor performs a research task with 
funding from the collective of the countries participating in the IEA-IA. Task-sharing is where a 
joint program is pursued with the participating countries but where each country funds and im-
plements its own contribution to the project. We categorize the task-sharing components of these 
agreements as knowledge-sharing TOAs because they tend not to involve any additional R&D 
funding beyond pre-existing domestic programs. In contrast, we categorize the cost-sharing com-
ponents as RD&D TOAs.  
 
There are 35 Implementing Agreements (IAs), all of which incorporate task-sharing and about half 
of which have cost-sharing. They cover the fields of technology information (four IAs), renewable 
energy and hydrogen (nine IAs), end-use energy efficiency (twelve IAs), fossil-fuel technologies 
(five IAs), and nuclear fusion energy (five IAs).  
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Most of the tasks have been funded through domestic R&D budgets. If the IAs have generated ad-
ditional funds for energy R&D, the magnitude of the additional amount is difficult to estimate. The 
impact on technological change and ultimately the environment therefore comes in the form of 
better research coordination. The IAs have in some cases had a useful impact on technology stan-
dardization, such as in the case of the development of harmonized testing procedures for wind 
turbine performance (IEA, 2003). Given the limited cost and the opportunities to reduce costs and 
increase efficacy through information sharing and coordination, the cost-effectiveness probably is 
relatively high. Membership in IAs is not restricted to governments or to Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-based actors, and a number of organizations from 
non-OECD countries are participating in the IEA-IAs. Incentives for participation, therefore, are 
relatively high. The organization is not complex and administration tends to be housed at a spon-
soring domestic energy agency, keeping costs low. 
 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
In 2005, the United States established the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Cli-
mate (APP) with five other countries: Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The purpose 
of the APP is to “create a voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation 
to facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer 
term cost-effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices” in order to meet “increased 
energy needs and associated challenges, including those related to air pollution, energy security, 
and GHG intensities” (APP, 2006).  
 
The participants established eight task forces for industrial sectors: cleaner fossil energy, renew-
able energy and distributed generation, power generation and transmission, steel, aluminium, ce-
ment, coal mining, and building and appliances. Each task force is to develop a detailed action plan 
on short- and medium-term actions and achieve specific outcomes in the short term. 
 
It is difficult to predict how the APP will develop in the future. At this point, there are small budg-
ets allocated to the APP by the participants and implementation plans are unclear. Combined with 
the voluntary nature and purpose of the partnership, this implies that it qualifies as a knowledge-
sharing TOA in that its activities to date have been limited to road-mapping and planning. 
 
At this time, the environmental effectiveness and the impact on technological change of the APP 
are likely to be limited. Economic cost-effectiveness cannot be evaluated at this point; costs are 
low but so are effects. The incentives for participation are high for the developing countries in the 
group, as they may get greater access to climate-friendly technologies. Administrative feasibility is 
enhanced by the restrictive membership and hence the streamlined process for achieving agree-
ment.  
 
Energy Star bilateral agreements 
Energy Star is a voluntary label for energy-efficient appliances, and more recently, new homes. 
Rather than targeting knowledge transfer at the RD&D stage, Energy Star is focused on provision 
of energy efficiency information to end-users. It was originally developed by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency for personal computers but has been expanded to many other products 
as well. Products with the Energy Star label have been diffused to other countries through interna-
tional trade, and the Energy Star bilateral agreements have helped to harmonize the use of the label 
(and the associated testing procedures) in other countries. It has been adopted in Canada and 
Mexico for many of the same appliances used in the United States and in Japan and the European 
Union only in distinct categories, as these countries already had standards of their own (Meier, 
2003). 
 
The Energy Star agreements raised awareness about hidden energy consumption, such as stand-by 
power, and have diffused policy tools to reduce it (US EPA, 2003). Although it is uncertain how 
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much electricity reduction can be attributed to the bilateral agreements (as labels could be 
adopted without the agreements), the energy-efficiency labelling policies for several countries have 
become more cost-effective. Incentives for participation exist when there is not yet a domestic en-
ergy efficiency standard or where harmonization is beneficial due to international trade. Admini-
stration is straightforward. 
 
5.3.2 Research, development and demonstration agreements 
TOAs that feature cooperative RD&D are varied and can take place in virtually all research fields. 
They appear to be most successful in research that is more fundamental and that has not yet accu-
mulated commercial interests. Agreements to further RD&D can be effective in several respects: 
they increase international exchange of scientific and technical information and they increase the 
cost-effectiveness of research and developments through cost-sharing and reduced duplication of 
effort. Continuity of funding, however, has been problematic at times with existing efforts. The 
eventual contribution of RD&D to emissions reductions is uncertain without incentives for even-
tual technology adoption but that is not the primary goal of RD&D agreements. For technologies 
that are in the research or demonstration phase or for fundamental research, RD&D agreements 
can lead to more efficient development. We examine RD&D TOAs in the fields of particle physics, 
energy research, and coal liquefaction. We discuss proposals by Benedick (2001) and Barrett 
(2003) for a combination of technology R&D and standards in Section 5.3.5. Another option is in-
ternationally coordinated innovation inducement prizes for advances in GHG-reducing science 
and technology (Newell and Wilson, 2005). 
  
The European Organization for Nuclear Research 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) was founded in 1954 by 12 European 
countries to share the cost burden of fundamental particle research and has been joined since by 8 
other European countries and a number of observers from outside Europe. It focuses on fundamen-
tal physics. While not motivated by environmental concerns, CERN provides a useful case of in-
ternational research collaboration. The institute operates a number of particle accelerators, which 
are used by research groups from all over the world for experiments in natural sciences and engi-
neering. Currently, the largest fraction of the budget is being spent on the newest accelerator, the 
Large Hadron Collider (LHC), which straddles the French-Swiss border. The LHC will be the 
most powerful accelerator in the world and actually is a separate project outside the regular CERN 
agreement. Apart from cost sharing, the CERN joint venture also was one of the first steps in the 
direction of the unification of Europe, being established less than ten years after World War II.  
 
The member states of CERN contribute to the CERN Institute in proportion to their GDP, with 
some small adjustments. CERN’s expenditures in 2005 were almost US$ 1 billion, of which about 
50 percent was on material costs for the LHC and 35 percent on personnel (CERN, 2006). The re-
liance on separate national contributions for the US$ 2 billion LHC project led to budget problems 
in 1996, when CERN settled on a tight budget for the LHC because of a lack of offers from partici-
pating nations. In addition, budget overflows fell to CERN’s account, not that of the LHC consor-
tium, which led to serious budget problems in 2001 (Nature News, 2001).  
 
The purpose of CERN is to lower cost and cooperation barriers for particle physicists in Europe 
and the rest of the world and to achieve more technological progress. CERN appears to have suc-
ceeded in the purpose of advancing basic research, as it is one of the leading particle physics insti-
tutes in the world. The cost-effectiveness of particle physics seems to have been enhanced by the 
institute through cost-sharing of expensive particle accelerators. The incentives for participation 
are great and the provisions for contributions proportional to GDP seem to be acceptable to the 
parties, although separately negotiated project budgets, such as the LHC, may be subject to free 
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rider problems. Administration has worked without any major problems, other than the budget 
contribution issue.  
 
ITER fusion reactor 
The ITER is an international fusion experiment designed to show the scientific and technological 
feasibility of a full-scale fusion power reactor. The ITER builds upon prior research devices but 
will be considerably larger. Fusion power offers the potential of essentially inexhaustible, zero-
GHG electricity without the levels of radioactive waste associated with nuclear fusion—
properties that have obvious appeal as world energy demand increases. However, this option is 
still in the research phase. While some indicate that fusion power might be commercially available 
by 2040, many others doubt whether this can be accomplished by the end of the century. The high 
uncertainty that this research will deliver results, its low near-term commercial value, and the very 
high costs of the demonstration facility make a cost-sharing arrangement worthwhile.  
 
The ITER began in 1985 as a collaboration between the European Union, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and Japan. Participation has varied over time, and currently there are seven parties 
participating in the ITER program: the European Union, the United States, Japan, Russia, India, 
China, and South Korea. Conceptual and engineering design phases led to a detailed design in 
2001, supported by US$ 650 million worth of R&D by participating countries. The program is 
planned to last for 30 years—10 years for construction, and 20 years of operation—and cost ap-
proximately US$ 12 billion, making it the second most expensive international scientific project 
after the International Space Station. After many years of deliberation, and a contentious debate 
over locating the project in France versus Japan, the participants announced in 2005 that ITER 
will be built in Cadarache, France—Japan was promised 20 percent of the research staff on the 
French location of ITER as well as the head of the ITER administrative body. Also, a research facil-
ity for the project will be built in Japan, for which the European Union will contribute about 50 
percent of the costs. Overall, the participating ITER members have agreed on a division of funding 
contributions where 5/11ths is contributed by the hosting member (the European Union) and 
1/11th by each of the six non-hosting members (ITER, 2006). 
 
Cost-sharing within IEA-IAs  
In many cases where cost-sharing was included in IEA-IAs, money from the common funds was 
spent for covering central administration and information-sharing activities only and actual pro-
jects were implemented through task sharing. In a few cases, however, participants financed joint 
R&D or demonstration projects in a cost-shared scheme (Scott, 1995). One such case is a joint 
demonstration project of high-temperature, high-pressure filters necessary for pressurized, fluid-
ized bed combustion and integrated gasification combined cycle plants. In this project, partici-
pants, including private companies, shared the cost (about $US 15 million) and pooled technical 
knowledge (IEA, 1996).  
 
Other cost-sharing examples are the IEA Clean Coal Centre and the IEA GHG R&D Program, 
which do not perform much hard research but bring together research and development results in 
desk studies in the field of coal and CCS and organize international conferences in that field. IEA 
GHG also has contributed funds for conducting monitoring in CCS demonstration projects. Al-
though the publications of these organizations are in the public domain, only paying members of 
these cost-shared implementing agreements (mostly industrial organizations in the member coun-
tries) have free access to the information. In another example, the Implementing Agreement on 
Bioenergy works partly through task-sharing and partly through cost-sharing and had a research 
budget of US$ 1.36 million in 2005, which was spent on country reports, information provision and 
conferences, and desk studies (IEA, 2006a).  
 
The added value of most cost-shared IEA-IAs is in the bundling of research results and the provi-
sion of a platform for information exchange and learning. Although research is conducted in cost-
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sharing IEA-IAs, it typically concerns desk studies of technological progress, which indirectly con-
tribute to technological development. Desk studies usefully bundle information but rarely do the 
technological research itself. The cost-effectiveness is likely to be good given the relatively low 
budgets and the informational impact of some programs. The IEA GHG Program, for instance, has 
played a very prominent role in the work on CCS, and the Bioenergy IA is instrumental in sharing 
scientific knowledge. Incentives for participation are high if the technology is at the centre of at-
tention, especially in the case when only paying members can get access to the information (al-
though this decreases knowledge spill-over benefits). 
 
The Solvent Refined Coal II demonstration project 
In response to the 1970s oil crisis, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) built several small-scale 
pilot plants to test various approaches to coal liquefaction. The rationale for developing the tech-
nology was to expand the alternatives to conventional oil as a hedge against oil price increases. Af-
ter pilot plant tests, the DOE picked up promising liquefaction ideas and implemented large-scale 
demonstration projects between 1978 and 1982. Private companies shared the burden of the pro-
jects with the government (NAS, 2001). Solvent refined coal (SRC) was one of these ideas. At the 
pilot test stage, two plants were built to test two types of SRC and one of them was supposed to 
be chosen for a large-scale demonstration. Later, DOE decided to build two demonstration plants 
to test both ideas. To offset this cost increase, the DOE invited Japan and Germany to join SRC-II, 
and the three governments made an agreement for co-funding the project in July 1980. The total 
cost was approximately $US 1.5 billion (in 1981 dollars). The burden was to be shared 50 percent 
by the United States, 25 percent by Japan, and 25 percent by Germany.  
 
However, SRC-II was cancelled due to budget cuts by the Reagan Administration. The project was 
perceived to be less urgent as oil prices stabilized and it became more difficult to justify coal lique-
faction as a response to the oil price shocks. This case has been cited by the international scientific 
research community for particle science, fusion, and space, however, as an example of a country 
not respecting international joint-funding projects (OTA, 1995). 
 
As this project was cancelled, the technological outcome was not favourable ex post. Incentives for 
participation and compliance with the agreement changed over time with political and economic 
circumstances and eventually led to the programme’s demise. The SRC-II international agreement 
made clear that no agreement is carved in stone and that changing conditions can influence the 
continuity of any treaty. 
 
5.3.3 Technology-transfer agreements 
Specific mechanisms have been established to facilitate technology transfer in existing agreements 
related to climate change and other international environmental problems. Provisions for technol-
ogy transfer are driven primarily by a need to help developing countries follow a less GHG-
intensive development path by providing access to climate-friendly technologies and the funding 
to cover their additional cost. As such, technology-transfer TOAs can help to increase incentives 
for developing country participation in climate-mitigation agreements, while advancing overall 
technological and environmental effectiveness (IPCC, 2000a). 
 
Technology-transfer agreements have to address typical impediments to technology adoption, 
such as information availability and technological maturity, but in addition must address financing 
barriers that are specific to developing countries. Appropriate financial incentives are therefore an 
essential part of an effective technology-transfer agreement. The environmental effectiveness of 
technology transfer can be high, provided sufficient funding is available. The degree of intellectual 
property right protection, rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market openness are also criti-
cal conditions and potential impediments bearing on technology transfer. 
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Multilateral Fund for Implementation of the Montreal Protocol 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) was 
agreed to in 1987 as part of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer with 
the aim of phasing out the use of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs). It has commitments for all 
countries and was ratified quickly by the industrialized countries, but developing countries were 
unwilling to ratify it due to the costs of implementation. In order to provide incentives for develop-
ing countries to join the Montreal Protocol, and thereby curb the expected rise of ODSs in devel-
oping countries, the Multilateral Fund for Implementation of the Montreal Protocol was set up as 
part of the 1990 London Protocol (an amendment of the Montreal Protocol). Industrialized coun-
tries committed to donating funds to the Multilateral Fund on a three-year basis to “meet all in-
cremental costs” for compliance of the developing countries, who in exchange committed to the 
slow phase-out of ODSs. The money is in the form of grants or loans for projects such as the con-
version of existing manufacturing processes, training of personnel and setting up of national ozone 
offices, or paying royalties and patent rights on new technologies. Donor pledges amounted to US$ 
2.1 billion over the period 1991 to 2005 and the current level of replenishments to the fund are 
around US$ 400 million for the three-year period of 2006–2008 (UNEP, 2005). 
 
The environmental effectiveness of the Multilateral Fund has been substantial and contributed to 
the successful environmental outcome of the Montreal Protocol, as well as to technological diffu-
sion in developing countries. The incentives for participation are high, as industrialized countries 
were willing to make contributions in order to prevent their efforts as part of the Montreal Proto-
col from being offset by a rise in ODSs in developing countries. Developing countries were willing 
to make the necessary adjustments to comply with the Montreal Protocol as long as incremental 
costs were kept to a minimum. Administration has been as could be expected as it was the first 
mechanism of its kind and was set up with virtually no experience. However, through the use of 
implementing agencies—the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and 
the World Bank—that distributed tasks according to their competences, the operation of the Mul-
tilateral Fund is managed by a secretariat with about 20 staff. 
 
The Montreal Protocol, including its Multilateral Fund, is rightly seen as a success story in envi-
ronmental governance (DeSombre and Kauffman, 1996). It resulted in very substantial reductions 
in CFCs and effectively involved developing countries that were at first unwilling to commit to 
reductions. Because both stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are global atmospheric 
problems, the institutional solution of the Montreal Protocol, with its considerable institutional 
difficulties, often is pointed to as a model for climate change (Victor, 2001). As many experts have 
pointed out, however, this comparison is not entirely appropriate given the substantial differences 
between the two problems. The scale of changes required to address climate change is much 
greater, the sources of GHGs much more widespread, and the likely costs much higher than for 
addressing the ozone problem. Low-cost substitutes for ODSs were available, while the same is 
not true for large-scale GHG reductions. A technology-transfer fund that attempted to cover the 
incremental costs of GHG reduction in developing countries would have to be orders of magnitude 
larger in scale and in reach than the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol. 
 
Global Environment Facility 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established by the UNDP, UNEP, and the World 
Bank. The GEF provides grants to both small and large projects in developing countries that pro-
tect the global environment. Several categories are funded; climate change being the second most 
important (after biodiversity), claiming about 40 percent of the GEF’s current yearly budget. Since 
its establishment in 1991, the GEF has invested almost US$ 2 billion in climate change, generating 
co-financing of over US$ 9 billion. About 90% of the funding has gone to energy efficiency, renew-
able energy, GHG reduction, or sustainable transportation. The UNFCCC also has entrusted its 
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financial mechanism for developing country capacity building and technology transfer to GEF 
(GEF, 2005a). 
 
A 2005 evaluation of GEF found that while there has been variation in the success of different sub-
program elements, its climate change program has satisfactorily performed, exceeding its interim 
GHG reduction targets in an increasingly cost-effective manner (GEF, 2005b). While GEF’s over-
all resources and role in GHG mitigation is small on a global scale, the organization has the poten-
tial to play an important catalytic role in influencing transformation in energy and related markets 
in developing countries so that over the long-term their economies are less carbon-intensive (GEF, 
2005b). The incentive for developing countries to participate is to obtain new technology and pro-
ject financing at low cost. For industrialized countries, the GEF is financed from Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) flows, and were the sums to become very large and additional to regular 
spending on ODA, the enthusiasm to contribute to such a fund may fade. Administration of GEF 
has worked, but the organization is relatively complex, with task distribution between UNDP, 
UNEP and the World Bank. Requirements for the design and evaluation of projects are substantial 
and therefore relatively costly for smaller projects.  
 
5.3.4 Technology mandates and incentives 
Technology mandates and incentives can be both technologically and environmentally effective 
treaties to the extent that they divert the signatories of the agreement significantly from business-
as-usual. Cost effectiveness depends on the detailed provisions and domestic policies that are em-
ployed.  
 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships  
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Treaty was 
agreed in 1973 to halt marine oil pollution from oil tankers. Since the 1950s, attempts had been 
made to restrict oil emissions into the marine environment by means of the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL). OILPOL required ships to record 
all ballasting, cleaning, and discharge operations. This reflected the two main sources of oil pollu-
tion: the emission of oil-polluted ballast water that was used for balance after ships returned from 
their journey and the cleaning of tanks with seawater and subsequent dumping of the oil-water 
mixture at sea. The implementation of the OILPOL treaty was problematic because the enforce-
ment was supposed to be done by the states where the ships are registered (i.e., the “flag” states), 
which tended not to be those suffering from the pollution. In addition, there was considerable 
leakage of ships changing their flag state to states that were not enforcing OILPOL.17  
 
MARPOL eventually was agreed to after unilateral threats from the United States to impose strin-
gent domestic technology standards, which would have lead to the denial of access to U.S. ports 
for noncompliant ships. As a result, in 1978, countries agreed to strengthen international regula-
tions on tankers, setting mandatory design requirements for installation of separate tanks for bal-
last and operating requirements for washing tanks with crude oil rather than sea water; 119 coun-
tries are party to MARPOL. 
 
After entry into force of the MARPOL treaty and harmonization of standards by a large number of 
countries, international shipping had difficulties escaping the standards because all major ports 
required that ships meet MARPOL standards. Barrett (2003) calls this the tipping point: once the 
number of ratifying countries reached a certain threshold, the number of tankers equipped with 
specified technologies grew rapidly. Nonetheless, although much international shipping now is 
                                                 
17  According to Murphy (2004), with regard to ships other than oil tankers, a classic “race to the bottom” can be observed: 
competition of deregulation and loose enforcement occurred among flag states. 
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regulated, according to Tan (2006) many substandard ships still are in operation in many parts of 
the world and pollution, therefore, has in part been relocated to more lenient countries. 
 
The effectiveness of the MARPOL treaty in mandating the diffusion of environmentally beneficial 
technology has been high, as has been its environmental effectiveness given that it directly targets 
the most significant sources of marine oil pollution. However, the technological prescriptiveness of 
the treaty potentially could discourage innovation toward less-costly or less-polluting technolo-
gies in the shipping industry. There has been flexibility over time, however, with double-hull re-
quirements eventually replacing the segregated ballast tank prescription. However, it often is 
pointed out that mandating segregated ballast tanks under MARPOL is a relatively costly way to 
achieve a given oil-reduction goal, compared to emissions standards (Mitchell, 1994). The incen-
tives for participation and compliance are present for countries that suffer from oil pollution and 
are enhanced by strict domestic regulations in the United States for companies with U.S. trade 
destinations. Administration includes a detailed inspection mechanism.  
 
EU Renewables Directive 
Technically speaking, environmental agreements in the European Union should not be qualified as 
international environmental agreements, as the European Union has a degree of enforcement au-
thority that does not exist across other national boundaries. We include the EU Renewables Di-
rective nonetheless because it provides a relevant example of how an international technology 
mandate might be designed.  
 
The goal of the 2001 EU Renewables Directive is to double the share of renewable primary energy 
in the European Union to 12 percent in 2010. An element of this target is for the share of renewable 
electricity to reach 21 percent in the European Union, up from around 14 percent in 1997. The im-
plementation of the directive is left to the member states. Although the electricity targets in the 
Renewables Directive are indicative and not accompanied by penalties for non-compliance, the 
European Commission can make them mandatory if a country is unlikely to comply. The indicative 
targets for each member state depend on the share of renewables already in the electricity supply 
in that member state (Rowlands, 2005).  
 
All EU Member States currently have a renewable energy policy in place to comply with the direc-
tive and most are aimed solely at electricity supply. Countries have chosen either a feed-in tariff 
system or an obligation system coupled with tradable green certificates (Linden et al., 2005; 
Lauber, 2004). However, not all are on track and the European Commission has estimated that the 
share of renewable energy sources in the EU15 is on course to reach 10 percent in 2010.Although 
this is an improvement relative to business-as-usual, it is less than the 12 percent target. 
 
Even if progress has not been as fast as hoped, both the environmental and the technological effec-
tiveness of the EU Renewables Directive are likely to be high given the ambitious targets and the 
magnitude of technology investments that will need to be made in many countries to achieve their 
targets. It is expected, for example, that the directive will boost the use and development of wind 
energy, which appears to have been the case in Germany (Michaelowa, 2004). The costs of the 
policies to achieve the targets have been significant in many countries and cost-effectiveness is en-
hanced in cases where tradable renewable energy certificates allow for flexibility.  
 
The question of participation and compliance is less relevant on the EU level but is likely to be an 
issue would such an agreement be proposed on a global level. The efforts of a number of countries 
to establish something similar for renewable energy have shown limited success. These efforts 
were spearheaded by the German Government at both the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg and at the Bonn International Conference on Renewable Energy in 
2004. A Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition (JREC) was formed by some 60 countries. 
More than 200 renewable energy partnership projects have been reported (REN21, 2006). The dif-
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ficulty is the additionality of the projects; it is unclear whether these are projects that already ex-
isted and were simply reported to the project secretariat or whether the projects are actually new 
and would not have taken place without the JREC. Administration of a global renewables agree-
ment is feasible, assuming that the definitions of renewable energy are clear. In Europe, for in-
stance, a debate is currently underway on whether the co-firing of palm oil from developing coun-
tries can be counted as renewable energy, as rainforests are often cleared to make room for palm oil 
plantations. On a global level, the complexity of such issues only would increase.  
 
5.3.5 Prospective Technology-Oriented Agreement proposals for post-2012 climate pol-
icy 
Although most of the post-2012 international climate policy proposals in the literature entail emis-
sions reduction targets of various forms, a small number of proposals include technology-oriented 
elements.  
 
Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Mandate 
The only prospective TOA mandating a specific GHG mitigation technology is the Carbon Cap-
ture and Storage (CCS) scenario by Edmonds and Wise (1998). In a modelling study, they explore 
the costs and effects of an obligation of Annex I countries to implement CCS with all fossil fuel-
based power plants and coal-based synthetic fuel facilities built in 2020 and beyond and demon-
strate that such a measure would stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at 550 ppm, storing 
almost 350 GtCO2 cumulatively between the start of the treaty and the end of the century. In this 
scenario, developing countries are obliged to take the same commitment if their GDP equals the 
average Annex I GDP.  
 
The effectiveness of the simulated agreement in diffusing CCS technology and reducing emissions 
is significant, as given by their outcome of stabilization at 510 ppm. Cost-effectiveness is not high, 
according to the authors, but could be enhanced through some type of flexibility measures. The 
incentives for participation and compliance with this agreement alone are low for countries that 
rely heavily on coal, because they would face more restrictions than other countries. Administra-
tion would be comparable to traditional technology standards for air pollution assuming it takes 
place at the domestic level. Enforcement may be simplified by the targeted technological nature of 
the mandate on large stationary sources. 
 
Zero-Emissions Technology Treaty 
Sugiyama and Sinton (2005) propose an “Orchestra of Treaties” with four elements: emissions re-
ductions, a Zero-Emissions Technology Treaty (ZETT), a climate-wise development treaty, and 
the UNFCCC forum. The ZETT is a technology-mandate TOA because of its commitment to zero-
CO2-emission technology for the energy sector as its ultimate goal. It is not proposed to be a bind-
ing emissions target, and the mechanism for compliance is “pledge and review.” The hypothetical 
treaty formulates flexible targets, such as technology cost reduction and deployment, for a number 
of technologies by coalitions of countries. It allows countries to contribute to the long-term devel-
opment solely of their preferred technologies. A later version of the ZET treaty, proposed in Sugi-
yama et al. (2005), elaborated on the types of technologies and outlined how the treaty could de-
velop given the current players. The potential environmental effectiveness of the ZETT depends on 
the strictness of its targets but could be high, especially if implemented alongside an emissions 
target approach, as in the Orchestra of Treaties proposal. The treaty proposal is designed to facili-
tate long-term technological development and adoption and, therefore, the potential impact on 
technological change could be high. The cost-effectiveness is unclear but is unlikely to be very 
high. Incentives for participation are increased by allowing countries to focus on their preferred 
technologies.  
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Combined Technology R&D and standards 
Benedick (2001) proposes a number of parallel approaches. Emissions targets that can be renegoti-
ated are in his portfolio, but in terms of technology, he proposes to have long-term international 
technology standards and a small global carbon tax to fund research and development of technolo-
gies. He does not argue for international cooperation in energy research but proposes to devote the 
revenues of a small domestic fuel tax to research funding. Similarly, Barrett (2003) proposes a pro-
tocol based on both technology push through collaborative R&D and technology pull through 
technology standards. Although both approaches have similarities, we focus on Barrett’s proposal.  
 
Barrett argues for an international approach to energy R&D, and takes “big science” collaborative 
research, such as the International Space Station and the LHC as examples. The essential incentive 
for participation is that the contribution of the countries to the R&D fund would depend on the 
other countries participating. If one country accedes, then all the other parties will increase their 
funding by a specified amount. Alternatively, if that country withdraws, the others will lower their 
funding. A cap on the total fund ensures that countries know their maximum costs. The incentives 
for participation and compliance are increased by the mutually enforcing participation clause, pro-
vided a credible sum can be agreed upon. However, the fund as proposed might suffer from the 
same problems as the LHC example in the CERN case. 
 
Barrett models the technology standards part of his approach on the MARPOL treaty and his most 
important critique of the Kyoto Protocol—its non-enforceability—would be solved because it 
eventually would lead to a tipping point for climate-friendly technologies. Barrett’s claim that cli-
mate-change technology is sensitive to a tipping point is essential to the argument for his proposal, 
particularly for participation and compliance incentives. His claim, however, is highly speculative. 
Most importantly, such measures would have to be implemented for such a broad number of prod-
ucts that there would be a significant degree of complexity and potential problems with the meas-
urement of compliance. 
 
The technological, and hence the environmental, effectiveness of the proposal depends in part on 
the total sum that the participating countries are willing to devote to the fund. This can go two 
ways. On the one hand, governments could indeed view energy research as a global public good 
and agree on a high level of funding, which the clever sign-in mechanism could assist in attaining. 
On the other hand, governments may want to keep a technology-leader role in their own hands 
and feel that they already have sufficient programs domestically. It also is questionable whether 
funding devoted to a newly established international fund would be additional to domestic fund-
ing for low-carbon energy research or whether it would crowd-out existing funding. The technol-
ogy-mandate part of the proposal enhances the proposal’s overall environmental effectiveness, as-
suming that the standards are stringent enough. 
 
Cost-effectiveness of technology-based standards is likely to be relatively low, especially if no trad-
ing or offsets of any kind are allowed. Cost-effectiveness can be enhanced through the benefits of 
R&D cooperation and long-term cost reduction, and therefore the combination of standards with 
R&D allows for greater long-term technological effectiveness.  
 
5.4 Embedding Technology-Oriented Agreements 
5.4.1 Rationale for a technology and emissions policy portfolio 
Addressing climate change likely will require a broad range of policies and measures given the long 
timeframe and the breadth of sectors, economic activities, and actors involved. TOAs include a va-
riety of cooperative actions and no single action can address the environmental and technological 
challenges of the climate problem on their own. In combination with measures that directly ensure 
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emissions reductions—which may include emissions targets, technology mandates, standards, or 
incentives-based treaties—TOAs aimed at knowledge sharing, RD&D, or technology transfer 
could play an important role in a portfolio of actions and commitments. The economic rationale for 
combining emissions targets or prices with TOAs is clear (see Section 5.2). Since the ultimate goal 
is to reduce GHG emissions, a policy directly targeting emissions is likely to be the most cost-
effective single policy means for achieving this end. However, since private markets often provide 
insufficient incentives for RD&D, TOAs can be used to address these shortcomings by facilitating 
technological progress. RD&D policy by itself is a poor substitute for mitigation incentives for re-
ducing emissions, however, since it postpones the vast majority of the effort until after costs are 
brought down, requiring large R&D investments and forgoing many cost-effective opportunities 
to reduce emissions (Fischer, 2004; Fischer and Newell, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2005). 
 
Of the different types of TOAs, only technology mandates or significant adoption incentives have 
the possibility of acting as a substitute for emissions policy. Such TOAs may be sector-specific, as 
technologies often are used only in a single sector or sub-sector. Mandates may be particularly ap-
propriate for sectors in which it is difficult to implement emissions trading or where informational 
or other market problems may be present, such as in the context of energy efficiency in building 
and/or transportation technologies.  
 
Experience also shows that for reasons of administrative and political feasibility, technology stan-
dards and mandates frequently are proposed and applied in the electricity sector, which has a his-
tory of regulation for economic as well as environmental reasons. Examples include renewable en-
ergy portfolio standards in the European Union, Japan, and the United States and the CCS Tech-
nology Mandate agreement. Such applications of TOAs can be environmentally and technologi-
cally effective on their own, although the economic cost-effectiveness tends to be less than an 
emissions target-based approach due to inflexibility and technological specificity. TOAs also can 
complement one another. For example, an agreement on knowledge sharing could be made more 
effective if it goes hand-in-hand with joint RD&D efforts, and technology transfer could enable 
developing countries to participate in a technology standard regime. Complementarities also exist 
because technologies are developed through several stages, from R&D to demonstration, initial 
adoption and widespread diffusion (Sandén and Azar, 2005). A portfolio approach may be sup-
ported based on uncertainties involved in the innovation process, the risk of attempting to pick 
winners, and the variety of national circumstances.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that TOAs could be designed according to country interests. If, for 
instance, Brazil sees itself as a major player in the world market of dry biomass, it may have an in-
terest in agreeing to an international agreement on bio-energy technologies. The same may apply 
to Indonesia or Malaysia, countries that dominate the international palm oil market. Saudi Arabia 
may be inclined to use its emptying oil fields for CO2 storage of if there is an international agree-
ment for its implementation and it has incentives to take the CO2. Countries like Denmark, whose 
companies have dominated the world wind-turbine market, may be able to further their industrial 
interests with a TOA aimed at wind energy in energy-hungry countries such as China and India, 
which have significant potential for wind energy but a limited wind-energy industry of themselves. 
East Asian countries, the growing centre of world energy demand, may agree to a TOA dedicated 
to energy efficiency (Sugiyama and Ohshita, 2006). TOAs could be worldwide (with most coun-
tries involved) or could be made by groups of countries, even though that would lead to fragmenta-
tion of international regimes. 
5.4.2 Institutional embedding of TOAs 
The larger question then is how to structure various technology-specific components into a pack-
age with emissions-based policies and/or mandatory TOAs aimed at technology deployment. Many 
ways are conceivable. TOAs may be negotiated on their own terms, alongside or aside from other 
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climate agreements, or they may be treated explicitly as part of a larger climate-policy package 
with emissions targets or other policies and measures. Depending on the structure, different fo-
rums are likely to be appropriate. 
 
For example, we already see that knowledge-sharing and joint RD&D agreements are possible in 
bilateral, regional, and larger multilateral frameworks. Depending on their scale and ambition, they 
may not need distinct institutions and may be administrated by cooperating domestic agencies. 
Larger and deeper commitments are likely to need more centralized and better equipped multilat-
eral institutions (Koremenos et al., 2001). The IEA may be an appropriate body for managing en-
ergy-related agreements among its members, mostly developed countries. Other organizations 
could facilitate efforts in other areas, such as the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion for biological sequestration technologies and techniques. While considering these options, it 
also should be kept in mind that the fragmentation of agreements across country groups, tech-
nologies, and existing international agreements may lead to reduced transparency, compatibility, 
and accountability.  
 
Technology transfer agreements similarly could follow different frameworks. They could be nego-
tiated bilaterally between particular developed and developing countries. Developed countries 
could agree in a multilateral framework to engage in technology transfer through their own devel-
opment agencies or they could agree to jointly fund climate-friendly technology transfer through 
international organizations, such as the multilateral development banks or the GEF. Efforts in a 
broader, multilateral context are likely to have more impact, but the lesser degree of domestic con-
trol may be a stumbling block for some countries18. 
 
Some of the technology mandates are more likely to require broader multilateral engagement due 
to the costs entailed by these commitments. In other cases, a small coalition of countries may agree 
on specific technology mandates that have expected ancillary benefits for their situation (e.g., im-
proving security of supply, reduction of local air pollution, providing incentives for innovation in 
domestic industry). By design, they may be better able to foster participation. For example, sector-
based technology standards may be able to provide better assurances of a level playing field for in-
ternational trade because broad emissions targets may not be implemented in a way that affects 
sectors identically across countries. Moreover, performance standards can have lesser effects on 
competitiveness: although the standards may raise product costs, emissions prices also would im-
pose the cost of the embodied emissions, further raising marginal production costs (Bernard et al., 
2007; Fischer and Fox, 2007; Fischer, 2003). For these reasons, a set of countries may be willing to 
take on these kinds of TOAs even with a lack of GHG-reduction commitments by other countries.  
 
TOAs could emerge outside of the context of an existing treaty, but they also could be negotiated 
under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. Even in this framework, though, many forms are conceivable. 
For instance, one could have a single Technology Protocol under which various technology-
specific commitments are structured. Such a package could recognize complementarities among 
components. Or the UNFCCC could have multiple technology-by-technology protocols, in which 
case countries could select which to join and not necessarily join all the protocols. As noted, such 
arrangements also are possible outside the UNFCCC; additional examples are the APP and the G8. 
Barrett (2003) proposes to set-up technology protocols by stages, drawing an institutional line 
between a R&D protocol, and a deployment and standards protocol, similar to some of the distinc-
tions we made in TOAs.  
 
Alternatively, TOAs could be incorporated into emissions-oriented agreements in a policies and 
measures (PAMs) format in which countries trade-off one component for another in the negotia-
tions. A similar idea was adopted by the General Agreement on Trade in Services as a schedule of 
                                                 
18  A good example is the United States nonparticipation in the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
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commitments. This option would recognize that preferences for a particular set of policy ap-
proaches may diverge across countries due to the different socioeconomic characteristics of na-
tions or due to the uncertain nature of the costs, benefits, and strategies for reducing GHGs and 
the negotiators’ perceptions of the risks. For example, a country that is more optimistic about fu-
ture technological potential may prefer to engage in less near-term mitigation in favour of more 
R&D now and stricter caps later. A country that is more risk averse about impinging upon eco-
nomic growth and more pessimistic about the speed of technological progress may be willing to 
accept intensity-based targets. Another country may have different expectations about the mar-
ginal benefits and be willing to accept a certain carbon tax (or safety valve) but not to risk a sharp 
run-up in energy costs. 
 
However, while opening up a menu of policies could broaden the opportunities for agreement 
along some lines, it also would increase the number of negotiation parameters substantially and 
may create complexity that might not be administratively manageable. It also raises important dif-
ficulties in evaluating the trade-offs in effort and effectiveness and in measuring compliance 
(Fischer et al., 2005). In terms of emissions reductions, R&D and mandatory policies have very 
different time profiles and certainty of effectiveness. The credibility of long-term commitments is 
another important issue raised by Montgomery and Smith (2005). They argue for technology-
oriented policies, given the difficulty in committing future governments to costly, stringent emis-
sions targets. However, current reductions are certain and negotiators may be uncomfortable trad-
ing off certain reductions with uncertain results from investments in technological efforts. In this 
case, parallel R&D and mandatory emissions-reduction agreements may be more likely to bear 
fruit. 
 
At this point, starting substantial negotiations on TOAs under the UNFCCC umbrella will be 
challenging, potentially requiring a new consideration of PAMs and technology agendas and a way 
to incorporate countries not party to the Kyoto Protocol. The most promising opportunity may be 
a review of the whole structure of the Kyoto Protocol, pursuant to Article 9, which could open the 
door to other types of agreements, such as TOAs. 
 
5.4.3 Interactions with other agreements 
No climate policy operates in a vacuum. Rather, it operates in a world of complex interlinkages 
through global trade and myriad governing rules defined by other international agreements. These 
forces and obligations impact the effectiveness of a climate agreement and vice-versa. Therefore, 
climate agreements should be evaluated in the broader context and negotiators should note oppor-
tunities to improve the functioning and compatibility of all international agreements. Given the 
broad span of mitigation and adaptation options, efforts on the climate front obviously will overlap 
with those in the areas of energy, air pollution, biodiversity, agriculture, development, and public 
health. Asselt et al. (2005) provide an overview of these interlinkages across international institu-
tions and discuss linkages related to biodiversity, food supply, poverty, energy supply, trade and 
finance, and air quality. In this section, we consider those agreements most likely to interact with 
TOAs. 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has as its goal “the conservation of biological diver-
sity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources.” Conflicts may arise with TOAs that have the potential 
to impact native habitat. Likely candidates are TOAs related to agriculture in developing coun-
tries, such as soil or forest sequestration. However, any TOA that affects land use should be sensi-
tive to CBD goals. Renewable energy targets are a good example, as they can involve wind turbine 
siting, hydroelectric dams, or biomass cultivation requiring deforestation. 
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The Montreal Protocol 
The Montreal Protocol offers an example of how agreements could run at cross-purposes. CDM 
crediting for implementing HFC 23-reduction technologies is said to create a perverse incentive for 
developing countries to continue to produce HCFC 22 that is supposed to be regulated as an ODS 
under the Montreal Protocol19. TOAs should be aware of any direct or indirect effects on phase-out 
incentives and consider options that create compatible incentives.20 This example also raises the 
issue of whether by agreeing to TOAs, developing countries may forego opportunities for CDM 
credits, thereby affecting their incentives to participate. 
 
World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements are likely to interact with TOAs, particularly 
mandates, in several ways. On the one hand, the rules governing global trade place restrictions on 
the policy options one might consider for coping with extraterritorial emissions. On the other 
hand, because of these rules, certain kinds of TOAs may be useful substitutes for other kinds of 
emissions policies.  
 
The guiding principle of “national treatment” requires importing countries to treat foreign goods 
the same way they treat “like” domestic goods, once these goods have entered the market.21 For the 
most part, this requirement means that countries must impose environmental taxes or regulations, 
like carbon taxes or energy efficiency standards, equally on domestic as well as imported goods. 
The WTO agreements also specify when taxes may be border-adjustable; importantly, taxes on 
inputs to production are border-adjustable only when the goods are physically incorporated into 
the exported products, thus excluding emissions taxes.22  
 
Global trade can limit the effectiveness of climate agreements (TOA or emissions targets ap-
proach) when significant shares of emitting countries do not participate in implementing similar 
policies. Since regulations restricting emissions impose economic costs, they change relative prices 
internationally and cause emissions leakage by giving non-participants a competitive advantage in 
emissions-intensive production. However, the WTO obligations prevent countries that are par-
ticipating in a climate agreement from imposing taxes or regulations on imported products accord-
ing to their production processes, including their GHG-emissions profiles. In other words, they 
eliminate trade measures as a vehicle for inducing participation, compliance, and enforcement with 
climate agreements and limit options for preventing leakage. Consequently, TOAs that do not ad-
versely affect competitiveness emerge as more palatable – and possibly more effective – policies.  
 
                                                 
19  HFC 23 is a by-product of HCFC 22 and has a high global warming potential (GWP). Although HCFC 22 is also a GHG, it 
is not regulated under the Kyoto Protocol due to its regulation as an ODS under the Montreal Protocol. Developing coun-
tries are committed to freeze production and consumption of HCFC 22 used for refrigerators by 2015 and phase it out by 
2040 under the Montreal Protocol. However, they do not yet have a stepwise phase-out commitment between 2015 and 
2040, and CDM crediting for HFC 23 reduction seems to create an incentive to continue to produce HCFC 22 because of 
double incomes from sales of HCFC 22 and CDM. Currently, credits from HFC 23 reduction dominate the largest share of 
CDM market. 
20  A TOA related to energy efficiency in refrigeration technology could be an example. A multilateral fund for destroying HFC 
23 is also an option, as proposed by Wara (2006). 
21  Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
22  The GATT (1994) Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. A revision in the Uruguay Round broadened the category of adjustable taxes to allow rebates for indirect 
taxes on goods and services if they are “consumed” in the production of the exported product: “in addition to physically in-
corporated inputs, export rebates are permitted on ‘energy, fuels and oil used in the production process’” (GATT Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex II, footnote 61). This expansion raises critical questions for poli-
cies concerning energy or greenhouse gas emissions, such as whether specific taxes on energy are adjustable, and if so, 
whether adjustments only may be applied to exports and not to imports. The U.S. government has been of the view that 
this footnote to the Subsidy Code should not open the door to broad new border tax adjustments on energy and was in-
tended solely as a technical adjustment for certain country-specific approaches to taxation (Charnovitz, 1994). However, 
the issue has not been clearly settled among legal experts (Fischer et al., 2004). 
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Knowledge-sharing and R&D-oriented agreements, as well as mandates on consumption goods 
(like energy-efficiency standards), neither generate much in the way of competitiveness effects nor 
do they run afoul of national treatment. Mandates for production technologies are more likely to 
be costly and have adverse economic impacts, so the ability to agree on them may in part be deter-
mined by the international competitiveness of the sector. However, performance standards still 
may be politically preferred to emissions price policies because performance standards can have 
lesser effects on competitiveness where they result in smaller product price increases (Bernard et 
al., 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2007). 
 
Indeed, the WTO agreements prohibit subsidies to domestic producers that burden foreign pro-
ducers with a competitive disadvantage. Agriculture, however, remains a notable exception, as 
trade barrier reductions still are being negotiated that could affect policies directed toward bio-
mass. The restrictions also may affect TOAs in that direct production subsidies to producers of 
climate-friendly technologies, like wind energy, may be disputed by other countries with wind 
turbine producers. Deployment subsidies that do not discriminate based on the origin of the tech-
nology product should not run afoul of this test, unless they are so large as to affect the competi-
tiveness of the utilizing industry (e.g., subsidizing adoption of less energy-intensive technologies 
in the steel industry to the point of lowering their production costs). Considering the nature of the 
interactions between environmental and trade agreements, negotiators may be well advised to 
look beyond climate-oriented agreements and to pursue strategies to remove inconsistencies with 
other multilateral obligations. New agreements (like TOAs) also may be as likely to create their 
own inconsistencies as they are to create synergies. Linking these issues has the potential not only 
to improve consistency but also to facilitate collaboration and agreement by extending the zone of 
possible agreement.23 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Our aim has been to assess the possibilities for using international TOAs in the context of address-
ing global climate change. The motivations for considering TOAs for international climate agree-
ments are numerous, ranging from improving the efficiency of markets for technological innova-
tion, to expanding opportunities for international agreement, to spurring necessary socioeconomic 
and technological change. TOAs have been implemented successfully to address problems other 
than climate change and they tend to fall into four categories: knowledge sharing and coordina-
tion; RD&D; technology transfer; and technology deployment mandates, standards, and incen-
tives.  
 
To understand some of the design issues and tradeoffs among TOAs, we identify five useful crite-
ria: environmental effectiveness, technological effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, incentives for par-
ticipation and compliance, and administrative feasibility. While the existing agreements provide 
important lessons, they vary substantially in their designs, circumstances, and perceived success. 
Still, several conclusions can be drawn conceptually based on both these experiences and more 
general features of the different kinds of TOAs. 
 
In the case of climate change, the environmental effectiveness of an agreement is typically evalu-
ated in terms of emission reductions and, ultimately, atmospheric concentrations. TOAs in the first 
three categories (knowledge sharing, RD&D and technology transfer) are not likely to be effective 
on their own for achieving significant GHG reductions, and are better seen as complements, fulfill-
ing the criteria for technological effectiveness where other environmental agreements may be in-
sufficient. An exception may be technology transfer programs, if accompanied by significant finan-
                                                 
23  See Haas (1980) and Sebenius (1983) on issue linkage and Raustiala and Victor (2004) on overlapping institutions in the 
development of multilateral environmental agreements.  
Chapter 5 
 
116 
cial resources. As emissions reduction is essential for climate change mitigation, only TOAs of the 
fourth category—technology mandates, standards, or incentives—appear to have the potential to 
be effective in environmental terms as a substitute for emissions target-based agreements.  
 
Considering effects of TOAs on actual technical progress is difficult, given the long time lags and 
uncertainty involved in the process. Therefore, the technological effectiveness of a TOA should be 
seen in context of its purpose. Agreements aimed at enhancing implementation could be judged, 
for instance, based on the number of installations they realize and agreements aimed at increasing 
research spending could be judged on additional research effort that is encouraged or, better yet, 
the additional scientific and technical advances achieved. RD&D agreements in particular would 
need to be structured with appropriate accountability mechanisms, since it is otherwise difficult 
to judge whether research funding is truly additional. One option would be to structure an agree-
ment around RD&D levels (e.g., a certain share of GDP) rather than an increment to existing in-
vestment.  
 
Cost-effectiveness must also be taken into account and this again depends on the type of TOA, its 
specific design, and the role it is intended to play relative to other policies. Knowledge-sharing 
agreements can be highly cost-effective in the sense that they are inexpensive and can lead to more 
efficient spending of domestic R&D funds and more cost-effective implementation of domestic 
policy. RD&D agreements can be beneficial so long as they generate additional research, reduce 
unproductive duplication of effort, and help overcome failures in the market for innovation. Tech-
nology transfer agreements can be cost-effective if the reductions generated are relatively less 
costly than alternative opportunities. These agreements also should be viewed more broadly, since 
their value may be in complementary international development goals and in securing agreement 
on the part of developing countries to other commitments, now or in the future. In practice, most 
technology-transfer agreements have been implemented as funds, which do not always provide an 
efficient allocation mechanism.  
 
Technology mandates, standards, or incentives could be cost-effective additions if appropriately 
targeted and designed. For individual, trade-sensitive sectors, performance standards have the po-
tential to be more cost-effective than an emissions pricing program if they prevent sufficient emis-
sions leakage. They also may have specific ancillary benefits. However, when thinking about using 
such mandates for a broad set of sectors, it seems unlikely that policymakers can set the standards 
such that the overall program is as cost-effective as a uniform emissions-price program (such as 
cap-and-trade) with long-term targets, which can better exploit opportunities for cost savings 
across sectors. Aside from addressing leakage, technology or sector-specific mandates and the like 
can be cost-effective in conjunction with emissions policies if they are used to address other mar-
ket deficiencies, such as the demand for energy efficiency or international coordination problems. 
However, poorly designed policies run the risk of governments being unsuited to “picking win-
ners,” of creating undesired lock-in of technology, and of reducing flexibility and incentives for fur-
ther innovation. 
 
Incentives for participation and compliance depend on both the type and ambition of the agree-
ment. The inexpensive and limited nature of most knowledge-sharing and joint RD&D agreements 
historically has encouraged participation, but concerns over intellectual property may loom if the 
knowledge shared extends beyond more basic research toward nearly commercial technologies for 
which domestic constituencies exist. Mutual commitments to domestic energy RD&D without an 
international cost-sharing component would not have this problem. Technology transfer, since it 
typically involves commercial technologies, can be inhibited by lesser intellectual property protec-
tion in developing countries and concerns about industrial competitiveness. A question is whether 
the gains from the reductions (or the export support for the technology providers) are deemed to 
be worth the losses. Such agreements may need to be linked to other issues, such as international 
trade and development policy, to engage participation.  
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Technological mandates and standards entail larger costs and, therefore, a higher hurdle for par-
ticipation. However, there are some reasons why they may be easier to agree upon than emissions 
targets or prices. First, since they do not require payments for emissions up to the standard, the 
impact on product costs and competitiveness is potentially smaller, making agreement easier when 
some major players are not inclined to participate. Second, mutual agreements on technology stan-
dards may embody a more level international playing field within the affected sector, while broad 
emissions targets provide no assurance as to the evenness of application to the same sectors across 
countries. Third, technology mandates may be attractive to specific countries if they are expected 
to provide ancillary benefits, such as local air quality or energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Administrative feasibility should not be problematic for TOAs, assuming domestic agencies are 
responsible for implementation. Nonetheless, joint programs may only be effective if avenues for 
coordination are established among domestic agencies. In cases with many participants, interna-
tional institutions may be needed to facilitate implementation. In existing TOAs, the administra-
tive funding required has not been large relative to that required for the implementation of broad 
emissions-target approaches. However, more expansive TOAs could entail significant costs and 
could be as or more administratively complex as emissions policies. In summary, TOAs of all types 
have the potential to be valuable components of an overall international climate policy portfolio. 
TOAs can address important problems in the market for technological innovation and will likely 
operate best in conjunction with appropriate emissions-reduction policies, particularly market-
based ones. This complementarity could be mutually reinforcing: as emissions-reduction policies 
spur the uptake of new technologies and increase the profitability of innovation, TOAs spur addi-
tional innovation to lower the costs of mitigation and improve the social and political acceptability 
of emissions targets. TOAs could be negotiated separately, linked together, or incorporated into 
the climate policy framework in a PAMs approach. More modest TOAs have the advantage of be-
ing able to be negotiated and implemented by a smaller set of countries, potentially outside of the 
UNFCCC.  
 
The use of TOAs as an environmentally effective substitute for an emissions-based approach is lim-
ited to the category of standards, mandates, or substantial financial incentives. These would need 
to be applied on a sector-by-sector, if not technology-by-technology, basis, which can be limiting 
practically. This approach may make the most sense in certain specific settings: for highly trade-
sensitive sectors that make agreement upon targets and timetables difficult; for sectors not other-
wise covered by emissions trading programs (e.g., possibly vehicles or end-use energy demand, de-
pending on domestic policies); for sectors that can benefit from international coordination (e.g., 
building codes, appliance standards, regulation of vessels for international transportation); and for 
situations where significant ancillary benefits are foreseen. For a comprehensive program of reduc-
ing global emissions, TOAs are best viewed as playing an important supporting role, with a well-
designed and flexible emissions-reduction policy with long-term targets as the main attraction. 
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Chapter 6 Balancing market-based and technology-oriented 
agreements 
At the outset of this thesis, a theoretical analysis has explained why the emission-target regime of 
the Kyoto Protocol has not reached universal participation, and how technology-oriented agree-
ments could help resolve this (Chapter 3). Although this is not the only problem of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, it is often considered as one of its most essential shortcomings (see Chapter 1). Chapter 5, 
subsequently, has gone in greater detail by evaluating past and potential future technology-
oriented agreements and has subjected them to a criteria analysis. Before proceeding to chapters 
that explore what technology-oriented agreements may look like in practice, how they compare 
with market-based approaches in the case of technology transfer, and how international technol-
ogy agreements may co-exist with continuing cap-and-trade-based agreements, it would help to 
clarify the main characteristics of international market-based instruments, and where exactly they 
differ fundamentally from technology-oriented agreements.  
 
In this light, this brief chapter generalises the findings of the earlier chapters on technology-
oriented agreements to such a degree that they can be compared to market-based international 
agreements. This comparison is useful to bring out the main contrasts between market-based and 
technology-oriented agreements, and to thus make the discussion more concrete when, later on, 
co-existing technology-oriented agreements and market-based instruments are discussed.  
 
The method of this chapter is similar to the method in Chapter 5. First, the international market-
based approaches and technology-oriented agreements will be discussed in general. These ap-
proaches (all international instruments, to be distinguished from nationally implemented policy) 
include a follow-up of the existing Kyoto Protocol and a number of other often-mentioned propos-
als for the future. In the second section, the criteria from Chapter 5 will be used to discuss some 
general versions of international market-based agreements: a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade with and 
without a safety valve, and a multi-staged market-based agreement. The discussion of technology-
oriented agreements in Chapter 5 will be summarised briefly as well. In the last section, the main 
differences between market-based and technology-oriented agreements will be discussed, includ-
ing the advantages and drawbacks of each of them.  
 
6.1 Introduction to international market-based approaches 
Market-based approaches are often only thought of as national or regional policy instruments. In 
the context of this thesis, however, they comprise all international policy instruments that use a 
combination of the market and economic incentives to reach a policy goal. They are different from 
regulatory (sometimes also named command-and-control) approaches, including technology-
oriented agreements, as they are merely changing the conditions for production and consumption, 
through that exert a price effect, and avoid being specific in prescribing the one or the other meas-
ure or technology, leaving that choice to the market. Market-based approaches can be used on the 
international level as well as domestically. Domestic market-based approaches require a political 
decision by the government and are often easily enforceable, as taxation and registration institu-
tions are usually arranged on the national level. It goes at the expense of significant sovereignty to 
delegate such powers to an international institution, and also distributional effects are politically 
problematic (Ekins and Barker, 2001). Arguably, the international community has only managed to 
do so for two international institutions: the UN Security Council (through a combination of ma-
jority and consensus voting) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (through committee deci-
sion), and even in those contexts the enforcement sometimes leads to problems.  
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The international climate policy literature, particularly those papers that were published prior to 
the Kyoto Protocol agreement in 1997, and the literature aiming at post-2012 proposals, has dis-
cussed a number of market-based approaches. This section briefly describes the most important 
generic proposals. All of them have more detailed variants with extra features, specific targets, 
country allocations and burden sharing rules24, but for contrasting them against technology-
oriented approaches on fundamental characteristics, the details do not matter so much. Chapter 9 
will discuss a few of them further for an institutional compatibility analysis with technology-
oriented agreements. 
 
The four types of market-based approaches discussed here are an emissions trading variant akin to 
the Kyoto Protocol, a global carbon tax, an emissions trading variant with a safety valve, and a 
multi-stage approach. These are briefly introduced in this section, and are discussed in further de-
tail in the criteria discussion in section 6.2.  
 
The first market-based approach is the international emissions trading model that was pioneered 
by the Kyoto Protocol continuing after 2012. This would mean that the current basic design of the 
Kyoto Protocol, including targets for a number but not all Parties, international allowance trading, 
a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the current compliance regime are maintained.25 In 
the “Kyoto-Continued” case, the Parties taking on targets might change, probably by expanding 
the list of Annex B Parties with an emission reduction target, but the general principle that there 
are developing countries that are exempt from emission targets and can participate voluntarily 
through the CDM remains, and industrialised countries with emission targets. The emission target 
level would presumably be different in a next commitment period, although it is assumed that the 
process for agreeing on future periods remains similar to the method adopted in the Kyoto Proto-
col, so negotiations for periods in the relatively short term, so about 5 or at most 10 years. Referring 
back to Chapter 3, an emissions trading approach is an effect-based approach where the environ-
mental outcome is certain against uncertain costs.  
 
A carbon tax is the other side of the same coin; although its design is notably different from an emis-
sions trading instrument, it is still a market-based approach. Proposals for a global tax vary on de-
tails such as participation conditions, commodity under taxation (fossil fuels or carbon emissions) 
and the destination of the revenues (Cooper, 1998; Nordhaus, 1998; Stiglitz, 2006), but have one 
necessary similarity: they all have to be implemented on the national level, as there is no interna-
tional government that can tax (Barrett, 2007). An international agreement on a global carbon tax 
would therefore necessarily involve governments signing up to it and subsequently implementing 
such a tax in their own countries. In order to create a level-playing field, these taxes should be 
harmonised as much as possible and enforced by an international organisation, for instance 
through trade barriers. As has been argued in Chapter 3, a carbon tax would essentially be an ef-
fort-based system where the cost is fixed and the environmental outcome is uncertain. 
 
Responding to criticism on the Kyoto Protocol that it would lead to exorbitantly high costs 
(Nordhaus, 1998) and the uncertainties in target setting, an emissions trading scheme with a safety valve 
has been suggested by Pizer (1999), based on early work by Weitzman (1974) and endorsed (al-
though and slightly modified) by Victor (2001). Such a scheme would work as follows. Initially a 
government would distribute (through auction, grandfathering or a combination) carbon emission 
allowances similar to a normal emissions trading model, and businesses would have to comply 
with the targets set. Initially, the market would look for the most cost-effective emission reduc-
tions. However, if the carbon price were to exceed a given "trigger price", the government would 
                                                 
24  For an exhaustive overview, see Bodansky (2004). 
25  By design, the Kyoto Protocol is a market-based policy instrument as it implements an international emissions trading 
market, of which the CDM is a special, because project-based, case. Also its implementation in signatories is often market-
based. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is the best example of this. However, some of its implementation might not be 
done by means of market-based instruments. 
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offer an unlimited amount of allowances for that price, even though businesses exceed their ini-
tially allowed emissions. Although safety valve approach has been called a hybrid between an 
emissions trading scheme and a tax system, it primarily caps costs, not emissions, so in effect it is 
more akin a tax on emissions, and is thus an effort-based system. However, if the emission reduc-
tions are considered insufficient, the trigger price can be modified to a higher level thus resulting 
in more emission reductions.  
 
Another approach combining different concepts in one treaty is a multi-stage system (Höhne, 2005; 
Elzen, 2002; Berk and Elzen, 2001). In such a system, the basic design features of emissions trading 
à la Kyoto will be maintained, but apart from the Annex B and non-Annex B categories, an inter-
mediate stage is introduced to account for a "middle category" of emerging economies. Those coun-
tries are developing countries with rapidly industrialising economies and growing incomes. They 
have little historical responsibility for climate change, but increasingly contribute to the global 
greenhouse gas emissions, with future contributions exceeding those of the industrialised coun-
tries. These countries argue that their economies should not be constrained by an emission reduc-
tion target, but Annex-B countries argue that their contribution to the future problem also cannot 
be ignored. Two variants of a middle target are discussed: carbon or energy intensity targets, 
where the emerging economies should reduce their emissions relative to GDP, or no-lose targets, 
where they get an absolute target (possibly sectoral), remain without consequences if they exceed 
their target, and can sell emission allowances if they reduce emissions below the no-lose target. 
The countries would graduate into the different stages by per capita income level.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces a taxonomy of technology-oriented agreements (TOAs), which is also used in 
Chapter 3. It distinguishes four types: (1) knowledge sharing and coordination; (2) research, de-
velopment and demonstration (RD&D); (3) technology transfer; and (4) technology deployment 
mandates, standards, and incentives. Of these, technology incentives (part of type 4) could be con-
sidered market-based instruments. If for instance a technology is subsidised, a market instrument 
rather than a regulatory instrument is employed, even though it can be technology-specific. 
 
Building on Chapter 3 and this introduction, the distinctions between market-based and regula-
tory, and effect- and effort-based, are summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Attribution of agreements to effect/effort-based and market-based or regulatory 
 Effort-based Effect-based 
Market-based • Carbon tax 
• Safety valve 
• TOA-Type 4 (Incentives) 
• Kyoto Continued  
• Multi-stage 
 
Regulatory (or com-
mand-and-control) 
• TOA-Type 1 (Knowledge sharing 
and coordination, e.g. CSLF (see 
Chapter 5)) 
• TOA-Type 2 (RD&D, e.g., part of 
“Combined R&D and standards”) 
• TOA-Type 3 (Technology transfer) 
• TOA-Type 4 (mandates and stan-
dards, e.g. the “CCS Technology 
Mandate” (see Chapter 5)) 
 
6.2 Criteria discussion of market-based approaches 
The market-based approaches introduced in Section 6.1 will now be discussed based on the same 
set of criteria as the one used for technology-oriented agreements. A more extensive discussion of 
the criteria can be found in Section 5.2.3, but a brief summary of the criteria is given here:  
• "Environmental effectiveness" is the extent to which the agreement is certain to achieve emis-
sion reductions in time; 
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• "Technological effectiveness" is the extent to which the agreement promotes innovation and 
technological change required to address climate change; 
• "Cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency" is the extent to which the agreement inherently 
achieves the lowest cost, as well as the best balance between cost and benefits; 
• "Incentives for participation and compliance" describes whether the agreements has sufficient 
benefits for participants to reach a degree of self-enforcing;  
• "Administrative feasibility" discusses whether the legal, institutional and practical means exist 
to implement the agreement in an effective and cost-effective manner.  
 
The criteria discussion in Chapter 5 is primarily empirical and evaluated the performance of con-
crete TOAs based on detailed information. The discussion in this section will be on more general 
agreements with many unknowns about the details, e.g., on whether the targets are strict or leni-
ent, on the breadth of participation and on the costs of the agreement. Still, the resulting discus-
sion will give insights that might allow for a general comparison of TOAs and market-based ap-
proaches in Section 6.3.  
 
6.2.1 International emissions trading à la Kyoto 
Although the Kyoto Protocol has been accused of not going far enough in its ambition to cut green-
house gas emissions, the countries that have ratified the treaty are generally showing less of a 
greenhouse gas intensive emissions path than the countries that have not, and most are likely to 
comply with their commitments. This speaks for the environmental effectiveness of a follow-up 
agreement, although the overflow allowances in Russia and the Ukraine, if used, could lower the 
emissions reduction considerably. In general, the additionality provisions in the CDM are consid-
ered a sufficient guarantee that greenhouse gas emission reductions claimed in the CDM are real, 
although there is criticism as well, and doubts about the contributions to sustainable development 
(Schneider et al., 2007). Overall, "international emissions trading à la Kyoto" could be environmen-
tally effective, provided that the problem of overallocation of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to 
particularly the Former Soviet Union (the “hot air” problem) is solved, and that stricter targets are 
agreed upon and complied with.  
 
With regard to technological effectiveness, the short commitment periods, relatively weak price 
signal, and the regulatory uncertainty after 2012 have so far not led to signs of technological change 
or innovation, and unless Parties can agree on deeper emission reductions, a more extended com-
mitment period or a longer timeframe, a continuation of Kyoto is unlikely to change this. The rela-
tively shallow commitments of Kyoto led to implementation of measures that often amount to in-
cremental changes in energy production (such as fuel switch) and reductions of non-CO2 green-
house gas emissions. In addition, there is the problem of markets generally under-investing in in-
novation; the technology market failure (see Chapter 5, particularly Jaffe et al. (2005)).  
 
Cost effectiveness in emissions trading schemes is generally high, provided that it can be imple-
mented against relatively low transaction costs. Although start-up costs are significant, the trans-
action costs have come down fast for the CDM as well as for the other emissions trading schemes. 
A follow-up of Kyoto can benefit from the experiences and investments made in the first commit-
ment period, thus enhancing the ease of administrative implementation. Economic efficiency is 
difficult to predict upfront, but it has been calculated that the costs of Kyoto are significantly 
lower than initially projected (IPCC, 2007c), and that it has been effective, although its effects 
have been limited. Overall, it is difficult to say whether any agreement is economically efficient, 
but, depending on the targets set, a follow-up of Kyoto might generate similar results.  
 
The weak point of an international emissions trading approach, as argued in Chapter 3 and in 
many publications (Aldy et al., 2003; Victor, 2001) are its incentives for participation and compli-
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ance. The interest profile of cost and benefits of climate change are such that signing up for an 
emissions trading pact is not in line with the interests of those countries most crucial for achieving 
its aims. The compliance mechanism in Kyoto is more likely to drive non-complying Parties away 
from the protocol than back into its arms. Enforcement is notoriously difficult in any international 
agreement, and it not explicitly arranged in the Kyoto Protocol. It is difficult to see how these is-
sues can be repaired in a follow-up international emissions trading scheme. 
 
6.2.2 Global carbon tax 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a global carbon tax is an effort-based agreement, where the costs can be 
predicted but the environmental outcome is uncertain. The environmental effectiveness therefore 
depends on the level of the tax – a high carbon tax can be as effective as an emission target, but the 
emission reductions are not guaranteed. The technological effectiveness might be higher than in 
the case of an emissions trading agreement, as a tax is normally installed in perpetuity, whereas 
emission targets would have to be fixed per trading period, after which in principle everything is 
open until a new agreement arises. The long-term price signal of a tax is therefore likely to be 
stronger, although the technology market failure still exists.  
 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, in theory a carbon tax can be as cost-effective as an emission trading 
scheme, but in an international playing field it is virtually impossible to find the optimal price 
(Weitzman, 1974). As mentioned in the introduction, in practice, a global tax would have to be 
installed in each separate country and preferably, it would be harmonised across countries, making 
it even harder to tune the tax to suit an international target for emission reduction. Transaction 
costs for a tax, contrary to emissions trading, are low, as no institutions for trade or brokerage, nor 
any carbon trading specialists would have to be installed to deal with the scheme, and administra-
tive feasibility is also high. Economic efficiency depends fully on the level of the tax, but again is 
difficult to determine or predict. 
 
A carbon tax has similar problems as emissions trading in terms of incentives for participation and 
compliance, although the cost predictability may make it more attractive than an emissions trad-
ing scheme. Although governments may officially sign up for a global tax and install it in their 
countries, the collection of the tax cannot be enforced, or governments could strategically decide 
to compensate those affected by tax breaks or refunds, outside the view or the influence of interna-
tional enforcers, to control the cost for the businesses or consumers. Trade measures, such as bor-
der-adjustable taxes for carbon-emitting products, are proposed as a means to enforce a carbon 
tax, but the WTO allowance of border adjustments for taxes may exclude emission taxes (Con-
inck et al., 2008a). Problems of compliance and enforcement therefore remain unresolved. 
 
6.2.3 Emissions trading with safety valve 
As emissions trading with a safety valve is a hybrid of emissions trading and a carbon tax, it shares 
their outcomes of the criteria assessment. If the trigger price is not reached, the system is akin to 
an emissions trading scheme; if the trigger price is exceeded, it is a carbon tax. The outcome there-
fore depends much on the emission targets and the level of the price cap. 
 
The environmental effectiveness of emissions trading with a "safety valve" is similar to that of a 
global carbon tax – similarly, unless the "trigger price" is set high enough for companies to start 
abating greenhouse gases, the pollution will continue and companies will just pay a cost per tonne 
of CO2, which is essentially the same as a tax. Its effectiveness in bringing about technological 
change is probably more similar to international emissions trading, as it necessarily shares the 
fixed trading period feature. Cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency depend on the trigger 
price. If it is set at the equilibrium level of where emission reductions over time would be dynami-
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cally optimal, a safety valve approach can be very efficient, but, as noted in the previous section, it 
is already difficult to achieve this in a national system, and it is even more complex to harmonise 
this in an international scheme. Incentives for participation and compliance are not fully solved, 
although, similar to the carbon tax, the price cap gives some certainty on costs. The administrative 
realisation of any emissions trading scheme is not easy and the administrative feasibility is there-
fore not considered high, although adding a price cap to the existing Kyoto Protocol system might 
make it easier to implement.  
 
6.2.4 Multi-stage with intensity targets or no-lose targets 
In the multi-stage scheme, the criteria assessment of the lower and higher stages (those without 
any obligation and those with an absolute cap) are similar to the international emissions trading 
variant in Section 6.2.1. It is the middle category, with either an intensity target or a no-lose target, 
that I will focus on for this discussion, particularly for the environmental, technological and cost 
effectiveness criteria.  
 
As both the no-lose and the intensity targets are flexible, the environmental effectiveness is uncer-
tain and depends on the target chosen. A strict intensity target combined with high production 
and consumption growth might still increase emissions substantially, although probably less than 
in a business as usual scenario. Similarly, a strict no-lose target might result in emission reductions 
in some sectors, whereas others will not respond to the possible incentive of selling emission cred-
its. If a no-lose target is set on a country level and not per sector, or even per installation or busi-
ness, such a scheme may result in a collective action problem where some sectors will pollute more 
and compensate the emission reductions achieved in another sector, thus denying the other sectors 
of compensation for their emission reductions. Technological effectiveness is uncertain in both 
cases, and, similarly to emissions trading, depends on the target and the length of the commitment 
period. Cost-effectiveness would most likely be high for the no-lose case, as only those measures 
that lead to cost-effective emission reductions would be implemented. Economic efficiency is con-
sidered high compared to an emissions trading scheme where emerging economies are not given 
any constraint, as these emissions increasingly determine the future emissions and emission reduc-
tions achieved under intensity or no-lose targets are most likely relatively affordable. 
 
The administrative feasibility of both intensity and no-lose targets is rather low, as the baseline-
setting in both cases probably requires extensive data collection, uncertain projections, and com-
plex negotiations. If there is to be trading in emissions between the industrialised countries and 
the intensity-constrained countries, it is not straightforward to translate intensity in absolute 
emission reductions. For the remainder, the administrative complexity is similar to the interna-
tional emissions trading system.  
 
The incentives for participation and compliance need to be seen in the light of the treaty as a 
whole, and not only the middle stage. Throughout the negotiations, developing countries have em-
phasised that industrialised countries should take action first, and that developing countries will 
not accept any targets as they do not bear responsibility for the climate change problem and their 
capabilities to take measures is more limited. Although this is true for the past, this is changing in 
the near future, and one of the reasons the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol was because of the 
absence of emission targets for large developing countries. The multi-stage proposal was designed 
to solve that deadlock. The idea is that the US would ratify an international treaty if it has provi-
sions for emission reductions in the large developing countries, and that developing countries 
would agree if it would not limit their economic development. The proposal may indeed help. But 
the design does not make the inherent problems of compliance and enforcement go away.  
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6.2.5 Technology-oriented agreements 
For a discussion of the criteria in different types of potential post-2012 technology-oriented agree-
ments, see Section 5.3.5. Clearly, the criteria assessment depends on the type of agreement – the 
substance of the agreement and therefore the environmental and technological effectiveness will 
vary much depending on that.  
 
Administrative feasibility of TOAs has been discussed for separate agreements in Chapter 5, but 
not for the set of agreements that would be needed if TOAs alone would have to mitigate climate 
change. In that case, for all relevant sectors worldwide, agreements would have to be made, adding 
up to an environmental outcome that is as cost-effective as possible. This might become very com-
plex and would render a low the administrative feasibility. 
 
6.3 Contrasting market-based and technology-oriented approaches 
The discussions in Chapter 5 (for the TOAs) as well as the assessment in this chapter (for the mar-
ket-based instruments) bring out some areas where technology- and market-based approaches for 
post-2012 climate policy differ. Based on the criteria, they are summarised in a very generic way in 
Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2 Generalised, high-level comparison of market-based and technology-oriented approaches to international cli-
mate agreements.  
 Market-based approaches Technology-oriented approaches 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
Strong targets, taxes and price caps 
can be environmentally effective, but 
weak effort-based agreements are 
not 
Strong, Type-4 agreements aimed at 
implementation of technologies can be 
effective but weak, Type 1, 2 or 3 
agreements not 
Technological 
effectiveness 
Moderate if credible long-term 
targets cannot be set. Market 
plagued by technology market 
failure 
High, although governments picking the 
wrong winners can reduce the 
technological effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness 
and economic 
efficiency 
High Can be low if not aligned well, but if the 
technology targets are chosen well, can 
be improved. 
Incentives for 
participation and 
compliance 
Has significant problems that are 
difficult to solve. Taxes and safety 
valves have benefit because of cost 
predictability 
Relatively high because of perceived 
first-mover advantages. Agreement 
among governments that technology is 
important for solving climate change. 
Cost predictability high.  
Administrative 
feasibility 
High for taxes; moderate to low for 
emissions-trading based agreements 
High for single agreements, but the 
whole set of agreements can get complex 
and accountability issues may arise. 
 
It becomes clear that neither market-based nor technology-oriented agreements can be rejected on 
grounds of environmental effectiveness or administrative feasibility. The major differences are in 
the fields of technological effectiveness, and incentives for participation and compliance, and cost-
effectiveness. Technology-oriented agreements seem to provide better prospects for the former 
two, whereas market-based approaches are more likely to lead to the lowest overall system costs. 
 
It has already been discussed in detail why market-based approaches are more likely to lead to 
cost-effective implementation of climate policy; markets are better at picking winners than gov-
ernments. It is also obvious why technology-oriented agreements score better on technological ef-
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fectiveness; they are designed to solve the technology market failure and are tailor-made towards 
technological change and innovation; it is more than merely a by-product like in the case of emis-
sion caps or taxes.  
 
Why the incentives for participation and compliance are problematic for emission-targeted ap-
proaches has been argued extensively in Chapter 3. The question then arises why technology-
oriented agreements would be better at this. There are three general arguments for that. A more 
extensive explanation is given in Chapters 3 and 5. First, there is an interest of practically all Par-
ties in the UNFCCC in technology, as demonstrated by the setup of mechanisms aimed at greater 
diffusion of technology. The second argument relates to the perceived first-mover advantages that 
can increase participation of those countries that feel they either need access to the technology in 
question, or that they are able to export the technology, thus helping their own industry sectors 
perform better. Such interests can also be there in the case of an emissions trading regime of a tax, 
but the benefits are not so clear as in technology-oriented agreements. Thirdly, the predictability 
of cost is greater when they are determined on a per-sector or a per-technology basis than in the 
case of the whole economy, where each business will have to figure out for itself how much of the 
cost will fall on him. Predictability of cost, to some degree, may be worth it to sacrifice some cost-
effectiveness.  
 
In summary, markets are unlikely to lead to the optimal technology path to reduce emissions but 
are more cost-effective, and as a whole easier to implement. However, in technological effective-
ness, they are outperformed by TOAs, and possibly also in the field of participation and compli-
ance. This leads to the main conclusion in Chapter 5: technology-oriented agreements are perhaps 
best applied in conjunction with market-based instruments. The issue of technology transfer may 
be a case in point for that. The next chapter will explore whether technology-oriented funds or 
market-based mechanisms are more effective in transferring technologies.  
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Chapter 7 The issue of technology transfer: markets or funds?26,27 
7.1 Introduction 
Technology transfer is an extensively debated issue , both in the academic literature and in the cli-
mate negotiations28. Arguably, the only broad agreement with regard to technology transfer and 
climate change might be that it is tremendously important (see e.g., Forsyth, 2007; Koehler et al., 
2007 but also older references such as Nakicenovic and Victor, 1993). What technology transfer 
exactly comprises, how it can best be promoted, what its most crucial barriers are and who should 
pay for what aspects are all being discussed. Most empirical technology transfer work is based on 
case studies of technologies or countries (e.g., Forsyth, 2005; Martinot et al., 1997, and many refer-
ences in IPCC, 2000a), and aims to derive success and failure factors from those cases (Ramana-
than, 2002). Although such studies yield valuable insights, the multi-faceted characteristics of 
technology transfer and the inevitable localised nature of effective policies to overcome barriers 
still make it challenging to make predictions on effective policy.  
 
Views on barriers to technology transfer are generally converging, although a blueprint of a con-
crete and successful strategy to overcome them has not yet been formulated. Indeed, the very term 
of technology transfer has been contested, and alternatives such as “technology cooperation”, em-
phasising the process nature of the action rather than the perception that technology transfer is an 
“event”, can also be found in literature (Heaton et al., 1994) and this consensus has indeed 
emerged. Despite this, technology transfer is sometimes for practical reasons still defined as only 
the transfer of the technology design plus property right to reproduce, although it is always ac-
knowledged that without the transfer of “know-how”, the technology transfer is likely to be less 
successful (Lewis and Wiser, 2007). Attempts to translate the various barrier analyses into con-
crete policy have been made early on (e.g., Martinot et al., 1997), but remain to be implemented. 
 
The discussion in this chapter will focus on technology transfer of "environmentally sound tech-
nologies" (IPCC, 2000a; Andersen et al., 2007), particularly those relevant to climate change miti-
gation. The transfer of technology is more complex than the word leads to suspect: it integrates 
"human beings, know-how, physical objects and techniques" (Karani, 2001). More simply said, 
technology transfer cannot be hardware transfer alone; it should necessarily involve the build-up 
of capacity to handle the technology and the raising of awareness among users and other stake-
holders, including civil society (Reddy, 1991; Lall, 1992; IPCC, 2000a; Forsyth, 2005; 2007). Given 
these requirements, which are both difficult to meet and difficult to verify, it is first of all hard to 
declare any technology transfer projects a success, and secondly to formulate conditions that will 
render projects with the objective of technology transfer successful.  
 
The IPCC (2000a) and Worrell et al. (2001) structure technology transfer in a five-stage process, 
the stages being: assessment, agreement, implementation, evaluation and adjustment, potentially 
followed by replication (also called diffusion)29. The process nature of technology transfer and the 
long-term commitment that necessarily accompanies it has led to questioning whether grants or 
subsidies are suitable for bringing about technology transfer. The long-term commitments and 
                                                 
26  Acknowledgements: my co-authors Frauke Haake, Nico van der Linden, Carolyn Fischer, Richard Newell and Takahiro 
Ueno, as well as Rob Youngman and Remko Ybema, and a number of anonymous reviewers.  
27  Section 7.2 has been published in Climate Policy (Coninck et al., 2008b). References to section numbers have been modi-
fied to make them consistent with the outline of this thesis, and some edits have been made. Some duplication with other 
sections in this chapter has emerged as the journal paper reads as a stand-alone document, but for the policy comparison in 
this chapter some further introduction was necessary. 
28  The debate on technology transfer in the academic literature has seen contributions from development economics, social 
science, and political science, as well as from engineering disciplines. In the UNFCCC, the most discussion on technology 
transfer was in Bali, and plays in both Subsidiary Bodies (IISD, 2007)  
29  Note the parallel with the stages of international institution formation in chapter 1. 
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significant efforts into after-sales seem less compatible with a subsidy or grant provided upfront. 
On the other hand, finance barriers to technology transfer of environmentally sound technologies 
are particularly high, and funds are seen as the obvious solution. Barriers other than the cost of the 
new technology have been identified, however, and include the lack of appropriateness of the for-
eign technology for the local circumstances, the capacity of the recipient institutions to accommo-
date the technology, the lack of skilled labour and the lack of entrepreneurial activity in the recipi-
ent country (Andersen et al., 2007; Ramanathan, 2002; Karani, 2001; IPCC, 2000a). Barriers related 
to intellectual property rights (IPR) are also often mentioned, although in some cases they are not 
considered to be high for several reasons (Barton, 2007) and can be overcome by paying a relatively 
small royalty fee. IPR, however, is perceived as a major issue by developing countries (Ockwell et 
al., 2008). Another barrier is the capacity of the technology-recipient country to absorb the tech-
nology. This barrier encompasses issues related to institutional capacity, knowledge, social adop-
tion, and suitability of the technology for local conditions and use (Reddy, 1991). It is clear that an 
instrument that addresses only the issue of costs will not solve the whole problem, which is the 
reason that funds would have been designed to also take broader enabling issues into account.  
 
This chapter aims to bring to the fore whether strategies to enhance technology transfer have 
worked out for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF). The role of this chapter in this thesis is to make explicit the implications of these lessons 
for a technology-oriented climate regime. The CDM, representing a market-based approach, and 
GEF, a fund representing a more regulatory approach, are two international policies that are gen-
erally thought to enhance technology transfer in the field of climate change mitigation. Their dif-
ferent nature may give interesting insights into the contrast of market and regulatory instruments 
for technology transfer. 
 
The CDM could be seen as representing the Annex-I approach to technology transfer, the initiative 
being mainly with the private sector and the cost being an outcome of constructed market forces. 
The discussion of technology transfer in the CDM, in Section 7.2, is based on an evaluation of the 
origin of technology in the CDM as part of the EU FP6-funded TETRIS project. It yields detailed 
results for the first 63 projects, and includes investment sums analysis. In the evaluation, the per-
spective of the technology-exporting countries is also taken into account: it investigates which 
countries (mostly Annex-I) benefit from hardware exports. Developing countries, conversely, of-
ten prefer a technology transfer fund and have actively pursued this during the negotiations of a 
new mandate under UNFCCC's Article 4.530. The most prominent example of such a fund is the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), in operation since 1991, and the financial instrument of the 
UNFCCC. The performance of the GEF, where possible in terms of technology transfer, will be 
assessed based on independent literature and official evaluations. The international policy instru-
ments will be introduced in more detail in their respective sections.  
 
In addition to the international climate policy instruments, it might be useful to have an upfront 
look at successful policies for other international environmental issues that share characteristics 
with climate change. The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund (MLF) is often mentioned as a 
success story of technology transfer (Andersen et al., 2007; Luken and Grof, 2006), and even Kofi 
Annan, in his days as Secretary General of the United Nations. The Montreal Protocol has been 
called "perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date", partly because of the 
MLF’s achievements. The MLF aims to meet the incremental cost of Montreal Protocol compliance 
in Article 5 (developing) countries. Andersen et al. (2007) claim large degrees of technology trans-
                                                 
30  Text of UNFCCC Article 4.5: "The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take 
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the 
provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall support the development and enhance-
ment of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a posi-
tion to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies." 
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fer for the MLF based on case studies. The major sectors are refrigeration, air conditioning, sol-
vents, and foams, and the MLF’s budget, established through periodical replenishments, was US$ 
400 million over 2006-2008, and US$ 2.1 billion (spent on 5520 projects) in 1991-2006 
(IPCC/TEAP, 2005; Andersen et al., 2007). The funding in the MLF by developed countries is con-
tingent upon the ratio of their funding of the UN, and proved sufficient to cover the costs of com-
pliance to the Montreal Protocol for developing countries, and to convince these nations to ratify 
the Montreal Protocol and agree on ODS targets for the long term. What helped was that the sub-
stitutes for ozone-depleting substances, in the form of "soft CFCs", such as HCFCs, or other re-
placements, were already largely available in industries in developed countries. The costs of these 
measures turned out to be significantly lower than initially projected (Hammit, 2000; Andersen et 
al., 2007), and some of the funds could be devoted to covering the cost of use of patented processes 
initially developed in industrialised countries. A published UNIDO31 evaluation of sustainable de-
velopment impacts of the MLF arrived at many positive benefits, although in some projects there 
were negative impacts on product quality or employment (Luken and Grof, 2006). 
 
In hindsight, with full insight in the ozone problem and its causes, and knowing the solutions and 
what they cost, solving the ozone problem seems like a clear-cut decision. It was not necessarily so 
at the time of agreement of the Montreal Protocol. There was still some uncertainty as to the 
causes and effects of the ozone hole. When the Montreal Protocol was agreed, the cost-benefit re-
lation of 1:11 that is now found in the literature (Barrett, 2007) was of a wholly different order. The 
extent and costs of the effects were uncertain, and the costs of solving the problem were estimated 
significantly higher than they turned out to be (Hammit, 2000). Still, however, although it in-
volved multi-billion dollar industries, the scope of the solutions to the ozone problem was rela-
tively limited. The largest sectors it covered were refrigeration, air conditioning and foams. The 
MLF in the Montreal Protocol, however, has clearly shown that a fund can make a difference and 
can be effective in transferring technologies. In this chapter, however, the MLF is not considered 
as part of the evaluation of climate change instruments. Although the climate and the ozone prob-
lems share some characteristics – both are atmospheric problems, rely on international coordina-
tion for their solutions – they also differ in several determining respects. The scale and economic 
impacts of both the climate problem and its solutions are larger than the ozone problem to such a 
degree that they would significantly affect the institutional design, making a comparative evalua-
tion inappropriate. Nevertheless, Section 7.5 will revert back to the MLF to investigate whether 
lessons can be learned. 
 
This chapter will first evaluate the technology transfer results of the market-based CDM (Sec-
tion 7.2), and subsequently the GEF as a fund (Section 7.3). It will then make a comparative analy-
sis of the two in Section 7.4, and discuss conclusions in Section 7.5. 
 
7.2 Technology transfer in market-based mechanisms: the Clean Development 
Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Proto-
col and has two purposes: to allow Annex B countries to comply with their Kyoto obligations 
through emission reductions generated in non-Annex B countries, and to assist non-Annex B 
countries in achieving sustainable development (UNFCCC, 1997a). The CDM Executive Board 
safeguards that the emission reductions are real and measurable, while the Designated National 
Authorities in the host countries are responsible for the fulfilment of the sustainable development 
criterion. Numerous evaluations have been conducted to establish whether the CDM lives up to 
the expectations, whereby especially the sustainable development contribution of the CDM was 
questioned (see e.g. Ellis et al., 2007), as the additionality of the greenhouse gas emission reduc-
                                                 
31  The UN Industrial Development Organisation is one of the implementing bodies of the MLF. 
Chapter 7 
 
132 
tions is thought to be sufficiently guaranteed through the stringent mechanism for registration 
with the UNFCCC. The flexibility in applying the sustainable development definition and the pre-
rogative of the host country to determine whether it takes place have led to ambiguity and a lack of 
transparency on how the sustainable development criterion is handled (Cosbey et al., 2005). 
 
Although not an explicit policy goal of the CDM, it is often associated with the transfer of tech-
nologies from industrialised to developing countries. Much has been written about how technol-
ogy transfer under the CDM might be enhanced, pointing at for instance the strategies of credit-
purchasing governments (Aslam, 2001) or at mobilising synergies between private sector involve-
ment and capacity building (Davidson, 2001). As the number of projects under the CDM is now on 
the rise, it is possible to go beyond the speculation on future improvements and empirically evalu-
ate the level of technology transfer taking place in the current CDM project portfolio.  
 
Transfer of technology has several aspects: the transfer of hardware, in terms of the actual installa-
tions and equipment, and the ‘soft’ technology transfer, in the form of knowledge transfer and ca-
pacity building. This paper first generally assesses technology transfer as a whole, including soft 
technology, and determines whether technology transfer took place according to the definition 
adopted in Section 7.2.1. Next, it focuses on two aspects of ‘hard’ technology transfer: it first as-
sesses in detail the origin of technology of the 63 CDM projects that were registered with the 
UNFCCC on 1st January 2006, and in addition provides a rough analysis of the volume of exports 
from industrialised countries to the CDM host countries. 
 
The latter question is relevant for two purposes. Firstly, the outcome gives an indication of the in-
vestments in cleaner, foreign technologies that CDM generates. Secondly, it provides an additional 
ground for the development of cleaner technologies in industrialised countries, and for gaining ex-
perience with these technologies, in order to be able to export to countries that have not been will-
ing or able to develop them.  
 
Section 7.2.1 explains the methodology that is used in the analysis. Section 7.2.2 provides results 
for the overall technology transfer analysis, and Section 7.2.3 for the hardware and investment 
analysis. Section 7.2.4, finally, discusses the conclusions that can be drawn. 
 
7.2.1 Approach for the technology transfer analysis 
There is surprisingly little consensus on what technology transfer comprises. The literature shows 
a broad array of definitions (Wilkins, 2002; Kline et al., 2004). In this paper, we adopt the broad 
definition of the IPCC (2000a):  
 
"A broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and 
adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, fi-
nancial institutions, NGOs and research/education institutions." 
 
Projects looking at technology transfer often focus not so much on the question whether technol-
ogy transfer took place, but on the effectiveness of the technology transfer. In the context of cli-
mate change, for instance, criteria include “whether emissions are reduced” or “whether the local 
community is involved in the activity” (IPCC, 2000a). As these criteria are already inherently posi-
tive for the CDM, given its requirements for emission reduction, additionality, public comment 
procedures, and sustainable development, we have not used them.  
 
Given the IPCC definition, in the context of this paper, we will first evaluate three criteria that can 
be applied to registered CDM projects and that evaluate all aspects of technology transfer: 
1. Whether technologies deployed in CDM originate from outside the host country, or  
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2. Whether the technologies that are implemented in CDM are indeed new or improved and do 
not represent business as usual in the host country of the project, or 
3. Whether the knowledge and capacity to implement the technology in the project is originating 
from outside the host country. 
 
The evaluated CDM project portfolio consists of all registered CDM projects by January 1st, 2006. 
The total number of projects is 63, situated in 20 different countries. The Project Design Docu-
ments (PDDs) (UNFCCC, 2006) were used to obtain a detailed description of the project activity, 
including in some cases an assessment of whether technology transfer has taken place. Sometimes, 
the PDDs gave sufficient information on the technology origin, but in other cases, the project de-
veloper was interviewed by e-mail to obtain missing information. This resulted in an overall, high-
level evaluation of hard and soft technology transfer.  
 
After evaluating all projects, the second step entailed further analysis of the projects that comply 
with the 1st criterion (i.e. projects that show hard technology transfer), evaluating the countries 
that export the various technologies and the capital costs of the installations used in the projects. 
The sum of the total capital costs of projects that show technology transfer equalled the value of 
the exports that companies from Annex-B countries have been able to make as a consequence of 
the CDM.  
 
Although the approach outlined above fits the purpose of evaluating technology transfer in the 
CDM, it has a number of limitations. First of all, according to the definition in IPCC (2000a), 
which includes technology transfer inside a country, e.g. from the one region to the other, or from 
urban to rural areas, we do not show the full, real technology transfer. The fact that domestic tech-
nology transfer may be a significant flow is illustrated by investment numbers – the lion’s share of 
all investment in most developing countries are domestic investments (Ellis et al., 2007). As we 
disregard a potentially large amount of technology transfer, the resulting numbers may be an un-
derestimation. 
 
Another limitation is data availability, particularly for the 2nd and the 3rd criterion. In the case of 
the question whether the technology is “new or improved”, there is much room for interpretation 
and information on the state-of-the-art or ‘average’ technology in specific countries is often hard to 
obtain. This is the main reason why we focus on the hard technology transfer in Section 7.2.3. 
 
For the 3rd criterion, the question whether knowledge transfer or ‘soft’ technology transfer has 
taken place, is surrounded by even greater uncertainties. Not only is the criterion itself rather sub-
jective (e.g., in an extreme case, knowledge transfer could even occur by sending a user a manual of 
an installation), the source of information is problematic, as we have to rely on the PDD only for 
this. Many PDDs do not mention ‘soft technology transfer’, and the ones that do, use it to demon-
strate additionality or ancillary benefits. Because the claim of knowledge transfer or capacity 
building cannot be evaluated independently and the project approval partly depends on it, the 
writer of the PDD has an incentive to exaggerate the level of knowledge transfer or capacity build-
ing associated with his project. The reliability of the assessment of particularly the 3rd criterion is 
therefore reduced significantly.  
 
7.2.2 Results of the broad technology transfer analysis  
The 63 CDM projects that were registered on January 1st, 2006, were evaluated based on the crite-
ria in Section 7.2.1. The projects in the portfolio involve the sectors of electricity, waste, industry, 
agriculture, thermal energy, and the residential sector. 
 
The technologies of the registered projects were biogas, bioenergy, hydropower, wind energy, fuel 
switch and energy efficiency, all of which reduce CO2, methane capture from swine manure and 
Chapter 7 
 
134 
landfill gas capture (reducing CH4), N2O avoidance and HFC-23 destruction. The host countries 
were Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Korea, South Africa and Sri Lanka 
(UNEP/Risoe, 2006). The project development and financing arrangement vary significantly across 
the project portfolio. While some of the projects were initiated unilaterally, others were heavily 
financed by development agencies, were helped by World Bank funding, or had contracted buyers 
via national tender constructions before registration with the CDM Executive Board. 
 
The emissions reductions per technology are summarised in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of emission reductions by technology in the 63 registered CDM projects by January 1st, 2006 
Technology Number of 
projects 
Share in number
of projects 
Annual emission 
reduction (tCO2-eq) 
Share of total emission 
reduction 
Biogas 6 10% 387,591 1.4% 
Biomass 10 16% 302,735 1.1% 
Energy efficiency 1 2% 6,580 0.0% 
Fuel switch 1 2% 19,438 0.1% 
HFC-23 destruction 3 5% 8,233,566 28.9% 
Hydropower 22 35% 775,471 2.7% 
Landfill gas 10 16% 2,712,395 9.5% 
Methane capture 3 5% 410,378 1.4% 
N2O destruction 2 3% 15,111,165 53.0% 
Wind energy 5 8% 573,013 2.0% 
Total 63  28,532,332  
 
As has been noted on many occasions (see e.g. Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006), the share of renewable 
energy projects in the total share of projects is significant in this snapshot of the CDM project 
portfolio, but it is small in the market share of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) compared to 
the large-scale non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission reduction projects. Especially N2O and HFC-23 
destruction dominate the CER portfolio, as well as landfill gas projects. Normally, a lower level of 
sustainable development is associated with CDM projects providing large-scale, industrial, non-
energy-sector emission reductions. Particularly the low cost of HFC-23 projects (IPCC/TEAP, 
2005), the associated windfall profits on CERs and the perverse incentives such HFC projects pro-
vide for the production of ozone-depleting HCFC-22 have generated much concern. A large part of 
the projects in the portfolio uses technologies that originate from the host country and therefore 
do not generate technology transfer as defined in criterion 1 (see Table 7.2). In those cases where 
the technology originates from outside the host country, it comes mainly from the European Union 
and a small part uses technology from the United States, Japan or Switzerland.  
 
Moreover, in almost 60% of the projects, we could confirm that new or improved technology was 
used (criterion 2). The projects in the group that use new or improved technology included all pro-
jects that met criterion 1 with respect to the use of foreign technology. The technologies that were 
new or improved, but also supplied from inside the host country, involved for instance swine ma-
nure methane capture projects in Chile, and biomass projects in India.  
 
In addition, according to the PDDs, almost half of the projects involved some degree of capacity 
building or knowledge transfer (criterion 3). This mostly involved the employment of local work-
ers, who require training and courses to operate the technology.  
 
The summary of the evaluation of the criteria is in Table 7.2 and in Figure 7.1. 
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Table 7.2 Summary of results of the technology transfer criteria analysis 
Criterion Result indicator Number of projects 
meeting criterion 
Share of projects meet-
ing criterion 
Europe 23 37% 
Host country 26 41% 
Other (mainly Japan, US) 7 11% 
1. Origin of technology 
used 
No data 7 11% 
    
Technology transfer 37 59% 
No Technology transfer 22 35% 
Unclear 3 5% 
2. New or improved 
technology, new in the 
country 
No data 1 2% 
    
Capacity building 29 46% 
No capacity building 33 52% 
Unclear 1 2% 
3. Capacity building or 
knowledge transfer re-
quired 
No data 0 0% 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of results of the technology transfer criteria analysis in share of the projects 
 
7.2.3 Origin of technology and international capital flows  
Zooming in from broad technology transfer to transfer of ‘hardware’, it is observed that the origin 
of specific technologies is very widespread. The technology for landfill gas comes mainly from the 
Netherlands although some is of host-country origin, technology for N2O reduction comes mainly 
from France (for some: no data found), and technology for HFC-23 destruction originates from Ja-
pan, the UK and Germany. Methane capture from swine manure in Chile is a locally developed 
technology.  
 
In the power sector, hydropower technology is partly imported from the EU (Spain and France), 
Japan, Switzerland and the United States, and partly supplied by the host country (India, Peru, Sri 
Lanka). Wind energy technology originates from Spain and Denmark. Bioenergy for electricity 
generation originates without exception from the host country.  
 
As for thermal energy, the biogas installations are partly from the host country, and for another 
part data are unavailable. With respect to the one efficiency project, its technology originates from 
the host country, i.e. South Africa. The project that involves fuel switch in industry uses technol-
ogy from Germany. 
 
The technology transfer results per technology are summarised in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3 Summary of technology transfer and origin of hardware per technology 
Technology Number of projects with 
technology outside host 
country of total projects 
Percentage of 
projects technology 
outside host country 
Origin of technology 
Biogas 0 of 6 0% China, India 
Biomass 0 of 10 0% India 
Energy efficiency 0 of 1 0% South Africa 
Fuel switch 1 of 1 100% Germany, United States 
HFC-23  2 of 3 67% Germany, Japan, United Kingdom 
Hydropower 12 of 22 55% China, Australia, France, India, 
Japan, Panama, Brazil, Peru, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Switzerland, United 
States 
Landfill gas 8 of 10 80% Belgium, Netherlands, Japan, 
France, Brazil, United States 
Methane capture 0 of 3 0% Chile 
N2O destruction 2 of 2 100% France 
Wind energy 4 of 5 80% Spain/Denmark 
 
It is remarkable that many of the projects that might be able to comply with ‘sustainability quality 
brands’, such as the CDM Gold Standard (Ecofys, 2005), do not feature technology transfer. The 
small projects in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions, energy efficiency, fuel switch in in-
dustry, biogas and small-scale biomass based energy, use host country technology, whereas the 
large-scale projects, especially in the non-CO2 greenhouse gases, use technology from the Euro-
pean Union or Japan. The power sector shows a more mixed picture; with respect to wind energy, 
all projects of which the technology origin could be determined show technology originating from 
the European Union, whereas hydropower technology comes from all over the world. The origin of 
technology is shown in Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2 Overview of technology transfer per technology (Haake, 2006). For biogas, biomass, hydropower and methane 
capture, most of the projects use technology from the host country. For HFC and N2O destruction, landfill gas, and wind 
energy, most of the projects used technology from the European Union or Japan 
 
Even when the greenhouse gas reduction and the technology are known, the size of the investment 
is not necessarily obvious. For capital costs, the size of the installation is relevant, as opposed to 
the reduction in tonne CO2-eq. For wind energy, for instance, the capital costs are expressed in 
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installed capacity (€/MW) but the emission reductions on the produced electricity are expressed 
in tCO2/kWh. These units are not readily convertible, as a wind energy project with a load factor 
of 20% produces less electricity, and therefore reduces fewer emissions than a project with a load 
factor of 30%, which may be the case in good wind locations. One needs a significantly higher in-
vestment to reach the same GWh electricity production for a less favourable wind location. Simi-
larly, run-of-river hydropower plants have a very different load factor than dam-based hydropower 
plants. For non-power projects, the investment costs have to be expressed in other units; per tonne 
of HFC-23 or N2O destroyed, or per tCO2 in the case of fuel switch.  
 
The investment costs in this analysis are technology-specific but have not been made location-
specific. This is a serious limitation, but general assumptions had to be made of projects that func-
tion under fairly diverse conditions. The investment costs are calculated based on the size of the 
project and the greenhouse gas emission reduction, and on generalised assumptions on investment 
costs per unit size. The numbers do not include costs for any soft technology transfer (such as 
knowledge, capabilities). Table 7.4 shows the investment costs that are used for different tech-
nologies that were transferred. A pragmatic approach was adopted to evaluate investment costs, 
which was more often led by data availability than by the question what would be the most suit-
able metric for the investment costs. The numbers in Table 7.4 should therefore be regarded with 
much care, and only be used in a general way. Only the projects that meet criterion 1 (see Section 
7.2) involve the transboundary movement of technology transfer-associated capital flows, and 
therefore only those projects are considered in the investment flow analysis. 
 
Table 7.4 Assumptions on metric and investment costs for technologies that are transferred under the registered CDM 
projects as of 1st of January 2006 
Technology Unit for 
investment costs 
Investment 
costs 
Reference and clarification 
Landfill gas €/kW 1,20032 Based on Jansen (1992) and SCS Engineers (1994) 
(1.5 million US$ for 1 MW), and the average GHG 
reduction per MW in the CDM registered projects of 
UNEP Risoe is 51. 
Hydropower €/kW 1,958 Investment costs for small-scale hydro from Sambeek 
et al. (2003) - MEP tariffs - 2004-2005. It is assumed 
that 55% of the total investment costs of 3560 €/kW 
are ‘technology costs’ and are associated with tech 
transfer. 
Wind power €/kW 1,000 Investment costs for small-scale hydro from Sambeek 
et al. (2003) - MEP tariffs - 2004-2005. It is assumed 
that some 91% of the total investment costs of 1100 
€/kW are ‘technology costs’ and are associated with 
tech transfer. 
HFC-23 
destruction 
€/tHFC-23/yr 15,000 Based on ‘expert judgment’ of € 3 million for 200 
tHFC-23/yr (Harnisch and Hendriks, 2000) 
N2O 
destruction 
€/tN2O/yr 176 Based on the PDD of the Korean CDM project, which 
claims an offer by Rhodia of France of € 6.5 million 
for 29,500 tN2O 
Fuel switch 
(coal to gas) 
€/tCO2-eq/yr 23 Based on the PDD of the sole coal-to-gas project (for 
steam production) in the portfolio: 550000 US$ for 
reduction of 19,438 tCO2-eq 
 
                                                 
32  Most of the investment costs are for the turbine, converting the landfill gas into usable electricity. Many projects, however, 
don't generate electricity and only claim the emission reductions from the methane flaring. In the case of flaring, the in-
vestment costs are: 0.35*1200 because the electricity production is 65% of the total investment cost.  
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The main uncertainties and assumptions occur in the following steps and data: 
• There are uncertainties in the technology transfer database to start with. For instance: the 
Dutch supplier of landfill gas technology uses turbines from Germany. These secondary earn-
ings are not taken into account; 
• The investment metric has been generalised in many respects. For instance: the unit of € per 
MW for landfill gas projects is not the most appropriate one- per tonne of waste would princi-
pally be more suitable; 
• The investment costs themselves originate from different data sources, and in many cases are on 
an aggregate level. Investment costs for hydropower projects, for instance, vary greatly depend-
ing on the project circumstances and the technology used;  
• No ranges are given, only ‘best estimates’. 
 
According to the data in Haake (2006), transfer of hardware technology took place in 30 of the 63 
projects. However, because in several projects the technology originated from more than one coun-
try, the total number of entries in our analysis is 34. In the case with more than one country, it is 
assumed that the investment value is shared equally among the technology-exporting countries.  
 
Table 7.5 shows the greenhouse gas emission reductions per exporting country and per technology 
in tCO2-eq per year. The total amounts to 25.4 MtCO2-eq per year, which constitutes 89% of all 
emission reductions of registered CDM projects on January 1st, 2006. EU Member States supply 
technology associated with 23.5 MtCO2-eq/yr of emission reduction and other countries (mainly 
Japan) supply the remaining 1.9 MtCO2-eq/yr.  
 
Table 7.5 Greenhouse gas emission reductions through the technology of exporting country, and per technology (numbers 
in ktCO2-eq/yr). The numbers between brackets indicate the total number of projects that transfer hardware technology 
from the country. Columns and rows may not add up correctly because of rounding errors  
Technology 
exporting country 
(# of projects) 
Landfill
gas 
Hydro 
power 
Wind 
energy 
Fuel 
switch 
HFC-23 N2O 
destruction
Total GHG reductions in 
host country through 
transferred technology 
Belgium (2) 87      87 
Denmark (1)   26    26 
France (8) 70 135    15,111 15,316 
Germany (3)  30  10 3,834  3,873 
Netherlands (3) 752      752 
Spain (7)  48 366    414 
United Kingdom (1)     3,000  3,000 
USA (5) 279 30 26 10   345 
Japan (3) 135 0.3   1,400  1,535 
Switzerland (1)  30     30 
Total (34) 1,323 274 417 19 8,234 15,111  
 
Based on the above, the detailed project data in our databases and using the investment costs in 
Table 7.4, the total investment value per technology and per exporting country can be calculated. 
The numbers are given in Table 7.6.  
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Table 7.6 Investment costs per technology and exporting country for the registered CDM projects as of 1st January 2006. 
Numbers are in million €, and columns and rows may not add up correctly because of rounding errors 
Technology exporting 
country (# of projects) 
Landfill 
gas 
Hydro 
power 
Wind 
energy 
Fuel 
switch 
HFC-23 N2O 
destruction 
Total 
Belgium (2) 0.7      0.7 
Denmark (1)   13    13 
France (8) 0.6 83    8.6 92 
Germany (3)  29  0.2 4.9  34 
Netherlands (3) 9.1      9.1 
Spain (7)  23 212    235 
United Kingdom (1)     3.8  3.8 
USA (5) 8.0 29 13 0.2   50 
Japan (3) 2.0 0.1   1.8  3.9 
Switzerland (1)  29     29 
Total (34) 21 194 238 0.4 11 8.6 472 
Share in total 4% 41% 50% 0% 2% 2%  
 
Renewable energy technologies dominate the investment portfolio in the registered CDM projects 
where hardware technology is transferred. Spain exports the highest value of technology, primarily 
through its supply of wind energy. France also has a high export value, primarily through hydro-
power. The United States, Germany and Japan also export a substantial value of technology. Den-
mark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Belgium all have small shares. The 
results per country are given in Figure 7.3.  
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Figure 7.3 Value of exports per technology exporting Annex-B country used for CDM projects in € 
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7.2.4 Technology transfer in the CDM: discussion and conclusion  
We have analysed the portfolio of registered CDM projects on 1st January 2006 to clarify whether 
and how much technology transfer takes place in the CDM. We have found that a significant share 
of the projects uses technology from outside the host country, notably in large-scale non-CO2 
greenhouse gas projects and in wind energy. The lion's share of the technology used in the projects 
originates from either the EU or the host country. In most of the projects, new or improved tech-
nologies were used, and in many projects knowledge transfer and capacity building took place, 
although these numbers are uncertain. The outcomes confirm that many of the projects that re-
sulted in hard technology transfer also involved knowledge transfer and capacity building associ-
ated with the transfer of new technologies. 
 
In terms of hard technology transfer, the EU exported technology in over one third of the projects 
registered under the CDM in the beginning of 2006, notably in non-CO2 greenhouse gases, wind 
energy and some of the hydropower projects. In bioenergy, thermal/efficiency and some hydro-
power and landfill gas projects, much of the technology was locally produced. In general, hardware 
technology transfer takes place to a larger extent in projects that reduce non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases than in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The exception is wind energy, for 
which all projects used technology from the EU. 
 
The value of the investment in technologies originating from industrialised countries is estimated 
at approximately € 470 million, of which € 390 million comes from the European Union. Most is 
spent on renewable energy: about half on wind energy, 40% on hydropower, and the contribution 
of non-CO2 greenhouse gas reducing projects is very small: 4, 2, and 2 % of the total for landfill gas, 
HFC-23 and N2O, respectively. The investment analysis is surrounded by many uncertainties and 
assumptions. The numbers should therefore be regarded as a mere approximation of the actual 
benefits for Annex-B companies in the CDM.  
 
It can be insightful to compare these numbers to other money flows. Compared to total foreign 
direct investment in developing countries, for instance, which amounted to approximately € 50 
billion in 2002 (Ellis et al., 2007), the investments associated with CDM are small.  
 
It is remarkable that the allegation that CER-buying countries sponsor their own private sector 
through buying CERs only from projects that use national technology is not supported by the 
above data. The large buyers of CERs, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan and 
Italy, are not the countries that export the highest value of technology to the host countries for 
CDM projects. It should also be noted that the United States, though not a Kyoto Party, has ex-
ported technology valued at around € 50 million, which constitutes around 10% of the total export 
value for CDM projects at the time.  
 
What is the potential for extrapolation of these numbers to the more recent CDM portfolio, which 
throughout 2006 and 2007 has grown significantly? Several developments have taken place that 
will significantly influence the numbers presented above, both in the direction of more technology 
transfer and in the direction of less. First of all, the number of projects has increased rapidly, as 
well as the number of technologies. As we have not elaborately analysed these new technologies, 
we can only speculate about their origin, but given the rise in technologies that are widely used in 
Europe and Japan, particularly in the renewable energy and industrial efficiency sectors, it can be 
expected that the potential for technology transfer (and the export potential for companies in 
those countries) to developing countries has not been exhausted. Secondly, and contradicting the 
first point, there is a trend towards the development of high-technology industries in particularly 
emerging economies, such as wind turbine industries in India and China. Although these indus-
tries still need to gain experience, their location gives them an advantage in terms of costs, and this 
is likely to increase their market share in the CDM. The balance of these developments might be 
that the amount of exports of climate-friendly CDM-compatible technologies from industrialised 
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countries will increase, but the number of projects without technology transfer, or, for that matter, 
with non-Annex-B to non-Annex-B technology transfer, will also rise. The extent of these in-
creases will depend on the post-2012 regime and the market that it will provide for the CDM. 
Thirdly, another recent development is that the share of non-CO2 projects is decreasing and the 
renewable energy projects dominate not only the project portfolio, but are also on the rise in the 
CER portfolio. This is likely to be associated with an increase in the overall international invest-
ments as a result of the CDM. 
 
Although it became clear from this paper that the CDM generates both hard and soft technology 
transfer, both the broad data on technology transfer and the cost data should be considered care-
fully as they suffer from limited data availability and many arguable assumptions. In order to re-
trieve better data, local visits and more readily available information are essential. A possibility to 
resolve the question around technology transfer in the CDM in a better way that this paper could 
do is to encourage project developers to let DOEs report on technology transfer during the valida-
tion and/or the verification phases of their project. This reporting should be done voluntarily, as 
there is currently no mechanism to oblige such reporting. Positive results, however, particularly on 
soft technology transfer, could increase support for the CDM as its benefits would be portrayed 
with more emphasis.  
 
7.3 Technology transfer through funds: the Global Environment Facility 
7.3.1 Method 
This section will discuss specifically and into some depth the performance of the GEF. Although 
the premise of this chapter is that the transfer of environmentally sound technologies for climate 
change is discussed, the literature on technology transfer by the GEF is scant. It is not possible to 
identify the origin of the technology hardware, as has been done in Section 7.2 for the CDM, for 
each and every project in the GEF.  
 
Hence, a different approach to the technology transfer assessment had to be adopted, consequently 
leading to a lower level of detail than the CDM evaluation in the previous section. The evaluation 
reported here only consists of the study of official GEF evaluation studies and independent litera-
ture sources related to the GEF performance in their climate change programme. In the 1990s, this 
programme primarily consisted of enabling activities and projects in energy efficiency and renew-
able energy, and later on the portfolio was extended to include sustainable transportation, adapta-
tion, and new low-GHG energy technologies. None of the evaluation studies addressed technology 
transfer specifically. However, the following approximation of the three technology transfer crite-
ria for CDM will be used: 
• In the case of projects that lead to the implementation of technology, the procedures of the GEF 
require only the funding of the incremental costs of the technologies implemented. This means 
that in general, the technologies will not have been implemented widely in the host country of 
the GEF project. In this sense, GEF projects are likely to meet criterion #2 in Section 7.2 
• The GEF also funds a number of enabling activities in its climate change programme. Enabling 
activities comprise capacity building, a favourable regulatory framework development and 
promotion, awareness raising, technical assistance, and enacting of codes and standards (Mar-
tinot and McDoom, 2000). Activities like capacity building are part of all projects. These ena-
bling activities all contribute to “soft” technology transfer, and to meeting criterion #3 in Sec-
tion 7.2.  
 
Based on these parallels, and concluding that technology transfer is inherent in the GEF’s activi-
ties, the performance of the GEF projects can be used as an indicator for whether the GEF is effec-
tive in delivering technology transfer. In addition, the size of the GEF’s activities (in greenhouse 
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gas emissions reduction and generated investment) indicates the quantitative contribution of the 
GEF and makes it comparable to the CDM contribution. Unfortunately, however, an analysis of 
criterion #1 in Section 7.2 was not possible, thus making the performance of the GEF and the CDM 
incomparable in that regard.  
 
7.3.2 Introduction to the GEF 
The GEF was started by the World Bank in 1991 as a pilot programme, and co-governed by UNEP 
and UNDP. It was inspired by the Brundtland findings on sustainable development that develop-
ing countries need assistance to “leapfrog the polluting and wasteful stages of industrialisation” 
(Jordan, 1994). Later on, after the Rio Convention in 1992, it became the financial mechanism for 
the Conventions on biodiversity and climate change. A summary of characteristics of the GEF as of 
2004 is provided in Table 7.7.  
 
The initial contribution, for the pilot 1991-1994 period, was relatively small at US$ 1.2 billion, but 
the contributions have grown to US$ 3-4 billion over the next periods. The GEF has never been 
without criticism. Already during its pilot period, the project implementation and governance 
structure were criticised both by internal and external evaluators (Jordan, 1994; Bowles, 1996). A 
continuing objection relates to the top-down nature of the GEF and the lack of recognition of local 
circumstances in project awarding. Consequently, a number of changes was carried out, including 
a more democratic voting system and limited involvement of NGOs as observers to GEF’s govern-
ing council (Bowles, 1996). However, developing countries in the UNFCCC negotiations still regu-
larly comment on the donor dominance in the GEF.  
 
Table 7.7 Summary of the GEF main features (GEF, 2004) 
Objective Fund projects and programmes that protect the global environment in devel-
oping countries 
Areas of work Biodiversity, international waters, land degradation, ozone depletion33, per-
sistent organic pollutants and in 
climate change: renewable energy, energy efficiency, sustainable transporta-
tion, adaptation, new low-GHG energy technologies, and enabling activities 
Budget Through periodical replenishment 
2007-2010: US$ 3.13 billion (for all areas of work) 
Funds and projects 1991-2006: > 650 projects in the climate change area; around US$ 2,5 billion in
grants. 
Achievements Closed projects with GHG estimates: cumulatively 224 MtCO2 (27 projects, 
direct and replication effects). For total current portfolio, this number is es-
timated at 1,7 GtCO2. 
 
7.3.3 Performance of the GEF 
The Monitoring and Evaluation Office of the GEF (with help of independent consultants) has 
evaluated the project portfolio of the climate change programme based on several indicators: mar-
ket reform impact, greenhouse gas emissions impacts, effectiveness of greenhouse gas strategies, 
and the level of strategic response (GEF, 2004). The most quantifiable indicator is the impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions. The 27 projects from 1991-2004 that had been closed upon the time of 
the evaluation are projected to result in a cumulative 97 MtCO2 in direct project emission reduc-
tions, and 224 MtCO2 if the replication of the projects will be as expected. The same projection for 
                                                 
33  The GEF supplemented MLF activities for countries with economies in transition, for example Russia. It spent a total of 
US$ 359 million between 1991 and 2004 on this, resulting in a reduction of 99% in CFC consumption and a total halt to 
ODS production.  
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the entire current portfolio of over 600 projects in the climate change programme would lead to 
cumulative emissions reductions of 430 MtCO2 and 1,7 GtCO2, respectively, over the coming 10 to 
30 years. If the latter number is translated into a yearly number by dividing it by the average life-
time of 20 years, the GEF incremental impact on greenhouse gas emissions would be approxi-
mately 100 MtCO2 per year (GEF, 2004). As stated above, technology transfer as such was not 
evaluated. 
 
It is interesting to note which types of projects in the GEF portfolio yielded the best results. The 
sectors in which the GEF was most successful (in terms of greenhouse gas reduction impacts) 
were found to be the energy efficiency and carbon sequestration/fugitive emissions. These projects 
also have relatively low investment costs. Although there were some positive results in renewable 
energy as well, with several large projects that reduced emissions substantially, the main contribu-
tions were from energy efficiency. These projects have also been evaluated and discussed in the 
peer-reviewed literature (Martinot and Borg, 1998) and lessons have been formulated (Birner and 
Martinot, 2005).34 The latter have focussed on the results of market transformation efforts for sup-
ply- and demand-side energy efficiency projects. Their positive evaluation of lighting, industrial 
boilers, refrigerators, building chillers and demand-side management projects in China, Poland, 
Thailand, Mexico, and seven other countries (united in one lighting programme) pleads for a col-
lection of interventions that can be done on the supply and the demand-side of energy. It also high-
lights that “new institutions and regulatory changes are among the most important outcomes for 
sustained market transformation” (Birner and Martinot, 2005). In this case, therefore, it seems that 
the enabling activities are most effective for energy efficiency projects – indicating that the main 
barrier is not cost, but should be found in awareness and institutional issues.  
 
In terms of geographical distribution, it is noted that 75% of the emission reductions were from 
only 12 projects; nine of these large projects took place in China, and the other three in India, Rus-
sia and Brazil. The GEF has something in common here with the CDM, which also disproportion-
ally concentrates in large, emerging economies. A difference is that the GEF also funds projects in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, whereas CDM does not attend to those countries 
(Joint Implementation, another flexible mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol, does). 
 
The GEF is generally positively evaluated in terms of the project impacts, although not all projects 
are successful in achieving their targets. However, its size is nowhere near the reductions needed 
to address climate change, even if the replication effects are taken into account. In this field, it is 
notably different from MLF (see Section 7.1), which was large enough to solve the entire ODS chal-
lenge for developing countries. The GEF also performs better in some sectors (particularly end-use 
sectors) and countries (particularly large emerging economies) than in others.  
 
As stated at the beginning of this section, this analysis has made the assumption that the projects 
funded by the GEF have provided technology transfer to the target countries. In many cases this is 
likely to be true, as it is the inherent policy of the funds to only fund new technologies and to pro-
vide for soft technology transfer alongside the hardware. Although the claim that the positive pro-
ject results in the GEF involve technology transfer therefore remains unsubstantiated by empirical 
data, it is safe to say that transfer of technologies had to take place to a significant degree. 
 
7.4 Comparing technology transfer in markets and funds 
Comparing the CDM and the GEF yields interesting quantitative insights. In terms of greenhouse 
gas reductions and technology transfer, the CDM easily outperforms the GEF. The assessment in 
Section 7.2 only covered the first 63 registered projects, with emission reductions of about 28 
                                                 
34  Note the overlap in authors between the publications in peer-reviewed journals and the GEF evaluations. 
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MtCO2 per year. The September 2007 number of projects was over 800, leading to over 170 MtCO2 
emission reductions per year (UNEP/Risoe, 2007). This has been achieved in only four years of ac-
tive operation of the CDM, whereas the GEF has achieved only about half of those emission reduc-
tions in over 15 years of operation, including a rather blunt assumption that replication was suc-
cessful. The associated investment flows with CDM are highly uncertain, but certainly amount to 
several billions by now, and are projected to grow further (World Bank, 2006). 
 
From this, it seems that the scope of a market-based mechanism is larger than the scope of a fund. 
The scope of the CDM (i.e., the extent to which it can make a difference towards solving a prob-
lem) is on the order of the Kyoto Protocol's targets. It is fully conceivable that stricter targets un-
der a follow-up of the Kyoto Protocol, or for instance stricter emission caps in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme, would lead to a higher demand for CERs, and a growth in the market well be-
yond current levels. The demand for CDM projects is created through an emission cap. For the 
GEF, every dollar committed directly comes from industrialised country's budget, often a devel-
opment aid budget. The GEF is already quite large, and the size of the fund would have to be tre-
mendous if it would be made responsible for all required emission reductions in developing coun-
tries.  
 
A measure for cost-effectiveness for technology transfer does not exist, as technology transfer is 
too heterogeneous of an activity to allow for measurement in a single-unit way. Cost-effectiveness 
of climate change mitigation efforts is normally expressed by indicating carbon price – the cost of 
one tonne of CO2-eq reduced. Indirect effects, for instance of capacity building programmes, are 
excluded from such analysis. The CER price in the case of the CDM would determine the cost ef-
fectiveness of the CDM – the price has roughly been between 3 and 12 US$/tCO2-eq over the past 
few years. The GEF (2004) reports lower carbon costs of its projects: on average 0.35 US$/tCO2-
eq, with the lowest category being energy efficiency projects (0.21 US$/tCO2-eq) and the most ex-
pensive alternative transport (0.90 US$/tCO2-eq; still significantly lower than the CER price). Al-
though these numbers suggest that the GEF has been more cost-effective than the CDM, the re-
ported figures are not comparable and do not support firm conclusions cost-effectiveness for at 
least three reasons: hidden costs, project selection and design differences.  
 
Hidden costs are particularly the CDM, but also in the GEF expenditures. The CDM, for instance, 
has not directly funded enabling activities. Its development has been helped considerably by nu-
merous capacity building programmes, including some funded by the World Bank, by buyer coun-
try governments (often using ODA), and by the GEF. Indeed, the carbon market has taken off 
much faster in countries that have seen many capacity building efforts, although this is not the de-
termining factor whether the CDM takes of in a host country. Other factors include the willing-
ness and speed of the government to approve projects and the general investment climate of the 
country. It can be concluded that a market-based mechanism such as the CDM requires enabling 
activities through other means in order to function to its full potential.  
 
Second, market-based mechanisms like the CDM favour certain types of projects and certain coun-
tries. Large-scale projects that reduce potent non-CO2 greenhouse gases are clearly preferred by 
the market because of economies of scale on the benefit side – they lead to greater greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and thus to more CERs that can be sold. In addition, the CDM procedures 
around monitoring and verification are favourable to centralised projects, such as industrial pro-
jects and some applications of renewable energy, and give demand-side energy efficiency and 
transportation projects less of a chance. The GEF claims to reach the highest cost-effectiveness on 
efficiency and transportation projects, which often have low or negative carbon costs.  
 
There is also geographical selection in the CDM. CDM money, more than GEF, follows foreign di-
rect investment flows, meaning that countries with high levels of foreign investment benefit dis-
proportionally from the CDM. Countries with marginalised economies, primarily countries in Af-
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rica, in practice have little access to the funding available through the CDM. Although the CDM 
regulators have actively tried to correct some of these problems, by agreeing on fast-track proce-
dures for small-scale projects and in for instance the "Nairobi Framework of Action" to achieve a 
more geographically balanced project portfolio, these issues are inherent in the design of any mar-
ket mechanism. In the GEF, the geographical distribution is not much better, but there is more 
room for intervention. The GEF reserves a considerable budget for projects in least-developed 
countries, including Africa. 
 
Third, the design of the mechanism matters to how cost-effectiveness can be determined. The ex-
penditures of the GEF exclude contributions by other donors; the GEF works on the basis of co-
financing. The reported carbon costs are therefore relatively low. The numbers for the CDM report 
a carbon price, which hides that many emission reductions have been achieved at a lower cost than 
the price paid by the buyer. The carbon price can include significant profits for the project devel-
oper. This is particularly the case for non-CO2 greenhouse gas projects, such as the HFC-23 de-
struction projects in China and India. The cost of HFC-23 destruction projects are around 0.20 
US$/tCO2-eq (IPCC/TEAP, 2005), but credits are sold at 3 US$/tCO2-eq. This has led to a vehe-
ment discussion of windfall profits for project developers (Wara, 2006). It also shows that the 
cost-effectiveness of the CDM and GEF is not so easily compared. 
 
The analysis does clearly show that the GEF claims to have performed well in some sectors where 
the CDM has not been able to achieve much. The most striking is that where in the CDM only a 
small proportion of the projects consist of energy efficiency projects, the GEF climate programme 
evaluation concludes that energy efficiency projects are among the fund's most successful. This can 
be explained by the type of projects that apparently work better for energy efficiency: projects 
aimed at regulatory reform or market transformation can be funded under the GEF but not under 
the CDM35. Conversely, the CDM has a large share of renewable energy projects, which is a cate-
gory considered less successful in the GEF. Also for the CDM, this did not come naturally; the 
rules have accommodated small-scale (often renewables) projects by agreeing on separate rules for 
small projects that have reduced transaction costs considerably, and thus helped particularly re-
newable energy projects.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated technology transfer in two international environmental policy instru-
ments: one market-based mechanism (the CDM), and a fund: the GEF. The CDM has provoked 
some hardware technology transfer in its first 63 projects, and is presumably helping "soft" tech-
nology transfer to a limited degree. Stimulating more creative business constructions, and pre-
sumably improving alignment of enabling activities, however, could lead to more technology trans-
fer, which would benefit both the technology exporting countries and the host countries. The GEF 
has been effective in implementing greenhouse gas reducing energy technologies in developing 
countries that were previously not in use, and has provided transfer of capabilities in various ena-
bling activities. However, it has a smaller scope than the CDM, and a less rapid growth as its funds 
are not market-driven but depend on government replenishments.  
 
It can be concluded that for the climate change problem, where, contrary to the ozone problem, a 
fund is not sufficient to come anywhere near a full solution, market-based mechanisms and funds 
can complement each other in order to reach overall goals. The bulk of the emission reductions 
will necessarily have to come from market-based mechanisms, which require strict emission tar-
gets or equivalent commitments in a post-2012 agreement. However, funds can facilitate further 
                                                 
35  This may change. In order to enlarge the scope of the CDM, reform measures are proposed that might allow crediting for 
programmatic activities or even sectoral policies (Bosi and Ellis, 2005).  
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development of market-based instruments through enabling activities, and by covering sectors and 
countries that are disadvantaged and therefore underperforming in a market environment.  
 
The Montreal Protocol and its MLF are often mentioned as an example for the climate change re-
gime. It is probably inappropriate, however, to compare the MLF with the CDM or even the GEF 
directly. Although the lessons in terms of practical fund design that can be learned from the MLF 
should certainly not be ignored, the design of a climate change fund that would have the same rela-
tive effect on climate change mitigation as the MLF had on ODSs is challenging, due to the mere 
size of the problem and the scope of sectors it will have to cover. Comparing the investments the 
IEA (2006) claims are needed to address climate change over the coming years, it is two to three 
orders of magnitude higher than the sums that have been devoted to the MLF. 
 
The analysis above has made clear that suggestions that a technology fund can provide a solution 
to the climate change problem, as it has done for the ozone problem, do not do justice to the scope 
of climate change mitigation and the necessary size of such a fund. However, both in geographical 
distribution and in project type, the decision-makers in a fund can deliberately correct disadvanta-
geous circumstances in particular sectors or regions. Funds may play a role in helping markets 
work better in sectors or countries where markets do not provide appropriate incentives, or by 
providing capacity building, training, and knowledge transfer that improve the functioning of 
markets. A fund could be focused on enabling activities such as buying off IPR royalties, on energy 
efficiency and transportation projects, and making sure that African countries get an appropriate 
share. It can be concluded that by using market forces and complementing them with fund-based 
activities, technology transfer could be enhanced more effectively.  
 
If we generalise these findings to technology-oriented agreements that aim at providing technology 
transfer, we can carefully conclude that they can be effective, by being designed as a specific com-
plement to a demand-pull mechanism, but should not be relied on to provide all technology trans-
fer that is needed to reduce emissions to address climate change. The demand-pull for technologies 
has so far been provided by the market-based CDM.  
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Chapter 8 Feasibility of hypothetical international technology-
oriented agreements36  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first part of a research report that explores the compatibility of a cap-and-trade 
regime with a different form of international agreements to address climate change: technology-
oriented agreements (TOAs). The aim of the chapter is to identify a number of TOAs, and assess 
their environmental effectiveness, costs, and political feasibility. The second part of the project 
(Chapter 10) will select two of the TOAs discussed in this chapter, and will analyse their compati-
bility with a number of cap-and-trade variants.  
 
TOAs are defined as those international agreements that are aimed at advancing research, devel-
opment, demonstration, and/or deployment of technologies (see Chapter 6). With respect to 
TOAs to address global climate change, these technologies would be aimed specifically at reducing 
GHG emissions. A general review of such agreements, including an examination of their potential 
relevance for climate change, was already conducted (Coninck et al., 2008a). Four types of TOAs 
are distinguished: 
• Knowledge sharing and coordination;  
• Research, development and demonstration (RD&D);  
• Technology transfer; and  
• Technology deployment mandates, standards, and incentives. 
 
The dominance of economic instruments in current thinking around climate policymaking have 
kept TOAs from playing a role in the discussions and studies on international agreements in the 
context of climate change. The current deadlock in the climate negotiations around a market-
based agreement has however renewed interest in other types of agreements. This is inspired by 
the thought that it may be worthwhile to sacrifice some of global cost effectiveness in exchange of 
political support and compliance with an agreement (Barrett, 2003). In addition, initiatives by the 
United States, supported by a number of emerging economies, such as the Asia-Pacific Partner-
ship, have indicated that the interest in technology as a solution-targeted approach (rather than 
emissions as a problem-targeted approach) is rising. Concerns, however, have been raised about 
environmental effectiveness and costs of such technology-oriented initiatives (see e.g. Höhne, 
2005). Besides political feasibility, we explore these aspects of international agreements to address 
climate change as well.  
 
The discussion of alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol in this chapter should not be seen as a critique 
to the Kyoto Protocol, or to the UNFCCC as such. Rather, the authors feel that it is worth explor-
ing an alternative in the case that the important post-2012 follow-up of Kyoto will not gain suffi-
cient support among the global players. The agreements described here may provide a different 
way to achieve the much-needed emission reductions, but can also complement a cap-and trade 
regime. 
  
The method taken to examine the proposed TOAs comprises a political constraints framework, 
which is developed in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 goes on in describing the agreements proposed here, 
in terms of expected emissions reduction (i.e. environmental effectiveness) and costs. The agree-
                                                 
36  A synthesis of this chapter and chapter 10 has been submitted to Climate Policy in January 2008. This chapter is part of a 
report commissioned by the Netherlands Programme on Scientific Assessment and Policy Analysis (WAB) Climate 
Change, report number 500102013. It has been written by Heleen de Coninck, Stefan Bakker and Bob van der Zwaan at 
ECN, Eric Massey at IVM, and Martin Junginger at NW&S. The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Merrilee 
Bonney, Michel den Elzen, Ronald Flipphi, Onno Kuik, Marc Londo, Jeroen Peters, Richard Tol, and Takahiro Ueno. 
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ments are never global but involve a group of relevant countries. They are in the fields of bioetha-
nol from sugarcane, ammonia production, cement production, CO2 capture and storage, carbon 
efficiency in cars, and nuclear energy. With the exception of the nuclear energy case, which dis-
cusses an existing deal between the US and India, all TOAs do not yet actually exist in the form 
presented here. Each section that discusses the characteristics of the agreement, its environmental 
effectiveness and costs, also assesses the political feasibility according to the framework in Sec-
tion 8.2. Section 8.4, lastly, will discuss the TOAs in an integrated manner and will draw some 
conclusion.  
 
8.2 Political feasibility framework37 
While there are varying definitions of “political feasibility” (of policy proposals) at its core it can 
be characterized as a policy proposal being palatable enough to a majority of parties so as to over-
come enough resistance that would inhibit the policy’s adoption and/or implementation. For ex-
ample, if one were to ask what the political feasibility is of instituting a 100% tariff on all new cars 
imported into the Netherlands or the EU, what is meant is that, will such a proposal meet with 
enough approval by those in power to impose it as well as those who would be affected by it. 
 
As the above description suggests, feasibility can be seen as overcoming some form of resistance, 
resistance itself implies the presence of certain constraints that would inhibit the approval of a 
policy proposal (May, 1986). Thus, if these constraints were to be enumerated and assessed, then 
one could have some understanding of the likelihood of a proposal gaining acceptance. Under-
standing the constraints a proposal might face is however, only a part of assessing feasibility. 
There exist also certain influencing factors that contextualize the policy proposal and help set the 
stage for creating a strategy to overcome the constraints. It is then the combined understanding of 
the influencing factors as well as the points of constraint that can form the basis of a feasibility as-
sessment.38  
 
Interestingly, not much attention has been given to the assessment of political feasibility as such in 
either public policy literature or political science writings. The concept has been phrased in differ-
ent ways, e.g. in criteria analysis for international climate regimes (see e.g. Aldy et al., 2003 or 
Chapter 6 and 7). The lack of generic work on political feasibility is indeed surprising as public 
policy is heavily governed by its surrounding political climate and a framework for navigating a 
policy proposal through the political waters would be most useful. Be that as it may, this section 
attempts to construct a framework that could be useful in assessing the political feasibility of 
Technology-Oriented Agreements (TOAs) for climate change. It is loosely based upon the works of 
Majone (1989), May (1986), Meltsner (1972) and Webber (1986). Essentially, this section lists and 
briefly describes the most important factors and constraints to be considered, and presents them 
in the form of descriptive questions. This framework is not prescriptive nor is it a straightforward 
model but should be seen as a focusing aid to be applied to each of the six TOA case studies. In the 
end, by asking the questions set out here of each case study, one should gain a greater understand-
ing of the likelihood that the TOA in question might gain acceptance.  
 
8.2.1 Influencing factors  
Influencing factors are factors that help contextualize the policy proposal within the “political” 
arena by highlighting external elements that can have direct and indirect influence over the ac-
                                                 
37  Credits for this section go to Eric Massey (IVM). 
38  While there is a direct relation between factors and constraints, this paper does not attempt to construct or detail those 
influencing links between the two, as it would unduly expand the scope of this short paper and is not entirely necessary for 
understanding the framework. It would however be an interesting exercise in the future on it own right. 
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ceptability of the proposal. There are four key factors to be considered for a feasibility assessment: 
actors, resources, time frame & timing, and leverage points. 
 
Actors 
Actors (Meltsner, 1972) refer to the parties to whom you are making your policy proposal and 
whose acceptance you must win. The first step in any feasibility assessment is to outline the actors 
(i.e. the people) that will be involved in the negotiation and assess their motivations, beliefs and 
bargaining power in light of the proposed policy option. 
 
Actor’s motivation refers to the person or parties’ desires, drives, goals or objectives. Every actor 
has some motivation for taking part in negotiations, in terms of TOAs perhaps the party wants 
new technologies to boost industrial production, perhaps they are generally interested in reducing 
their GHG emissions, or perhaps they are interested in money to support their farmers. These are 
simplistic examples but whichever the case, if possible one should try to pinpoint as many motiva-
tions of the other party and see if they fall in line with the proposal. If not exactly, can the proposal 
be adjusted to square better with their motivations? 
 
Actor’s beliefs in this case refer to the attitudes and values held by an actor. In some sense this can 
be seen as the core of any political feasibility assessment as it is attitudes and values that make up 
one’s politics. Any policy proposal must of course not run counter to the beliefs one holds, it would 
be useless to advocate a transfer of nuclear technology if the country or actors involved in the ne-
gotiations are fundamentally opposed to nuclear energy. Thus one should attempt to outline the 
attitudes and values of the actors involved and look at the policy proposal in light of those beliefs. 
A related and perhaps further step would be to target the policy proposal towards those actors (if 
the situation allows) whose beliefs are most in line with that of the proposal. This however may 
not always be the case and the proposal then, if possible, might be altered to fit as close as possible 
with the other parties beliefs.  
 
Actor’s bargaining power refers to the amount of political clout or power the actor has to accept or 
reject your policy proposal. The underlying point here is twofold. Firstly, it is to identify, out of the 
pool of actors, who has the most clout and secondly to make a judgment whether to engage that 
actor or if possible avoid that actor. For example, which ministry has more clout, the Ministry of 
Finance or Ministry of Environment? Would it be more advantageous to hold negotiations with 
the Finance Ministry if they are in a better position to see that your proposal gets accepted? While 
this is probably not a fundamental criterion like actor’s beliefs it is an important one all the same and 
should be taken into consideration when possible. 
 
Resources 
Resources, materiel or otherwise, here refers to the relation of what parties have on offer in relation 
to each other. The concept is plainly straightforward and in general, subconsciously assessed by 
most people prior to any push for a policy proposal. Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate the 
concept, as it is an integral part of a feasibility assessment framework. In relation to pushing for 
TOAs, one should assess what actual resources one has to offer and if in fact that the other party 
wants these as well (this is related to Actors above and to the constraints detailed below). More-
over, one should consider unrelated resources that might act as “deal sweeteners”. These are things 
that have no relation to the policy proposal at hand but are resources that the other party might be 
seeking and that if offered in combination with the proposal make it more likely to be adopted. 
Note that in some cases different resources will need to be identified for the different actors, de-
pending on the number of actors involved in the negotiation. 
 
Time frame and timing 
Time frame and timing are important elements to any feasibility assessment and must be consid-
ered with care.  
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Time frame refers the length of time expected by the proponent of the proposal to be used in the 
adoption and implementation of the proposal. In other words, how much time is needed to convince 
others that the proposal should be accepted? In general: the more time there is, the better the 
chances of acceptance. Thus, how much time is available for negotiations should be specified in an 
exact manner. The same principle applies to time for implementation. How long will the party it-
self have to implement the proposal? Twenty years for the phase out of old coal fired generators for 
the adoption of new gas powered turbines is more attractive than five years. One should try to 
identify the minimum and maximum time frame that the other party has or expects for implemen-
tation. 
 
Timing is in some cases more crucial to assess than time frame and as the colloquial phrase goes, 
“timing is everything”. Timing here refers to the opportune and inopportune moments for pushing 
your proposal (i.e. policy windows). This involves taking stock of what is happening within the 
larger policy and political environment surrounding the proposal that might help make it more 
attractive on the one hand or divert attention from it on the other. A few examples: A good time to 
try and force Type 3 (technology transfer) or Type 4 (technology deployment mandates, standards, 
or incentives) TOAs might be within the context of larger trade negotiations. An inopportune time 
to open negotiations on a proposal is prior to parliamentary elections, as there is a risk of having 
the deal undone by the new government. Perhaps an opportune moment for negotiations is just 
after a new government is formed. Another external condition that may facilitate an agreement is 
whether the countries involved find themselves in a period of economic prosperity; when budgets 
of governments are not too constrained and there is room for something extra. The downside of 
such a “good timing” may be, conversely, that, in case government or economic conditions change, 
the agreement may not be complied with in the end. While these are just simple examples, the idea 
is that just as with time frame, one should take timing into account and if possible sketch out 
within the larger time frame the best and worst moments to advocate for the proposal.  
 
Leverage points 
Leverage points are preferably related but possibly unrelated issues that can be used to enhance 
the attractiveness of a proposal. A key question to ask of the proposal is what other policy prob-
lems or issues can it be linked to so as to leverage it. These leverage points can come in various 
forms. Perhaps the proposal helps to address other key issues on the policy agenda (e.g. greater use 
of local biofuels can help increase energy security). Perhaps a particular event has recently oc-
curred that draws focus to the issue being proposed (focusing events) raising it on the policy 
agenda and giving it a sense of urgency (e.g. the 2003 heat waves in Europe highlighted the need 
for early warning systems and an adequate policy of dealing with the elderly and infirm, prior to 
this they were not on the policy agenda). Whichever the case, one should try to identify and enu-
merate any leverage points associated with the original proposal.  
 
8.2.2 Constraints 
Identifying constraints helps highlight what key difficulties the proposal might encounter during 
its promotion and thus aid in the design of a proposal that is more likely to win approval. In the 
end however, if there are too many constraints to be surmounted then the proposal will have little 
chance of success. Constraints are in most cases double edged and apply reflexively to the party 
promoting the proposal as well as to the parties being asked to accept the proposal. Thus they 
must be calculated for both sides. Constraints are different from “Influencing factors” (Sec-
tion 8.2.1) in that they are not political but inherent to existing physical, economic, legal, social 
and institutional features of the proposal.  
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Economic 
It goes without saying that most transactions involved with promoting, adopting, and implement-
ing a policy proposal involve some financial matters. The central questions surrounding this con-
straint are as follows: What are the economic resources and what is the budget for extending the 
proposal? What are the financial obligations for other parties associated with accepting the pro-
posal? Do they have financial resources to accept it? What will be the cost for all involved if they 
accept the proposal? Do all actors have enough? 
 
Physical and technical 
While a proposal might be interesting and well received by all parties, there is the chance that 
some external factor could inhibit its likelihood of adoption or implementation. A carbon effi-
ciency standard that is agreed to apply in 10 years time might not yet be technically achievable at 
present, so barriers need to be overcome. Assessing these constraints is very context-specific and it 
is difficult to make generalizations. Nevertheless, looking at it through the lens of TOAs a few ge-
neric questions emerge, although greater specification will be needed when looking at a specific 
TOA proposal. In general, are there any physical/technical barriers that could inhibit a Type 2, 3 or 
4 agreement? Does the receiving party/country have adequate technical and physical infrastructure 
to comply with the proposal?  
 
Legal and contractual 
These constraints are concerned with any institutional or legal barriers that could prevent the 
adoption or implementation of the proposal. In short, is the institutional, legal and regulatory in-
frastructure equipped to address the proposal? Will any laws need to be changed so that it can be 
accepted? Would the proposal require regulatory approval and by whom? For example, the trans-
fer of nuclear technology may require approval from the ministry of defence and may be inconsis-
tent with earlier laws and regulations. These institutional hurdles should be enumerated so that 
the requisite steps can be taken. These are constraints that revolve around any prior commitments 
or obligations that might prevent or in some way hinder the proposal from going forward. For ex-
ample perhaps there is a trade agreement that states that by doing X for one party one is obliged to 
do the same for another party. Or perhaps by doing Y for one party, that party will be required to 
do Z in return (but may not be in a position to fulfil that commitment). In addition, one must ask 
question of legal accountability of the actors that one will be negotiating with. Are they trustwor-
thy? Will corruption be an issue? 
 
Social and equity 
Similar to factor of Actor’s Beliefs social constraints are concerned with the beliefs and prejudices of 
the wider social audience or, possibly, the public at large. As with some of the other constraints 
this is very context-specific and difficult to generalize, however, it need only be taken into account 
for those issues that could be controversial. Thus the first question to ask is, could the proposal be 
socially controversial (either in one’s own country or in the one receiving the proposal)? Some op-
tions, such as solar energy are general accepted, while nuclear energy is a lightening rod for atten-
tion. Second, is the proposal socially acceptable for the general public and the other parties? While 
nuclear energy itself is quite acceptable in some countries, the transfer of nuclear technology might 
not be.  
 
Equity constraints may be difficult to judge yet it is still a point to be taken into consideration. It 
revolves around the notion of the fairness of a proposal and how it will be seen by those that might 
accept it. Essentially, will the proposal be seen as equitable and fair or will others feel cheated by 
it? Are the interested parties being given enough? Should one party, if possible, be offering more? 
Does the proposal offer economic benefits to already richer countries; does it enhance inequity in 
the world, or in a country? For example, a tax reduction for the upper income classes is usually not 
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seen as equitable. A good way of judging this constraint is to have a good outline of the actor’s moti-
vations as well as your own resources.  
 
Institutional 
This is similarly linked to Actor’s Bargaining power and is concerned with negotiating/bargaining 
powers and political clout. Is the negotiating party the right party to be advocating the proposal, 
and do they have enough weight to push it through? Is there a need to seek help from others to 
support the proposal? Is the proposal advocated to the right people on the right level; do they have 
enough clout to accept it? A junior staff member attempting to convince a deputy minister will 
most likely have more difficulties than a minister attempting to convince a deputy minister. Will 
the proposal be in a safe investment environment? Is, in terms of a country, the climate politically 
stable? Are the institutions that need to be formed or burdened with the agreement the right ones? 
 
8.2.3 Political feasibility assessment framework 
In the following sections, various proposals for TOAs will be assessed on their political feasibility. 
First, for a number of government actors involved, the constraints will be discussed in a matrix 
form as in the table below. The table also contains a summary of the constraints as well as the 
framework for the applicability of the constraints to the actors is included here: 
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Actors Constraints: 
Actor 1 Actor n 
Economic 
• What are the economic resources and what is your budget for extend-
ing the proposal?  
• What are the financial obligations for the other party associated with 
accepting your proposal?  
• Is there enough budget to accept it?  
• What will be the cost for the receiving party if they accept the pro-
posal?  
• Do you have enough funding? 
  
Physical and technical 
• Are there any physical/technical barriers that could inhibit a Type 2, 3 
or 4 agreement?  
• Does the receiving party/country have adequate technical and physical 
infrastructure to receive the proposal?  
• Does the receiving party have enough technical resources for the main-
tenance of the proposal? 
  
Legal and contractual 
• Is the institutional, legal and regulatory infrastructure equipped to ad-
dress the proposal?  
• Will any laws need to be changed so that the proposal can be accepted?  
• Would the proposal require regulatory approval and from whom? 
• Are there any prior commitments or obligations that might prevent or 
in some way hinder the proposal from going forward? 
  
Social and equity 
• Could the proposal be socially controversial in any of the countries in-
volved? 
• Is the proposal socially acceptable for the general public and the other 
parties? 
• Will the proposal be seen as equitable and fair or will others feel 
cheated by it? 
• Are the interested parties being given enough and if possible, be offer-
ing more?  
  
Institutional 
• Are the right parties involved to be advocating the proposal, do they 
have enough weight?  
• Is additional support required? 
• Is the proposal advocated to the right people, do they have enough 
clout to accept it? 
• Is the negotiation party/country politically and economically stable? 
• Will corruption be an issue? 
  
 
Subsequently, the other influencing factors will be discussed for the potential treaty. Based on the 
number of constraints for actors, and the extent to which the other influencing factors are relevant 
and conducive to the proposed treaty, the TOAs will be assessed for their political feasibility. 
 
8.3 Cases of technology-oriented agreements 
In this section, a variety of technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) for addressing climate change 
is explored. We distinguish four types of TOAs: 1) knowledge sharing and coordination; 2) re-
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search, development and demonstration; 3) technology transfer; and 4) technology mandates, in-
centives and standards (Coninck et al., 2008a)  
 
The technologies selected are: 
• Bioethanol from sugar cane (elements of type 2 and 3) 
• Nuclear energy: the US/India deal (elements of type 1, 2 and 3) 
• Cement industry (elements of type 3 and 4) 
• Ammonia production (elements of type 3 and 4) 
• CO2 capture and storage in the electricity sector (type 4) 
• Carbon efficiency standards in cars (type 4) 
 
It is assumed in the discussions that there is some degree of institutional embedding of the TOA in 
the UNFCCC. This could be in a similar manner the Kyoto Protocol was agreed on but with a sub-
group of countries. In that case it would be firmly “inside” of the UNFCCC and the UNFCCC 
would measure, report and verify the outcomes. Another possibility is that the TOA outcomes are 
registered at the UNFCCC – there would be “oversight” of the UNFCCC on its implementation 
but no accountability. Lastly, it is possible to include agreements outside the UNFCCC, with or 
without formal reporting. For the TOA substance in this chapter, the institutional embedding is 
not crucial; in Chapter 9 this will be discussed in more detail. 
 
Each TOA description contains the basic rules for cooperation on technology. It will explore a case 
of a limited number of participating countries. It will describe the technology at hand, including 
the overall emission reduction potential the technology can achieve. It will then establish the 
emission reduction and costs that are associated with the case TOA. Each section will conclude 
with a discussion of the political feasibility framework that was introduced in Section 8.2. 
 
8.3.1 Bioethanol from sugar cane39 
With rising oil prices and growing concerns regarding anthropogenic climate change, biomass 
transportation fuels (biofuels) have received increasing attention and policy support. For example 
in the US, the production of ethanol from corn has reached peak levels, while in the EU, the target 
of 5.75% biofuels in 2010 (equivalent to about 750 PJ) has caused a strong increase in the produc-
tion of biodiesel from rape seed and ethanol from grains (EurObserv’ER, 2006). However, the feed-
stocks used in developed countries (corn, rape seed, wheat) only allow for small greenhouse gas 
emission reductions (IEA, 2004). Also, given the recent ambitious new targets set by the EU, it is 
likely that the demand for biofuels beyond 2010 will only further increase (European Council, 
2007). Even when taking into account additional production in the EU, expectations are that only 
about 414 of the required 750 PJ will be met by domestic production. Advanced biofuel technolo-
gies (so-called second generation technologies) based on cellulose material are expected to have 
more favourable energy balances and a higher production per hectare, but are not expected to be 
commercially available until in another decade or so. In summary, it is expected that the EU will 
not be able to meet its ambitious biofuel targets by domestic production on its own. 
 
                                                 
39  Credits for this section go to Martin Junginger (NW&S, University of Utrecht). 
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Figure 8.1 Reduction in well-to-wheel CO2-equivalent GHG emissions per km, compared to gasoline (for ethanol) and die-
sel (for biodiesel) (IEA, 2004) 
 
On the other hand, ethanol based on sugar cane in Brazil is a biofuel currently produced on a large-
scale industrial basis that can already achieve GHG emission reductions of 80-90% (Figure 8.1). 
This is first of all due to the high photosynthetic efficiency of the sugarcane plant, a perennial grass 
whose cultivation is limited by plant physiology to tropical and sub-tropical regions. The sugar-
cane stalks contain the cane juice from which sucrose is extracted and/or bio-ethanol is created 
(Johnson and Matsika, 2006). Second, the high GHG efficiency is also due to the development of 
new, high-yield varieties of sugar cane, and technological development and up-scaling of the etha-
nol production process (Wall Bake et al., 2009). Next to a high GHG emission efficiency, ethanol 
from sugarcane is also highly competitive compared to oil-based gasoline. From 38 US$ per barrel, 
ethanol can compete with gasoline, and between 2004-2005, the consumer price of ethanol on en-
ergy content basis was only 50-80% of the price of gasoline (Walter, 2006; Figure 8.2).  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Ethanol prices as percentage of gasoline prices (on energy basis) in different parts of Brazil between 2004-2005 
(Walter, 2006). (“Preço àlcool/gasoline” is “price of ethanol/gasoline”) 
 
In 2006, Brazil produced about 17 billion litres of ethanol, using about 3 million hectares of land 
(Smeets et al., 2006). This corresponds to an average yield of about 78 tonnes of cane and about 
6,000 litres per hectare. Given the competitiveness of Brazilian ethanol and the demand for biofu-
els by the US and Europe, Brazil has increasingly exported ethanol to amongst others the US, Ja-
pan and Europe, about 2.5 billion litres in 2005, and about 3 billion litres in 2006 (Walter et al. 
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2007). Brazil expects to increase domestic production to 35 billion litres in 2015, of which about 6 
billion litres (about 125 PJ) would be available for export. Thus, it is apparent that this will not be 
sufficient to meet the demand for biofuels in most EU/OECD countries.  
 
Fortunately, Brazil is by far not the only country with soils suitable for sugar cane. Major other 
current producers include India, Thailand, Australia, and countries in the Caribbean and sub-
Saharan Africa (see Table 8.15 in the Annex). Especially in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the potential for (additional) sugarcane production is substantial, as in these 
countries the climatic conditions are favourable even with only marginal or any irrigation (Johnson 
and Matsika, 2006). In many of these countries, the total cultivated land is only a fraction of the 
total agricultural land available (temporary and permanent pastures, permanent crops, and tempo-
rary crops). Given the relatively low population density, the large potential of available land, and 
the suitability of the region to grow sugar cane, sub-Saharan Africa offers in principle ample poten-
tial to produce (excess) ethanol for export to e.g. the European Union. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been identified as one of the most promising regions in terms of future biomass producing poten-
tial (Hoogwijk, 2004; Smeets et al., 2007), taking into account restrictions on land that is currently 
forested (Table 8.16 in the Annex), as only a small part of agricultural areas are currently . How-
ever, in order to be effective for climate change, firm guarantees that bioethanol production from 
sugar cane does not lead to significant land use emissions (as suggested in Searchinger et al. 
(2008)) need to be put in place.  
 
The potential for biofuels production in sub-Saharan Africa has not gone unnoticed. For example, 
in July 2006 an association of 15 African nations signed a treaty to join the PANPP, an acronym of 
"Pays Africains Non-Producteurs de Pétrole" (in English: the "Pan-African Non-Petroleum Produc-
ers Association) (Biopact, 2006). Also, in December 2006, the first Pan-African biofuels conference 
was organized, at which numerous initiatives for biofuels production in Africa were presented 
(Green Power Conferences, 2006). However, repeating the Brazilian experience in Africa will re-
quire support from Brazil. The Brazilian sugarcane/ethanol sector has been developed gradually 
over thirty years, and extensive knowledge transfer is required. Brazilian stakeholders have also 
emphasised that they do not intend to become an ethanol-producing monopolistic, but rather 
would like to share their experience with other countries in e.g. Latin-American and Asia (see e.g. 
Orellana, 2006, Walter, 2006), and also specifically in African countries (Daniel, 2006). 
 
Scope of the technology40 
 
The agricultural sub-system 
Sugarcane cultivation in Brazil is based on a ratoon-system, which means that after the first cut 
the same plant is cut several times on a yearly basis. Before planting in the first year, the soil is in-
tensively prepared, nowadays mainly mechanical. After this the soil is furrowed and phosphate-
rich fertilizers are applied, seeds are distributed and the furrows are closed and fertilizers and her-
bicides are applied once again. The stock is then treated with artificial fertilizers or ´filter cake´41 
once or twice again during cultivation in the first year. After 12-18 months the cane is ready for the 
first cut. For this it is (still) common to burn down the cane in order to simplify manual harvest-
ing. Mechanical harvesting can be applied, e.g. currently it is used for approximately 25% of all 
sugarcane in São Paulo. After cutting and sometimes chopping cane stalks by a chopped cane har-
vester, the cane stalks are loaded in trucks and transported by trucks to the industrial plant. Burn-
ing and delays before processing such as loading and transport lead to significant losses of the 
amount of sucrose per ton stressing the importance of quick harvesting, loading and transporta-
tion. After the first harvest, the process is repeated excluding intensive soil treatments and plant-
ing. Depending on the rate of the declining yields the same stock can be used up to 5-7 harvests 
                                                 
40  This section is largely based on Wall Bake et al. (2009). 
41 “ Filter cake” is a residue of sugar and ethanol production, containing large amounts of nutrients.  
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nowadays. Yields decline with approximately 15% in the year after the first harvest and 6-8% in 
the years that follow. Declining yields depend on treatment of the stock during maintenance and 
harvesting but are mainly determined by the combination of applied variety and type of soil (Wall 
Bake et al., 2009). 
 
The reductions achieved over time for the sugarcane production have been significant, about a fac-
tor of 3, from about 100 R$42/tonne cane (TC) to about 35 R$/tonne cane. Cost reductions for land 
rent, soil preparation and crop maintenance, were highly influenced by the increasing length of the 
ratoon system and the rising agricultural yields. Improved strength of new varieties against pests 
and drought, special breeds for varying soils and application of advanced management systems 
form the main explanations behind these increased yields. Harvesting costs declined mainly be-
cause of increasing yields in the manual process. Yields increased from 4.5-6 TC/man/day in 1977 to 
over 9 TC/man/day in 2004. Due to increasing ethanol plant sizes, average transportation dis-
tances doubled from 10 km in 1977 up to 20 in 2004, but loads increased significantly from 10 
TC/truck to 40 TC/truck. Transportation costs declined mainly because of up-scaling, introduc-
tion of automated logistic systems, and improved infrastructure.  
 
The industrial sub-system 
At the plant, the sugarcane is washed and shredded, and using a set of 4-7 mill combinations juice 
sugar is extracted. The main objective of the milling process is to extract the largest possible 
amount of sucrose from the cane, a secondary, and increasingly important objective is the produc-
tion of bagasse43 with low moisture rates in order to feed the boilers. The boilers supply enough 
electricity and steam for the process to be self-sufficient, and in some cases to deliver excess elec-
tricity to the grid. The cane juice is filtered and treated by chemicals and pasteurized. In the fol-
lowing process, the molasses are fermented to produce a “wine” with an ethanol content of 7-10%. 
The wine is then distilled to 96% hydrated ethanol. Further dehydration up to 99.7% is achieved 
by addition of cyclohexane. 
 
Industrial processing costs were reduced by approximately 70% during the past 30 years, from 
over R$1000 to R$250-350/m3. First of all, the up-scaling of the average ethanol plant has led to 
lower specific investment and operation & maintenance (O&M) costs. While the average plant 
size used to be 120 m3 per day in 1980, nowadays, plant sizes have increased to 1000 m3 per day, 
resulting in cost reductions through economies of scale. Strongly correlated to scale, load factors 
play an important role in cost reductions. Load factors of 90% were found in the late 1970s, while 
nowadays load factors are typically around 95%, mainly because the number of crushing stops was 
decreased as a result of introduction of automated feeding and milling processes. In addition, the 
amount of operational days per year was raised from 160 in 1975, up to 190 days/year in 2005 (Wall 
Bake et al. 2009). This was mainly the result of the use new varieties, but also of a well-organized 
planting and harvesting logistics. Due to further development of new varieties and optimization of 
the harvesting logistic systems, the amount of operational days is expected to reach 200 days/year 
in the near future. 
 
Total cost reductions and prospects for the future 
As described above, significant cost reductions have been achieved in the Brazilian ethanol pro-
duction system. Production costs have roughly been reduced by over a factor of three from 1975-
2005 (see also Figure 8.4). For the future, further cost reductions are expected with cumulative 
production. Already today, the cost of production of ethanol in Brazil is estimated as US$ 200/m³ 
for the producers with best economic performance, while the average production costs in Brazil 
are around US$ 280/m³ (Walter, 2006). 
 
                                                 
42  Brazilian Real (1€ equals about R$ 2,5). 
43  Bagasse is the fibers left after milling. 
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However, the experience for bringing costs down further does not necessarily have to be gained 
solely in Brazil. By enlarging the system boundaries, and applying knowledge (e.g. Brazilian cane 
varieties and ethanol plants) abroad, additional experience could be gained, which would likely 
lead to further improvements in the cane and ethanol production process.  
 
Contents of the TOA 
Given the problem description and rationale and the available technology, we propose the follow-
ing type-2 and 3 (knowledge transfer) technology-orientated agreement: 
 
Brazil will be the knowledge-supplying party. The knowledge transfer will include both expertise 
on the agricultural system (e.g. cane varieties for various soil types, pest control, use of vinasse as 
fertilizer etc.) and on the industrial ethanol production system (technical assistance with building 
large-scale ethanol plants) 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) will be the technology-receiving countries. As 
part of the TOA, Brazil and the SADC will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in 
which they stipulate the intention to build up an ethanol industry.  
 
As third party, the European Union (EU) will act as financing party of projects. In return, supply con-
tracts are signed for the ethanol production to be exported to Europe to meet biofuels target and 
GHG emission reduction, possibly coupled to a fixed price (or a price range with minimum and 
maximum boundaries depending on the oil price developments). The commitment by the EU 
could be expanded by the introduction of flex-cars on its market; cars that can use both ethanol 
and gasoline.  
 
The initial investments in the SADC countries may have to be done by EU government funds, but 
when the market picks up, commercial investors could come in. In the latter case, better oversight 
of the TOA would be necessary to see to it that the investments are done in a sustainable manner 
and adverse impacts are minimised.  
 
The time horizon for this TOA will be 2020. The aim of the TOA is to utilize the Brazilian knowl-
edge to set up an ethanol industry in the SADC countries. It is estimated that this could result in 
an increasing sugarcane/ethanol production, with an approximate (optimistic) annual growth rate 
of 23%, reaching a tentative 67 million m3 ethanol in 2020 in the SADC countries (see also Figure 
8.3). The production in 2007 will be based on 60 million tonnes of sugarcane (compared to 45 Mt 
actually produced in 2004), and rises to 880 Mt in 2020. This would require about 13.4 Mha in the 
SADC, equivalent to about 3.1% of their total agricultural area (see tables in the Annex). Note that 
yields/ha in some SADC countries could be higher than the Brazilian average, so possibly less land 
will be needed. This, as well as the land use, means that production could rise further after 2020. 
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Figure 8.3 Potential ethanol production in Brazil and the SADC countries 2005-2020 
 
Overall emission reduction potential and impact of the TOA 
As mentioned earlier, the well-to-wheel GHG emission reduction range of ethanol from sugarcane 
compared to gasoline use is about 80-90% (IEA, 2004). In our scenario the ethanol will be trans-
ported to Europe. This will negatively influence the overall GHG balance, but in general, the losses 
of transporting a liquid with a high energy density by bulk freighter has a relatively small impact 
on the overall energy and GHG balance. In the scenario, a GHG emission reduction of 80% com-
pared to gasoline is assumed.  
 
This means that 67 million m3 of ethanol could replace about 1400 PJ of fossil transportation fuels, 
which is equivalent to about 91 MtCO2 emission reduction in 2020. Whether the ethanol is con-
sumed locally or exported to Europe has only a marginal influence on the total emission reduction. 
 
Next to this direct GHG emission reduction, the TOA will also have an impact on production 
costs of ethanol. It is expected that production costs will further decline with cumulative ethanol 
production. Taking the additional production in the SADC into account, it is expected that etha-
nol production costs will continue to follow the experience curve and decline approximately an-
other 20-25% to about 230 US$/m3 (see Figure 8.4). This will further increase the competitiveness 
of ethanol in comparison to gasoline and other fossil fuels. On the other side, the higher demand 
for bioethanol may drive the prices of the feedstocks for sugarcane up, which may compensate 
some of the learning effects.  
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Figure 8.4 Historic ethanol production cost reduction in Brazil (1975-2006, based on Wall Bake et al., 2009) and antici-
pated further production cost reductions based on anticipated production volumes in Brazil and the SADC 
 
Expected costs of the TOA 
As was discussed earlier, ethanol can compete with oil-based gasoline from an oil price of 34 
US$/barrel and higher. Given the current oil price developments, it is very likely that ethanol will 
be able to compete on the market on its own. However, significant upfront investments are still 
necessary. Current investment costs are about 125 R$/m3 ethanol (about 45 €/m3), and thus invest-
ment costs per tCO2 avoided would roughly be 33 Euro/tonne, or (spread over the duration of the 
agreement (2007-2020) approximately 3000 M€. However, investment cost will further decrease 
over time as part of the total production costs (see above). Actual costs per tCO2 could be zero or 
negative, given the competitiveness of ethanol (i.e., producers could possibly gain extra income by 
selling the GHG credits). This calculation also assumes that costs for sugarcane remain stable over 
this period in time; if the costs for sugarcane production rise, so will the costs for ethanol produc-
tion. 
 
Political feasibility of the bioethanol-TOA 
The above paints a favourable picture for an international bioethanol agreement. However, there 
are a number of real constraints that inhibit the realisation of such an agreement, or can possibly 
even provide a genuine and righteous showstopper for the agreement to go forward. Table 8.1 as-
sesses the constraints to the TOA implementation per actor.  
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Table 8.1 Actor-specific constraints of the sugar-cane based bioethanol TOA 
Actor Constraints 
Brazil SADC EU 
Economic   High interest rate and 
risk of investment 
  
Physical/technical   Land availability 
Food security 
  
Legal/contractual Investment 
agreement with 
SADC needed 
  Trade agreement with SADC 
needed (i.e. change of current 
import barriers for ethanol) 
Social/equity   Employment 
Land ownership 
Environmental issues; 
sustainable land-use 
Concerns regarding the 
sustainability and land-use 
effects of sugarcane and ethanol 
production 
Institutional   Political stability in 
SADC countries 
  
 
Each of the main constraints is described in some more detail below: 
• Economic constraints: As ethanol production is competitive from 38 US$/barrel, competitive-
ness may further improve over time. Thus, it is expected that this TOA could be realized with-
out any net costs. However, large investments will have to be made in regions which often have 
a poor infrastructure and a mediocre governance track record. Thus the risks for investments 
are relatively high, which may be translated into high interest rates. Possibly, this could par-
tially be avoided by low-interest loans from the EU (e.g. as part of an trade agreement) 
• Physical and technical constraints: as was shown, the general land potential in the SADC coun-
tries is considered large, but within the frame of this study, no detailed analysis was carried out 
to accurately assess the amount of suitable land for sugar cane. Also, it should be avoided that 
current food production is displaced by sugarcane for ethanol. Another important constraint is 
the physical infrastructure (roads, pipelines, electricity supply) that is required to transport the 
sugarcane and ethanol efficiently.  
• Legal and contractual constraints: Currently, Europe has import tariffs in place for ethanol. 
However, Europe could (within the boundaries of WTO rules) make agreements with the 
SADC for annual import quotas (a similar agreement exists e.g. also for the US and a number of 
Caribbean countries). There could be however considerable resistance from actors within the 
EU (e.g. farmers and ethanol producers). 
• Social/equity constraints: sugarcane production is likely to cause a number of social, environ-
mental and other impacts, as was shown for Brazil (Smeets et al., 2007), including issues of land 
ownership, environmental impacts (use of water, fertilizers, pesticides etc.), biodiversity and 
social issues (e.g. hard labour conditions; impact of ethanol production on food prices). Al-
though in the state of Sao Paulo, these problems are not considered prohibitive, they may prove 
to be in other parts of the world. Although sugarcane and ethanol production would create new 
employment opportunities, the kind of employment may not be preferred. In various EU coun-
tries (e.g. the UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) criteria are developed for the sustain-
able production of biomass. The sugarcane production would likely have to comply with these 
criteria, the criteria may have to be adapted for the specifics of this case and will have to be 
overseen by the implementing body of the TOA.  
• Institutional constraints: some SADC members (such as Congo or Zimbabwe) have a very poor 
governance track record, while others (such as Botswana and Mozambique) are politically 
more stable and feature less corruption. Also, the EU, which currently leaves energy supply is-
sues to the discretion of the Member States, would have to operate as one in order to make the 
agreement worthwhile.  
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With regard to the non-actor factors, in terms of resources, it can be observed that: 
• Brazil has the technology off the shelf as well as a thriving ethanol industry 
• The SADC have the geographical potential, and interest in additional sources of income 
• The EU is interested in fuel security, GHG emission reductions and has the financial means  
 
Regarding timing and time frame, the agreement feels particularly timely given the recently set 
biofuels target of 10% in 2020 in the EU (European Council, 2007), and the anticipated extra costs 
and pressure on land. In terms of leverage, the agreement holds the promise of clear benefits for 
each of the three actors involved, especially the economic feasibility of the proposed TOA. 
 
8.3.2 Nuclear energy TOA: the US/India deal44 
Radioactive waste, nuclear proliferation, reactor accidents, economic competitiveness, and public 
opinion continue to create concerns regarding the use of nuclear power and are barriers to nuclear 
energy policymaking. Still, worries over energy supply security, local air pollution, and global cli-
mate change provide reason to assess its potential share in domestic power production. It is diffi-
cult to predict with any confidence what the 21st century will hold for nuclear power, both at the 
national and global level, and whether in the long run nuclear energy may contribute, along with 
other energy resources, to the establishment of sustainable development.  
 
While many countries have presently no plans to build nuclear power capacity and some are com-
mitted to gradually phase out their current domestic nuclear power production, others decisively 
continue to preserve a significant part of nuclear energy in their national electricity generation 
portfolio or are at the start of building up a prospected domestic nuclear energy capacity. At any 
rate, recent policy directions in an increasing number of countries show that nuclear energy is re-
appearing on the political agenda. While at present the globally installed nuclear capacity is ap-
proximately in status quo, it may increase again over the next two decades given e.g. the expected 
new build in countries like China and India. Its prospects beyond 2025 will depend on the relative 
weights given to the benefits and drawbacks of nuclear power, as well as the long-term sustain-
ability features of all energy resources. 
 
TOAs in the field of nuclear energy could be particularly worthwhile between developed and de-
veloping countries would be inspected, as there are several large industrialising nations, among 
which notably China and India, that for decades have been showing interest in the development of 
nuclear energy and today have optimistic plans for a major expansion of their existing domestic 
nuclear power installations. Recent developments suggest that nuclear energy TOAs may receive 
increased attention in the near future. An example is the “U.S.-India nuclear deal” that was closed 
in 2005, under which three decades of restrictions on nuclear cooperation between these two 
countries would be ended, and China’s multiple official declarations to augment its domestic nu-
clear energy capacity and purchase associated foreign nuclear technology, among which in 2006 
the announcement to buy 4 nuclear reactors from Westinghouse-Toshiba. This chapter assesses 
the recent U.S.-India nuclear energy deal as a TOA case study in the context of climate change. 
Just like the biomass-TOA should address impacts on biodiversity and land-use change, assessing 
a nuclear deal will have to take into account the consequences for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT)45, to which the United States is a signatory, and nuclear proliferation concerns in 
general. 
 
Scope of the US-India nuclear deal 
The exact contents of the U.S.-India nuclear deal as announced by President George W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, and agreed in detail in March 2006, are not public. 
                                                 
44  Credits for this section go to Bob van der Zwaan (ECN). 
45  For the full text of the treaty, see http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html.  
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What is clear that it would imply a major change in U.S. non-proliferation and export control laws 
and policies that until today have prohibited full nuclear cooperation with India. Since India ex-
ploded an atomic bomb in 1974, thereby violating U.S. and international efforts to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has barred civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with In-
dia. The U.S.-India nuclear deal would end these nuclear trade restrictions, and thereby allow a 
broader strategic and economic relationship between the U.S. and India, while the latter is infor-
mally accepted as a ‘responsible possessor’ of nuclear weapons. In exchange for this recognition, 
India ought to assume the practices related hereto, such as distinguishing its military nuclear fa-
cilities from civilian ones and putting all civilian nuclear plants under International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards (see e.g. Perkovich, 2005). After a process of collaboration between the 
U.S. Congress and administration to address some of the deal’s major nuclear proliferation con-
cerns, and correspondingly the introduction of some adaptations, the deal has now been approved 
by Congress (Levi and Ferguson, 2006). The resulting agreement still needs to be formally ac-
cepted by the Indian authorities, and is currently politically very controversial, before it can go 
into force. Furthermore, it needs approval from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the interna-
tional cartel of 45 countries that controls most global trade in nuclear technologies. The U.S. 
President has stated that his administration would work with its allies to adjust the relevant in-
ternational nuclear regimes, notably that of the NSG, to enable nuclear reactor and fuel sales to 
India (Ganguly and Mistry, 2006). 
 
Emission reduction potential 
In the foreseeable future, coal is expected to provide most of India’s electricity. For various reasons 
nuclear energy would probably become among the prime climate-friendly substitutes for the con-
ventional use of coal for power production, rather than e.g. hydropower, renewables, or natural gas 
(Chikkatur, 2005). There is considerable uncertainty regarding the new nuclear capacity likely to 
be realized under the U.S.-India nuclear deal, but the significance of new nuclear build in terms of 
CO2 emissions savings is likely to be large. For example, the construction by the U.S. of two 
1 GWe reactors under the U.S.-India agreement achieves a reduction of about 15 MtCO2 per year 
(under the assumption that a coal-based power plant emits approximately 7.5 MtCO2/yr, and that 
India would not build those reactors without the deal). When all reactors built under the deal by 
either foreign or domestic constructors are taken into account, one may reach much higher figures. 
Accounting for India’s track record of installing nuclear power plants, as well as the difficulties 
that are likely to arise when India shifts to a truly commercial nuclear power program, analysts 
claim that new nuclear capacity could be in the range of 10-20 GWe by 2020 (Victor, 2006). Such 
studies don’t take into account the lengthy licensing procedures that characterize the Indian elec-
tricity sector, and that could lead to delays once the political clout and the resulting momentum 
have declined. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has suggested that the U.S.-India nuclear deal 
could have even larger implications, perhaps the installation of up to 40 GWe nuclear power ca-
pacity over this time frame. Figure 8.5 depicts the expected annual CO2 emissions reduction as 
function of the total capacity of newly installed nuclear power plants. 
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Figure 8.5 CO2 reduction potential (in MtCO2/yr) of new nuclear capacity (in GWe) in India (after Victor, 2006). Central 
case and two different baseline assumptions46 
 
Emission reduction costs 
The construction of a new nuclear power plant requires large upfront investment costs. When in a 
liberalised power sector a limited planning role is reserved for government, it is often difficult to 
ascertain low costs of capital, which constitutes an impediment for the acquisition of the funds 
required for construction. Typically, capital requirements per unit of capacity are two times higher 
for nuclear power plants than for coal plants and three times higher than for natural gas based 
power plants. In order to render the difference in capital requirements between nuclear and fossil-
based power production capacity surmountable, a significant role of government by creating the 
right investment environment seems essential. In the case of India, the power sector is not fully 
liberalized. State Electricity Boards control the electricity supply of the various states. Although 
capital is generally more difficult to get by in developing countries than in OECD countries, the 
state-controlled character of the Indian electricity sector may actually be conducive to nuclear 
electricity.  
 
In terms of levelised production costs, nuclear energy is able to compete well with its two main 
counterparts in the electricity sector, coal and natural gas based power generation, basically as a 
result of the low fuel cost component. Figure 8.6 depicts the range of total levelised electricity pro-
duction costs for coal, natural gas, and Generation-II47 nuclear power plants, for two different dis-
count rates. The electricity costs presented in Figure 8.6 cover all investment, fuel, and operation 
& maintenance costs over the entire lifetime (of typically 40 years) of the power plant (including 
costs associated with waste disposal and reactor decommissioning), do not include CO2 emission 
prices or potentially other external environmental costs, do not account for possible power plant 
lifetime extensions, and account for modest fossil fuel price increases with respect to the prices for 
oil and natural gas prior to their high rise in 2005. For all three alternatives a dependency exists on 
especially where and under what operating conditions the electricity has been produced. The cost 
ranges indicated by the bars in the three charts of Figure 8.6 mostly reflect different domestic cir-
cumstances in OECD countries. On the basis of the data presented in this figure one can conclude 
that there are in principle no costs involved with the reduction of CO2 emissions per unit of gener-
                                                 
46  N.B. The two other baseline assumptions correspond to, n * 0.1% efficiency gain of coal power plants for n installed GWe 
nuclear power plants, respectively, this efficiency gain plus a 1 GWe coal power plant equipped with CCS (at 100%) for 
every 10 GWe of installed nuclear power plants). 
47  Commercial nuclear power reactors, developed and built in the years 1965 – 1995, such as Pressurised or Boiling Water 
Reactors or Advanced gas-cooled reactors. Future generations include Generation IV, which involves inherently safe reac-
tors and might be deployed from 2030 onwards.  
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ated electricity through the use of nuclear power. It may be assumed that power generation costs 
in India fall within the broad ranges as depicted in this figure. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2
$/
M
W
h
 
  (a) Coal: 5% and 10% 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2
$/
M
W
h
 
  (b) Gas: 5% and 10% 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2
$/
M
W
h
 
  (c) Nuclear: 5% and 10% 
Figure 8.6 Range of total levelised electricity generation costs (in US$/MWh) for (a) coal, (b) natural gas, and (c) (genera-
tion-II) nuclear power plants for two discount rates (left bar 5%, and right bar 10%). Source: Zwaan (2008); data from 
OECD (2005b) 
 
Political feasibility of the nuclear-TOA, including proliferation issues 
While nuclear agreements are unlikely to be of a type 2 TOA (no common research funds are built 
for new reactor development), they probably are of a type 1 TOA (since through e.g. the Genera-
tion-IV (see footnote 8) program R&D is coordinated between different member states). If under 
formal government agreement advanced nuclear reactors are exported from the EU to e.g. China or 
India, then the agreement involved would clearly be of a type 3 TOA. On the other hand, since nu-
clear power plants involve negligible GHG emissions, they would intrinsically not be of a type 4 
TOA (there are no standards to be set - standards could, on the contrary, apply to e.g. reactor op-
eration safety and waste disposal, but these do not fall under climate change based TOAs). 
 
The main political feasibility issue around the U.S.-India nuclear deal is around proliferation. The 
TOA does not only fundamentally transform the relationship between the two countries, but 
represents a challenge to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as it 
could motivate other countries to proceed in their attempts to produce sensitive nuclear material 
and acquire nuclear weapons in the hope of eventually being recognized as a ‘responsible posses-
sor’ of nuclear weapons. Whether with or without this deal, India would most likely proceed with 
the production of weapon-grade fissile material. It has been pointed out, however, that the U.S.-
India nuclear deal would allow India to potentially accelerate the build-up of its stockpile of nu-
clear weapons materials (Mian et al., 2006). India’s production of weapon grade plutonium is cur-
rently constrained by the competing demands of India’s nuclear power reactors for its limited do-
mestic supply of natural uranium. If India could import fuel for its civilian nuclear reactors, it 
could use more domestic uranium for the production of nuclear weapons materials.  
 
India has not made definite commitments on whether reactors that are built in the future will be 
opened for inspection under IAEA safeguards agreements. India could decide to use these new re-
actors for nuclear weapons production and correspondingly exempt them from international in-
spections. Nor did India make promises to end its production of nuclear weapons material, 
whereas the five official nuclear weapons states have de facto stopped producing such material.  
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Positive aspects of the U.S.-India deal are that India agreed in principle to bring its civil nuclear 
plants – 14 of its total number of 22 nuclear facilities – under international safeguards as performed 
by the IAEA, to adhere to international guidelines on nuclear and missile export controls as pre-
scribed by the NSG, to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing (as long as other states do so 
too), and to support talks on proposals for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). 
 
Table 8.2 summarises the constraints on this nuclear TOA. 
 
Table 8.2 Actor-specific constraints of the nuclear TOA 
Actor Constraints 
India United States 
Economic Potential capital constraints to 
build the reactors 
US industry is likely to benefit from the 
bill as a new export market is opened 
Physical/technical    
Legal/contractual  The US is a signatory to the NPT, with 
which this deal is inconsistent.  
Social/equity Parliament is asking questions 
about the deal.  
Concerns with US NGOs on conse-
quences for international nuclear dis-
armament 
Institutional It’s unclear whether bureaucratic 
licensing procedures in India pose 
challenges to the full implementa-
tion of the deal. 
 
 
In terms of resources, no large sums of money are involved in the deal. Only the investments that 
might take place as a result of the agreement could become considerable, but that is more of an en-
hancing factor than a constraint. The timing of the agreement seems to be conducive as the Indian 
electricity demand is growing rapidly (IEA, 2004), and US industry is deprived of an internal mar-
ket for nuclear plants as a result of hampering domestic progress in that field, and uncertainties 
about nuclear waste management. As the deal does not have a final date, the time frame is not rele-
vant. The leverage factor works positive on both sides as long as political consequences of violating 
the NPT are not considered.  
 
Like perhaps with other cases of TOAs, there is the issue whether ‘the deal’ is made with a role for 
government, or whether it is struck solely between industrial partners. In the latter case the deal 
may not be seen as a TOA as referred to in this report. In the former case, however, it would qualify 
as an example of a TOA. 
 
This section only aimed to describe some of the aspects of the recent deal between the U.S. and 
India. Other countries are imaginable as well, if concerns about NPT violation can be taken away. 
China has much potential for nuclear power plant construction. The question, however, is to what 
extent the U.S. and/or Chinese governments would be involved in such a deal48. In addition, not 
only deals between developing and developed countries are imaginable (as the above examples), 
but also between developed and developed (e.g. between the U.S., EU, Japan, Russia; within the 
EU recently between e.g. France and Finland), and even between developing countries (e.g. be-
tween South Africa and China). Accounting for all possible deals, the total emission reduction po-
tential could in principle run in units of GtCO2. An open question for this and other cases is 
whether plants will be sold under normal (liberalised) market conditions or whether special deals 
are struck or discounts applied. Varying assumptions on these imply different reduction cost esti-
mates. 
                                                 
48  The author’s estimate is that it would probably not be made based on a purely industry-industry interaction, as at various 
levels governments would intervene. 
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8.3.3 Cement industry49 
World production of cement in 2004 was 2.2 billion tonnes, resulting in 1.9 GtCO2 emissions, or 
5.5% of global CO2 emissions (Price and Worrell, 2006). Cement production increased over 50% 
since 1990 or approximately 3% per year. This increase almost exclusively comes from developing 
countries, as the production in industrialised countries is more or less stable. China currently ac-
counts for 44% of world cement production. It is projected China’s share in world cement produc-
tion maintains this level until 2020 and then slowly decreases (IEA, 2004). By 2030, around 50% of 
the world’s cement production is projected to be in China and India alone (WBCSD, 2009). 
 
Approximately 50% of cement CO2 emissions are process-related: in the calcining process CaCO3 
is decomposed into CaO and CO2. The other emissions are from fuel combustion in the clinker 
production process, where the different mineral components of clinker are formed at 1500 °C. The 
dominant fuel in most countries is coal or lignite, with significant shares of oil and gas in some 
countries. Different waste sources are also increasingly used, as the high temperatures in the kiln 
decompose most substances. In addition, in the production process large amounts of electricity are 
used (in raw meal grinding, rotating kiln, and finish grinding). 
 
Scope of the technology 
This TOA is applicable to the cement manufacturers. CO2 emissions per tonne of cement produced 
can be reduced by application of a range of technologies: 
• Efficient kiln types: state-of-the-art dry kilns with new suspension pre-heaters and pre-calciner 
make more efficient use of the kiln heat and use significantly less energy than other types of 
kilns. These are standard technology for new plants in Japan, but much less used in China (Ta-
naka, 2006). However in China the smaller-scale vertical shaft kilns are the preferred technol-
ogy for the lion’s share of production.  
• Further waste heat utilisation to generate electricity (co-generation) 
• More efficient use of electricity by improved grinding and cooling devices. This would however 
result only in reduced CO2 emissions from power production. 
• Alternative fuels: biomass ‘waste’ or fossil waste. However, no technology adjustments are 
needed, as all wastes can be burned in the standard kiln, except for maybe additional end-of-
pipe measures to abate air pollutants. 
• Blended cement: replacement of clinker with alternative minerals such as fly ash and blast fur-
nace slag. No technological adjustments in the production process are needed, only infrastruc-
ture for sourcing, and perhaps market barriers such as acceptability. Note that in unblended 
cement 5% gypsum is used, and therefore 95% clinker content is the maximum. 
• CO2 capture and storage (CCS). CO2 concentration in flue gas is relatively high, compared to 
coal-fired power plants, therefore post-combustion capture may be cheaper (but typical emis-
sions per kiln may be lower). Retrofitting existing cement plants is possible, but some issues 
need to be looked into (e.g. impurities in flue gas, heat requirement for solvent regeneration. 
Oxy-fuel combustion may also have advantages, but impact on kiln design and calcination 
process needs to be assessed (Davidson, 2006). 
 
                                                 
49  Credits for this section go to Stefan Bakker (ECN). 
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Contents of the cement-TOA50 
The kiln technology options and CCS are the most applicable options for the TOA. The co-
generation and electricity efficiency technology can be included if the reduction in power emis-
sions is properly accounted for. Alternative fuel use is more difficult to include as it depends only 
on local conditions of waste sourcing. Blended cements also do not require a certain technology 
but may be included by agreeing on blending targets and cooperation on removal of market barri-
ers and sourcing. 
 
Efficient kilns are commercially applied in many countries, therefore TOA type 3 (technology 
transfer) or 4 (technology mandates, standards, incentive agreements) would be preferred. 
Blended cements and alternative fuels can also be included in this type as there as no technological 
barriers. CCS however has not been applied in cement plants yet and is still in the research phase, 
therefore Type-2 appears to be more applicable. Assumed timeline is 2013-2020. An alternative 
could be to extend the timeline (e.g. to 2030) and include CCS after 2020 in a Type 4 TOA. 
 
Components of the cement agreement would be: 
• Three large-scale demonstration plants with CCS in Annex-I countries (Japan, US and EU) be-
fore 2020; 
• Technology mandates (state-of-the-art kiln) for new large-scale plants (e.g. >0.1 Mt cement/yr) 
in all participating countries; 
• Technology transfer, including shared learning etc., and financial assistance, e.g. from Japan to 
China and from US/EU to India, to achieve these targets; 
• Targets for low-clinker cements (i.e. blended cement), e.g. 75% clinker content average across 8 
years for Annex-I and 85% for non-Annex-I; 
• Option for emissions trading: non-Annex-I countries exceeding their target can sell credits to 
Annex-I countries that are short of their target; 
• Targets for alternative fuel use. 
 
In principle all countries can be included. The most relevant are listed in table 8.3 with important 
characteristics. 
 
Table 8.3 Approximate cement production data of important world regions 
 % of world cement 
production in 2004 
Emission factor  
(tCO2/t cement) 
Share efficient kilns  
(dry and new dry) 
US & Canada 5 0.95 65 
EU 6 0.62 60a 
Japan 3 0.66 100 
China 44 1.03 44 
India 5 0.88 50 
Sources: Price and Worrell (2006), WBCSD (2002); Tanaka (2006). 
a: average of Western Europe and Eastern Europe (Humphreys and Mahasenan, 2002). 
 
Estimated emission reduction of the TOA 
Assumed is that 50% of world cement production is included (large-scale plants in China, India, 
EU, North America). 
• Efficient kilns: if roughly 500 Mt/yr capacity (large-scale plants) is added in developing coun-
tries from 2013 to 2020, with specific CO2 emissions 10% lower (estimate) compared to other-
wise applied technology, then impact in 2020 can be 50 MtCO2/yr. 
                                                 
50  The Cement Sustainability Initiative of the WBCSD (2009) proposes a sectoral agreement on cement production, and es-
timates that around 1GtCO2 can be avoided by 2030, around 60% of which would be in developing Asia. 
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• Blended cements: from currently 10% (baseline) to 20%, or 5% to 15% in non-Annex-I, 5% of 
emissions will be saved (across 50% of global emissions of 3 GtCO2), so impact can be 75 
MtCO2/yr in 2020. 
• Alternative fuels: similar (at 10% increase against baseline) 
• If CCS is included, large reductions after 2020 are achievable 
 
The overall potential is in the order of 200 MtCO2/yr. Including CCS after 2020 increases potential 
significantly (e.g. if 50% of all included capacity uses CCS reduction potential is more than 1 
GtCO2/yr). Impacts of the TOA will also be on the removal of non-technical barriers for blended 
cement and alternative fuels and technological learning for CCS. 
 
Expected costs of the cement-TOA 
Costs for blended cement and alternative fuels are very difficult to determined, and cost is likely 
not the most important factor for its utilisation. Efficient kiln technology is somewhat more ex-
pensive compared to other technology, and may be calculated and expressed in $/tCO2. For CCS 
this can also be calculated (according to Davidson (2006) costs are in the same range as for CCS in 
power plants). 
 
Political feasibility of a cement-TOA 
A technology-based agreement on CO2 emission from cement production has attractive elements 
for several important world regions, in both the industrialised and emerging economies. The po-
tential impact on CO2 emissions ranges from approximately 200 to more than 1000 Mt/yr, depend-
ing on the design of the agreement. Other important impacts include technological learning for 
application of CO2 capture and storage in cement plants. The economic costs are likely to be rela-
tively modest. 
 
The constraints of a cement-TOA from the perspective of the most relevant actors are outlined in 
Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4 Actor-specific constraints of a cement-TOA  
Actor Constraints 
Japan China/India United States 
Economic Limited financial 
resources for inter-
national support; 
financing for 1 CCS 
demonstration 
plant 
Some financing for 
national use 
Limited financial resources for 
international support; financing 
for 1 CCS demonstration plant 
Physical/technical Sufficient infra-
structure for waste 
material (fly-
ash/slag) and fuel? 
Infrastructure for 
waste fuel may not 
be sufficient 
Sufficient infrastructure for waste 
material and fuel? 
Legal/contractual In case of CCS CO2 
storage might need 
to be institutional-
ised 
  In case of CCS CO2 storage might 
need to be institutionalised; posi-
tive vote by senate needed 
Social/equity   Are mandatory 
blending targets ac-
ceptable? 
Acceptance of blended cements? 
Institutional Interaction with 
cap-and-trade 
mechanisms might 
need to be consid-
ered 
China and India 
might consider pos-
sible reduction un-
der the CDM 
  
 
Potential issues in terms of resources for the TOA include financing for implementation of tech-
nologies, technology transfer, including capacity building and knowledge transfer, and resources 
for demonstration plants. As all TOAs assessed here, there is a potential interaction in the timing 
of the agreement with potential post-2012 agreements such as a follow-up of the Kyoto Protocol. 
In terms of leverage points, the global cement industry might support a TOA more than a (sec-
toral) greenhouse gas emission limit.  
 
8.3.4 A TOA on ammonia production51 
Because of its many uses, ammonia is one of the most highly-produced inorganic chemicals. The 
worldwide production in 2004 was 163 million metric tons (ChemWeek, 2000; 2002; 2004). China 
produced 27.1% of the worldwide production followed by India with 8.4%, the United States with 
8.6%. Large producers in the EU are Germany (2.5%), Poland (1.7%) and the Netherlands (1.7%). 
Most production takes places in large-scale plants. About 80% or more of the ammonia produced 
is used for fertilizing agricultural crops. Ammonia is also used for the production of plastics, fibers, 
explosives, and intermediates for dyes and pharmaceuticals. In 1974, the developing countries ac-
counted for 27 % of ammonia capacity. By 1998, their share had increased to 51 %. In these coun-
tries, ammonia is used to produce urea for rice growing (IPTS, 2006). Also for the future, basically 
all new ammonia plants are to be built in developing countries.  
 
Scope of the technology 
Ammonia is synthesized from nitrogen and hydrogen by the following reaction: 
 
N2 + 3H2 -> 2 NH3 
                                                 
51  Credits for this section go to Martin Junginger (NW&S, University of Utrecht). 
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The best available source of nitrogen is from atmospheric air. The hydrogen required can be pro-
duced from various feedstocks but currently it is derived mostly from fossil fuels. Depending on 
the type of fossil fuel, two different methods are mainly applied to produce the hydrogen for am-
monia production: steam reforming or partial oxidation. 
 
As it can be seen from Table 8.5, currently, about 80 % of the ammonia production capacity world-
wide is provided by the well-developed steam reforming process. High level process integration, 
innovative equipment design and improved catalysts are the main characteristics of ammonia 
plants today. 
 
Table 8.5 Applied processes and feed stocks in the production of ammonia. The third column shows the related share of 
world capacity (1990) (European Commission data, in IPTS, 2006) 
Feedstock Process % of world capacity 
Natural gas Steam reforming 77 
Naphtha, LPG, refinery gas Steam reforming 6 
Heavy hydrocarbon fractions Partial oxidation 3 
Coke, coal Partial oxidation 13.5 
Water Water electrolysis 0.5 
 
There has been limited development work of the partial oxidation process in integrated plant con-
cepts. At present, a typical plant is a blend of techniques offered by different licensors assembled 
by the selected contractor. Specific energy consumption (SEC) varies between about 28 GJ/tonne 
NH3 for best available technology (BAT), to about 34 GJ/tonne NH3 for the industry average, see 
table 8.6 and Figure 8.7 (Ramirez and Worrell, 2006). The achieved energy consumptions reported 
in Table 8.6 suggest that, compared to the steam reforming process, there is a potential for im-
provement of the energy efficiency of partial oxidation processes.  
 
Taking the average SEC of 34 GJ/tonne NH3, the total specific energy consumption for worldwide 
ammonia production was about 3.7 EJ in 2004, representing more than 1% of the worlds total final 
energy consumption (IEA, 2006b), or about the energy demand of the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.6 Cost differences and total energy demands for ammonia production (European Commission, in IPTS, 2006) 
Feedstock Process Net primary energy cons.  
(GJ/t NH3) (LHV)* 
Relative 
investment 
Natural gas Steam reforming 28a 1 
Heavy hydrocarbons Partial oxidation 38 1.5 
Coal  Partial oxidation 48 2-3 
a Best achieved values; * LHV: Lower Heating Value 
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Figure 8.7 Trends in SEC and cumulative production of ammonia, BAT and average technologies from 1913-2001. Data in 
LHV, expressed per tonne N (Ramirez and Worrell, 2006) 
 
However, there is no clear definition of a best available technology (BAT) plant, as these depend 
strongly n the chosen plant layout, feedstock etc. To achieve specific energy consumption (SEC) 
levels of 27.6-31.8 GJ/tNH3, the BAT is to apply a combination of the following techniques (IPTS, 
2006, not exhaustive): 
• extended preheating of the hydrocarbon feed  
• preheating of combustion air  
• installation of a second generation gas turbine  
• modifications of the furnace burners to assure an adequate distribution of gas turbine exhaust 
over the burners  
• rearrangement of the convection coils and addition of additional surface  
• pre-reforming in combination with a suitable steam saving project  
• improved CO2 removal  
• low temperature desulphurisation  
• isothermal shift conversion (mainly for new installations) 
• use of smaller catalyst particles in ammonia converters  
• low pressure ammonia synthesis catalyst  
• use of a sulphur resistant catalyst for shift reaction of syngas from partial oxidation  
• liquid nitrogen wash for final purification of the synthesis gas  
• indirect cooling of the ammonia synthesis reactor  
• hydrogen recovery from the purge gas of the ammonia synthesis  
• implementation of an advanced process control system 
• application of CO2 capture and storage on pure CO2 streams. 
 
The European Union’s ammonia industry produces approximately 11 million tonnes ammonia per 
year (2001), from around 50 plants, i.e. approximately 9% of current global production. While no 
new ammonia plants have been built in the EU after 1991, many of the existing plants have been 
revamped, and in general, expert knowledge is available on how to built BAT plants (IPTS, 2006).  
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Most new ammonia production capacity is expected to be built in developing countries, and in 
China and India. In 2004, three new ammonia plants were opened in 2004: a 0,7 Mt/yr plant in 
Iran, a 0,68 Mt/yr plant in Qatar, and a 0,2 Mt/yr plant in Turkmenistan. In addition, several com-
panies announced in 2005 capacity increases in Bolivia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Lithuania, Russia, 
and Trinidad and Tobago that would add about 2.7 million tons of ammonia production capacity 
(USGS, 2005). 
 
For the future, according to the 2006 world capacity survey of the international fertilizer associa-
tion (Heffer and Prud’homme, 2006), global ammonia capacity is projected to increase by 35 Mt 
from 167 Mt in 2006 to 202 MtNH3 in 2010. The annual capacity increase will average 7 MtNH3 
between 2006 and 2009. In 2010, an additional 15 Mt is anticipated, assuming all announced pro-
jects are completed on schedule. During the period from 2006 to 2010, the global consumption of 
nitrogen fertilizers is projected to increase at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent, reaching 99.1 Mt N in 
2010 (Heffer and Prud’homme, 2006).  
 
In Figure 8.8, the growth of ammonia production in China and India is displayed, while in Figure 
8.9, the global ammonia production per world region is presented.  
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Figure 8.8 Growth of ammonia production in China and India (source data: Kramer, 2004) 
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Figure 8.9 Global ammonia production per world region (source data: ChemWeek, 2000; 2002; 2004) 
 
IPTS (2006) argues that most expertise on BAT technology is present in the industrialized coun-
tries, while the main further growth in production is expected in developing countries, and espe-
cially in China and India. This points at an opportunity for technology transfer and emission re-
ductions. 
 
Proposal for a TOA on ammonia production in China and India 
An ammonia- TOA is envisioned between the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the 
other. The TOA would include that existing capacity is revamped and new capacity is built by 
BAT standards in these countries (containing elements of TOAs types 3 and 4), technology trans-
fer within the next 5 years and mandate for only BAT plants until 2020. The BAT technology 
would be provided by EU manufacturers. Possible additional costs could be covered by EU gov-
ernments in exchange for tradable emission permits. Possibly, the TOA could be carried out under 
the umbrella of the clean development mechanism (CDM), potentially in a sectoral-CDM context.  
 
Next to the direct benefits of shifting from average to BAT, this would also mean that the BAT ex-
perience curve (see Figure 8.7) would be “extended” (i.e. more cumulative production with BAT 
technologies), which would result in further increases in energy efficiency and CO2 emission re-
ductions. 
 
Overall reduction potential and expected impact of the TOA  
Carbon dioxide is produced in accordance with stoichiometric conversion and can be recovered 
for further use as feedstock in a urea plant, for use in fertilizer production (ODDA process). The 
emission of CO2 per tonne of ammonia cannot be given straightforward, as it depends on the plant 
layout and the further use of the ammonia. CO2 can be used as reactant for ethanol production or 
liquefaction, in the beverage industry or as a coolant gas in nuclear reactors (IPCC, 2005). There is, 
however, an inevitable excess of CO2 which is released as an emission from the process (IPTS, 
2006). Much of these emissions (possibly around 30 MtCO2/yr (IPCC, 2005)) can be captured and 
geologically stored at low cost as they are pure CO2 emissions. 
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The carbon dioxide production in the steam/air reforming of natural gas is 1.15 – 1.40 kg/kg NH3, 
dependent on the degree of air reforming (the figures do not include carbon dioxide in the combus-
tion gases). A CO2/NH3 mole ratio of 0.5 (weight ratio 1.29), the stoichiometric ratio for urea pro-
duction, is obtainable in the heat exchange reformer concepts. In partial oxidation of residual oils, 
CO2 production is 2 – 2.6 tCO2 per tNH3, dependent on the feedstock C/H ratio. 
 
When taking into account both the use of CO2 in urea production and emissions from combustion 
gases and other energy inputs, and using US specific data, a net emission of about 1.82 tonnes CO2 
per tonne of ammonia can be calculated, i.e. as a rough estimate, 300 MtCO2 of global ammonia 
production. For these 300 MtCO2, China and India currently contribute about 105 MtCO2. By ex-
trapolating the production trends for China and India (see Figure 8.9) to 2020, we estimate that 
combined production will increase to 120 Mt of ammonia in 2020 (i.e. more than a doubling of an-
nual production). Assuming business as usual (the same ratio of 1.82, i.e. no process improvements, 
use of CCS technology etc.) this would result in a CO2 emission of about 220 Mt in 2020.  
 
As shown in Figure 8.7, both the BAT and industry average technology have shown significant im-
provements in energy efficiency in the last few years. However, compared to the BAT, the industry 
average consumes still about 30% more energy (about 7 GJ/tonne NH3). In case a plant changes 
from average to best available technology, a reduction of about 0.43 tonnes CO2 / tonne ammonia 
can be achieved, i.e. about 70 Mt based on current annual ammonia production year. The global 
energy demand for ammonia production would be reduced by about 20% (0.75 EJ).  
 
Specifically for China and India, the CO2 reduction potential by revamping all currently existing 
capacity would be about 30 MtCO2, and, if all new capacity will also be based on BAT technology, 
total annual reductions in 2020 could be above 50 MtCO2. 
 
Next to this direct emission reduction, the proposed TOA would have other impacts as well. First 
of all, the BAT technologies necessary to achieve lower CO2 emissions also bring other benefits, 
such as lower NOx emissions, more efficient use of materials (e.g. recycling of catalyst) and re-
duced emissions to water (IPTS, 2006). Secondly, in the calculations above, we have assumed that 
the level of the average and BAT technology remains constant, i.e. no technological learning. How-
ever, if the projected production scenario for China and India (and the Rest of World (ROW) as-
sumed at 1.8% growth per year), this would lead to 1 cumulative doubling of production (from 3 to 
6 GtNH3 per year). Following the experience curve, this would imply that the achievable specific 
energy consumption of BAT could be lowered approximately by another 1.7 GJ per tNH3. 
 
Expected costs of the TOA 
The costs of revamping existing plants are very difficult to estimate, as they depend to a large ex-
tent on the individual plant layout and technology, economic depreciation, technical lifetime of the 
plant, feedstock used and other factors. For a number of the BAT improvements mentioned earlier, 
in IPTS (2006) it is stated that cost benefits can be achieved, though only in a few cases payback 
times of the investment are estimated. Finally, profitability and pay-back time of investments de-
pend strongly on (local) feedstock prices and (international) ammonia prices.  
 
As a general example, the costs of revamping a 20 year old reduced primary reforming ammonia 
plant (1100 tonnes/day) are estimated at 5.7 M€ corresponding to approximately 17 €/tonne. Such 
a revamp would result in an energy efficiency improvement from 36 to 31.1 GJ/tNH3 (IPTS, 2006). 
According to Vrooman (2004), general ammonia production costs in 2001 were around 100 
US$/tonne ammonia (about 100 €/tonne in 2007, taking exchange rates and inflation into ac-
count).  
 
For this specific example, in the case that all costs for the revamp are attributed to avoided CO2 
emissions, the costs would hypothetically be 48 €/tCO2. However, as was discussed above sub-
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stantial benefits can be gained by the lower fuel requirements, the extended life time of the plant 
etc. It is likely that revamps are already economical at high fuel prices, as the European experience 
has shown. Costs of storing the pure CO2 emissions depend strongly on recompression, transport 
and geological storage costs, and could be between 10 and 30 US$/tCO2. 
 
Political feasibility of the ammonia-TOA 
The feasibility of this TOA is determined by a number of constraints, as summarized in the feasi-
bility matrix. No in-depth analysis has been performed of all possible constraints, so the feasibility 
matrix is not necessarily complete. The outcome is summarised in Table 8.7. 
 
Table 8.7 Actor-specific constraints of the ammonia-TOA 
Actor Constraints 
China and India EU 
Economic   Implementation of BAT technology may be 
detrimental to competitiveness of EU ammo-
nia industry  
Physical/technical Feedstock changes may be 
required (e.g. from coal to 
natural gas) 
  
Legal/contractual Legal requirements needed in 
India /china to comply with 
BAT level  
 
Social/equity If CCS might be applied, there may be public acceptance issues associated 
with CO2 storage. 
Institutional     
 
The potentially high costs of the revamp of ammonia plants may be a problem for all participating 
parties. In terms of timing and time framing of the TOA, the high current growth of ammonia pro-
duction in India and China may constitute a window of opportunity. Leverage points may be the 
co-benefits of applying BAT. 
 
8.3.5 Carbon dioxide capture and storage in the electricity sector 
Scope of the technology 
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) comprises the capture of CO2 from a large CO2 point source, its 
subsequent transport, and storage in a geological reservoir. In this TOA, we limit the capture of 
CO2 to newly built capacity52 in the power sector, but it could also be applied to other sectors. No-
tably, there is much potential in refineries, ammonia production, hydrogen and gas processing. 
Transport will likely to be done through pipelines, and storage is expected to be done in either de-
pleted gas- or oil fields or in saline formations. It is assumed that storage in coal beds will not be 
technically feasible in most locations, and that the potential for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) is 
too limited to make a big economic difference. The costs of CCS are therefore the sum of the cap-
ture cost from a (new) gas- or coal-fired power plant, the transport cost and the storage cost. Data 
from the IPCC Special Report (IPCC, 2005) are used for this.  
 
Contents of the CCS-TOA 
 The type of TOA that is relevant for the technology at stake depends on the maturity of the tech-
nology. When it is still in the research phase and needs to proceed to demonstration, a Type 2 
agreement might be best suited. When the technology is technically feasible but still faces eco-
                                                 
52  Including replacement. 
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nomic or institutional barriers, a Type 4 agreement, targeted at overcoming those barriers, might 
be best suited.  
 
The different components of CCS each have different levels of maturity (see IPCC, 2005). Trans-
port and the storage options that are selected for this TOA are generally regarded as technically 
mature. In capture, the situation is more complex. Major technological hurdles are not expected, 
but capture of CO2 with a full-scale gas- or coal-fired power plant currently remains to be demon-
strated. It is expected, however, that by the time this TOA is in operation (2012 – 2020), there will 
be several large-scale demonstrations of CCS in operation. Also, the instruments considered on the 
EU and the national level do consist of Type-4 instruments. It is therefore assumed that CCS is 
mature enough to be included in a Type-4 TOA, meaning a mandate, incentive or standard aimed 
at CCS deployment should be employed. 
 
The generally cited proposal for a technology-oriented agreement was discussed and explored by 
Edmonds and Wise (1998). This agreement involves the following: 
• Any new fossil fuel electric power capacity in Annex I nations installed after the year 2020 
must scrub and dispose of the carbon from its exhaust stream; 
• Any new synthetic fuels capacity must capture and dispose of carbon released in the conversion 
process; and 
• Non-Annex I nations that participate must undertake the same obligations that Annex I na-
tions undertake when their per capita income, measured by purchasing power parity equals the 
average for Annex I nations in 2020. 
 
Edmonds and Wise conclude that it can be environmentally effective (i.e., concentrations can re-
main below 550 ppm CO2-eq) but the overall costs will be higher than the costs for an cap-and-
trade-based approach. They explicitly consider the protocol as a “backstop” option – an emergency 
agreement if other, more cost-effective ones, turn out to be difficult to realise politically or institu-
tionally. We may have arrived at the point where this is relevant, as it is projected that a GHG 
concentration level of 550 ppm CO2-eq is probably not low enough to prevent serious impacts of 
climate change, and there is no global follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol in sight.  
 
The TOA is inspired by what Edmonds and Wise propose, but treats a number of issues differ-
ently. Firstly, reflecting the higher urgency of emission reductions and the open situation after 
2012, the TOA proposes to let the protocol start in 2013 and run until 2020, when it will be re-
newed and expanded, or replaced by something better. Secondly, the country involvement is dif-
ferent. A smaller group of countries is envisaged, and major emitters that are developing countries 
also get a mandatory target. However, mechanisms are included to compensate for the costs made 
by those countries. A graduation mechanism, as in the proposal by Edmonds and Wise, is not en-
visaged. If new countries report to participate in the protocol, their entry conditions need to be 
negotiated. Thirdly, because the TOA is restricted to the power sector, synfuel plants are not in-
cluded (but could be covered in a different protocol). 
 
The elements of the “Low-Emission Power” protocol are the following: 
1. Annex I countries involved commit to enact domestic legislation that requires all new and re-
placement fossil-fuel-based power capacity, as well as all fossil-fuel-based capacity that is older 
than 35 years, to install CO2 capture and to store the CO2. This is most likely done by replacing 
or repowering the power plant given that the age of the plant would make retrofitting unattrac-
tive. 
2. Up to 50% of the target for Annex-I countries involved can be done by providing for an equal 
amount of low-carbon power capacity implementation (renewables or CCS) in the non-Annex-
I countries involved53. 
                                                 
53 This could be expanded to a CDM-type mechanism where equivalent reductions in GHG or CO2 emissions could be traded.  
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3. Involved non-Annex-I countries commit to enact domestic legislation that requires 50% of new 
and replacement fossil-fuel-based power capacity to capture and store their CO2, in addition to 
the capacity that is installed as a consequence of point 2.  
4. Annex-I and non-Annex I countries commit to cooperate to facilitate technology transfer by: 
5. Establishing a fund to which Annex-I countries contribute and which non-Annex-I countries 
can apply to for help in realising their commitments under 354, and for capacity building and 
awareness raising programmes. The required contributions are not established in detail here, 
but should be significant in relation to the aim of the fund; 
6. Making provisions to ensure that intellectual property rights for renewable and CCS-related 
technologies are guaranteed in the involved Annex-I and non-Annex countries alike, but do not 
form a barrier to implementation of those technologies anywhere; 
7. All countries involved enact legislation that arranges for sufficiently permanent storage of the 
CO2. This legislation should meet internationally developed and agreed standards for best prac-
tice.  
 
In terms of geographical coverage of the agreement, CCS might be relevant for all countries that 
depend heavily on fossil fuels for their electricity production. However, some countries are more 
likely candidates for participation in a TOA, for instance those countries with fast-growing and 
substantial greenhouse gas emissions, ample national fossil fuel resources, growing gas- or coal-
fired power capacity, and with much potential for CO2 storage. For this agreement, the following 
countries and regions are selected: China, European Union (EU), India, Russia and the United 
States (USA).  
 
It is assumed that all countries involved have sufficient national CO2 storage capacity. India ap-
pears to be the only country for which this may be problematic as there are no reliable capacity 
estimates for that country, and initial scans do not reveal a large area of suitable underground. 
 
Emission reduction of the CCS-TOA 
The overall reduction potential in the five countries and regions is calculated based on the IEA 
World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2006b). The scenario projects a significant increase in coal-fired 
power capacity that has sobered in countries like the United States and also China, so the num-
bers should be regarded an upper bound. Given some rough assumptions, through the incremental 
and replacement capacity that is likely to be built in the years 2013 – 2020, the overall emissions of 
CCS-prone capacity are calculated. What happens without the TOA or any other climate policy in 
place is outlined in Table 8.8. 
 
                                                 
54  This fund is a replica of the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol. 
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Table 8.8 Estimation of baseline emissions of new and replacement fossil-fuel-based electricity generation from 2013 to 
2020 
Country New 
capacity 
2005-203055 
Intra-
polation for 
2013-2020 
Yearly 
electricity 
generation56 
Assumed 
share in the 
mix 
Assumed 
emission 
factor of 
electricity57 
Yearly 
electricity 
generation 
Yearly 
baseline 
CO2 
emissions 
 GW GW TWh  kgCO2/kWh TWh GtCO2/yr 
COAL        
China 1089 348 1307 80% 0,762 1045 0,80 
EU 862 276 1034 40% 0,762 414 0,32 
India 330 106 396 80% 0,762 317 0,24 
Russia 153 49 184 20% 0,762 37 0,03 
USA 750 240 900 60% 0,762 540 0,41 
Total   3821   2353  
        
GAS        
China 1089 348 1307 10% 0,367 131 0,05 
EU 862 276 1034 20% 0,367 207 0,08 
India 330 106 396 10% 0,367 40 0,01 
Russia 153 49 184 70% 0,367 129 0,05 
USA 750 240 900 20% 0,367 180 0,07 
Total      686  
 
Given an assumed emission reduction of about 86% for both coal- and gas-fired power plants, the 
annual technical potential for emission reductions of the CCS protocol is 1.8 GtCO2 over the pe-
riod 2013-2020, and the cumulative potential is 14 GtCO2. 
 
If the TOA was implemented as outlined above, emissions from newly built coal- and gas-fired 
power generation would decrease by 86%. The overall emission reduction for the five regions and 
countries evaluated here would amount to an annual 1.3 GtCO2, with a cumulative result of 10 
GtCO2 over the period 2013-2020. The results are in Table 8.9. Because of the wide coverage of the 
TOA, and the stringent targets, the emission reduction is large, and the CCS-TOA can therefore be 
qualified as environmentally effective. 
 
There are a number of impacts that have not been taken into account in the calculation in Table 
8.9. First, if there is a view at an agreement, there may be a potential perverse effect: before 2012, 
countries (or companies in countries) may rapidly install fossil-fuel-based power plants to avoid 
the obligation after 2012. Second, since the agreement involves only a small number of countries for 
this analysis, leakage to countries not involved in the agreement could happen. Electricity import 
from countries not involved has not been taken into account.  
 
                                                 
55  Reference scenario, IEA (2006c). 
56  Number are halved because of the linear increase in new capacity from 2013 to 2020 (so in 2016 50% of the capacity has 
been added) 
57  Based on IPCC (2005), table TS3, Pulverised Coal (PC) for coal-fired electricity generation, Natural Gas Combined Cycle 
(NGCC) for gas-fired. 
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Table 8.9 Estimated emission reduction for the CCS-TOA 
Country Assumed 
emission factor 
of electricity 
with CCS58 
%CCS 
implementation 
in CCS Protocol 
Yearly CO2 
emissions under 
CCS protocol 
Yearly CO2 
emissions 
reduction 
Cumulative CO2 
emission 
reduction 2013-
2020 
 kgCO2/kWh  GtCO2/yr GtCO2/yr GtCO2 
COAL      
China 0,110 50% 0,46 0,34 2,7 
EU 0,110 100% 0,05 0,27 2,2 
India 0,110 50% 0,14 0,10 0,8 
Russia 0,110 100% 0,00 0,02 0,2 
USA 0,110 100% 0,06 0,35 2,8 
Subtotal    1,09 8,72 
      
GAS      
China 0,052 50% 0,03 0,02 0,2 
EU 0,052 100% 0,01 0,07 0,5 
India 0,052 50% 0,01 0,01 0,0 
Russia 0,052 100% 0,01 0,04 0,3 
USA 0,052 100% 0,01 0,06 0,5 
Subtotal    0,19 1,51 
      
Total    1,28 10,23 
 
Expected costs of the TOA 
Table 8.10 expresses the costs for the CCS-TOA in US$/tCO2. These costs have been established 
by multiplying the additional investment in CO2 capture installations per MW installed with the 
total capacity of power generation with CCS that will be installed under the TOA, based on IPCC 
(2005). The numbers in IPCC, however, are global numbers, and do not take into account differ-
ences in investment costs in countries where material, labour and land may be cheaper. Based on 
the capital costs of coal-fired power plants in various countries (IAEA, 2000), however, the incre-
mental costs for CO2 capture are indexed to the unity value of the United States and the European 
Union (which are assumed to be equal). In that way, different capital costs for China, India and 
Russia are obtained (0.63 for China, and 0.85 for India and Russia).  
 
It should be noted that the calculation is rather rough and has a large uncertainty for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it is based on “best estimate” numbers in the IPCC Special Report of 2005, and 
does not take into accounting learning effects that may have taken place by the time of the start of 
the TOA, in 2013. In addition, the mitigation costs are only calculated over the period 2013 – 2020, 
rather than over the lifetime of the power plant (30 to 40 years). The numbers are also not dis-
counted. Given these simplifications, Table 8.10 probably overestimates the costs.  
 
On the other hand, although the capital costs of CO2 capture make up the largest share of the costs 
of CCS, transport and storage costs are not taken into account in Table 8.10, and are likely to add 
significantly, especially in countries where storage locations are not amply available and large dis-
tances may need to be overcome through pipelines.  
 
                                                 
58  Based on IPCC (2005); table TS3. 
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Table 8.10 Rough calculation of the mitigation costs over an 8-year crediting time of the TOA without taking into account 
cost reductions through learning, transport and storage costs 
Country Yearly additional 
capital costs 
Cumulative additional 
capital costs 
Cumulative CO2 emission 
reduction 2013-2020 
Average 
mitigation costs 
 Billion US$ Billion US$ GtCO2 US$/tCO2 
COAL     
China 9 71 2,7 26 
EU 11 88 2,2 41 
India 4 29 0,8 35 
Russia 1 7 0,2 35 
USA 14 115 2,8 41 
Total 39 309   
     
GAS     
China 1 5 0,2 29 
EU 3 24 0,5 46 
India 0 2 0,0 38 
Russia 2 12 0,3 38 
USA 3 21 0,5 46 
Total 8 63   
 
Political feasibility of the CCS-TOA 
In table 8.11, the actor constraints of a CCS-TOA are outlined. It should be born in mind that CCS 
is a costly technology, and the economic constraints will therefore be substantial. The investment 
flows that have to be realised to comply with the agreement, both domestically and internation-
ally, are very large. The negative consequences for competitiveness, however, are restrained by the 
level-playing field that is created by the agreement. Table 8.11 shows the actors and the constraints.  
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Table 8.11 Actor-specific constraints on a CCS-TOA 
Actor Constraints 
China/India EU Russia USA 
Economic The costs of the 
TOA are high, 
but not if com-
pared with the 
big competitors: 
USA and EU.  
The treaty will have 
high costs for the 
EU, but this might 
be counteracted by 
first-mover advan-
tage perceptions.  
Costs are high, but 
Russia can use its 
ample storage ca-
pacity to store CO2 
from neighbouring 
countries and can 
thus potentially 
achieve economic 
benefits.  
The treaty will 
have high costs 
for the USA, but 
this might be 
counteracted by 
first-mover ad-
vantage percep-
tions. 
Physical/ 
technical 
China and par-
ticularly India 
may encounter 
storage capacity 
constraints 
CO2 storage capacity 
is likely to be suffi-
cient over the whole 
EU, but may be con-
strained locally. CO2 
storage reservoirs 
may compete with 
other underground 
functions. 
  
Legal/  
contractual 
 If the EU wants to 
continue the EU ETS 
in this period, meas-
ures need to be 
taken to avoid dou-
ble-counting of the 
CCS obligation in 
the case of non-100% 
auctioning. 
  
Social/equity The risks and public acceptance of CCS may become a problem at the scales of im-
plementation. 
Institutional There is a need for an international set of guidelines for CCS projects, which might 
be enabled by such a TOA. 
 
Although in terms of resources, the lower availability of resources in China and India is partially 
covered by a fund and by technology transfer through a flexible mechanism, and this will compen-
sate for the difference in both financial and technical resources between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries, the absolute cost burden on all countries involved is substantial. For timing of the 
agreement, the planned construction of power plants may be taken into account, as well as a 
scheme to allow for further development of the technology. 
 
Costs are high for the CCS agreement, but leverage points may be important. The agreement will 
ensure a level-playing field among the participating countries. Technological development and 
progress, and export potential, may be a big asset for the countries that have heavier targets. The 
first-mover advantages will be greater for those countries with stricter targets, which may com-
pensate for the costs. The technology of CCS is one of the few low-carbon technologies that is 
compatible with the vested interests of the fossil-fuel industries in countries like the US, China 
and Russia. 
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8.3.6 Carbon efficiency in cars 
Scope of the technology 
The technology addressed in this agreement applies to all personal vehicles (petrol and diesel) and 
includes all measures that reduce CO2 emissions per km59. Some of the measures relate to the en-
gine, but also efficiency gains can be made in transmission, weight, aerodynamics, additions, and 
tires (IEEP/TNO/CAIR, 2005). Also, because this is not a fuel economy agreement but a CO2 emis-
sion agreement, the fuelling with sustainably grown biofuels or low-carbon hydrogen, as well as 
the switch to electric vehicles, could be used to reach the target. The adoption of other fuels would 
depend on the engine and the provisions therein, which the car manufacturers control, but also on 
the fuels available at the pump and upstream emissions of hydrogen and electric cars. The agree-
ment therefore contains commitments of both car manufacturers and countries. 
 
Contents of the Cars-TOA 
The type of TOA that is relevant for the technology at stake depends on the maturity of the tech-
nology. When it is still in the research phase and needs to proceed to demonstration, a Type 2 
agreement might be best suited. When the technology is technically feasible but still faces eco-
nomic or institutional barriers, a Type 4 agreement, targeted at overcoming those barriers, might 
be best suited.  
 
It is clear from a number of studies that the technologies required for the improvement of fuel effi-
ciency in cars are largely mature. The fuel economy of cars in Japan, for instance, is almost a factor 
2 better than that of the United States (Sauer, 2005) – as an indication of the emission reduction 
potential that is there just by bringing the entire world on the level of the current best available 
technology. It also seems, by comparison of Japanese, European and US programmes, that manda-
tory standards are more effective than voluntary ones (Kuik, 2006; Dings, 2006). Strict targets lead 
to higher innovation levels in industry, so even acknowledging that deeper emission reductions 
would still need research and development, a Type-4 agreement seems most appropriate for an in-
ternational agreement on fuel efficiency in cars.  
 
The contents of the agreement that we examine might be as follows: 
1. All car manufacturing industries agree that their new person cars on average emit less than 80 
gCO2/km in the year 202060. The target is made with non-mandatory intermediate targets of 120 
gCO2/km in 2012 and 100 gCO2/km in 2016; 
2. All countries involved agree that, in addition to point 1, they will provide tax incentives for 
smaller and more efficient cars, and that they will promote the availability of low-carbon fuels 
at fuelling stations; 
3. If a car manufacturer in a one of the participating countries does not comply with the manda-
tory provisions, the country’s government will apply an appropriate CO2-tax to each car that 
exceeds the target for that year. If a car manufacturer doesn’t comply with the non-mandatory 
targets, it is left to the discretion of the government to stimulate the company to stay on track. 
  
Cars are only produced in a small number of countries around the world. Since it is an agreement 
under the UNFCCC, the discussions should take place between Parties. However, the car manu-
facturing industry is highly globalised, and there are only a small number (<20) large car manufac-
turers worldwide. The number of actors to involve in the agreement is therefore small.  
 
For the Cars-TOA, the following countries are relevant: 
• China 
• European Union 
                                                 
59  In fact, according to our definition, this is not so much a technology-oriented agreement as an emission standard.  
60  This corresponds to a linear improvement according to the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) 
schedule (120 gCO2/km in 2012, 100 gCO2/km in 2016 and 80 gCO2/km in 2020). 
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• India 
• Japan 
• South Korea 
• United States 
 
Emission reduction potential of the TOA 
The WBCSD (2004) indicates that about 45% of all global energy use in the transport sector origi-
nates from cars (or light-duty vehicles). According to the IPCC (2007c), a global 50% increase in 
energy efficiency in cars could reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 0.7 to 0.8 GtCO2 in 2030. 
Others indicate that a 50% energy efficiency increase in new light-duty vehicles would be achiev-
able by 2020.  
 
A simple calculation can shed light on the assumptions and emissions reductions as a result of the 
Cars-TOA. If we assume, based on data in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, the IEA World 
Energy Outlook data, and incorporating some assumptions on replacement rates of cars, that a re-
duction of CO2 emission per passenger-km from current levels to 80 gCO2/km in 2020 corresponds 
to a 50% reduction, given that presently, emission levels in the EU-15 are around 160 gCO2/km. 
Bear in mind, however, that emission levels in developing countries but notably in the US, are sig-
nificantly higher, but that they are lower in Japan (Kuik, 2006). Given the weight of the US de-
mand on worldwide car sales, it is likely that the emission reductions are an underestimation of 
the actual emission reductions.  
 
Table 8.12 Calculation of emission reduction as a result of the Cars-TOA 
 2004 2010 2015 2020 
CO2 emission transport sector worldwide (MtCO2)61 5289 5900 6543 7111 
Share of LDV62 45% 46% 47% 48% 
Total CO2 emissions by LDVs worldwide (MtCO2) 2380 2708 3063 3396 
Number of LDV (billion)63 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,1 
Vehicles added to the fleet, plus those replaced - - 0,2 0,5 
Cumulative emission reduction through 50% 
efficiency improvement (MtCO2) 
- - 255 695 
Resulting worldwide CO2 emissions from LDVs 
(MtCO2) 
2380 2708 2808 2701 
 
It is clear from Table 8.12 that the Cars-TOA realises a small decline of total emissions in a sector 
which is normally on the rise, and a significant diversion from the baseline scenario emissions. The 
treaty can therefore be regarded as environmentally effective.  
 
Expected costs  
The costs of this TOA at this point cannot be estimated. The IPCC (2007c) argues that a 50% re-
duction of carbon emissions from cars can be achieved by 2030 at a cost of less than 100 US$/tCO2. 
This excludes possibilities of biofuels, which might result in reductions of a similar magnitude, 
also below 100 US$/tCO2. Costs are therefore significant, but are not exorbitant compared to other 
options. In addition, because the costs of cars will increase, there might be a decrease in car sales, 
which would enhance the emission reductions further, and make alternatives such as mass transit 
more competitive.  
 
                                                 
61  Numbers are based on the IEA World Energy Outlook 2006 Reference Scenario: page 81.  
62  Number in 2004 is based on WBCSD (2004), assuming a 2% per year increase in share. 
63  Numbers from IPCC Fourth Assessment Report Final Draft (2007): Figure 5.5. 
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Costs distribution among the different countries involved will most likely not be equal. Countries 
with a large portion of their LDVs in heavier classes, notably in the United States, might have diffi-
culties changing the sales to smaller types of cars, and will have to rely on further technological 
advancements, and make more costs, to reach the targets. On the other hand, costs are not only 
made on the country level, but will, due to the level-playing field, burden those consumers that 
have a preference for large cars more. In that sense, the agreement does right to the polluter pays 
principle. 
 
Apart from the benefits in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions, there are several co-
benefits to this type of agreement. One major benefit in terms of economic effectiveness compared 
to national regulation (which has been the case so far) is that there will be a global level playing 
field if all countries participate. Another benefit, particularly in developing countries with increas-
ing urban air pollution problems, is the effect on the emissions of health-damaging air pollution. In 
terms of energy security of supply, and the conservation of hydrocarbon resources, the agreement 
would have benefits as efficiency improvements reduce oil use.  
 
Political feasibility of a Cars-TOA 
It appears that the carbon efficiency of cars could be improved significantly by implementing an 
international agreement with a limited number of countries (those that manufacture cars), which 
is environmentally effective and has a number of co-benefits. The costs are substantial, but mainly 
fall to those consumers with the most carbon-intensive preferences, and the level-playing field en-
sures that country’s industries are not disadvantaged.  
 
The agreement is flexible in the sense that new countries can enlist easily without extra costs to 
the car industry. The compliance check could be simple and straightforward, although there are 
potential barriers in terms of agreement on testing procedures for cars (An, 2006). The likelihood 
of enforcement is enhanced by keeping the punishment on the domestic level. Although a country 
can decide not to enforce, this will probably not help its own industry much as the requirements 
still goes for the other participating countries. The free-riding incentive of the agreement is there-
fore not very large.  
 
One note should be placed here – the treaty discussed here is not a technology-oriented agreement 
according to the definition used in this report, as it does not prescribe a technology. It can better 
be classified as a sector-based carbon efficiency agreement.  
 
The political constraints for a number of actors are addressed in Table 8.13.  
 
Table 8.13 Political constraints for a selection of actors in the Cars-TOA treaty 
Actor Constraints 
EU and Japan United States India 
Economic  High costs because 
of larger reductions 
Difficulties in freeing devel-
opment costs for domestic 
car industry. 
Physical/technical The treaty is a technology-forcing treaty, which means that there is uncer-
tainty on whether the goals will actually be achieved.  
Legal/contractual    
Social/equity  Employment issues 
may be at stake 
 
Institutional There is a tendency that technology-forcing agreements are later weak-
ened for protectionism reasons. This is most likely to apply to the US. 
Also, the compliance mechanism is not particularly strong and there are 
likely to be issues with testing procedures.  
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The other factors that have been identified as relevant for the political feasibility of agreements are 
resources, time frame and timing, and leverage points. The resources that companies will have to 
spend in case they will need to make profound adjustments to the cars they produce will likely be 
substantial. The time frame allows for sufficient time to implement the agreement, and seems ap-
propriate given the literature around this issue. In terms of leverage points, the co-benefits for con-
sumers and ample possibilities for first-mover advantages is hopefully driving both car manufac-
turers and countries towards an ambitious solution.  
 
8.4 Conclusion on the proposed TOAs 
Table 8.14 summarises environmental effectiveness, costs and political feasibility in a qualitative 
way. The environmental effectiveness (i.e. the emissions reduction the agreement is to achieve) 
depends on the type of agreement. If the agreement is certain to lead to emission reductions (be-
cause inherent in the agreement), the environmental effectiveness is described as “guaranteed”. 
However, if the agreement only aims to take away political or legal barriers to deployment of the 
technology, the environmental effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. The emission scope of the 
agreement is also assessed here; as the ammonia agreement only covers a small amount of green-
house gas emissions, its effect is small, whereas the scope of a CCS agreement is much larger, and 
its effect is large.  
 
Cost burden is partly dependent on the scope of the emission reductions, especially if they cannot 
be achieved at low or negative mitigation costs. Sometimes, such as in the case of bioethanol, the 
costs depend on domestic policies (biofuels obligation in EU) or on oil and gas commodity prices. 
Although the cost effectiveness is not comparatively assessed in this report, and cost effectiveness 
of TOAs is almost certainly significantly lower than the cost effectiveness of a global cap-and-trade 
agreement, the likelihood that emissions reductions are complied with in areas where they are 
relatively cheap are estimated to be higher in the case that a TOA is agreed on them.  
 
The outcome of the political feasibility assessment is also summarised in the below scheme, where 
in most cases it is a diffuse balance between positive and negative aspects.  
 
Table 8.14 overview of political feasibility of the hypothetical TOAs 
 Environmental 
effectiveness 
Cost 
burden 
Political feasibility 
Bioethanol Large and 
guaranteed 
Medium High, although concerns on social/equity constraints 
should be taken into account 
Nuclear 
energy 
Potentially large 
but not guaranteed 
Small High as agreement is in place; low if NPT problems is 
considered 
Cement Large and 
guaranteed 
Small High because of low cost burden; low for large number of 
actors 
Ammonia Small but 
guaranteed 
Small High 
CCS Large and 
guaranteed 
Large Low because of cost burden, may be medium because of 
positive technology perception and high for good 
compatibility with vested interests in fossil-fuel sector 
Cars Large and 
guaranteed 
Large High because of small number of actors; low as 
technology forcing agreement meet resistance 
 
The study concludes that a number of TOAs could be explored and might be politically feasible as 
well as environmentally effective in the context of the factor-constraint framework used here. 
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Costs can be high, and can pose barriers to implementation. In addition, various TOAs would have 
social and legal consequences that need to be addressed. In reality, other considerations will play a 
role. For instance, developing countries have resisted the use of sectoral approaches based on 
moral and sovereignty arguments. Many developing countries reject the notion of taking on any 
obligation whatsoever based on principles of equity and per-capita emissions, which are very low 
for a major emerging economy like India.  
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Appendix: Data relevant to bioethanol TOA 
 
Table 8.15 Sugar Cane production in 2004 in SADC* and selected other countries (from Johnson and Matsika, 2006) 
 Area 
harvested 
total 
production 
average 
yield 
Shares of total production 
 
1000 ha 1000 tc** tc/ha 
share of SADC 
total 
share of world total 
Angola 10 360 38 0,8%  
Congo DR 43 1786 42 3,9%  
Madagascar 69 2460 36 5,4%  
Malawi 20 2100 105 4,6%  
Mauritius 72 5199 73 11,4%  
Mozambique 30 400 13 0,9%  
South Africa 326 20419 63 44,8% 1,5% 
Swaziland 48 4500 93 9,9%  
Tanzania 17 2000 118 4,4%  
Zambia 17 1800 106 4,0%  
Zimbabwe 45 4533 101 10,0%  
      
SADC total 696 45557 65  3,4% 
      
Australia 448 36995 83  2,7% 
Brazil 5371 396012 74  29,1% 
India 4608 281600 61  20,7% 
Thailand 1139 74259 65  5,5% 
      
World 20822 1359120 65   
Sources: FAOSTAT 2005     
*SADC: Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
** tc: tonne cane 
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Table 8.16 Land Use summary for SADC countries and other selected countries (from Johnson and Matsika, 2006) 
Country/ Region Total 
Land Area 
Forest Area Agricultural Areas (a) Cultivated Area (b) 
UNITS: Million ha 
Million 
ha 
share of 
total 
land 
area 
Million 
ha 
share of 
total 
land 
area 
Million 
ha 
share of 
total 
land 
area 
Angola 124,7 69,8 56% 57,6 46% 3,6 2,9% 
Botswana 56,7 12,4 22% 26,0 46% 0,4 0,7% 
Congo 226,7 135,2 60% 22,8 10% 7,8 3,4% 
Lesotho 3,0   2,3 77% 0,3 11,0% 
Madagascar 58,2 11,7 20% 27,6 47% 3,6 6,1% 
Malawi 9,4 2,6 27% 4,4 47% 2,6 27,5% 
Mauritius 0,2   0,1 56% 0,1 52,2% 
Mozambique 78,4 30,6 39% 48,6 62% 4,6 5,8% 
Namibia 82,3 8,0 10% 38,8 47% 0,8 1,0% 
South Africa 121,4 8,9 7% 99,6 82% 15,7 12,9% 
Swaziland 1,7   1,4 81% 0,2 11,2% 
Tanzania 88,4 38,8 44% 48,1 54% 5,1 5,8% 
Zambia 74,3 31,2 42% 35,3 47% 5,3 7,1% 
Zimbabwe 38,7 19,0 49% 20,6 53% 3,4 8,7% 
        
Total SADC 964,1 368,3 38% 433,2 45% 53,4 5,5% 
        
Brazil 845,9 543,9 64% 263,6 31% 66,6 7,9% 
China 932,7 163,5 18% 554,9 59% 154,9 16,6% 
India 297,3 64,1 22% 180,8 61% 169,7 57,1% 
United States 915,9 226,0 25% 409,3 45% 175,5 19,2% 
Sources: FAOSTAT 2005; World Resources Institute 2005 
Note: (a) Agricultural areas include temporary and permanent pastures, permanent crops, and temporary crops. 
The figures do not provide any indication of the suitability or availability of the land for particular purposes. 
Note: (b) Cultivated areas includes permanent crops and temporary crops 
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Chapter 9 Technology in the climate regime: fatal fragmentation or 
enhanced cooperation?64 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 has discussed political feasibility and environmental effectiveness of several hypotheti-
cal TOAs separately. To address the whole of the climate regime, we examine the institutional op-
tions for co-existence in this chapter. We will discuss three variants of cap-and-trade regimes, and 
two hypothetical examples of TOAs. We distinguish between four levels of integration of TOAs 
and cap-and-trade regimes. These four levels range from no integration (‘Separate’), to full institu-
tional, organizational and operational integration (‘Joined’). In-between these extreme levels of 
integration is a level of partial (operational) integration (‘Linked’) (see Section 9.2.3). 
 
Apart from the organization and embedding of the treaty, there are different ways of co-existence 
of agreements. We make a distinction as to whether the TOA and cap-and-trade agreements are 
instrumentally or geographically additional. With instrumentally (or sectorally) additional we mean 
that the TOA is applied in the country where also a cap-and-trade agreement is implemented. This 
thesis will not focus on that case, but it has been addressed in the report on which this chapter is 
based (Coninck et al., 2007), taking a game-theoretic approach. 
 
The analysis in this qualitative game-theory exercise is based on the fact that coalitions have to be 
profitable, stable and credible in order to survive. To address a global public good problem, which 
notoriously suffers from free-riding problems, the issue area could be linked with another issue 
area that has a different benefit profile. Issue linkage has first been suggested as a strategy in inter-
national economic and military negotiations (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Sebenius, 1983). Cesar 
and Zeeuw (1996) have demonstrated that it can also be applied to international environmental 
agreements. For climate change, issue linkage is most commonly used to solve the public-good re-
lated free-rider effects by linking membership of the for some parties unprofitable climate change 
agreement to membership of a profitable club-good coalition. This club good coalition could be a 
TOA. Some analysis has already been done linking research-related TOAs to cap-and-trade agree-
ments (Buchner et al., 2002), but the result was that the threat to not agree to a TOA if another 
country does not agree to the cap-and-trade agreement is not credible. It all depends, however, on 
whether the different countries can see through other country's strategies – game theory based on 
the Nash equilibrium principally assumes perfect information and foresight with all participants 
in the game. In reality, participants in negotiations do not know the profitability of the agreements 
for themselves and for other participants, and although game-theoretic analysis can provide a use-
ful framework for analysis, it is not a realistic representation of the actual situation.  
 
Geographically additional agreements represent the case that country A pursues a TOA whereas 
country B pursues a cap-and-trade agreement, as well as the TOA. This will be examined based on 
institutional analysis, where the consequences of various modes of co-existence will be assessed 
based on the effectiveness and functioning of the institutions (Section 9.3). A conclusion is in Sec-
tion 9.4. 
 
                                                 
64  This chapter is part of a report commissioned by the Netherlands Programme on Scientific Assessment and Policy Analysis 
(WAB) Climate Change, report number 500102013. It has been written by Heleen de Coninck and Stefan Bakker at ECN, 
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9.2 Approach and starting points  
9.2.1 Methodology: subsequent steps taken in the analysis 
We established that the compatibility of various approaches for international climate policy has 
several aspects: the approaches can co-exist in the same or in different countries, and the extent of 
linkage can vary greatly. In order to shed light on the interactions, we have identified a number of 
concrete cap-and-trade and TOA approaches (see sections below).  
 
For each of the possible combinations of these approaches, we will discuss the formation of the 
agreement in the different contexts, as well as the institutional consequences of co-existence. The 
coming about of a treaty is examined through game-theory analysis, and the co-existence through 
analysis of institutional interaction.  
This chapter will go through the following steps: 
• Identification of cap-and-trade agreements and hypothetical TOAs 
• Explanation of ways of co-existence 
• An institutional issue linkage discussion, the consequences of having the different TOAs and 
the various cap-and-trade approaches in different countries will be discussed in the case that 
they are completely separate, institutionally linked, or institutionally joined.  
- In the separate case, interactions only take place because the mere existence of the one 
treaty influences the outcome of the other.  
- In the linked case, institutional challenges for linking are addressed. 
- In the joined case, the treaties would have to be negotiated in parallel, and there is interac-
tion between the two in terms of the negotiated outcome.  
• The discussion will be framed in the context of advantages and disadvantages of fragmentation 
in the international institution area, and in the context of political feasibility of Parties under 
different conditions. 
• Lastly, the mere situation of more regimes on one issue area might have consequences, and these 
will be discussed in a conclusion, based on literature on fragmentation, and linked to the earlier 
outcomes on separate, linked or joined regimes.  
 
The steps are illustrated in the scheme below.  
Hypothetical TOAs
• Bioethanol 
• CCS
Cap-and trade variants
• Kyoto continued
• Multistage (intensity/no-lose)
Ways of co-existing 
agreements or issue 
linkage: 
• Separate 
• Linked
• Integrated 
• Joined
Section 9.3: Institutional analysis
What are the institutional interactions between the 
hypothetical TOAs and the cap-and-trade variants if they co-
exist in a separate, linked or joined way?
Compatibility analysis
Section 9.2: Starting points
Section 9.4: Conclusion
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9.2.2 Description of the technology and cap and trade agreements 
For the cap-and-trade agreements we selected three different approaches: a ‘Kyoto-continued’, 
where the Annex I countries and the treaty design remain the same, and only deeper targets are 
agreed; and two multi-stage approaches with an intermediate stage for emerging economies that is 
either an intensity target or a no-lose target.  
 
Chapter 8 outlined six potential technology-oriented agreements and evaluated them for costs, 
environmental effectiveness and political feasibility. The TOAs were agreements on ammonia pro-
duction, bioethanol from sugarcane, carbon efficiency in cars, the cement industry, CO2 capture 
and storage (CCS) in the power sector, and nuclear energy. From these TOAs, we selected the bio-
ethanol and CCS cases. Before going into the compatibility of the agreements, this section will de-
scribe the proposals based on their most important characteristics. 
 
The agreements will be described in general terms, and not in terms of quantitative targets, al-
though we would like to emphasise that the legal nature of both the cap-and-trade and the tech-
nology-oriented agreements is assumed to be binding. The TOAs can therefore be regarded as 
‘technology-pull’ rather than ‘technology-push’ agreements. Because in that sense they serve the 
same purpose as a cap-and-trade agreement (which also aims to provide a technology-pull), the 
activities in the TOA could in one way or another be credited in a similar way as the cap-and-trade 
efforts. 
 
The reasons for not going into the details regarding quantitative targets in the cap-and-trade vari-
ants here are twofold. First, we would like to steer clear of the discussions around the exact per-
centage of emissions reductions required to comply with the UNFCCC, i.e., “to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, and the allocation of allowable emissions to 
countries. We will however assume that the agreements lead to reductions of emissions relative to 
the baseline, and therefore that the reductions come at some cost (economic cost or investments 
into realising no-regret options). Second, as we will assess the interactions between the agree-
ments in a qualitative way and no single TOA has the potential to fully meet the assumed cap on 
its own, the outcome will not change fundamentally if the emission reductions or technology im-
plementation levels are small or large; the result depends on whether there is implementation tak-
ing place. 
 
Cap and trade: Kyoto-continued 
The ‘Kyoto-continued’ agreement is included as a representation of a continuation of the mindset 
that let to the current state of affairs around Kyoto. Although times have changed since 1997, and 
doubts can be expressed around whether a treaty like Kyoto would be achieved again, we assume 
that there is a possibility that the current situation will continue. Kyoto-continued represents no 
divergence from the design of the Kyoto Protocol, and assumes essentially the same ratifying coun-
tries in Annex B and the same rules for international emissions trading and CDM. The only differ-
ence with the current Kyoto Protocol is that the emission targets will be stricter, and the commit-
ment period will be stretched to 2013-2020. The Kyoto-continued agreement is likely to offer the 
same benefits and difficulties as the present Kyoto Protocol. Although doubts can be cast on 
whether the same countries that have currently ratified the Kyoto Protocol will also ratify its suc-
cessor, and the same countries that have not participated so far will not, we will assume for this 
case that this is the case.  
 
Cap and trade: Multi-stage with intensity or no-lose targets 
The multi-stage variant of a post-2012 regime is extensively described in various publications 
(Berk and Elzen, 2001). Recognising the unlikelihood that emerging economies will participate in 
a system with fixed and binding caps, a Kyoto-type of agreement is proposed with more differen-
tiation. In addition to the two stages that Kyoto has, i.e. fixed caps for Annex-B countries, and vol-
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untary participation through the CDM for non-Annex-B countries, the multi-stage approach is 
extended with an intermediate category. This intermediate category might be linked to the targets 
of the original Annex-B countries through emissions trading. 
 
In this variant of the multi-stage approach, the intermediate stage would comprise intensity tar-
gets (in terms of CO2 emission per GDP or unit of product) that show some diversion from the 
baseline (which already includes an endogenous reduction of energy use per GDP). The reason 
why emerging economies, with rapid economic growth, are thought to be more inclined to agree to 
intensity targets than to an absolute emission reduction target is that an intensity target is more 
amenable to uncertainty on future economic growth – and related changes in emissions. It remains 
to be seen if emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, are willing to agree 
to such an agreement. Some countries have indicated that they might sign up to such an agree-
ment, whereas others have not shown any interest. It is also uncertain whether the commitment of 
a country like China to comply with intensity targets is enough to make the United States agree to 
an absolute target. However, for the sake of this analysis, we assume full participation. 
 
In the second variant of multi-stage agreements, the intermediate level receives a no-lose target (or 
non-binding target, or ‘emission budget’). Each country signing up to a no-lose target negotiates a 
target (allowed amount of emissions, or assigned amount), very likely above current emission level 
and probably close to a baseline scenario of emissions. If it emits more than the target, it will not 
be punished. If it emits less, it can sell the credits on the international market; i.e. to Annex-B 
countries (Philibert, 2000).  
 
The no-lose targets don’t punish economic growth, which is important, but it is likely that the es-
tablishment of the target scenario is a very difficult and highly politicised action. The permits gen-
erated by the no-lose system can be easily integrated with the international carbon market, al-
though there might be concerns that the additionality check for CDM projects is currently more 
easily implemented and stronger than the check for an economy-wide target such as in the case of 
no-lose targets. For example, ‘windfall’ emission reductions in some sectors could compensate for 
rising emissions in other sectors. In the case of the CDM, these would not be credited; in the case 
of no-lose targets, they would. Also here, we assume that all countries agree to the conditions of 
this agreement and that broad participation is achieved. 
 
TOA: Sugarcane-based bioethanol in Africa 
The first TOA that will be assessed for compatibility with cap-and-trade-based systems is an 
agreement between Brazil, the European Union and countries in the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC). The aim of the TOA is to utilize the Brazilian knowledge and the Euro-
pean biofuels targets and finance to set up a sugarcane-based bioethanol industry in SADC coun-
tries in order to supply Europe with sustainable biofuels. The time horizon for this TOA will be 
2020. 
 
Brazil will be the knowledge-supplying party. The knowledge transfer will include both expertise 
on the agricultural system (e.g. cane varieties for various soil types, pest control, use of vinasse as 
fertilizer) and on the industrial ethanol production system (technical assistance on building large-
scale ethanol plants, infrastructure, etc.). The SADC will be the technology-receiving countries. As 
part of the TOA, Brazil and the SADC will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in 
which they stipulate the intention to build up an ethanol industry. As third party, the European 
Union (EU) will act as financing party of projects. In return, supply contracts are signed for the 
ethanol production to be exported to Europe to meet targets for biofuels and GHG emission re-
ductions, possibly coupled with a fixed price (or a price range with minimum and maximum 
boundaries depending on the oil price developments). The commitment by the EU could be ex-
panded by the introduction of flex-cars on its market: cars that can use both ethanol and gasoline. 
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Even without carbon crediting in the EU, the TOA may be economically feasible at high oil prices 
because it provides the EU with guaranteed and affordable biofuels, which is good for energy secu-
rity of supply, the African countries with a new source of income and Brazil with a market for the 
technology with which they have unique, decades-long experience. The SADC countries might 
also use part of the biofuels for own consumption, which would lead to emission reductions in Af-
rican countries rather than in the EU. It is therefore essentially a win-win agreement which would 
only require minimal coordination. Drawbacks, however, include environmental and social conse-
quences of large-scale sugarcane cultivation in Africa.  
 
TOA: CO2 capture and storage in large users of coal 
A TOA on CCS might be relevant for all countries that depend heavily on fossil fuels for their elec-
tricity production. However, we have identified a small number of countries with fast-growing 
and substantial greenhouse gas emissions, ample national fossil fuel resources, growing gas- or 
coal-fired power capacity, and with much potential for CO2 storage as the most likely candidates: 
China, the European Union, India, Russia and the United States. Other possible countries are 
thinkable, but we will restrict the analysis to these. The elements of the CCS agreement are ex-
plained in Chapter 8. 
 
It is assumed that all countries involved have sufficient national CO2 storage capacity. India ap-
pears to be the only country for which this may be problematic as there are no reliable capacity 
estimates for that country, and initial scans do not reveal a large area of suitable underground. 
 
Incentives for participation are absent if there is no urgency for emissions reductions at all. How-
ever, what might convince some countries is that there are difficult targets for China as well as for 
the EU and the US, which would improve the level-playing field, and hence compliance. The US 
and the EU may perceive the enormous market for all aspects of CCS technology as an opportunity 
for technology export, e.g. of gasifiers, CO2-separating membranes, and underground management 
services. 
 
9.2.3 Ways of co-existence 
It is our contention that under any future climate regime the current system of cap and trade will 
continue to form the foundation of the regime’s architecture. We also believe that TOAs could in 
some capacity be part of that framework, either by supplementing cap-and-trade efforts in coun-
tries, or by having an environmentally effective policy in countries that have not signed up to the 
cap-and-trade agreement. The question then arises at what level and in what form TOAs could 
possibly co-exist with cap-and-trade. Could they fit, both institutionally and economically, within 
the framework of a regime such as the Kyoto Protocol? Or would they work better outside of the 
regime? Using Kyoto as our frame of reference we have identified four potential scenarios of co-
existence for TOAs: Separate, Linked, and Joined.  
 
Separate 
As the name suggests in this scenario the cap and trade (CAT) regime and the TOA would operate 
in parallel and have no institutional or economic linkages. There would be separate unrelated sec-
retariats and separate unrelated accountancy and reporting schemes. The only potential for over-
lap would be that countries might opt to be signatories to both the CAT and the TOA. Current 
examples of this can be seen in the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the Asia-Pacific 
partnership. 
 
Linked 
The Linked scenario can be characterized by two separate agreements operating under two sepa-
rate institutional regimes (a TOA regime and a CAT regime) with two different reporting and ac-
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counting schemes for emission reduction credits. The links between the CAT and TOA could exist 
in two forms. The first is that all projects or actions under one of the institutions, for example the 
TOA, would receive emission reduction credits under the CAT but not vice-versa. In the current 
Kyoto design, this is automatically the case for Annex-I countries but could also be made the case 
for non-Annex I countries through the CDM. The second form it could take is that only a certain 
number or type of projects under either the TOA or CAT would be mutually recognized and re-
ceive corresponding emission reduction credits. These would have to be agreed upon between the 
two institutions.  
 
There is also a third way of establishing linkages between the regimes: in terms of fulfilment of ca-
pacity building, technology transfer, awareness raising and other means of achieving the ‘softer’ 
targets often included in cap-and-trade agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol. However, with-
out denying the relevance of these activities, we do not regard this in this research as it is not cen-
tral to emission reductions. 
 
Joined 
Under the ‘Joined’ scenario the TOA would be an integral part of a larger climate agreement that 
combines CAT elements. One could envisage a regime that has quantified and binding emission 
reduction targets and that the instruments to reach those targets would be a combination of the 
current ‘flexible mechanisms’ as well as the employment and/or transfer of agreed technologies. 
Institutionally then the TOA would not be an agreement as such but rather an article in a conven-
tion or a protocol and overseen by either an executive board or supervisory committee adminis-
tered by the convention’s secretariat, much the way JI and CDM are handled under the UNFCCC. 
The institutional oversight of TOAs in this form would serve to certify that technology ‘imple-
mented’ was meeting its set goal. Economically, the specific parties undertaking the initiative 
would manage the TOA. 
 
9.3 An institutional compatibility assessment of technology agreements and 
cap-and-trade approaches 
A game-theoretic perspective on the co-existence of TOAs and cap-and-trade regimes primarily 
addresses the reasons why a country might be persuaded into agreeing to a cap-and-trade regime 
through issue linkage with technology. It therefore primarily examines shifting interests of various 
parties in the climate negotiations, in an instrumentally additional context; i.e., for a country to 
participate in the TOA, it has to participate in the cap-and-trade agreement as well (Coninck et al., 
2007).  
 
This chapter takes the notably different view of geographically additional agreements. It assumes 
that the treaties have already been agreed and discusses, for different ways of co-existence, how 
the TOAs and cap-and-trade agreements interact, and, contrary to game-theoretic approaches, 
doesn’t speculate on the process of agreeing on the treaty.  
 
The theoretical framework of the study is the situation of fragmented international regimes, and 
applies the insights resulting from that literature to the climate regime. First, therefore, the chap-
ter provides a review of the existing, theoretical literature on the co-existence of international in-
stitutions. Secondly, it asks the question: what happens to the institutions involved if different 
countries sign up to cap-and-trade agreements and TOAs? How would such a landscape affect the 
entire climate regime? 
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9.3.1 Fragmented regimes for climate change 
There is an ongoing academic debate on the consequences of the increasing density of organiza-
tions in the international institutional playing field. There seems agreement in the literature that 
this increasing density leads to fragmentation of the regime complex, in the sense that there is 
more overlap and specialization of international treaties, and less international coordination. There 
is, however, by no means a definite answer as to whether such large variety of partially overlapping 
treaties would decrease the effectiveness of reaching solutions. Whether centralization or frag-
mentation leads to a better outcome depends on the perspective taken; i.e. an international lawyer 
will look at the issue differently than a political economist. It also depends on the specifics of the 
issue area. Where for economic trade issues, a fragmented regime may be adequate, for a more fun-
damental issue such as human rights, a centralized regime may be regarded as more appropriate 
(Tahvanainen, 2004).  
 
It is regularly argued for fragmentation that a plurality of regimes results in healthy competition 
for influence, resulting in the most effective means to reach a target (Charney, 1996). It is also seen 
as a logical symptom; an “institutional expression of political pluralism internationally” (Kosken-
niemi and Leino, 2002). Any problems caused by such plurality of international regimes, such as 
isolation and lack of coordination, would supposedly be solved by the increasing number of net-
works that impact the regimes and that would solve problems of coordination (Raustiala, 2002).  
 
In response to these rather optimistic earlier publications, however, a number of political theorists 
started pointing at weaknesses in fragmented regimes. It started with highlighting a methodologi-
cal problem: Keohane and Nye (2001) elaborate on the increasing difficulty of contemplating and 
studying single international organizations, as they should be seen in an increasingly important 
and complex context. Raustiala and Victor (2004) coined the term ‘regime complex’ as a substi-
tute for an international organisation. They use the example of the various treaties impacting on 
plant genetic resources as an example of how changing insights in an issue area result in a dynamic 
regime complex with a host of different rules and a lack of legal consistency. This conveniently 
leaves room for all nations involved to interpret the rules as they like it, but it doesn’t provide a 
consistent backdrop for a common solution. Benvenisti and Downs (2007), finally, even go beyond 
this and argue that fragmentation is detrimental for the interests of small states, and is even used 
by powerful states as a strategy to further their own goals at the expense of weaker others. Such 
purposeful use of fragmentation as a power-enforcing strategy, they argue, makes it resistant to 
reform by consistency-enhancing features such as networks, and moreover obscure implementa-
tion of treaties and reduce accountability.  
 
In the light of the above, the move of the United States to found the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate (APP), as well as a number of one-issue technology-oriented 
agreements, could be interpreted as a deliberate strategy to pull Parties out of the Kyoto Protocol 
and even the UNFCCC context into a more attractive, because less ‘deep’ agreement. This infer-
ence is confirmed by some observers (Asselt, 2007). However, it is also clear that the APP falls 
short of providing a credible solution for the climate change problem and the reduction of green-
house gas emissions.  
 
A requirement of the TOAs we will discuss further on in this chapter is therefore that they should 
be environmentally effective (or: having a significant global impact on GHG emissions), which, we 
established in Chapter 8, is the case for the CCS and Bioethanol TOAs. This in itself reduces the 
chance that the TOAs are used as token agreements to divert attention from the cap-and-trade re-
gimes, but it doesn’t rule out the possibility that other negative impacts of the emergence of a cli-
mate regime complex manifest. This we investigate in the sections below. 
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9.3.2 Separate 
As explained in Section 9.2.3 in the case of separate co-existence of the CAT and the TOA there are 
no institutional or economic linkages and the regimes operate in parallel. The main interactions are 
potential overlap when countries are signatories to both regimes, and a ‘technology bias’ intro-
duced by the TOA compared to the more market-based approach in the CAT.  
 
For countries that are part of both regimes there will be no possibility to transfer carbon credits 
generated in one regime to the other. They will have to achieve both their commitments independ-
ently. This could be less than optimal from an economic point of view, but prevents difficulties of 
finding ways to link the schemes (Philibert, 2005). A point of attention should be the long-term 
view: if it is envisaged that the regimes be linked in the future, it could be useful to stimulate some 
interaction between the bureaucracies so that GHG accounting and policies may become more 
easily linked in the future.  
 
In TOA countries also having a CAT target, a technology bias is likely to be introduced by the TOA 
compared to the CAT-only scenario: higher diffusion of the TOA technology, and lower diffusion 
of other mitigation technologies, and thus, theoretically, a higher price of emission reductions. Al-
though there is a theoretical possibility that a CAT agreement could push a technology so far to 
make the TOA on that technology obsolete, normally a TOA for such a technology would not be 
necessary so such a TOA would not be agreed. Also, if participation of the TOA does not fully over-
lap, the TOA would still have an effect in the country that has not signed up for the CAT agree-
ment. 
 
A new additionality question also needs to be answered: to what extent are GHG reductions cre-
ated by TOA technologies implemented still eligible for trading? E.g. can India claim CERs for CCS 
implemented under the TOA to which it has signed up? This is a similar question as currently in 
the CDM additionality test, which says that reductions should go beyond current domestic policy 
in place. The presence of a TOA gives a new international context. In the ‘separate’ case it is not 
decided a priori that these reductions are non-additional, as it can be argued that there are no inter-
actions between the regimes. If the reductions go beyond what was agreed under the TOA, all 
countries (under both regimes) should be able to claim carbon credits eligible for trading. 
 
The interactions are for the bioethanol and CCS case are further specified in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 Institutional interactions in separate TOA and cap-and-trade combinations 
TOA-variant Cap-and-trade vari-
ants Bioethanol CCS 
Kyoto-continued All countries in the TOA are 
also Kyoto countries. The EU 
will achieve their Kyoto tar-
get partly by using bioetha-
nol (technology bias). In the 
case of own use of the biofu-
els, African countries could 
produce the biofuels both for 
export to EU and claim 
CERs, which introduces the 
possibility of double-
counting (which could be 
difficult to resolve in the 
‘separate’ case). 
All countries except the US are covered 
by both regimes. A technology bias will 
be created in the EU and Russia. Also, 
demand for carbon credits may decrease 
as the required reductions are fulfilled 
through the TOA. The supply potential 
for CDM in India and China may or 
may not be reduced, depending on the 
outcome of the additionality debate. 
No-lose No difference with Kyoto-
continued as Brazil – with a 
no-lose target – is only tech-
nology supplier. 
The US, EU and Russia have both an 
absolute GHG target and a commitment 
under the TOA which creates a technol-
ogy bias. Whether signing up to the 
TOA will have an impact on the strin-
gency of the no-lose target for India and 
China is an issue to be resolved. In one 
case, they are likely to achieve and go 
beyond their targets easily due to their 
TOA commitments, which will result in 
a larger supply of carbon credits to the 
international market. Double dipping is 
not an issue in the no-lose case 
Multi-
stage 
Intensity Similar to no-lose case India and China are likely to achieve 
their intensity target with more ease, 
and will be able sell more carbon credits 
compared to the CAT-only case, assum-
ing that the targets of the TOA and the 
CAT are set independently. If not, India 
and China may accept stricter targets in 
the CAT if they know they have to com-
ply with the TOA. 
 
9.3.3 Linked 
In the case that separate institutions exist for the TOA and the cap-and-trade regime, but deci-
sions on linking or integration of the two regimes are made, the TOA, similarly to the ‘separate’ 
case, would still introduce a technology bias in the (supposedly) otherwise perfectly competitive 
market of the cap-and-trade agreement, in the case that a country engages in both a cap-and-trade 
regime and a TOA. For the remainder, interactions would take place in the field of availability of 
technologies. This is a consequence of spill-over effects of technological change in the country im-
plementing the TOA, which, if effective, brings down the costs of technologies needed to comply 
with the cap-and-trade regime.  
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For other effects, we first explore how links between the technology regime and the cap-and-trade 
agreement may look like. The next step is to determine the nature, scope and consequences of the 
linking or integration specifically for the selected TOAs and cap-and-trade examples, which is 
done in Table 9.2. 
 
If there is to be a link between the institutionally separate regimes, it would mean that part of the 
TOA commitment of country can be met through buying credits in another country on the CAT-
based carbon market. Conversely, it could mean that part of the commitment undertaken as part of 
a cap-and-trade agreement can be met through implementation of the TOA.  
 
This might not be straightforward. In both of the cases above, one needs a metric that allows for 
conversion of the one target into the other. The first metric that comes to mind for this is emission 
reductions (tonnes CO2-eq emissions reduced), although this is by no means unproblematic. The 
advantage is that the metric of cap-and-trade agreements is already stated in terms of tonnes of 
greenhouse gas emissions, or emission reductions, and that the technologies implemented also lead 
to reductions in emissions. It gets more problematic if the details are taken into regard. What 
baseline, for instance, for the emissions would need to be assumed in the country that only signs 
up for the TOA, and that wants to sell credits on the market of the cap-and-trade country? When 
can such credits be regarded as additional? And how do we deal with the fact that the bioethanol-
TOA regulates supply or production of fuel, whereas the cap-and-trade agreement measures the 
demand or consumption? 
 
The most likely outcome might be, in the case of the cap-and-trade variants, to treat the TOA obli-
gation as a policy and apply procedures similar to the first, hesitant proposals for ‘Policy CDM’ as 
they are now discussed and might be implemented in the context of improving the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM). It could even be decided that the policy baseline would be the sec-
toral baseline of the country that signed up to the cap-and-trade agreement. In the specific case of 
the bioethanol-TOA, the reductions of emissions take place in the Annex-I countries, so they are 
automatically accounted for in their national inventories. 
 
If the country that signed up to the TOA wished to achieve part of its agreement through the pur-
chase of carbon credits from the cap-and-trade system, a similar operation would have to be done, 
although it could also be argued that the compensation would be one-way. Based on a baseline, the 
amount of credits required to compensate for the non-implementation of an action under the TOA 
would be calculated, and non-compliance with the TOA would only be established if the amount 
of carbon credits is insufficient. Creating a linkage in general means that part of the risk of signing 
up to a TOA or a cap-and-trade agreement is mitigated through allowing compliance through the 
other.  
 
Both in the case of the TOA-country buying or selling into the cap-and-trade treaty, and the re-
verse, the TOA or the cap-and-trade agreement could include a limit to the amount of compliance 
that can be done outside of the agreement itself. If there is a limit, the agreements are linked. If 
there is no such limit, they qualify as integrated.  
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Table 9.2 Institutional interactions in linked/integrated TOA and cap-and-trade combinations 
TOA-variant Cap-and-trade 
variants Bioethanol from sugarcane CCS 
Kyoto-continued In this case, all countries in the 
TOA are also Kyoto countries. A 
policy-CDM type of arrangement 
could be agreed between African 
and EU countries, where the Afri-
can countries would sell any emis-
sion reductions by using more bio-
fuels in their own countries, as 
well as selling biofuels to the EU. 
The TOA introduces a technology 
bias in the EU Kyoto-continued-
implementation, and possibly also 
a geographical bias in policy-CDM 
towards Africa, which can be per-
ceived as correcting the current 
low representation of Africa.  
The agreement has no direct con-
sequences for Brazil, except poten-
tial consequences for Brazil in sell-
ing less CERs to the EU. 
The countries in the TOA are not all 
Kyoto-countries; the US is not. The 
question therefore is how to link with 
a non-Kyoto party. If the US would 
like to buy credits from, or sell them 
into the Kyoto-continued agreement, 
a baseline would have to be estab-
lished which may be methodologi-
cally challenging. To guarantee envi-
ronmental integrity of the Kyoto-
continued agreement, the baseline of 
the EU or Russia could be adopted.  
A policy-CDM-type of agreement 
could be agreed between China and 
India, as Kyoto-ratifying countries 
without a binding target.  
No-lose African and EU countries can 
trade similarly as in the Kyoto-
continued case. The TOA intro-
duces a technology bias in the EU 
Kyoto-continued-implementation, 
and possibly also a geographical 
bias in policy-CDM towards Af-
rica. 
Brazil has a no-lose target under 
multi-stage but the TOA does not 
affect that as Brazil is only tech-
nology supplier in the TOA, and 
there are no consequences in its 
own emissions. 
For the US, Russia and the EU, the 
treatment would be the same as in 
the Kyoto-continued agreement.  
India and China are subjected to a 
no-lose target, and sales of emission 
reductions below the no-lose baseline 
scenario would lead to double-
dipping (or: double funding for the 
same effort) . This can be avoided 
through taking account of the TOA 
emission reductions in the no-lose 
baseline scenario. One could also de-
cide to allow double-dipping to pro-
vide an extra incentive to sign up to 
the TOA and the multi-stage agree-
ment.  
Multi-
stage 
Intensity Similar to the no-lose variant of 
multi-stage.  
Similar to the no-lose variant of 
multi-stage. The accounting of car-
bon credits is likely more complex 
because of the use of relative (inten-
sity) rather than absolute targets. 
 
Recalling the factors and constraints used to determine the political feasibility of the stand-alone 
TOAs, the advantages of linked regimes in terms of political feasibility lie primarily in the flexibil-
ity regarding timing and number of actors. In terms of timing, the treaty agreed on first would be 
determining the linking rules laid down in the other treaty. (Would they be negotiated simultane-
ously, they would count as a ‘joined’ regime.) The number of actors in the TOA can be kept flexible 
as well (assuming that the participation of cap-and-trade regimes is broader), which allows for 
easier negotiations, but possibly also to equity constraints as late entrants would have to play by 
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the rules of the club that initially started the agreement. This was also mentioned as one of the 
problems of fragmentation (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007).  
 
9.3.4 Joined  
It will be recalled that under the Joined scenario the TOA and the CAT are institutionally one and 
the same, as they form different but integral parts of the larger rubric of the climate agreement. It 
will also be recalled that countries subscribing to this larger Joined agreement have the option to 
employ, as with the linked scenario, one or both means of emissions reduction strategies, CAT or 
TOA. Although this is not necessarily a simple task, for the sake of the argument we will assume 
here that the problem of the conversion metric encountered in the linked scenario is essentially 
solved. The issues of targets (either intensity or absolute) and baselines are also predetermined or 
pre-negotiated as well as the manners in which those targets will be achieved; either through CAT 
or TOA. This though is also the main political and technical drawback of this Joined scenario.  
 
Whereas with the linked approach, baselines and targets are agreed upon by the parties under the 
framework of either a TOA or CAT agreement, within the joined scenario a commonly agreed upon 
set of targets, baselines and deadlines would have to be negotiated before the joined regime could 
begin. For example the USA would need to agree to a specified baseline and target if it were to par-
ticipate in the joined agreement. 
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Table 9.3 Institutional interactions in joined TOA and cap-and-trade combinations 
TOA-variant Cap-and-trade 
variants Bio ethanol CCS 
Kyoto-continued As all the countries under this 
scenario are Kyoto signatories 
this arrangement affects very 
little the actions of the 
countries. The only significant 
interactions to note is that since 
the TOA is an integral part of 
the climate agreement the 
accounting of carbon credits (if 
the African countries decide to 
use the biofuels itself) is made 
easier if compared to the linked 
scenario. 
In this case, since the US is not a party to 
Kyoto and has no general baselines or 
targets but wishes to participate in the 
joined regime, a baseline and target 
would need to be negotiated on the 
amount of CO2 that could be reduced by 
the use of the CCS-TOA. The EU and 
Russia still have their full range of 
commitments of which CCS will deliver 
a portion. The amount agreed upon by 
the US could be a correlated matrix of 
that which either the EU or Russia as 
Annex I parties believe can be achieved 
through CCS. Any ‘extra’ reduction 
stemming from CCS in the US could be 
‘sold’ to third party Annex I countries, 
via a mechanism similar to JI.  
Alternatively, if the US were to aid 
China or India in implementing CCS 
through the flexible mechanism in the 
CCS-TOA, then the US itself could gain 
credit to be applied to their pre-
negotiated emissions reduction target, 
similar to CDM. 
No-lose Similar to the linked scenario, 
SADC and the EU can trade 
carbon credits; it is only made 
easier as the accounting scheme 
is under one regime.  
For the US, Russia and the EU situation 
is as above. As with the integrated 
scenario, China and India have no-lose 
targets of which a portion can be 
achieved by the use of CCS. In this case 
however reductions below an agreed no-
lose baselines would simply go into the 
common pot of credits for the Joined 
agreement, no double dipping could 
occur, resulting in a standard CDM-type 
arrangement, if the other sectors to 
which the no-lose target applies perform 
according to expectation. 
Multi-
stage 
Intensity This situation would not vary 
from the ‘No-lose’ above. 
Again for the US and Annex I countries 
the situation remains as under KP. For 
China and India any credits gained by 
the use of CCS would be attributed to 
the common accounting scheme under 
the Joined agreement. The accounting of 
carbon credits may be more complex 
because of the use of relative rather than 
absolute targets. 
 
Politically speaking, the Joined regime might be more feasibly implemented than the Linked re-
gime, regardless of the actual TOA case involved, but assuming that the TOA is a technology-pull 
agreement (for a R&D agreement, linked or separate agreements are sufficient). One can postulate 
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that the administrative and transaction costs of creating two institutionally separate yet compati-
ble carbon accounting schemes might be prohibitively high thus making such an option unattrac-
tive, especially if participation in TOA schemes is low. 
 
Referring back to Chapter 8, the discussion of political feasibility revolves around a discussion of 
key factors and constraints. What then are some of those factors and constraints associated with 
the implementation of a Joined regime? The first is that a convincing enough argument is made 
that TOAs are environmentally effective enough to be fully incorporated into the global climate 
regime, that their value added would be broadly applicable to a diversity of parties. This we have 
endeavoured to show by highlighting the technical additionality of TOAs as well as the range of 
actors that have the potential to participate in them. The second issue has to do with advocacy and 
timing. If TOAs are a path to pursue, the discussion of them in the post 2012 regime needs to be 
advocated or lobbied for by a coalition and must be brought to the negotiating table at the earliest 
opportunity.  
 
It is conceivable that the discussion of TOAs emerges after an initial framework for a new regime is 
settled. This would in all likelihood lead to either the Separate or Linked scenario as discussed ear-
lier. At present there have been no obvious, broad, policy windows to leverage the issue of a Joined 
regime. Nevertheless, the time and timing for engaging in such a discussion is opportune. The one 
main institutional constraint, as stated above, would be the necessity for defined baselines and 
targets to be associated to particular TOAs, especially for those countries that would still choose 
not to employ cap and trade mechanisms. Institutionally then there would need to be a strong 
body within the regime to oversee the accreditation of all potential TOAs. In which case, TOAs 
could be taking the route of policy-based CDM for CAT-parties without a target, or a means of 
participating in the same regime for non-CAT parties. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed the compatibility of TOAs with a number of post-2012 cap-and-trade 
variants. Apart from the organization and embedding of the treaty, where we have distinguished 
separate, linked, and joined institutions, as well as different ways of co-existence of agreements. 
We have made a distinction as to whether the TOA and cap-and-trade agreements are instrumen-
tally or geographically additional. Instrumentally additional agreements have been discussed else-
where, and the focus in this chapter has been on TOAs and cap-and-trade variants that are geo-
graphically additional.  
 
Geographically additional agreements represent the case that country A pursues a TOA whereas 
country B pursues a cap-and-trade agreement, as well as the TOA. This was approached based on 
institutional analysis, where the consequences of various modes of co-existence are assessed based 
on the effectiveness and functioning of the institutions. The argument for looking into this geo-
graphically additional option is that it is uncertain whether all relevant emitters are willing to sign 
up to a domestic or international emission reduction target.  
 
The following results were found. When the TOAs and cap-and-trade agreements are institution-
ally completely separate, but there is overlap in participation, the interactions will be limited to 1) 
technology bias in the realisation of emission reductions under the cap-and-trade agreement, and 
2) impacts on baseline setting and CDM additionality for non-Annex I countries in the Kyoto-
continued case, and all countries that do not have an absolute target in the multi-stage case. When 
the TOAs and cap-and-trade agreements are linked or joined, there are will be challenges in agree-
ing on a metric for conversion of the achievements under the TOA into the achievements under the 
cap-and-trade variant. These challenges are likely to be greater in the case of the bio-ethanol-TOA 
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compared to the CCS-TOA, as the implications of the bio=ethanol-TOA are on the demand-side 
and are inherently more uncertain than the CCS-TOA, which directly regulates emissions.  
 
The interactions that have been identified can be readily solved by explicitly relating the cap-and-
trade and the TOA, but the effort of making the full ‘climate change regime complex’ internally 
consistent with several TOAs, and varying membership, ambition and substance, would be signifi-
cantly more difficult. In such a situation, the problems of fragmentation and the potential conse-
quences in terms of accountability and increase of power of already powerful states could be se-
vere.  
 
Neither application of game-theory nor the institutional analysis in this chapter allows us to make 
firm predictions of behaviour of countries and regions with respect to TOAs in combination with 
cap-and-trade variants. For such predictions, we would need more information on costs and pay-
off functions, we would need a deeper understanding of the strategic incentives of some of the op-
tions, and we would have to dive deeper into the detailed developments of the various TOAs. 
Moreover, we would also need to have a better understanding of the institutional challenges and 
constraints regarding the compatibility question. An additional challenge is understanding the role 
of the private sector. Technologies are often not owned by states (although states often represent 
the interests of their private sectors), leading to a different dynamic, including complicated IPR 
issues, than would be the case if states would be the proprietor of the technology. Although some 
scholars are looking into this problem of "multi-level decision-making", this has not yet resulted in 
usable recommendations for international agreements that have a bearing on company competi-
tiveness.  
 
What we can conclude, however, is that there can be conditions, in the case that the design of the 
TOA introduces a beneficial reciprocity in the cap-and-trade regime, the combination of both 
types of agreements can lead to a better environmental outcome than only a cap-and-trade treaty 
would through wider participation and a dual emission target and technology diffusion target, 
notwithstanding the less cost-effective outcome.  
 
This potentially positive result should be weighted, however, against the possibility of regime 
fragmentation and the threat that might entail to consistency and accountability of the interna-
tional institutions. Responsible linking, although potentially costly in terms of administration and 
transaction costs, would be essential to safeguard that adding TOAs to the climate change regime 
would constitute a credible solution.  
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Chapter 10  Conclusion: Technology rules? 
This thesis addresses the general research question: Can technology-oriented agreements provide 
greater reciprocity and thus improve the effectiveness of the international regime for climate 
change mitigation? The research brought together in this thesis suggests that specific technology-
oriented agreements indeed provide greater reciprocity, although for a robust conclusion data cur-
rently do not suffice. After starting with an overview of recent developments in the international 
political field is, this concluding chapter discusses the outcomes of this thesis following the re-
search questions in Chapter 1.  
 
10.1 Current international climate politics 
While the various chapters of this thesis were written, developments around climate change have 
moved rapidly. In some sense, the question addressed is a moving target; as research emerges, ne-
gotiations proceed in certain directions, new issues arise, and country positions change as a conse-
quence of economic and political developments. As the ideas in this thesis took shape over the 
course of 2006, technology-oriented agreements and even sectoral agreements played no signifi-
cant role in the climate negotiations. After the flood of critiques immediately following the Kyoto 
Protocol agreement in 1997 (e.g., Cooper, 1998; Ott, 1998; Victor, 2001), the attention turned to im-
plementation, such as through the Marrakesh Accords of 2001 and the Joint Implementation 
mechanism. When the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the greatest interest was in whether its 
signatories would comply, how the carbon market both in the CDM and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme would develop, and how the private sector would respond to the car-
bon price (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). Although various scholars 
continued model calculations around long-term commitments, costs, regional impacts, and burden 
sharing (e.g., Elzen and Meinshausen, 2006), proposals for post-2012 policy options continued to 
be generated (Bodansky, 2004) and widening the impact of the Clean Development Mechanism 
received much attention (e.g., Samaniego and Figueres, 2002), the political process leading to a 
post-2012 treaty had come to a stand-still.  
 
The situation completely changed in only one or two years. Three main publications seem to have 
contributed most to this: The 2006 Stern Review, Al Gore’s 2006 “An Inconvenient Truth”, and the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, published in 2007, followed by a Nobel Peace Prize for Gore and 
the IPCC at the end of 2007. It also became clear that emissions have been rising faster than ex-
pected until 2007, particularly because of China’s rapid development, and are surpassing some of 
the highest estimates of the IPCC in its Emission Scenarios report (Raupach et al., 2007), although 
the rate of emission growth has been moderated in the past year due to economic fluctuations. In 
addition, results for the Kyoto Protocol impacts became available; for various reasons, it had a dis-
cernable but insufficient impact on global emissions (IPCC, 2007a; Prins and Rayner, 2007). Con-
sequently, the sense of urgency rose to unprecedented levels, and literature on post-2012 climate 
agreements became less academic and more inspired by reality.  
 
In thinking on post-2012 climate policy, one major thing changed: the single focus on emission re-
ductions by industrialised countries that had such a prominent role in the Kyoto Protocol has dis-
appeared. A myriad of possibilities for post-2012 architectures emerged, and mitigation through 
emission reduction, building on the Kyoto Protocol elements, was not the only concern anymore. 
Adaptation had been on the political agenda for a long time, but got a boost when the Conference 
of Parties met in Kenya in December 2006, with attention focussed on least-developed countries 
needs (Mueller, 2006). Sectoral agreements, both voluntary industry initiatives and binding 
agreements, have been reviewed by several institutes, scholars and governments (e.g., Schmidt et 
al., 2006; Baron and Reinaud, 2007). Technology innovation and diffusion also became one the is-
Chapter 10 
 
210 
sues under exploration. Discussions on the role of technology in climate policy started emerging 
(Grubb, 2004; Sugiyama and Sinton, 2005; Aldy and Stavins, 2008), focussing primarily on incor-
porating a technology innovation component alongside a cap-and-trade or emission-reduction 
agreement. This diversity of directions for international climate policy was reflected in the Bali Ac-
tion Plan, which features four negotiation tracks: mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance 
(UNFCCC, 2007). The technology track in the Bali Action Plan clearly opens up possibilities for 
incorporating technology innovation and diffusion in a future climate treaty.  
 
The thinking on the role of technology in the climate regime also seems to have changed. Increas-
ingly, technology policy is seen as a goal in itself, rather than a policy support to correct specific 
carbon market failures and reduce transaction costs of (a cap-and-trade-based) climate policy. 
This change in thinking was provoked by mostly US researchers, claiming that commercialisation 
of a number of promising technologies is needed (Hoffert et al., 2002) and that currently available 
technologies can reduce emissions substantially (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). The modified role of 
technology in the climate debate is also demonstrated by the way the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer (EGTT) under the UNFCCC now approaches the issue. In their proposals, as well as 
proposals for technology transfer/climate funds and the like by developing-country Parties, the 
innovation, adoption and diffusion of technology has become a distinct objective. A telling exam-
ple is the G77 and China submission for a “Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC” 
(UNFCCC, 2008a). This proposal talks exclusively about technology, and proposes a diverse 
menu of policy options including aspects of enabling environments and reducing barriers, such as 
addressing intellectual property rights and capacity building, and “meeting incremental costs” – 
i.e. funding the difference in costs between conventional and low-carbon technology – of mature 
low-carbon technologies, such as wind energy and CO2 capture and storage (CCS).  
 
Not only in emerging economies can a rising interest in innovation and diffusion of technology be 
observed. In industrialised countries, industry and technology policies have existed for decades, 
but climate policymaking has shifted towards market-based instruments since the Kyoto Protocol 
was agreed. There is now a growing recognition that clean industry and low-carbon technology 
policies provide opportunities for expanding markets and innovation. This recognition is con-
firmed by market data: investments in renewable energy have almost doubled between 2005 and 
2007 (REN21, 2008), innovative car companies producing cleaner and more efficient cars have 
been commercially successful (OICA, 2008), the solar energy export industry in China and Taiwan 
has grown rapidly, and wind turbine manufacturing in Germany and Denmark has continued to 
prosper (Dorn, 2007). Numerous private-sector initiatives have sprung up, and billionaire philan-
thropists such as Richard Branson have attracted media attention by making available funds for 
“winning” technologies. A coalition of banks, industry and policymakers with a keen interest in 
low-carbon technology, fortified by recession- and financial-crisis induced stimulus packages 
could lift low-carbon technologies to a next level (HSBC, 2009).  
 
United States domestic politics have also changed considerably. There have been calls in influen-
tial journals for technological leadership and strong domestic pushes for technology to address 
climate change and help the competitive position of US industry (Bales and Duke, 2008), contrary 
to earlier papers that defended the US climate policy scepticism. Where scholars used to argue 
that US involvement will be extremely difficult due to the two-thirds majority required in the US 
Senate for the ratification of international treaties (Bang et al., 2005; Ueno, 2007), Purvis (2008) 
argues that the option of congressional–executive agreements, which require a simple majority in 
Congress and a presidential consent only might be legally feasible. In addition, the mood of Con-
gress is changing towards allowing for domestic climate policy. Barack Obama, after his inaugura-
tion as 44th President of the United States, has signalled both a willingness to address climate 
change multilaterally and has sought to use the financial crisis aid package to make significant 
domestic investments in low-carbon technologies. The American Clean Energy and Security Act 
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contains a greenhouse gas reduction target, for the first time in American history, and a number of 
technology-oriented provisions.  
 
10.2 Can technology-oriented agreements provide greater reciprocity and thus 
improve the effectiveness of the international regime for climate change 
mitigation? 
Climate change is a global collective action problem. Providing a stable climate is a public good 
and no country can solve the problem by itself. This calls for international cooperation in interven-
tions to provide the public good. In addition, the climate change problem structure is character-
ised by deep distributional imbalance: The vulnerability to climate change impacts is highest in 
countries which do not hold responsibility for the problem, while the cost of addressing the prob-
lem is highest in those countries which are least affected by it. This structure leads to the central 
barrier that this thesis addresses: a specific agreement to reduce emissions is not in the interest of 
those countries that should most urgently reduce their emissions. What treaty design and which 
mechanisms for compliance should be chosen in such a situation? 
 
The problem would be ease to solve if it were a symmetric coordination problem, for which cost-
benefit analyses, such as Stern (2006), show that it pays to coordinate solving the problem. For 
separate countries, however, the interest structure is different. A review of international environ-
mental agreements and their problem structures reveals that the mechanism to ensure compliance 
in asymmetric externality problems is through provisions for either coercion or positive exchange 
(reward or “transfer”) in the design of the international agreement (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001).  
 
In the case of a “strong victim”, coercion is an option (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001). In the case of a 
rich victim, the victim can use rewards to provide reciprocity to the perpetrator, usually in the 
form of side-payments to compensate for the costs of addressing the problem. In the case of cli-
mate change, however, the victims are not strong, nor are they rich. Coercion or rewarding be-
tween countries are therefore no options. In international environmental agreements, there is no 
institution that can enforce compliance. The agreement will therefore have to be set up in such a 
way that it is self-enforcing, i.e., “attractive for countries to want to sign, and want to carry out the 
terms of agreement” (Barrett, 1994). For climate change, it means that the inherent structure of the 
agreement provides reciprocity to all signatories, but particularly those that face high costs and 
low benefits (Barrett; 2003). It has become clear over the past years that although the Kyoto Pro-
tocol has been successful on some accounts, its design is not suitable for providing sufficient par-
ticipation, compliance and technological effectiveness (Aldy et al., 2003; IPCC, 2007c).  
 
One way of providing countries with high mitigation costs with incentives to reduce emissions is 
to provide them something in return; in other words, to provide reciprocity – a method often ap-
plied in international agreements to make their terms acceptable to all involved (Keohane, 1986). 
Credible reciprocity could provide compensation for those parties with low climate change im-
pacts and high mitigation costs. This should be reciprocity in all directions – every party should 
perceive reciprocity, whether it is a developed or a developing country. In addition, reciprocity 
provided by a climate agreement should minimise uncertainty as much as possible, be as specific as 
possible, and Parties should trust each other. Only in that way, concessions can be valued and 
compliance can be expected (Larson, 1988). 
 
What might be the reciprocity that could be provided along with mitigation actions? Many miti-
gation actions inherently imply innovation and diffusion of technology (IPCC, 2007c; IEA, 2008b). 
Here, technology is broader than installations alone and comprises “know-how, methods, proce-
dures, experience of successes and failures, physical devices and equipment” (Dosi, 1982) to reduce 
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greenhouse gas emissions. The hypothesis of this thesis is that technology can provide reciprocity. 
Innovation and diffusion of technology are assumed to be institutionally implemented in so-called 
technology-oriented agreements (TOAs). 
 
The work reported in this thesis suggests that, whether replacing or complementing an emission-
reduction agreement, TOAs could provide for reciprocity more than emission reduction agree-
ments in three ways: enhanced innovation, concrete export opportunities and the positive “vibe” 
associated with technology compared to emission reductions. On the first source of reciprocity, 
economies that invest in innovation are more competitive in the international arena. Their produc-
tivity and the quality of employment are higher than in other countries (OECD, 1997). This con-
cerns all aspects of technology, including human capital and regulatory experience (Lall, 1992). 
Second, countries that have or expect a strong market position for their industry in the field of the 
technologies that will be implemented as a result of the agreement are unlikely to free-ride. Recent 
literature calls for technological leadership with Parties that are unlikely to embark on an emis-
sion-reduction agreement (Bales and Duke, 2008), reflecting the conviction that technological 
leadership and innovation will deliver economic, political and environmental benefits. Last, coun-
tries are more likely to sign up to an agreement that makes positive investments in a more sustain-
able and innovative economy, through making use of the first-mover advantages (developed coun-
tries) or through enhanced technology transfer (developing countries) (Bazilian et al., 2008). 
Many Parties perceive an emission reduction as limiting economic development and growth, 
whereas technological innovation is considered an opportunity and an essential economic stimulus 
(HSBC, 2009).  
 
In addition, particularly on the R&D and demonstration side, international collaboration on tech-
nology can deliver more cost-effective technology development. For more mature technologies, it 
can facilitate technology transfer and diffusion. This is demonstrated by existing international 
TOAs in a variety of environmental topic areas, such as knowledge-sharing agreements on research 
and development, and technology mandates against marine oil pollution (Coninck et al., 2008a). 
TOAs could provide benefits for all Parties involved. An agreement on technology development, 
diffusion and transfer would provide for greater innovation and global markets for countries with 
an outlook on technological leadership. For Parties with a strong interest in technology transfer, 
TOAs with technology transfer components could fulfil their needs (UNFCCC, 2008a). Whether 
from those countries’ point of view the TOA would provide reciprocity depends on the conditions 
for technology transfer in the agreement as well as the committed funds. The arrangements around 
intellectual property rights could be a key factor (Ockwell et al., 2008).  
 
Whether on balance TOAs would provide the sufficiently specific “deep reciprocity” that is re-
quired to improve the self-enforceability of a climate regime is hard to predict. More detailed stud-
ies could help clarifying the real value of TOAs. The general conclusion on reciprocity is that TOAs 
are likely to introduce a favourable dynamic in any climate regime. 
 
10.3 What design characteristics define technology-oriented agreements? 
A characterisation of technology-oriented agreements is introduced in Chapter 5 (Coninck et al., 
2008a): “International technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) to address climate change are 
those international agreements that are aimed at advancing research, development, demonstration, 
and/or deployment of technologies. With respect to TOAs to address global climate change, these 
technologies would be aimed specifically at reducing GHG emissions.” TOAs have become part of 
negotiations language, and are currently mentioned in UNFCCC negotiation documents (e.g., 
most recently, UNFCCC, 2009). In the technology transfer literature and UNFCCC documents, 
this class of technologies is most commonly termed environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) or 
low-carbon technology. Some TOAs have broad participation of the lion’s share of countries 
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around the world, but most existing TOAs engage a selected group of countries, consisting of only 
industrialised countries, or a combination of industrialised and developing countries. 
 
Four types of TOAs are distinguished, each with their own features and effectiveness in various 
circumstances. Type-1 TOAs advance technology by sharing and coordinating knowledge between 
governments, research institutions or industries. Members of a type-1 TOA for instance align re-
search and development programmes, exchange information on the latest research results and new 
directions, or agree on best practices for regulation of the new technology. This is the “shallowest” 
type of international technology cooperation and is generally low-cost and useful if information 
barriers are prevalent for the technology addressed. An example may be reduction of methane 
emissions, which in various circumstances can be done cost-effectively and only needs lowering of 
awareness barriers. Generally, however, for ESTs, information is one of many barriers and more 
than a type-1 TOA would be needed to significantly advance the technology.  
 
Type-2 TOAs focus on research, development and demonstration of technology, and involve some 
degree of cost-sharing. For instance, if various countries invest in an international research fund, or 
a collaborative programme to demonstrate large-scale Concentrated Solar Power applications, this 
would be a type-2 TOA. Type-2 TOAs can help advancing technologies that are not yet commer-
cialised in any market, that is, technical problems have not been fully resolved, they remain to be 
demonstrated at full scale, or costs could be reduced through further collaborative technology de-
velopment. In such cases, international coordination can be a cost-effective way to further develop 
the technology, and particularly get over the “valley of death” around demonstration of large-scale 
technologies (Murphy and Edwards, 2003). This could be useful, for instance, for getting a tech-
nology like CCS through the demonstration phase. Another example is nuclear fusion, of which 
the technological and economic risks, and demonstration costs, are so high that pooling of re-
sources pays off for the participating countries. ESTs that are technologically mature but remain 
more expensive than conventional technology, however, would not benefit much from a type-2 
TOA (Aldy and Stavins, 2008). For wind energy, for instance, a type-2 TOA will not make any dif-
ference – the technology is too advanced and structural implementation is required in order to re-
duce costs further by learning by doing and economies of scale.  
 
Type-3 TOAs are agreements that explicitly aim for technology transfer and adoption by firms and 
consumers in developing countries. This type would normally employ elements of the other TOA 
types, but technology transfer has specific features that require an additional strategy and justify a 
separate category (see e.g., UNFCCC, 2008b). Elements relevant to technology transfer include 
knowledge sharing, capacity building, transfer of regulatory experience, as well as demonstration 
and adjustment of the hardware to the specific social and infrastructural circumstances in the re-
cipient country. In addition, type-3 TOAs could provide for intellectual property rights transfer, 
modifying technology to fit local circumstances, and creating an enabling environment for the 
technology. One way of defining and analysing enabling environments for technology is through 
the Technological Innovation System (TIS) approach (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007). 
Bergek et al.’s approach links “structural components” of the TIS, such as actors, networks and in-
stitutions, to “functions”, such as market formation and entrepreneurial experimentation, and de-
fines a step-wise approach of specifying key barriers and policy issues. A type-3 agreement could 
be designed to take account of such functions. Often, technology-transfer agreements are not 
technology-specific, but include a list of “positive” technologies, such as in the Global Environment 
Facility which supports a broad range of ESTs. Type-3 agreements may be especially appropriate 
for technologies that are commercial in industrialised countries but that need an enabling envi-
ronment or some modification to be appropriate in other countries (Bazilian et al, 2008).  
 
Finally, Type-4 TOAs include standards, mandates or incentives that explicitly aim for deploy-
ment or diffusion of an environmentally sound technology. As the cooperation required in such 
agreements could be rather deep, involving considerable concessions, there are few examples of 
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type-4 international agreements in the history of international technology cooperation. However, 
the few examples that have been agreed have been rather successful in addressing environmental 
problems, such as for marine oil pollution. Some of this type of TOAs do not prescribe a technol-
ogy, but could exclude a technology, such as single-walled oil tankers, or coal-fired power plants 
without CCS. Such a design would take away some of the concerns of governments picking win-
ner technologies, or using technology standards to promote their own interests (see e.g., Jacobsson 
and Lauber, 2006; Jho, 2007). Type-4 TOAs are closest to regulatory, command-and-control 
agreements and can help particularly if the new technology is already technologically mature, can 
be implemented globally, and is not responding well to market-based incentives because of barri-
ers that still need to be overcome. An example is an agreement in the personal vehicle transport 
sector, in which a range of mature technologies can be implemented to increase efficiency of per-
sonal vehicles and reduce emissions (IPCC, 2007c), firms compete in an international market, 
market-based mechanisms, particularly the Clean Development Mechanism, have shown ineffec-
tive (Wright and Fulton, 2005), and numerous barriers play a role.  
 
The assessment of the characteristics, taxonomy and past performance of TOAs leads to the con-
clusion that the design of international TOAs should reflect specific technology characteristics and 
promote those technologies of which an objective assessment has shown that they are required to 
address climate change and have significant global emission reduction potential. In reality, how-
ever, TOAs also have specific problems. First, assessments of future emission reduction potentials 
will have uncertainties; an “objective” assessment hard to make. Countries that dominate negotia-
tions might be in a position to promote those technologies that are in their specific interest, which 
could lead to a suboptimal technological or economic outcome in general (Benvenisti and Downs, 
2007). Current proposals to address that include technology expert panels analogous to the Mont-
real Protocol Technological and Economic Assessment Panel (UNFCCC, 2009). Second, although 
there are examples where parties have agreed on and adhered to a TOA, those involving deep levels 
of cooperation would have to provide deep levels of reciprocity. As costs of the TOA may be high, 
while benefits are uncertain, this is a significant concession of countries that has not been tested 
for climate change.  
 
The question remains what TOAs would look like in practice if they were designed specifically to 
be deep and climate-focused. Chapter 8 presents six hypothetical designs of TOAs for different 
technologies with participation limited to countries that are relevant to the technology or the in-
dustry: ammonia production, sugarcane-based bio-ethanol, cement production, CCS, nuclear en-
ergy, and carbon efficiency in cars. A review of factors and constraints for those hypothetical TOAs 
bring the review of past international TOAs in Chapter 5 a few steps further. First, the typology of 
TOAs will probably not be applied rigidly. Rather, a combination of elements of various types of 
TOAs will be used. The TOA on bio-ethanol, for instance, combines type-3 and type-4 elements 
which complement each other and makes the totality of the TOAs more tailor-made to what the 
technology requires – an advantage discussed in Chapter 3. This is also confirmed by the above-
mentioned G77 and China proposal on a UNFCCC “Technology Mechanism” (UNFCCC, 2008a) 
and by various other recent proposals for technology frameworks that have been done (Bazilian et 
al., 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2008; Tirpak and Childs Staley, 2008).  
 
Another observation is that participation could be restricted to those countries that would likely 
comply, as their interest structure matches the aim of the TOA. Allowing for flexibility on who 
might join the agreement could make it self-enforcing. This can be done while the coverage in 
terms of greenhouse gas emission sources of the agreement and its environmental effectiveness re-
main large. An agreement on the manufacturing of cars, for instance, could be agreed by a limited 
number of countries, as the lion’s share of cars are manufactured in only six or seven countries 
(OICA, 2008). The emission impacts, however, would have a global scope as the companies from 
these countries produce for the rest of the world. The conclusions in Chapter 8 are further con-
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firmed by both qualitative and quantitative recent studies in this field (see e.g., Tomlinson et al., 
2008; IEA, 2008b).  
 
10.4 How do TOAs compare to the current climate regime? 
Based on converging critiques of the Kyoto Protocol, Chapters 1 and 2 identify a number of short-
comings that would have to be improved in a new regime. The extensive literature on the Kyoto 
Protocol (e.g., Sathaye et al., 2006; Victor, 2001; Ott, 2001; Cooper, 1998; Barrett, 1998) converges 
on five main areas of criticism: (1) Incentives for participation (particularly the United States and 
large, fast-growing developing countries); (2) Compliance and enforcement (preferably the new 
regime would be self-enforcing); (3) Environmental effectiveness and technological change; (4) 
Provisions for technology transfer and (5) Predictability of economic consequences and costs. 
Chapter 6 investigates how TOAs compare to the Kyoto Protocol. On some aspects, TOAs could 
improve on the Kyoto Protocol, but this answer is contingent on a number of important details.  
 
The first Kyoto criticism relates to participation: the United States did not ratify, and large emerging 
economies, increasingly contributing to global greenhouse gas emissions, were not given emissions 
targets. Chapter 3 analyses the interest structure around an emission targets-based approach and 
shows that a rational-actor IR analysis provides an explanation of why the United States reneged 
from the Kyoto Protocol. Two reasons were given by the United States for not participating: that 
economic impacts would be too high, and that developing countries did not get targets (US Sen-
ate, 1997). The first can be explained by studies showing very high costs for the United States 
compared to other Annex-I parties (see e.g. Murkowski, 2000). The second argument seems to re-
flect especially the concern with China challenging US industry (Rice, 2000).  
 
Both arguments for US defection from the Kyoto Protocol can be related directly to the lack of re-
ciprocity: the returns of the agreement are low compared to the costs, and developing countries’ ab-
sence of commitments is seen as damaging US competitiveness, thus magnifying the negative eco-
nomic impacts even further. Participation of the United States in a future regime is considered es-
sential for any effective post-2012 climate mitigation agreement. However, participation of high 
emitting and economically strengthening developing countries, particularly China, is also becom-
ing more important: while emissions trajectories develop according to higher baselines, the re-
quired emission reductions grow, and all countries with substantial emissions will have to make 
efforts to reduce them (IPCC, 2007c). If this is done in an international climate agreement, it needs 
to provide reciprocity to both the United States and to China to make participation attractive, and 
keep in mind that each country might require something else out of the climate agreement than the 
other. Moreover, this reciprocity would have to be greater as emissions rise faster. 
 
In addition, although assessment studies have been done (e.g., Nordhaus, 2001), the economy-wide 
targets in the Kyoto Protocol made the quantification of costs and benefits highly uncertain. This 
relates to another criticism: that the lack of predictability of costs of an agreement, or more in general 
information, is a major barrier to participation. Both the United States and developing countries 
hold back on targets, fearing that their economic development will face constraints by the high 
costs of complying with a climate agreement. Scholars from developing countries argue that they 
get too few “carrots” in return for commitments (e.g., Zhang, 2008).  
 
Various models project costs of climate policy measures, but have always had to cope with uncer-
tainties in selecting policy strategies (Lempert et al., 1996; Weyant, 1999; 2004b; IPCC, 2007c). 
Chapter 2 introduces instruments such as marginal abatement cost curves, and top-down and bot-
tom-up economic models for estimating costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. Marginal 
abatement cost curves and bottom-up models have the advantage of detailed sector and techno-
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logical cost estimates, but offer less information on substitution effects and economy-wide impacts 
(e.g., Bakker et al., 2007; McKinsey, 2009; Vuuren, 2007). Top-down models reflect substitution 
effects, but lack the technology and sector detail, as well as disaggregated learning effects, of bot-
tom-up models (Goulder and Pizer, 2006). The interactions of various sectors in the economy, as 
well as assumptions on optimalities of the energy system (Grubb et al., 1993) add to large uncer-
tainties on economy-wide costs.  
 
The performance on the cost predictability criticism, relative to the economy-wide target of the 
Kyoto Protocol, of a group of TOAs that would collectively be environmentally effective is difficult 
to determine, certainly in the absence of empirical data. Although considerable cost uncertainties 
remain, the cost uncertainty of any single TOA is generally smaller than for an economy-wide tar-
get. This is illustrated in Chapter 8, where straightforward calculations around concrete TOAs 
provide relatively exact numbers, albeit still dependent on assumptions. A group of TOAs, how-
ever, would still have uncertainties around costs that are probably on the same order of magnitude 
as the uncertainties of economy-wide emission reduction targets. The question is how the appar-
ent cost predictability of single TOAs would affect the perception of agreeing to a group of TOAs 
and lower barriers to participation.  
 
On the participation point, in Chapter 3, based on a theoretical analysis of the interest structure 
around the climate negotiations, the argument is made that the United States and several emerging 
economies might be willing to sign up to agreements that focus on a single technology in the event 
that they anticipate a leading market share in manufacturing the technology, exporting equipment, 
and selling expertise and intellectual property, producing the opportunity for monopoly rents and 
competitive advantage. The assumption here is that several countries expect to benefit from the 
agreement, although their expectations may not have become reality over the course of the imple-
mentation of the agreement as their information at the moment of agreeing on the treaty will be 
incomplete. If the expectations of benefits are high and certain enough, the treaty would become 
self-enforcing and compliance and enforcement mechanisms would be strengthened. The TOA-cases in 
Chapter 8 do show barriers in terms of costs, but also identify opportunities that economy-wide 
targets would not visualise so much. However, the chapter also explains that this outcome is not 
clear-cut, and makes assumptions that are surrounded with uncertainty. Notably, the dynamics of 
incomplete information is unclear; a nation state might be interested in pursuing a technology-
oriented agreement if it believes it will benefit, but might defect if later on it turns out they do not 
benefit from it.  
 
Another shortcoming that is sometimes linked with the Kyoto Protocol is environmental effectiveness, 
both in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and inducing technological change (Prins and 
Rayner, 2007). There is actually much disagreement on whether the Kyoto Protocol is sufficiently 
environmentally effective. Those criticising the Kyoto Protocol point out that the emission reduc-
tions as a result of the Kyoto Protocol are not going far enough and are also compromised by a 
number of concessions in the treaty, such as claiming of land use and certain types of projects un-
der the CDM (Wara and Victor, 2008). Indeed, longer-term and deeper emission reductions than 
those in the Kyoto Protocol are required to prevent dangerous climate change. Others point out 
that the emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol were never intended to solve the climate 
change problem; they were intended as a first step to be followed by deeper emission reductions 
beyond 2012 (Jacoby et al., 1998; IPCC, 2007c). They argue that the emissions caps inherent to the 
Kyoto Protocol would guarantee emission reductions, if there would be general compliance.  
 
The environmental effectiveness of TOAs is also contested. A number of researchers, based on 
multi-criteria analysis or game theory, questioned environmental effectiveness of technology 
agreements (Höhne, 2005; Buchner and Carraro, 2005). However, those studies focus on type 1 or 
type 2 agreements, involving the earlier phases of the technology development and innovation 
chain and leaving diffusion solely to market mechanisms. Chapter 8 introduces a number of TOAs 
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with elements of type 3 and 4 that are explicitly designed to achieve diffusion of technology, also 
towards developing countries, rather than development alone. Such TOAs could create a market 
for a technology through subsidies, mandate and standards, or through lowering barriers and forti-
fying the technological innovation system in a country. TOAs in the type-4 category could be de-
signed in a way that they are environmentally effective, e.g. by fixing targets for low-carbon tech-
nologies (Coninck et al., 2008a).  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 show that for TOAs, similar to the Kyoto Protocol, the environmental effective-
ness depends on the details of the target-setting; i.e., how much financing would be provided, or 
how much technology would be deployed. A well-chosen group of technology-oriented agree-
ments, possibly following recommendations from the IEA (2008b), and accounted for in a consis-
tent and transparent way, can arrive at similar emission reductions as an emission reduction 
agreement, and thus be as environmentally effective. Again, however, not every type of technology-
oriented agreement can be expected to have such performance: only type-4 agreements could per-
form as well. A threat to environmental effectiveness in a patchwork of specific TOAs is the lack of 
coordination between the various TOAs. Firm guarantees on preventing fragmentation of the cli-
mate regime into many separate elements, operating independently and not striving to reach a 
common goal, need to be put in place. For an emissions-targets approach, however, the threat of 
non-participation and non-compliance, which also leads to reduced environmental effectiveness, is 
greater.  
 
A last point of criticism relates to the specific issue of technology transfer to developing countries. 
The claim that the Kyoto Protocol facilitates technology transfer was investigated in Chapter 7 for 
the CDM (Coninck et al., 2008b). Here we compared market-based approaches with technology-
based approaches for technology transfer, mainly from industrialised to developing countries. 
These results are consistent with results in more extensive and recent studies (Haites et al., 2006; 
Schneider et al., 2007; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008). They demonstrate that (for the sample of CDM 
projects investigated) the market-based CDM uses new or improved technologies that originate 
from outside of the host country in about half of projects, usually with knowledge transfer and ca-
pacity building as well. However, the CDM was not effective in all sectors; projects in end-use sec-
tors such as transportation and energy efficiency are a small part of its project portfolio, even 
though theoretical studies indicate that they would be cost-effective even without a price on car-
bon (e.g., Bakker et al., 2007; McKinsey, 2009). For technologies in these sectors, a specialised 
technology mechanism or fund that would address institutional aspects of technology – including 
the development of technological innovation systems and enabling environments – may be more 
effective. The characteristic of a market-based mechanism is that it prices an externality and thus 
directly addresses the cost barriers, but only indirectly other barriers, such as lack of human capa-
bilities, issues related to IPR, or the regulatory environment (e.g., Jaffe et al., 2005; Coninck et al., 
2008a; UNFCCC, 2008a). A mechanism that addresses those barriers might be more effective than 
a price signal.  
 
Summarising, TOAs appear to provide some improvement in the field of participation and compli-
ance, technological change, and technology transfer; areas where the Kyoto Protocol underper-
forms. They are particularly effective where free-rider incentives, market failures or extensive 
transaction costs hinder cost-effective implementation of a market-based regime. If applied in 
other situations, they may reduce cost-effectiveness of the climate regime as a whole (Coninck et 
al., 2008a) as technology choices will need to be made based on incomplete and imperfect informa-
tion, and the benefits over global coordination in a single emission-target approach would be lost. 
A similar conclusion could be drawn for sectoral approaches, although the loss in cost-
effectiveness might be lower (Bradley et al., 2007), as sectoral approaches are less prone to gov-
ernments picking the wrong winners.  
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10.5 How would technology-oriented agreements interact with the climate 
regime? 
The possibility of including TOAs in the climate regime leads to new questions of an institutional 
nature. How would TOAs be embedded in the current climate regime context? And if the interna-
tional climate regime would continue to be cap-and-trade-based, but would include technology-
oriented features, how would they influence each other's performance and the notion of reciproc-
ity? On the first question, Chapter 3 argues that there are institutional windows to accommodate 
TOAs within the UNFCCC regime, notably since the Bali Action Plan, but also outside that re-
gime. Incorporating TOAs in the UNFCCC allows for better and more consistent oversight, and 
could prevent double-counting of actions under various obligations.  
 
For this, however, the UNFCCC would have to develop clear standards of what is “measurable, 
reportable and verifiable”, even for actions that are not emission reductions. The specific nature of 
TOAs means that many are needed to cover the wide range of sectors that emit greenhouse gases 
and the most important abatement technologies. Chapter 9 notes that fragmentation is a real 
threat, as it may lead to powerful states furthering their interests disproportionally and a reduc-
tion of equity, transparency and accountability (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). A multitude of 
TOAs, whether along-side or substituting an emissions-targets regime, could lead to fragmenta-
tion of the climate regime. The rules might have to make provisions against powerful states ex-
ploiting their position and putting their economic interest in a specific technology above the gen-
eral interest of environmental effectiveness. An independent, impartial and UNFCCC-based Tech-
nology Assessment Panel is one of the proposals to address this concern (UNFCCC, 2009). 
 
To be effective the various TOAs would have to be coordinated and linked institutionally. Victor 
and Raustiala (2004) introduced the concept of “regime complex” – a range of separate agreements 
with overlapping issue areas and that have often evolved in an uncoordinated way. A coordinated 
“climate regime complex” might be diverse by design to reflect the different interest structures of 
parties and could have centralised oversight, for instance under the UNFCCC. Although such in-
stitutional linking in a regime complex would be necessary for environmental effectiveness, it 
would also result in higher transaction and administrative costs, and considerably complicate the 
climate negotiations. Three possible scenarios of institutional linking have been explored: “func-
tional complementarity”, “geographical complementarity” and “full replacement” of emission re-
duction targets with TOAs. 
 
Several chapters in this thesis arrive at the conclusion that combining TOAs and a market-based 
agreement on emission reductions (such as a follow-up of Kyoto) could provide the best result, in 
the light of the economic perspective of TOAs as reducing transaction costs and correcting market 
failures (Coninck et al., 2008a). In such a case, we speak of a “functional complement” of an emis-
sion reductions-based regime. The types of TOAs in this case would primarily be type 1, 2 or 3, de-
pending on the specific technology characteristics and needs. However, such a complement is 
unlikely to provide much reciprocity as the cost of the emission reduction target remain, the gains 
of only including the TOA are long-term technological effectiveness and reduction of transaction 
costs and market failures. To make full use of what type-4 TOAs have to offer on specific reciproc-
ity, TOAs can also be viewed in a way other than “functionally complementary”. 
 
The theoretical analysis on rational design of institutions in Chapter 3 shows that defection is 
likely in a emission reduction-based regime (such as a cap-and-trade agreement). Even if not all 
industrialised Parties defect, some may drop out, as we have seen in the Kyoto Protocol. The more 
specific reciprocity of the TOAs may make it more attractive for those countries to agree on a 
number of strong and specific Type-4 TOAs than to sign up to an economy-wide target with un-
clear economic consequences. Some countries might sign on to an emission reduction-based re-
gime, while others comply with a series of TOAs. In such a situation, TOAs would be a “geographi-
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cal complement” to an emission reduction-based international climate regime, even though seen on 
the country level, they would serve as a replacement of an emission-target regime. Formalisation in 
the UNFCCC context could take two forms: An environmentally effective combination of Type-4 
TOAs could be recognised as a commitment comparable to an emission reduction target, or it 
could serve as a backstop option (as first suggested by Edmonds and Wise, 1998) for defectors of 
an emissions reduction agreement and could be integrated in the compliance and enforcement 
mechanism.  
 
The last possibility is that TOAs would fully replace the international and all domestic emission 
target-based regimes. Currently, this is unlikely as several countries have already shown determi-
nation to continue a cap-and-trade-based regime (EC, 2008). In theory, however, even countries 
with a domestic emissions trading scheme could sign up to Type-4 TOAs on an international level 
– the loss of sovereignty might be limited, as the deployment of technologies that is achieved in a 
Type-4 TOA would contribute to achieving the emission target. There are no real additional barri-
ers to the “replacement” scenario, apart from that the current political situation in various parts of 
the world render it unlikely. 
 
10.6 Back to theory and further work 
Chapter 1 and 2 have reviewed the literature related to technology and innovation in various disci-
plines. The following chapters contributed to the theoretical work around international institu-
tions, technology and climate change in a couple of ways. To theory in particular, this thesis made 
three small contributions, which I would like to discuss here. 
 
First, Chapter 3 extended the framework for rationally designing international environmental 
agreements with an additional dimension determining the treaty design outcome if negotiated by 
rational actors. Earlier work had predicted the rational outcome of institutional design on whether 
there was a possibility of “symmetric externalities” (where several states both cause and experi-
ence damage), and when there were “asymmetric externalities”, based on whether the victims were 
either strong or weak. In the case of weak victims, the option of coercion is not available so re-
warding the perpetrators for reducing the damage, also called “exchange”, “transfer” or just “side-
payments”, is the only solution (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001). This model, however, did not solve 
the question of the choice between coercion and rewarding for asymmetric externalities and 
strong victims. Chapter 3 adds to this by introducing another dimension: that of the rich or poor 
perpetrator and the rich or poor victims. In the case of a strong victim and a rich perpetrator that 
does not accept side-payments, coercion would be the rational outcome. In the case of strong vic-
tims and poor perpetrators (Financial Mechanism in the Montreal Protocol), rewards would work 
best, but coercion would work better for the case of weak and rich victims (whaling in Iceland). 
However, for weak and poor victims, no clear outcome could be identified as those stakeholders 
lack the ability to coerce or to reward. In very simple terms this represents the climate change in-
terest structure between some of the important national players: the rich and strong perpetrators 
(the industrialised countries) and weak and poor victims (the developing countries). It provides a 
fundamental explanation for the absence of a clear rational outcome for an institutional design for 
the climate change regime and for the deadlock in the negotiations. Moreover, it provides a more 
robust connection between the game-theoretic literature on cooperation games and institutional 
design. Rationally acting nation states, given the interest structure of climate change, could be ex-
pected to generally follow this framework, and not reach agreement. 
 
A second contribution is an attempt to make steps towards a better understanding of the role of 
technology in international institutions in general, and climate change in particular, within IR-
theory. Understanding how the perception of benefits accruing from technology innovation and 
diffusion in the minds of rational-actor nation states is challenging. Some studies (e.g. Jacobsson 
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and Lauber, 2006) suggest that in some countries particularly those with an explicit industry pol-
icy, low-carbon technology interests play a role that could modify the interest constellation of in-
dividual nation states towards the problem structure of climate change, and therefore the outcome 
of the “rational institutional design” for climate change. There is a need to take into account vested 
(but dynamic) interests and bounded rationality. Perceptions of nation states can be based on cor-
rect or incorrect information, is impacted by uncertainty about outcomes, and all this can change 
over time. This thesis, in Chapter 3, has not done more than flagging the positive role that particu-
larly incomplete information and uncertainties about future markets may play in negotiating a 
technology-oriented agreement. A limited discussion was offered on perceived first-mover advan-
tages, but other areas, notably perceived comparative or competitive advantages, would be worth 
looking into as well. As in IR there is an ongoing discussion between neo-rationalists and con-
structivists (Fearon and Wendt, 2002) on a model for incorporating bounded rationality in nation 
state behaviour into rational design of international institutions, the role of perceptions of techno-
logical advantages and innovation may be a place to look for clues. The National Innovation Sys-
tems literature (Lundvall, 1992) and the discussion of Cardwell’s Law on the interaction between 
technological innovation, political competition and the success of economies (Mokyr, 1994) could 
provide useful theoretical concepts to develop further in an international context. The Technologi-
cal Innovation System (Bergek et al., 2008 and references therein) and the literature based on Lall 
(1992) on technology transfer could provide practical policy recommendations for international 
institutions on low-carbon technology diffusion and transfer.   
 
Third, the policy instrumentation of technology transfer in international institutions is an area 
where this thesis makes a contribution, particularly in Chapter 7. In international climate negotia-
tions, the technology transfer debate suffers from different perceptions of stakeholders – roughly, 
developing countries see industrialised countries financing the transfer of technology as a moral 
duty, whereas industrialised countries tend to treat it more like as a side-payment for engaging 
developing countries into mitigation actions. In this case, perceptions of the situation are inhibit-
ing an outcome of the negotiations (Larson, 1988). Much of the literature has been written from 
either the donor or the recipient country perspective (Ockwell et al., 2008; Haites et al., 2006), and 
an empirical analysis of effective technology transfer is much needed. This thesis made a first at-
tempt at this, attempting to incorporate both the industrialised and the developing country view-
points in the technology transfer definition and criteria.  
 
Only some areas around the potential role of technology innovation and diffusion in international 
institutions have been explored here. The conclusions allow for setting out some directions for fur-
ther research. There are three areas which this thesis has left insufficiently addressed to draw ro-
bust conclusions. These areas are 1) explicitly resolving the theoretical question of rational-actor 
nation states behaviour towards international institutions in the context of many other issues that 
relate to the subject of the institution; 2) a quantification of the interest structure of countries for 
agreements on the most important low-carbon technologies; and 3) the role of private actors in 
technology-oriented agreements.  
 
The first area concerns what the role of innovation is in changing rationally acting nation states’ 
point of views on a certain institutional outcome given their domestic political economy and inter-
ests. If relevant factors, such as technology in the climate regime or a changing world order, are 
weighed in the bounded rational actor views, would countries be willing to leave the conventional 
self-interested path? Various authors have provided more theoretical work on this issue (e.g., 
Slaughter, 2004, argued for the greater role of informal networks rather than formal institutions), 
but the linkage to innovation and climate change has not yet been made. 
 
The second relates to the constellation of interests informed by country-specific perceptions on 
pay-off functions, their competitiveness, and future global markets for single technologies that 
could be the subject of a technology-oriented agreement. For instance, a country could be taken as 
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a case study and the impact of specific TOAs could be investigated for every relevant sector, in-
cluding the business community. More detailed studies, including game theory experiments for 
specific sectors or technologies, that allow for repeated simultaneous decision-making on parallel 
issues with incomplete information (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and better insights in the costs 
of potential TOAs, could help clarifying the real value of TOAs. 
 
The third area is an interesting question as the holders and implementers of technology are often 
not the governments which take seat at the negotiation table, but national and multi-national 
companies. This brings along a wholly different dynamic – potentially more rational and supra-
national. Vested interests, as well as interest structures, will change. A model to simulate this was 
not provided by the current IR work, although much literature exists in the management studies 
field, which includes work on strategic behaviour of firms (Lichtenthaler , 2008) and on potential 
deal-enhancing and deal-inhibiting roles of the business community (Raustiala and Bridgeman, 
2007). Issues to be addressed on the intersections of IR and management studies could include 
specific and general aspects of reciprocity, the value of first-mover advantages, and protection of 
intellectual property in the global context.  
 
10.7 An outlook for the climate negotiations 
I would like to end this thesis with some words on the recent developments in the post-2012 cli-
mate literature and the international negotiations, and the way the results of this thesis could be 
used. In the recent past, and parallel with the work reported in this thesis, sectoral agreements 
have become a much-mentioned add-on to a potential cap-and-trade regime. Chapter 3 goes into 
the differences between sectoral agreements and TOAs and reviews some of the literature on sec-
toral agreements. The differences are subtle. TOAs should probably be seen as a sub-group of sec-
toral agreements (Bodansky, 2007), as TOAs necessarily aim at one sector, but sectoral agreements 
could cover several technologies. They are however often used interchangeably, and in this thesis 
the distinction is not always maintained clearly: the automobile-TOA in Chapter 8, for instance, is 
technically not a TOA according to Chapter 5’s definition, but a sectoral agreement. Most of the 
conclusions for TOAs in this thesis could also apply to sectoral agreements. However, sectoral 
agreements tend to focus more at mitigating international competitiveness concerns, and TOAs are 
more tailored towards mobilising interests in the innovation and diffusion of specific technologies.  
 
A number of conditions that TOAs need to fulfil can be identified based on the above. First, TOAs 
should reflect the characteristics of the technology they address and be aligned with the (vested) 
technological interests that prevail in the sector, to ensure a positive payback function of the 
agreements to important parties. Second, a smart combination of market-based and technology-
oriented agreements would work best both for climate change in general and for technology trans-
fer to developing countries. Third, if indeed market-based and technology-oriented instruments 
are combined, there co-existence under one regime is recommended over a fully fragmented re-
gime. This is necessary to prevent problems of fragmentation, lack of transparency and sketchy 
accountability that would all comprise environmental effectiveness of the climate regime. And last, 
if TOAs are applied as a replacement or as a geographically or functionally complement, they 
should be designed to be effect-based, to ensure environmental or technological effectiveness. 
 
My forecast for future international climate policy is that we will need geographically complemen-
tary TOAs or sectoral agreements; so that a range of TOAs would in some countries replace the 
ideal-case of an emission target-based regime. This might apply in particular in emerging econo-
mies for which emission targets are not acceptable, and an emissions trading scheme would be in-
stitutionally challenging anyway (Bell Greenspan, 2005). However, potentially also the United 
States and Canada, as part of a compliance mechanism for an emissions-trading based agreement, 
might prefer a range of multilateral and bilateral type-4 TOAs. In addition, there is potential for 
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type 1, 2 or 3 TOAs to complement other international mechanisms. This thesis suggests that it is 
possible to improve reciprocity in climate treaty design if such provisions were included. 
 
Finally, I would like to emphasise a last argument of why technology rules may create a positive 
dynamic in the international climate negotiations. Over the past years, emission caps have been 
associated with constraints and costs; they signal restraint and control, especially in countries 
with an allergy to excessive government interference. Technology and innovation, however, is as-
sociated with progress, with opportunities, indeed, even with civilisation. The associations and 
beliefs with negotiators can potentially contribute or inhibit international agreement. In climate 
change, years of difficult negotiations have fed mistrust between the state parties. The presidential 
election in the United States and the new sense of urgency, combined with the economic optimism 
that a technology brings, have the potential to change the international relations in climate change 
for the better, which is much needed to provide for an atmosphere of trust in which concessions 
are valued and duly reciprocated. 
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APP  Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Technology and Climate 
CAT  Cap and trade 
CCS  CO2 capture and storage 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER  Certified Emission Reduction (under the CDM) 
CERN  European Organisation for Nuclear Research  
CH4  Methane 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
CSD  Commission on Sustainable Development 
CSLF  Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum 
EC  European Commission 
ECN  Energy research Centre of the Netherlands 
EGTT  Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
EU  European Union 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
GHG  Greenhouse gas 
GWP  Global Warming Potential 
HCFC  Hydrochlorofluorocarbon 
HFC  Hydrofluorocarbon 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IEA-IA  IEA Implementing Agreements 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPHE  International Partnership on the Hydrogen Economy 
IPR  Intellectual property rights 
IR  International Relations 
IVM  Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University of Amsterdam 
JI  Joint Implementation 
kWh  kilowatthour 
LHC  Large Hadron Collider 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MDG  Millennium Development Goal 
MLF  Multilateral Fund (of the Montreal Protocol) 
Mt  Megatonne 
MW  Megawatt 
N2O  Nitrous oxide 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
ODS  Ozone-depleting Substance 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAMs  Policies and measures 
PDD  Project Design Document (for the CDM) 
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
R&D  Research and development 
RD&D  Research, development and demonstration 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
TC  Tonne cane (sugarcane) 
TIS  Technological Innovation System 
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TOA  Technology-oriented agreement 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
US  United States 
WBCSD World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
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